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Abstract 
 
In this work, I examine the traditional theories of mind and consciousness. I present the 
arguments that support them and the presuppositions that hold them. A critical analysis of 
these theories will show that they all fail for apparently different reason. I will also provide 
the standard arguments against them. 
I maintain that this failure is the result of a fundamental presupposition that they all share, 
namely substance ontology. The standard causality view, which presents the other source of 
this problem is the direct consequence of assuming a substance ontology. The result of 
these assumptions is to render consciousness impotent or over-determining. As a result, 
consciousness must be reduced to some other phenomenon, eliminated, or accepted as 
impotent. Moreover, theses view cannot really distinguish between mind and 
consciousness.  
The position maintained in this work is to abandon the ontological primacy of substance 
ontology and replace it with process ontology and add emergence, creativity, correlation, 
and simultaneity to our ontological world-view along with spatiality, temporality, and 
causality. We maintain that the world is primarily made of process, which are inherently 
temporal, lawful, and creative self-organizing dynamic systems. Human existence, mind, 
and consciousness should also be understood as embodied inherently temporal, lawful, 
creative self-organizing dynamic system. Consciousness should be distinguished from the 
mind, which can be adequately accounted for by functionalism. We should be able to 
account for intentionality, temporality, and phenomenology of consciousness. 
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Abstrakt 
 
In diesem Werk, ich untersuche die traditionelle Theorien von Geist und Bewußtsein. In 
dieser Zusamenhang ich präsentiere die unterstützende Argumente und die untermauerende 
Annahmen. Eine kritische Analyse von allen diesen Theorien will zeigen, daß sie alle für 
anscheinend vershiedene Gründe versagen. Ich werde auch die standard Argumente gegen 
diese Theorien präsentieren. 
Es ist meine Position, daß diese Theorien durch eine gemeinsame Annahme versagen 
nämlich Substanz Ontologie. Die standarde Theorie von Kausalität präsentiert der andere 
Grund fürs Versagen dieser Ansichten und sie ist genauso von Substanz Ontologie 
abzuleiten. Als Resultat ihre Annahmen diese Ansichten machen Bewußtsein entweder 
überdeterminierend, oder impotent. Danach muß man entweder Bewußtsein zu einem 
anderen Phänomnen reduzieren, oder eliminieren, oder dessen Impotenz akzeptieren. 
Ich glaube, daß der ontologische Vorrang von Substance aufgegeben werden muß und es 
muß mit Prozeß Ontologie ersetzt werden muß. Wir sollten Emergenz, Korrelation, 
Simulteneität, Kreativtät der gleiche ontologische Importanz einräumen wie Kausalität, 
Temporalität, und Spatialität. Wir nehmen an daß, die Welt primär aus Prozesse besteht, die 
gründsetzlich zeitlich, gesetztmäßig, schöpferische selbst-organisierende dynamische 
Systeme sind. Menschliche Existenz, Geist, und Bewußtsein sollte auch als solcher Prozeß 
betrachtet und verstanden werden. Unsere Ansicht unterscheidet zwischen Geist und 
Bewußtsein. Zusätzlich, es wird versucht die grundlegende Eigenschaften von Bewußtsein 
wie Intentionalität, Temporalität, und Qualität gerecht zu werden.  
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
 According to my understanding of the landscape of this topic, the traditional 
concept of mentality is based on four assumptions. 1) The notion of mentality is intimately 
linked to, and in fact inseparable from, the idea of the inner as opposed to the outer. Hence, 
it is deeply rooted in Cartesian dualism. 2) The idea of mentality is related to the idea of 
representation, which is the subject picturing the object. Here, the emphasis is on the mode 
of information processing as opposed to the first assumption, which emphasizes the 
ontological gap. 3) The traditional notion of mentality, and self, is based on substance 
ontology. 4) The concept of mentality is based upon a conception of time as the present, 
which fails to uphold the importance of past and future. This presupposition is a natural 
outcome of the substance ontology. A substance is necessarily an entity of the present 
moment moving along the medium of time, where the past once was and does not enjoy 
reality anymore and future, although representing the future potentialities, is not real. We 
reject the primacy of these assumptions and suggest the importance of understanding 
human existence in terms of a process as opposed to being a substantial subject, for which 
the world is an object.  
 Customarily, human mentality is considered a thing, or substance, occupying a 
corner of the world. The mind stands in a causal relationship to other things. In other 
words, it is the principle of causality that relates the mind to other things. This is best 
illustrated by Descartes’ cogito, which relates contingently to substantia cogitians. This 
view holds that the mind might have never been directed to its objects and the mind and its 
objects are logically independent of each other. In contrast to traditional idea of mentality, 
this work promotes the view that mentality is tied to the world through care and concern. 
Moreover, consciousness is necessarily directed.   
The question of the nature of the consciousness and its relation to the world is one 
of the perplexing enigmas of philosophical discourse. It seems like no objective or 
scientific definition is capable of capturing the essence of consciousness. For instance, if 
we try to define consciousness in terms of some psychological function, such as awareness 
or attention, or some physical structure and function, such as presence of certain 
neurotransmitter or the activity of certain group of anatomical structures in the brain, then 
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one’s attempt at the objective definition of consciousness will leave out an essential 
property of consciousness, namely why conscious states feel a certain way. There seems to 
be no logical reason why a creature should become conscious just because it is made of one 
kind of material rather than another. There appears something ineffable about the nature of 
consciousness. One can illustrate this subjective element through examples, but the 
objective definitions seem to be not forthcoming.  
Talk about conscious mental states, such as pains, sensory experiences, or dreams, 
often conflates subjective and objective conceptions of these states. However, one should, 
but often does not stop to, distinguish the subjective aspect, of what it is like to have the 
experience, from the objective features, such as the psychological function, and the 
physical constitution of that experience. This conflation is of no consequence in our daily 
activities, since the subjective aspect and the physical features seem to go always together. 
However, any serious philosophical and scientific discourse must respect that distinction. 
Thomas Nagel makes the same point when he raises the famous question: “What is 
it like to be a bat?”1 Science tells us that bats find their way around by echolocation. They 
emit high-pitched sounds and through the echoes, they map out the location of physical 
objects in the surrounding. Hence, bats are not aware of just raw sounds, but they are aware 
of physical objects in the same way that vision makes us aware of objects and not light 
waves. In raising this question, Nagel wants us to distinguish between the two conceptions 
of conscious experience, the objective and the subjective. The point is that we have no 
conception of the subjective aspect of bat’s experience. In case of humans, we do not 
bother with this distinction, because we think of human consciousness at once in subjective 
and objective terms. The bat case, however, forces us to make that distinction, because we 
have no understanding of how the bat experience feels like, in spite of having many 
objective data about it. In other words, our scientific investigation tells us a great deal about 
bat brain, but nothing about what is it like to be a bat. Consequently, Nagel identifies a 
feature of experience, which seemingly escapes scientific description. It seems no amount 
of scientific description will relay a subjective understanding of conscious experience. 
Even though, we normally run subjective and objective aspects together, we should not 
forget that these aspects should be distinguished. Moreover, the main problem of nature of 
                                                
1 Nagel, T., (1974) What is it like to be a bat?, Philosophical Review 83.4, pp. 435-450. 
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consciousness relates to the subjective character of mental states. This subjective aspect is 
the what-is-it-likeness, qualia, or the phenomenology of experience. 
Chalmers distinguishes between the hard problem and the easy problem of 
consciousness.2 According to Chalmers, the easy problem relates to the objective study of 
brain states. At the objective level, we can assign causal functions to different physical and 
psychological states and structures. The objective study of mind, and the brain, is easy as 
far as it lends itself to the tools of scientific investigation. In addition, it does not raise any 
seemingly intractable philosophical problems. For instance, one might analyze pain as a 
state, which is caused by bodily damage, and it leads to a behavior to avoid the noxious 
stimulus. Furthermore, we can investigate the multiple realizations of the pain function and 
circuitry comparatively in different organisms. However, none of the structural and 
functional analysis reveals anything about the phenomenology of pain or any other mental 
state. Causal and functional explanations ignore the qualia of mental states.  
The explanation of phenomenal consciousness, hence, constitutes the hard problem 
of consciousness. The question is whether we can explain why does it feel like something 
to be us. The difference between our ability to solve the easy problem as opposed to the 
hard problem constitutes the explanatory gap. 
Another feature of consciousness, which seems also to escape physical reduction, is 
intentionality. A state is intentional, if it is about something and it refers to something. The 
main puzzle is how physical states can be about something. How can words, marks on 
paper or patterns of sound, stand for something? One could respond by saying that the 
marks on paper and patterns of sound are about something, because we understand what 
they mean. However, this response just pushes the question one-step further and it does not 
resolve it.  
                                                
2 Chalmers, D., (1986) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press, 
pp. 32-42, 103-104, 131-132. 
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Traditionally, the landscape of the theories of the nature of consciousness is quite diverse: 
substance dualism, mentalism, and reductive and non-reductive materialism.    
 
Fig 1.1: Nature of reality (www.pages.slc.edu) 
 
The basic assumptions of substance dualism are that conscious experience is 
fundamentally different from brain activities. However, this assumption raises further 
questions as to if the world contains subjective elements, then how do the subjective 
aspects interact with the physical components that fill up space and time. Furthermore, 
what principle governs the emergence of these subjective elements?  
Descartes is the classical proponent of substance dualism. He believes that there are 
two separate but interacting realms, the mental and the material. Descartes assumes that the 
material realm contains matter in motion, and all action is by contact. For Descartes, all 
physical effects are caused by bits of matter bumping into each other. According to 
Descartes, colors, sounds, smells, and all sensory impressions are not just objects in 
themselves, but they are impressions produced in us by the action of material particles on 
our sense organs. Reality is not exhausted by matter in motion, but it is composed of the 
mental realm as well. The realm of mind is constituted by thoughts, feelings, desires, and so 
on. The constituents of the mental realm have none of the spatial properties of matter, such 
as size, shape, and motion. The only attribute that the constituents of the mental realm share 
with material things is temporality. Descartes, however, claims that these two realms can 
interact with each other in spite of their radical ontological difference. According to 
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Descartes, material causes can produce mental effects and mental causes can produce 
material effects. Moreover, there is a location for this interaction, namely the pineal gland. 
This is a pea-sized organ in the human brain that is not symmetrical. However, Descartes 
does not explain how this interaction happens. Realization of this problem led to the advent 
of parallelism and occasionalism. However, these attempts seem to complicate matters 
unnecessarily and so, they fall to the objections of Ocham’s razor. 
There are also modern theories of dualism such as the one proposed by Karl 
Popper.3 In this theory, dualism is expressed in terms dimensions, or worlds, of human 
existence. It is maintained that our existence is comprised of a physical dimension, a mental 
aspect, and a third world, which arises from the interaction of the physical and the mental 
realm. The Popperian notion seems very useful and fascinating. However, it is not clear 
how they support a dualism in a clear fashion.  
Mentalism arose from the problematic interaction concept of mind and matter in 
Descartes. The problem that perturbed Descartes’ successors was that if our conscious 
selves dwell exclusively in the mental realm, then how could we be sure about things on the 
other side of the mind-matter division? It seems like Descartes’ dualism condemns us to 
ignorance about the material world. Berkeley offers a radical solution to this problem. He 
claims that there is no independent evidence for existence of material world. All our 
experiences are just as they are, but there are no physical objects out there causing those 
experiences. As a result, everything would continue to appear as normal, even though there 
would be nothing in reality except mental experiences. Mentalism, at once solves the 
problem of knowledge of the external world and the problem of mind-matter interaction. 
According to Berkeley, we know only our ideas. Hence, to be is to be perceived.  
Hume’s critical analysis takes mentalism to its logical conclusion, which seems to 
be solipsism.4 The concern is that if mental states are essentially private, meaning that they 
are accessible to a single individual from the first person perspective, then how can 
anybody ever know about the mental states of others? More importantly this question 
makes our interactions, communications, and discourse nonsensical. Wittgenstein 
                                                
3 Heil, J., (2004) Philosophy of Mind: a contemporary introduction, Routledge, New York & London, second 
edition.  
4 Maslin, K. T., (2001) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Polity, Cambridge UK. 
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highlights the implausibility of mentalism through the private language argument.5  He 
asserts that public verification is essential to the workings of language. In other words, 
there are no meanings and sense in a language the claims of which can be checked by only 
one person. Accordingly, talk of mental states cannot possibly refer to solely private states. 
If mental states have any objective content, one must regard the mental realm as 
intrinsically connected to the behavior, which makes it publicly observable.  
 
Fig. 1.2: Physicalism (www.commons.wikimedia.org) 
Mentalism’s demise begins with Hume’s critic and the rise of eliminative and 
reductive materialism. Materialism, of any variety, rejects the distinction between 
subjective mind and objective brain. Eliminativism asserts that subjectivity is a fiction of 
folk psychology, which will be dispelled with scientific advances. Eventually, subjectivity 
and, in fact, all mental jargon will go the way of aether and other misconceptions of the 
unsophisticated mind. This view seems highly implausible, since it cannot explain why 
mental states act as if they have subjective qualities. How can the deception of subjectivity 
arise out of physical and objective structures? Reductive materialism, on the other hand, 
does not reject the reality of mental states, but it claims that they are identical to material 
states. Mental talk refers to the same material states, but it uses a different descriptive set 
and language. This implies that brain states can be expressed either in physical terms of 
natural sciences, or in mental terms. To say that one is in pain refers to the same brain state 
as saying one’s C-fibers are firing.  
We could use the example of temperature to illustrate the reductive materialist 
position. Physicists explain temperature in terms of mean kinetic energy. This, however, 
                                                
5 Kim, J., (1998) Philosophy of Mind, Westview Press. 
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does not entail the elimination of temperature talk from our ontology. Neither, does it imply 
that we must add temperature as an extra feature to our ontology. The point is that 
temperature is nothing above and beyond mean kinetic energy. A similar case holds for 
consciousness and brain. Conscious states do exist, but they are nothing above and beyond 
brain states. Mental talk is just a different language of describing brain states. Just as we 
have discovered that temperature is nothing other than mean kinetic energy of molecules in 
motion, so we shall accept that conscious states are nothing other than brain states.  
The problems with reductive materialism are manifold. First, reductive materialism 
cannot account for multiple realizability of mental states. Second, it cannot explain 
intentionality. Third, it cannot account for phenomenology of mental states. It cannot 
explain how objective states give rise to subjectivity.  
Functionalists think of mental states in terms of their typical causes and effects. 
Mental events are causal intermediaries, arising from perceptual stimuli and affecting 
behavior through their interactions with other mental states. For instance, pain would be a 
state, which arises from bodily damage and usually causes a desire to avoid the source of 
that damage. Any resulting behavior depends on the interaction of this desire with other 
beliefs and desires. Consequently, functionalism allows for the reality of mental states, 
even though they do not manifest themselves directly in observable action. Functionalism, 
however, does not commit itself on what mental states are made of. Ontologically, it is 
compatible with all the theories discussed here. However, most of the functionalists are 
non-reductive physicalists.  
As a response to the shortcomings of reductive materialism, modern theories of 
physicalism embrace a form of non-reductive materialism, which assumes the duality of 
properties. ‘Property dualism’, instead of considering conscious minds as made of a 
separate stuff, wholly other from the material body, asserts that there is only one type of 
substance—matter—which can possess two distinct types of properties. Consequently, 
humans have physical properties—such as height, weight, and neurophysiological 
parameters—and they have distinct conscious properties, such as being depressed or being 
excited. This implies that non-reductive materialists are property dualists and not substance 
dualists like Descartes.  
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The relationship between brain and mind is described by the principle of 
supervenience. This principle states that mental properties supervene on the brain states. 
The supervenience statement entails that mental properties depend on and co-vary with 
brain states, but not vice versa. Moreover, mental states are not reducible to brain states. 
There are some major arguments in favor of property dualism. In one case, Kripke 
imagines a creature who is physically identical to himself, but who has no phenomenal 
consciousness.6 Here, Kripke proposes the possibility of zombies. This possibility entails 
that consciousness and brain can come apart, since Kripke and Chalmers maintain that there 
is nothing logically contradictory about the idea of zombies. Consequently, if zombies are 
possible, then conscious properties must be different from any physical or structural 
properties. The crucial point is that if we so much as admit the zombie scenario as possible, 
its very description commits us to a difference between conscious properties and physical 
and structural properties.  
The second argument for property dualism is based on Leibniz’s argument from 
knowledge. Frank Jackson proposes the modern version of argument from knowledge.7 
Mary is an absolute authority on human vision and in particular on color perception. She 
knows all about light waves and reflectance profiles, rods and cones, and the different areas 
concerned with vision in the occipital lobe. However, she has never seen any colors herself. 
She has lived all her life inside a house painted black and white and shades of grey. All her 
knowledge of color vision is theoretical. One day Mary walks out of her front door and sees 
a red rose. At this point, Jackson claims, that Mary learns something new, something she 
did not know before. She learns what it is like to see something red. If this is the case, then 
it seems to follow that not all mental properties are physical or structural properties. 
Consequently, this further property must be distinct from the physical and structural 
properties she already knew about. She has learned about the phenomenal nature of what it 
is like to see a red rose.  
Property dualism, however, still has the problem of explaining how a mind can 
affect matter without violating the principles of physics themselves. This is due to the fact 
that physical world is causally closed and complete. The causes of physical events and 
                                                
6 Chalmers, Consciousness, pp. 131-133.  
7 Jackson, F., (1982) Epiphenomenal Qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32, pp. 127-136. 
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states are always other physical events or states. Moreover, if we trace back the causes of 
physical effects, we will never have to leave the realm of the material. This seems to leave 
no room for non-physical properties, such as the conscious properties of experience, to 
make any difference in behavior. The implication of the causal closedness of the material 
world is the causal impotence of the mental and conscious elements. This implies that, in 
spite of common sense belief our hopes, desires, and mental states affect our bodily states, 
the effect of mental states is an illusion. Since there is no room for anything non-physical to 
affect physical events, conscious mind must be causally impotent. This view is 
epiphenomenalism, which allows upward causation from brain to mind, while it denies the 
downward causation from mind to brain. Epiphenomenalism respects the causal closedness 
of the world, while allowing the reality of consciousness. According to this view, the 
conscious mind is an epiphenomenon caused by the brain, but it has no power to influence 
the brain. However, epiphenomenalism is a highly unattractive position, because it rejects 
the most immediate experience that we have. This view rejects the common sense view that 
our hopes, desires, needs, and other mental states play a role in the activities in this world. 
Furthermore, property dualism never gives a clear status to epiphenomenon in its ontology. 
It seems dualism, reductive materialism, and non-reductive materialism or property 
dualism fail to give a satisfactory account of the nature of consciousness. Mentalism saves 
consciousness, but sacrifices the world at its feet. It is my position that this failure is based 
on a misconception. This error is the result of a specific view of consciousness and its 
relation to the world. 
 
Fig. 1.3: Physicalism (www.commons.wikimedia.org) 
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All the theories of consciousness have certain ontological commitments. These 
ontological presuppositions are not accidental to a certain theory, but they provide the 
foundation upon which the theory is formed. In other words, any analysis of a theory 
should not be limited to the assertions of the theory, but it should also include the 
presuppositions of the theory, the grounds that make the assertions possible. Consequently, 
any evaluation of these theories must accompany a scrutiny of these ontological 
commitments. This requirement remains justified even in those cases where the theory is 
not formulated in ontological terms. To clarify this point, let us take the case of 
materialism. Modern materialist theories of mind mostly speak in terms of mental and 
physical events. On the surface, it seems the ontological presuppositions of these theories 
are irrelevant to what they say about the relationship between consciousness and the world, 
because they talk about events. However, this appearance of irrelevance is false, since 
avoidance of formulation of our theories in terms of our ontological commitments does not 
make those presuppositions irrelevant. Just because modern theories address the question of 
consciousness in terms of events, it does not divorce them from their ontological roots. The 
outstanding question is what those events are. Are these events anything other than the 
interaction between ‘things’ or concrete particulars, or the persistence or change of these 
‘things’ and concrete particulars through time? The answer seems to be negative to this 
question. The point is that if we assume the wrong ontological picture, the subsequent 
theories founded on these assumptions will be faulty. If the ontology of materialism is 
false, then the theory of consciousness built on this ontology will be faulty as well.  
If a problem becomes intractable, then maybe the culprit is the ontological 
commitments of the theories, which try to resolve that problem. It is my position that this is 
the situation with the problem of consciousness. Hence, the remedy is to change our 
ontological presuppositions and then formulate a theory of consciousness.  
At this point, we should identify those metaphysical commitments, which lead us 
astray. However, before we begin with this task, it is important to say a word about the 
justification of this project. The point is that why we should give up a metaphysical view, 
which works quite well otherwise, in order to resolve the question of consciousness. If our 
theory is satisfactory in all possible ways except for one, why should we discard it? This is 
a fair question otherwise, but it is misguided in this case. The reason is that if physicist had 
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subscribed to such a view, we would not have the theories of relativity and quantum 
mechanics. After all, Newtonian theories were functioning quite well except for two 
phenomena at the time. Those were the photoelectric effect and the double slit experiments. 
The point is that it is not just important what a theory can explain, but also what it cannot 
explain and why not. If a theory is fundamentally incapable to explain a phenomenon, then 
it must be either amended or discarded. This point is especially relevant in our case with 
respect to materialism. Even if materialism is completely potent in its explanatory powers 
to explain all kinds of phenomena, but it cannot explain one phenomenon, namely 
consciousness, then it must be corrected or discarded. Convenience is not a substitute for 
truth.            
Dualism, materialism, and mentalism, in spite of their differences, are based on two 
basic assumptions: 
1) The world is made of concrete particulars, or things. In other words, they 
assume a type of substance ontology. Traditionally, a substance has been 
understood as a primary reality, something that is able to exist 
independently. Hence, a substance is a logically independent, temporally 
persistent, and spatially extended ‘thing’.  
2) Consciousness and mind are representational in nature. Hence, they assume 
the representational theory of mind (RTM). 
Historically, there have been five distinct interpretations of the concept of ‘substance’:8 
a) A substance is an independent being. 
b) A substance is the ultimate subject of predication. Accordingly, a substance 
is that of which things can be predicated but which cannot be predicated of 
anything else. The relationship between substance and its properties is one 
of inherence. Accordingly, a substance is something to which things adhere, 
but which does not inhere in anything. Inherence signifies dependence. 
c) A substance is the individuator. A substance is a concrete particular with 
shareable and universal properties.  
d) A substance is the survivor of change.  
e) A substance is the basic object of reference.  
                                                
8 Kim, J., Sosa, E.,  (2000) A Companion to Metaphysics, Blackwell Publishing, New York. 
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f) A substance is a subvenient fact, upon which other facts supervene.  
My argument is not just against traditional scholastic Aristotelian substances, but all 
the different formulations of the concept of substance. One important distinction that needs 
to be made is between the scholastic interpretation of Aristotelian notion of substance and 
causality and the original ideas of Aristotle himself. We will come back to this important 
distinction later. However, my argument is not that substances do not exist, but that they 
don’t constitute the most fundamental level of reality. 
 The fundamental claims of the RTM are: 
1. Any attempt to understand the nature of mind requires us to outline the relationship 
between certain brain states and certain features of the physical world. In other 
words, how is possible for certain brain states to stand in, or represent, the physical 
world and it features. 
2. Moreover, the causal relationship between brain states should also be representative 
of the effective causal chain in the world. In other words, the relationships should 
also be represented, not just the objects. 
3. The representationalist theory of mind assumes a symbolic manipulation of data 
from the external environment. This means that RTM assumes machine 
functionalism. Consequently, it is a computational machine. 
 The methodology of a system based on RTM is very much akin to the 
methodology of symbolic logic. In both cases, we begin by formalizing our domain of 
discourse. This means that we convert the problem at hand, which is a real feature of the 
physical world, into formal symbols. The system performs its necessary calculations on the 
symbols and then, it converts the obtained symbolic answer back into a language, which is 
representative of the actual features of the physical world. Hence, the system performs two 
acts of translation: first, from the actual to symbolic, and then from symbolic back to the 
actual. The symbolic information, moreover, is according to the inherent rules of the 
system, or its syntax. In fact, a system based on RTM is a syntactical machine. This very 
realization is the harbinger of problems to come.  The problem is the question of the origin 
of semantics. The question can be formulated as such: how can a syntactical machine 
produce semantics and meaning. In other words, how can structure produce meaning. This 
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is not an aesthetic problem, as we will see. In the case of human mind, and human 
existence, this is the deciding question.  
 One possible solution could be to rely on the phenomenon reentrant loops. Here, 
we say the information is usually in feedback loops, which lead to a continuous re-
processing of information. The consequence of the looping of information is that the 
information is condensed. This information is made more and more salient at each turn. As 
a result, semantics emerges. Now this explanation, although fascinating and illuminating, 
falls short. First, the question remains: why should condensation of information lead to 
semantics. Furthermore, we have introduced the notion of saliency here; better said we 
have smuggled the notion of saliency here. However, saliency is another word for meaning 
and value. Nevertheless, to say salient instead of semantic does not solve our problem. 
 Another crucial feature of RTM is the necessity to separate perception, cognition, 
and volition in an ontological way. This is a real separation and not a distinction for the 
sake of explanatory purposes. RTM, in fact, must presuppose this separation. Otherwise, 
the computational model will crumble. It is necessary to assign perception, cognition, and 
volition separate functions, domains, and mechanisms. As a result, perception has the 
function of converting the external information into formal symbolic language, according 
to the rules of the syntax. This should constitute a representation of the physical world. 
Cognition is charged with processing the formal symbolic representations syntactically and 
causally. These rules of syntax, in the case of the brain, are the biochemical and electrical 
genetically encoded schemas of how the brain works. Finally, action is the product of re-
conversion of some of these processed data into world relevant motor output. 
From a theoretical perspective, as it was indicated above, the RTM present an 
argument for the validity of functionalism in general, and machine functionalism in 
particular, as the proper theory of mind. Functionalism is the doctrine that states what 
makes something a thought, desire, pain (or any other type of mental state) depends not on 
its internal constitution, but solely on its function, or the role it plays, in the cognitive 
system of which it is a part. More precisely, functionalist theories take the identity of a 
mental state to be determined by its causal relations to sensory stimulations, other mental 
states, and behavior. 
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For instance, a functionalist theory might characterize pain as a state that tends to be 
caused by bodily injury, to produce the belief that something is wrong with the body and 
the desire to be out of that state, to produce anxiety, and, in the absence of any stronger, 
conflicting desires, to cause wincing or moaning. According to this theory, all and only 
creatures with internal states that meet these conditions, or play these roles, are capable of 
being in pain. 
Suppose that, in humans, there is some distinctive kind of neural activity (C-fiber 
stimulation, for example) that meets these conditions. If so, then according to the 
functionalist theory, humans can be in pain simply by undergoing C-fiber stimulation. But 
the theory permits creatures with very different physical constitutions to have mental states 
as well: if there are silicon-based states of hypothetical Martians, or inorganic states of 
hypothetical androids that also meet these conditions, then these creatures, too, can be in 
pain. As functionalists often put it, pain can be realized by different types of physical states 
in different kinds of creatures, or multiply realized.  
The main argument of this work is that both of these metaphysical commitments are 
faulty. Consequently, any theory of consciousness based on these presuppositions is false 
as well. The way that I propose to prove the falsehood of these presuppositions is to show 
that their corresponding theories of consciousness fail. Hence, the presuppositions must be 
rejected. Accordingly, this project is composed of two parts. The first part of the work is 
critical in nature. Here I present the traditional theories of consciousness and proceed to 
prove their falsehood. Chapter 2 (Dualism), chapter 3 (Mentalism), chapter 5 (Reductive 
Materialism), and chapter 6 (Reductive Materialism) comprise the critical part of this 
project.    
Whitehead and Rescher challenge the first assumption altogether. Furthermore, they 
propose a new ontology, which replaces substances with processes at the fundamental level 
of our ontology. Process ontology provides a very coherent picture of reality. Chapter 8 
provides an exegesis of the fundamental concepts of process ontology. Moreover, I will 
outline my view with respect to consciousness and it essence as the emergent evolutionary 
property of the world process.  
Kant challenges Cartesian dualism and mentalism at once. Moreover, he puts an end 
to the false notion that consciousness lacks function. The fundamental function of 
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consciousness consists of unifying all experiences of the subject under one principle, which 
accounts for the ownership of experience of the subject. This is the transcendental unity of 
apperception. Hegel takes Kant’s idea even further and establishes consciousness as the 
most fundamental aspect of reality. It is important to remember that Hegel differentiates 
between Consciousness and mind. 
Existential Phenomenology challenges the first assumption by focusing his critique 
on identification of mind with a substance and RTM. The existentialist claims that this 
faulty presupposition is at the heart of many philosophical enigmas. Hence, by correcting 
the wrong assumptions, we should dissolve many philosophical questions. For the 
existentialist, consciousness is best understood in terms of empirical existence; and human 
beings are best understood in terms of unfolding processes. In chapter six, we deal with the 
view of self as it is outlined in existential phenomenology. 
It is not my purpose to provide a survey of the prominent theories. In this project, I 
argue that substance ontology should be replaced with process metaphysics. Furthermore, I 
argue that processes are inherently lawful. In fact, there is an implicate order, which is the 
unifying, the creative principle and the guiding principle of the world-process. This 
implicate principle emerges as consciousness through the evolutionary process in advanced 
nervous system. In other words, consciousness is the inflection of the implicate order 
principle through brain. In this, I assume a non-dual position. I make a distinction between 
apperceptive consciousness (also called transcendental consciousness), perceptive 
consciousness (also called empirical consciousness), self-consciousness (also called 
introspection or attention), and repository consciousness (also called memory). I maintain 
that these are not different types of consciousness, but these are different manifestations of 
consciousness in various functions. I use the term transcendental in a Kantian sense and 
not a religious sense.     
 Thus the constructive part of the project is based on three fundamental 
assumptions: 
1) The world is fundamentally made of orderly and creative processes. Here, I 
do not use creative in a religious sense, but in the sense that the world 
process is capable of producing and emerging novel forms. 
 23 
2) Consciousness is the emergent property of the implicate order of the world 
process. 
3) Perception should be understood top-down as well as bottom-up. In other 
words, representation is not the primary mode of cognition and perception. 
This point refers to the holistic nature of perception, which requires us to 
concede that sense data is processed both from the elementary units and 
parts to wholes and also from whole to parts. Perception is a bidirectional 
process.  
At this point, it is important to say a few words about the methodology of this work. 
Let me begin by asserting that this project in no way claims to be a historical work. In other 
words, I do not claim to provide a complete treatment of any of the figures discussed. In 
fact, I could be wrong about the historical accuracy of the presentation. There are numerous 
interpretations of any one these thinkers and my specific interpretation could turn out to be 
wrong. However, this is of no consequence to my project. For instance, I am not interested 
in exactly what Berkeley claims, but my concern is the view that Berkeley is associated 
with. Thus, even if I am wrong about Berkeley, my argument still holds for subjective 
mentalism. In other words, I am not arguing for or against a specific philosopher but a 
school of thought.  
I have tried to make my methodology analytic, as well synthetic. The project aspires 
to be analytic in that I try to breakdown concepts into their constituents and analyze these 
components singly and in relation to each other. This project aspires to be synthetic in that I 
present a constructive theory based on the intuitions of different philosophers and schools 
of thought. I believe that it is valid to use specific conclusions and intuitions of a specific 
thinker to forge a new view. Moreover, this does not put one in a corner of having to agree 
with everything that those thinkers have claimed. This is a common practice in science. For 
instance, a string theorist in physics can adopt Einstein’s theories of relativity without 
accepting Einstein’s rejection of quantum mechanics. I believe that this attitude of all or 
none in philosophy is a perversion. It is quite all right to accept certain conclusions and 
intuitions from Kant, Heidegger, and Whitehead without being a Kantian, a Heideggerian, 
or a Whiteheadian. One can be simply a philosopher.              
In summary, my view is: 
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1) The phenomenal world is best understood in terms of processes and not 
substances. 
2) The fundamental entities of the world are processes, fields, and energy. 
3) The world is a lawful creative process. 
4) The lawfulness of the world-process can be explained coherently only in 
terms of an implicate order.  
5) An examination of our experience by Kant shows that consciousness is the 
principle of unity as the transcendental unity of apperception. 
6) Phenomenology shows that consciousness is intentional. It means that 
consciousness is always consciousness ‘of’ something. Hence, consciousness 
is the giver of meaning. Consequently, consciousness is the principle of value 
as well. 
7) Consciousness is the principle of action. It is responsible for the appearance 
and succession of mental states. Furthermore, the will is nothing other than 
applied consciousness. 
8) Consciousness is self-luminous. This means that consciousness is known 
immediately to the subject.  
9) Consciousness as the principle of intelligence, unity, action, and value is the 
manifestation of implicate, creative and orderly principle of the world-
process.  
 
 25 
Part One 
 
This part constitutes the critical analytical aspect of the work. It comprises chapter 2 
(dualism), chapter 3 (mentalism), chapter 4 (reductive materialism), and chapter 5 (non-
reductive materialism). In these chapters, I present the standard theories of mind and 
consciousness and I provide the supporting arguments for each. This presentation is also 
historically informed. This is of great importance, since theories do emerge from a 
historical context and this historical background provides the theories their assumptions and 
presuppositions. In addition, I provide the arguments, which I believe do provide sufficient 
grounds for rejecting them. 
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Chapter Two 
Dualism 
The dualist view of the nature of consciousness is a product of a fundamental 
intuition that mind is qualitatively different from matter. Furthermore, no amount of 
diligent reduction, or logical gymnastics, can be applied to the features of mental life so 
that they turn out synonymous with material features of the physical world. Hence, there is 
a radical ontological discontinuity in the fabric of universe. The world is made of two 
fundamentally distinct and logically independent substances: the mental and the material. 
Mind and matter exist together in our universe by chance or design, but they are logically 
independent of each other.  
According to the classical dualist view, primacy and ontological priority belongs to 
the mental substance. Our true and permanent identity is mental in nature. The physical 
aspect of our existence is impermanent and subject to destruction, division, and decay. It is 
but a garb that cloaks the spirit. In the dualist terminology, the mind is synonymous with 
the spirit, the soul, and consciousness; it is indivisible, indestructible, and eternal.9 The 
aging, disease, and the death of the body will not affect the soul; it will survive the demise 
of the body. In fact, I will survive the demise of my body, since I am, first and foremost, a 
spiritual being. The body is the abode of the soul. Hence, the body is what I have and not 
what I am.  
We can infer that dualism is informed by two powerful intuitions and motivations. 
One intuition, as mentioned above, is the sense that somehow it feels as if I am more than 
just a body and I cannot be reduced to a body. My love, hopes, desires, concerns, joy, pain, 
etc. are not identical, or reducible, to the activities of neurons in my nervous system. 
Release of neurotransmitters in synaptic clefts between neurons in the limbic system is not 
all there is to the pain and anguish one feels as one loses a loved one. Electro-chemical 
activity does not explain the excitement that one feels as one’s lover approaches into the 
clear in a crowded room. Somehow, my hopes and dreams for my future are more than, and 
in fact radically distinct from, the activity of neurons in my frontal lobe and prefrontal 
                                                
9 Braddon Mitchell, D., Jackson, F., (1996) Philosophy of Mind And Cognition, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 
UK. 
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cortex. This view does not rule out the possibility of neural correlates to my hopes, but my 
hopes and dreams are not identical or reducible to those neural correlates.  
For the proponents of substance dualists, it is a matter of chance, or design, that the 
conscious world is always accompanied by the physical world. However, this correlation 
does not, in any way, prove that there is only the material world and the spirituality is an 
illusion, or the product of a deluded intellect. In fact, all natural facts are contingent and not 
necessary. There is no necessity that the physical world should work in one way as opposed 
to another. There was no necessity that rational bipeds evolved from the mammalian 
lineage and not the reptilian one. The evolution of hominids into Homo sapiens is a product 
of interaction between the demands of nature in African savannah and random mutations of 
genes and haphazard sexual selection in the hominid population. The facts of nature are still 
facts, but they are contingent nevertheless. The world could have been different, if the 
initial conditions were different; and the original conditions could have been different. The 
correlation between the material and mental worlds, according to the substance dualism, is 
a contingent fact about the natural world. 
The second factor, which informs the dualist position, is a religio-psychological 
motivation. This claim does not reduce dualism to some kind of irrational psychopathology. 
This is not my position, nor is it my intention to malign this position by a brutal 
oversimplification. However, all human activities, including scientific and philosophical 
ones, are informed by human needs to negotiate a better existence in a hostile world. There 
is no perspectiveless perspective. This point does not make philosophical or scientific 
inquiry any less valid; it only makes it human and informed by human concerns. In the 
same spirit, I use the term religious in a broad sense. I do not mean any particular creed, but 
a human need to ask certain questions: ‘who am I?’ ‘Where do I come from?’ ‘Where am I 
going?’ ‘Is there a sense, purpose, or meaning to this world?’ ‘Or is this a stupid blunder?’ 
‘Are my struggles meant to accomplish a greater purpose or is this world a senseless veil of 
tears hiding nothingness and ultimate annihilation?’ ‘Is there a sense to my individual 
existence?’  
These questions arise from a metaphysical care that all human beings have for their 
existence. Since our concerns are not only physical, our existence is not just physical. There 
is a metaphysical aspect to our existence, which refuses all reductive attempts to the 
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physical. Furthermore, to ask these questions is a necessary feature of our existence. We 
cannot help but to ask these questions. This act of questioning does not have to be always 
verbal. It reveals itself in the structures of our daily existence. The goal-directedness of our 
existence and the metaphysical care we show for who we are reveals the purposefulness 
and meaning-orientedness of our existence. We cannot help but seek a sense of coherence 
and meaning to our existence. However, this hope is shadowed by an ominous, insidious 
intuition of our mortality. At some level, I am conscious of the fact that all my efforts, 
hopes, dreams, love, etc. can be permanently, meaninglessly, and suddenly be interrupted 
by a fatal happening beyond my control and comprehension. Death is a constant possibility 
of life. This represents the danger that all I am, have been, and hope to be, can fade into a 
meaningless nothingness. This possibility is highly anxiety provoking. Hence, most of us 
take refuge in predictable routines of a planned and mundane life. However, this mode of 
existence of being drawn to a purpose and being threatened by annihilation remains a 
deeply distressing and unacceptable proposition. There must be more to life than mechanics 
of chemical reactions and mechanical causality. There must be a purpose and meaning to 
all this. There must be guarantee that my efforts were not futile. My story may not end 
without a coherent flow, purpose, and a sensible ending. However, am I just a cog, a bag of 
chemicals, in this causal machinery? Moreover, is annihilation and senseless interruption of 
my life the inevitable end of all of us? In this case, there is no sense or meaning. It is all a 
meaningless blunder, but I cannot act purposefully in a purposeless world. Hence, life is 
absurd. It is a comical tragedy. However, the necessary need for purpose and meaning goes 
to show that that it cannot be hopeless. 
Hope is not an illusion. Meaning is not an illusion. In fact, they are real in an 
absolute sense beyond this veil of tears and relativism. There is goodness, knowledge, 
justice, love, etc. The ideals are real. Hence, I am real in an absolute and permanent sense 
beyond the contingencies of the of the natural and physical world. So, I will continue to 
exist in eternity after the decay of this temporal-spatial body.  
This is a powerful motivation. Maybe, this is the most important motivation that 
drives human existence. This motivation primarily informed our symbolic thinking. This is 
a kind of thinking, which manifests itself in mythology, arts, and literature. In my 
estimation, dualism is the product of expression of this same yearning in the language of 
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discursive thought. This is the belief that you, as you know yourself through the material 
conditions, are not the final expression of who you really are.                       
 So, dualism claims that there are fundamentally two types of independent 
substances in the world: the mental and the material. They are logically independent of 
each other. The interactionist version of the dualist view asserts that mind and matter, 
although fundamentally distinct and independent, interact with each other through an 
interface.10 The interactionist position states that: 
1. Mental events are distinct and different from physical event. 
2. Mental events can cause physical events. 
3. Mental events can cause other mental events. 
4. Physical events can cause mental events. 
 Parallelism, on the other hand, claims that any interaction between two 
fundamentally distinct substances is impossible.11 Hence, the relationship between mind 
and matter is one of parallel, independent, and covariance. Popper presents a modern 
version of interactionist dualism. However, he treats consciousness as a process and not a 
substance. Consequently, he is not substance dualist, but he maintains the independence of 
the mental realm from the physical realm. 
                                          
Fig. 2.1: Varieties of dualism (www.commons.wikimedia.org) 
 
2.1 The Platonic Argument for Substance Dualism 
 Plato seems to be the first Western thinker to provide an argument for the dualist 
position.12  However, the dualist position has been a widely held belief.  The reason for this 
popularity, I believe as indicated above, is our fear of the finality of death.  If there is a part 
                                                
10 Braddon-Mitchell, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. 
11 Maslin, Philosophy of Mind. 
12 Ibid. 
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of me that will survive this gloomy prospect, then I shall not be annihilated and I will 
continue in some substantial way.  In fact, what remains is the essence of what I am and 
what death takes away is a mere shell, a vehicle of worldly experience.  This is a very 
soothing view.  It gives hope and comfort.  However, comfort and solace do not constitute 
sufficient justification for holding a view. 
 Plato believes both that a soul survives the death of the body and that the soul 
existed before birth.13  Before the birth of the body, the soul was in the company of the 
eternal, permanent, and perfect essences and archetypes of all reality, the Forms.  The 
Forms are the perfect blueprints of all that exists and they reside in a realm that transcends 
all sense experience.  Human beings come to know the Forms through intellect and a type 
of intuition.  This mental state is called noesis.  Furthermore, only knowledge of forms 
constitutes true knowledge. 
 The relationship between the world of sense experience and the realm of Forms is 
one of participation.  Plato does not provide, in any serious way, an explanation of what 
participation is, but it constitutes the interface between the perfect world of Forms and our 
world of imperfection.  For example, all the objects in the transient world that exhibit 
beauty do so because they participate in the Form of Beauty, which resides in the eternal 
realm.  For Plato, the soul is like the Forms in that the soul is “divine, immortal, 
intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, unvarying, and constant in relation to itself.” 14   
 Plato provides many attempts to prove the existence of the soul, but the common 
notion between all these attempts is that the soul is an immaterial thing and it captures the 
essence and identity of a person.  However it should be noted that Plato describes the soul 
as ‘the principle of life’ in the Republic.  This means the soul is that thing that bestows life 
on all living things.  The preponderance of the presentations of the soul is in favor of an 
immaterial substance, which separates from the body at the time of death and survives as 
pure consciousness.  In this chapter, I will present one argument from Plato, which presents 
the majority view of what a soul is, according to Plato.  This argument is presented in the 
dialogue Alcibiades I, and it can be presented as such: 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Plato, (1961) The Collected Dialogues of Plato. “Phaedo.” E. Hamilton & H. Cairns, eds. Princeton: 
Princeton, 80a-b. 
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1. The use of a tool and the tool used are two numerically distinct and logically 
independent things. 
2. A person is said to be using his or her body. 
3. Therefore, a person must be a numerically distinct and logically independent 
thing from his or her body. 
The conclusion of the argument implies that if a person is logically independent from his or 
her body, then that person must be a non-physical logical substance, i.e., a soul.  A close 
analysis of this argument reveals some flaws, which turn out to be fatal. 
 The first and the second premise are guilty of equivocating on the term ‘use’.  The 
sense in which we ‘use’ a hammer is very different from the sense of ‘using’ one’s hand to 
open a cap or bottle.  The reason for this difference between the two senses of ‘use’ is that 
we stand qualitatively in a different relationship to parts of our body, and indeed our whole 
body than we do to a hammer or pen.  It is true that sometimes when I am immersed in a 
task I feel as if the instrument of my work is part of me, but one should remember that the 
tool feels as if it is a part one’s body and not actually has become part of the body.  The ‘as 
if’ points to a metaphysical play on ideas.  One’s body is an immediate object of one’s will, 
but foreign objects are at least by one step removed from one’s will.  It is in light of this 
that Plato’s argument is guilty of equivocation between a literal employment of the word 
‘use’ in the first premise and a metaphysical utilization in the second premise. 
 Another devastating problem with this argument is that it can be used to prove the 
separation and logical independence of a person from his or her mind by substituting ‘using 
one’s body’ with ‘using one’s mind’.  This should prove that this argument is fatally flawed 
and it cannot establish a credible argument for substance dualism.  
Plato’s philosophy was profoundly transformed by his encounter with the 
Pythagorean tradition.  This influence is evident in Meno.  This dialogue takes up the 
question of teach-ability of virtues. Meno opens the dialogue with the question: “Can you 
tell me, Socrates, whether virtue can be taught, or is it something not taught but acquired by 
practice.  On the other hand, is it neither something practiced nor something learned but 
comes to exist in men by nature or some other way? “15 
                                                
15 Ibid.,  Meno, 70a. 
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At the heart of this question is an ancient puzzle.  It is impossible to inquire into 
what one knows, since one knows that and there is no point in inquiry, nor into what one 
does not, since one cannot know what the object of inquiry is to be.  This conundrum points 
to an important issue.  Knowledge cannot be attained from a standpoint of absolute 
ignorance. Utter ignorance will not lead to any questions. Since questions are not results of 
formless curiosity.  Questions are formed on the backdrop of some sort of explicit or 
implicit knowledge or belief.  This gives the questions their sense of urgency significance.  
This background knowledge helps the questioner to determine what would constitute the 
correct answer.  Nevertheless, it would also indicate what would qualify as an answer.  This 
knowledge or belief also helps the agents to diagnose the ignorance and formulate the 
question.  Socrates addresses this issue by introducing the notion of immortal souls and 
reincarnation into a discussion, which is certainly influenced by the Pythagorean ideas.  
Socrates claims:  
“They say the human soul is immortal: at one moment it comes to an end, what is called 
dying, at another it comes to rebirth, but it is never subject to annihilation...and so since the 
soul is immortal and has been born many times, and has seen everything there is... there is 
nothing that it has not learned.  It is no wonder, then, that has the capacity to recollect all 
that it formerly knew about virtue and so forth...Inquiry and learning our entirely 
recollection. “ 16 
 
The fact that we have this implicit knowledge to be aware of our own ignorance and 
the fact that we can diagnose our ignorance and formulate questions proves that our inquiry 
and learning is recollection according to Socrates.  The fact that we search not only for the 
correct answers, but we are able to discern what qualifies as an answer proves the fact that 
we have previous knowledge an inquiry leads to recollection.  Socrates tries to convince 
Meno by conducting an experiment. Meno’s young slave is subjected to a series of 
questions concerning geometrical figures.  The boy is believed to have no knowledge of 
mathematics, but he is able to solve the mathematical problems.  Socrates’ methodology 
can be divided in several steps: one, false opinions are subjected to effective questioning 
and this leads to their refutation of the false opinion.  Two, refutation leads to ignorance 
                                                
16 Ibid., 81.c-d. 
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and confusion.  Three, ignorance and confusion will lead to desire for knowledge.  Four, 
desire of knowledge will lead to inquiry.  Five, inquiry would lead to true belief.  Six, a 
perpetual state of questioning about true reasons for one’s true belief will lead to 
knowledge.  
 
Fig. 2.2: Socratic method (www. socratic-method.blogspot.com) 
 
This methodology is the pathway to attainment of virtues and knowledge.  This is 
wisdom.  The philosopher moves from uncovering false beliefs to a state of utter confusion. 
Bewilderment becomes motivation for search of truth.  This motivation provides the 
philosopher with courage and persistence.  Courage would lead to true belief and finally 
uncovering the grounds for true beliefs would lead to true knowledge. In this sense the 
Socratic dialectical process is akin to the modern scientific process as illustrated in the 
following diagram: 
 
 
 34 
 
Socratic model Scientific model 
1. Wonder. Pose a question (of the ‘What is 
X ?’ form. 
1. Wonder. Pose a question. 
2. Hypothesis. Suggest a plausible answer 
(a definition or definiens) from which some 
conceptually testable hypothetical 
proposition can be deduced. 
2. Hypothesis. Suggest a plausible answer 
(theory) from which some empirically 
testable hypothetical proposition can be 
deduced. 
3. Elenches; ‘testing’ or ‘refutation’ or 
‘cross-examination’. Perform a thought 
experiment by imagining a case which 
conforms to the definiens but clearly fails 
to to exemplify the definiendum or vice 
versa. Such cases, if successful are called 
counterexamples. If a counterexample is 
generated, return to step 2, otherwise go to 
step 4. 
3. Testing. Construct and perform an 
experiment which makes it possible to 
observe whether the consequences 
specified in one or more of those 
hypothetical propositions actually follow 
when the conditions specified in the same 
proposition(s) pertain. If experiment fails, 
return to step 2, otherwise go th step4.  
4. Accept the hypothesis as provisionally 
true. Return to step 3 if you can conceive 
of any other case which may show the 
answer to be deduced. 
4. Accept the hypothesis as provisionally 
true. Return to step 3 if there are other 
predictable consequence of the theory 
which have not been experimentally 
confirmed. 
5. Act accordingly. 5. Act accordingly. 
Table 2.1: Comparison between the Socratic method and scientific method 
 
It is essential to point out that, according to Socratic/Platonic view, no knowledge is 
transferred from the teacher to student.  This methodology ensures that the student will 
uncover the truth for himself.  This is possible because to is recollected and not learned.  
The knowledge of truth is acquired by the soul in its earlier existences.  At this point, the 
question that squarely confronts us is the true nature of this knowledge. 
Heraclitus describes most men as wandering around in a dream-like state. They 
view the world from behind clouded glasses of their sensual experiences.  They followed 
their false beliefs and the considered the illusion as reality.  Human beings are urged to 
wake up and search for reality. The Eleatic school presented dialectic method and 
discursive reasoning as our path to truth.17 Pythagoreans presented intuition and 
contemplation of mathematical concepts as truth. Plato synthesizes these two approaches 
and in the process transcends both. In Meno, Plato offered hope from the web of attachment 
and pleasure and pain.  The possibilities have been presented to escape the world of 
                                                
17 Kenny, A., (2000) History of Western Philosophy, Oxford, UK.  
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cravings and sorrow.  The theory of recollection provides the means to recover and 
recollect the knowledge, which leads to salvation.  Our souls possess the knowledge of 
reality but they are trapped in the material world.  Here the soul becomes the subject of 
pleasure and pain hence it suffers.  However, memory of the knowledge of reality is 
available through right questioning.  This generates confusion, which would lead to thirst 
for knowledge.  The latter leads to inquiry.  Through inquiry true beliefs are formed.  The 
reasons for true beliefs constitute knowledge of reality.  Salvation is within reach, but it 
takes courage to attain it.  
The theory of recollection tells us how he came to know it does not eliminate for us 
the status of the objects of knowledge.  This further elaboration is provided by the theory of 
forms.  The theory of forms signifies a profound advance in Plato’s philosophy.  This 
theory is first introduced in Phaedo.  The theory of forms can be summarized as follows: 1) 
truth cannot be attained by the senses; a process of intellectual reasoning can grasp reality. 
2) The forms (Justice, Beauty, and Good etc) are not accessible to the senses. They exist as 
realities. 3) The world of sense-objects contains likenesses of realities (Equality Itself). The 
forms have no perfect manifestation in the material world. 4) Our recognition of the forms 
through their imperfect manifestations is recollection of the forms that become to know 
before birth by our souls. 5) The forms are eternal and unchanging. 6) The forms are eternal 
realities, which are instantiated in the material world.  Matter manifests the forms by 
partaking and participating in them. 7) The forms are intelligible. 8) True knowledge is the 
knowledge of forms. 9) Only the forms can provide satisfactory cause of explanation. 10) 
Essential property of an entity is those forms in which it participates necessarily.  The form 
in which the entity happens to participate is its accidents.  Consequently, any entity can 
partake in a number of forms. 11) Entities, however, cannot participate in forms, which are 
incompatible with their essential properties. 
That theory of forms is designed to ground the theory of recollection on a firmer 
metaphysical and epistemological foundation.  It introduces a world of eternal realities, 
which the soul comes to know before its incarnation.  The material world contains sensuous 
images of those eternal realities we can prompt us to remember the eternal realities.  The 
true philosopher is in a state of constant struggle to purify himself of the impurities and 
distortions of the sensual world.  The true philosopher perpetually strives to transcend the 
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attachments to the pleasures and fears of the pains of the material world.  He is in the 
search of that pure intellect which will take him to that primordial state of knowledge of the 
absolute eternal realities. 
In Symposium, the form that is presented is Beauty itself.  Contemplation of eternal 
Beauty is the ultimate fulfillment of Eros. Eros is the “desire to beget of the beautiful”, 
according to Socrates.  If we have the wisdom to refrain from sensual pleasures or even 
from appreciation and companionship of a beautiful soul and we go beyond the more 
abstract beauty of a mathematical system, we will ascend to the blissful knowledge of 
Beauty itself. Beauty exerts a tremendous force on us since it has the capacity to awaken in 
us the memory of the world of eternal realities, forms. The intuition of Beauty has a unique 
significance for human beings. Beauty is the ultimate object of desire for its own sake. The 
intuitive ascent to the realm of Beauty is parallel to ascension to the knowledge of all 
forms.                        
In the Republic, the theory of forms is elaborated by three symbolisms: the Sun, the 
Divided Line, and the Cave. The main idea of these analogies is to introduce the form of 
Good. The form of Good is the supreme reality of all other forms. It is by Good that 
knowledge is possible. The Good like the sun irradiates the realm of the forms and it 
enables us to intuit the nature of the forms. The Good is knowable and it is the source of all 
knowledge and knowability. Therefore, the Good is the ultimate fulfillment of knowledge. 
Just as Beauty is the final fulfillment of Eros, so Good is the ultimate fulfillment of 
wisdom. This parallelism points to crucial fact about human existence and his mission. The 
love of truth and ultimate reality is the supreme form of love in human existence as well as 
the supreme form of intellectual activity.  
Socrates calls the form of Good in Republic “beyond being in dignity and power” 18. 
The form of Good is not just the sun by which light other forms come to be illuminated, but 
Good is the form of being itself. 
Our knowledge and apprehension of the realm of forms is a function of 
intelligibility of the physical and metaphysical worlds. The visible world consists of two 
parts. One is the world of shadows, reflections, and other images. Second, there is the 
world of objects, animals, plants, artifacts etc. This distinction is attributed to our cognitive 
                                                
18 Ibid., Republic 509.b. 
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clarity and capacity. Then there is the intelligible realm. This is also divided in two parts. 
First is the world in which the mind uses visible things as images or representations of 
intelligible realities and reasons from hypotheses to conclusions. Second, there is a realm in 
which mind moves from hypotheses to first principle involving no hypotheses, making use 
of no images, only of forms. 
 
Fig 2.3: Platonic metaphysical and epistemological model (www. 100megsfree4.com) 
 
These four realms stand in hierarchical fashion. The lowest is the realm of shadows 
and images. Next is the realm of objects and physical entities. Next is the realm of 
abstractions, mathematical and scientific. The highest level is the realm of forms. The form 
of Good transcends all because it is the source of being and source of all knowledge. This 
picture is an image of synthesis of the philosophies of Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and 
Parmenides into a new philosophy, which transcends them all. The realm of illusions and 
objects corresponds to the world Heraclitus. This is a world of constant change and 
transience. This is the world of the relative. In the realm of mathematical and scientific 
abstractions, we meet Pythagoras. In the realm of forms, we follow Parmenides’ footprints 
on the path to the absolute, being itself. This is the realm of absolute reality, unchanging, 
and permanent. This is the realm of absolute “being” far from transience. This is the home 
of permanence. However, Plato surpasses them all by introducing the form of Good that 
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transcends all that there is. Good is the ultimate reality, source of all, transcending all 
absolute or relative. It is the origin of being.  
There is a corresponding cognitive state for each one the realm of reality. The 
physical and the metaphysical entities are objects of our comprehension and cognition. 
These are the four states of mind: eikasis, pistis, dianoia, and noesis. Eikasis corresponds to 
the comprehension of images, shadows, and reflections. It can be described as illusion. This 
is the state of mind that most humanity finds himself in, according to Heraclitus. Pistis is 
belief and opinion. Our beliefs are derived from our interaction through the sensory filter. 
Therefore, our beliefs are mostly tainted. Our opinions might happen to be right or wrong 
but they do not constitute real knowledge. Pistis and eikasis are both subdivisions of doxa, 
opinion. Dianoia is mathematical reasoning and knowledge. The reasoning employed is 
one that makes the inference from assumptions to conclusions. This is knowledge acquired 
from discursive reasoning. It outlines the relationship between the assumptions and the 
conclusion, but it will never ascend to comprehend the ultimate principle underlying the 
hypotheses. This kind of reasoning is deductive and differential. It is analytic in nature. It 
breaks down the phenomenon. Therefore, it can never transcend its own methodology. It is 
trapped in a circle between assumptions and conclusions. It is therefore is unable to 
comprehend the first-principle. Noesis is the state of mind capable of understanding the 
ultimate principle. It is not analytic, but it is synthetic. It is not differentiative, but it is 
integrative. Noesis can transcend the physical and reach the metaphysical. The knowledge 
of this state is that forms including the Good. Noesis is pure intellect; it is intuition.  
The cognitive states also stand in an ascending order. Eikasia is the most primitive 
since it is illusory and conjecture. Pistis is belief with respect to sensory-objects. Diatonia 
is discursive reasoning. In addition, noesis is pure intellect and intuition. 
Ascension from eikasia to noesis signifies the assent of human soul from illusion to 
enlightenment. It is freedom from defilement and the embrace of Good. In Symposium, the 
ascent is presented with respect to Beauty. Diatoma explains that at first the person is 
deluded and confused not knowing what Eros is. This is a life spent in the shadows. 
Through interaction, he becomes informed and he forms an opinion about Eros. This comes 
about by a love affair and Eros experienced for the lover. The next step is to appreciate the 
abstraction of beauty and love. The person has to rise from individual cases of love to an 
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abstract realm of love and beauty. The ultimate fulfillment is attained in the contemplation 
of Beauty itself, however. This is the ultimate object satisfaction for Eros. This is freedom. 
The same imagery is presented in the Allegory of the Cave. The image of cave represents 
the ascent of soul from realm of mere images to the realm of visible objects (objects carried 
along the pathway and the carriers) to the world of forms (the external world) and finally to 
the intuition of Good (the Sun).  
 
Fig. 2.4: Allegory of the cave (www. iblog.stjschool.org) 
 
2.2 Classical Cartesian Interactionist Dualism 
Descartes formulated the standard account of dualistic interactionism. According to 
Descartes, there are three different types of substances: God who is an eternal substance 
and two other substances created by God. For Descartes, everything that exists is either a 
substance or an attribute of a substance. Descartes claims: “By substance, we can 
understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing to exist”.19  
He claims, “We may thus easily have two clear and distinct notions or ideas, the one 
created substance which thinks, the other corporeal substance, provided we carefully 
                                                
19 Descartes, R., (1955) The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. 1, Dover, New York, p. 239-240 
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separate all the attributes of thought from those of extension.”20 Hence, in the empirical 
world there are two distinct and logically independent substances: the extended matter and 
the conscious mind. 
Descartes’ methodology to determine the true nature of self is based on the 
necessity to look first for metaphysical self-evident and independently true ‘absolutes’. The 
search for the metaphysical ‘axioms’ is followed by the establishment of metaphysical 
‘theorems’, which if ordered in a proper manner, will yield an indubitable picture of reality. 
The way to find these metaphysical axioms is to challenge every belief, regardless of how 
widely accepted and credible it might be, in order to determine whether it met the test of 
certainty. Hence, he suspended his beliefs until he could prove them conclusively. 
Descartes found that there is one thing that he certainly and infallibly knew; and it was that 
he doubted. This knowledge is so certain that even an evil genius God, who can deceive me 
about everything, cannot deceive me about my own existence. In other words, I can doubt 
everything except that I exist, because I must certainly exist in order to doubt that I exist. 
This realization is capsulated in the term cogito ergo sum. The ultimate proof for the 
existence of a conscious being is not the ability to think but the possibility to doubt its own 
existence or questioning its own being.  
According to Descartes, a person is essentially identical to an incorporeal soul.  This 
incorporeal soul is an immaterial logical substance, independent for its existence from any 
other entity.  A soul lacks the essential property of all material substance, i.e., extension.  
Accordingly, a soul has neither length, nor width, nor breadth, nor does it occupy a volume 
in space.  It is indivisible, because it lacks extension.  In fact, the immortality of soul is 
explained through its indivisibility, for it cannot decay or perish. Yet, Descartes claims that 
he is not just a mind: “I have a body which is adversely affected when I feel pain, which 
has need for food and drink when I experience the feeling of hunger and thirst and so 
on….”21 Hence, a human being is best described as an embodied mind: 
“I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a ship, but that I am very closely united to it, 
and so to speak so intermingle with it that I seem to compose with it one whole. For if that 
were not the case, when my body hurt, I, who am merely a thinking thing, should perceive 
                                                
20 Descartes. Works, p. 241. 
21 Descartes. Works, p. 192. 
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this wound by understanding only, just as the sailor perceives by sight when something is 
damaged in his vessel….”22  
 
For Descartes, the essence of mental substances is consciousness, thought, or res cogitans.  
In the Meditations, the notion of res cogitans is more clearly illustrated: 
“Thinking is another attribute of the soul; and here I discover what probably belongs to 
myself.  This alone is inseparable from me.  I am – I exist: this is certain; but how often?  
As often as I think; for perhaps it would even happen, if I should wholly cease to think, that 
I should at the same time altogether cease to be.  I now admit nothing that is not necessarily 
true: I am, therefore, precisely speaking, only a thinking thing.”23 
  
It is clear that thinking is not merely a property of the soul, but its essence.  An 
essence is that which makes a thing what it is, and in this sense, it is necessarily 
indispensable to it.  Consequently, ‘soulness’ and consciousness are identical.  An 
unconscious soul is a logical impossibility.  It is also important to note that thinking and 
consciousness refer to the same thing. Thinking includes experiences of sensation, 
perception, emotional states, conative states such as willing and wanting, and all intentional 
states such as doubting, imagining, understanding, believing, etc.  The soul has two basic 
powers “one of which consists in . . . the operation of will”: volition. 24  The other faculty is 
understanding, through which human beings seek truth. 
   Understanding is composed of two aspects.  First, there is thinking, which 
cognizes the world as it actually is.  Second, there is sensation, which perceives the world 
through the attributes of its material substances such as colors, odors, sounds, and textures.  
Here, we face the first problem with Cartesian dualism.  It is unclear how the mind knows 
its objects, while they are substantially different from it.  It is uncertain how the mind can 
make sense of the world and the world can invade the mind.  Here, Descartes introduces a 
linking principle to overcome the gap.  Ideas provide this link in that they are 
simultaneously states of mind and a true representation of the objects in the world.  In other 
words, an idea is a state of mind, which stands in a causal relationship to the objects of the 
                                                
22 Descartes. Works, p. 192. 
23 Descartes, R., (1986) Meditations. London, Everyman, p. 88. 
24 Descartes, R., (1931) Philosophical Works of Descartes: Volume I. “Discourse on Method”. Trans. 
Haldane & Ross. Cambridge: Cambridge. 223. 
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world. “Ideas are so to speak, images of the things . . .; examples are my thought of a man 
or of a chimera, of heaven, of an angel, or of God . . .” 25 Hence, an idea is true, because it 
corresponds to an object in the external world. This truth through correspondence is 
sheltered from deception and illusion through the guarantee of a benevolent God, who 
would not let me be deluded about anything, the nature of which I understand so clearly 
and distinctly.  For example, the idea of a triangle, which I know so completely is an idea 
put in my mind by God, while none of my experience of any triangle can give me that idea 
so clearly and distinctly.  Hence, our ideas of all simple entities, or natures, are innate ideas 
furnished by God
  
Fig.2.5: Cartesian theory of Perception (www. newworldencyclopedia.org) 
Descartes ascribes less reality to objects of sense perception, because it is 
understanding that deals with the essence of material things, extension.  Perception deals 
with the properties of material substance.  Thus, the knowledge acquired from sense 
perception is inessential. This knowledge is the product of the object acting on our sense 
organs.  Knowledge through sense perception is useful for daily activity, but it should not 
be expected to give us essential and substantial truth.  Its value is that it can distinguish 
harmful from hurtful causes.  Sense knowledge has pragmatic importance. 
                                                
25 Descartes. Works, p. 159. 
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 The nature of material substances is extension.  Hence, material bodies are called 
res extensia.  The material world is composed of matter in motion.  This motion is achieved 
through contact.  In other words, the cause of all physical effects is pieces of matter 
bumping into each other.  All change can be explained in terms of local motion of particles 
in relation to each other.  Properties such as colors, sound, odor, and texture are not 
essentially properties of the object, but they are merely impressions produced in us by the 
action of material particles on sense organs.  This is a causal relationship.  “The nature of 
matter or of a body in its universal aspect, does not consist in its being very hard, or heavy, 
or colored, or one that affects our senses in some other way, but solely in the fact that it is a 
substance extended in length, breadth, and depth . . .” 26 
 As we have seen, mind and matter reside in two completely separate and 
independent realms.  We also saw that the faculty of understanding presents a major 
problem for Descartes, in that it was not clear how an immaterial mind could make any 
sense of the material world, while the two are so different from each other.  To solve this 
problem, Descartes introduces the notion of ‘idea’.  Now, ideas are mental states, which 
can truly represent the objects of the world, and a benevolent God guarantees this truth.  
This is, however, not sufficient, for still a physical counterpart to ‘ideas’ is necessary to 
locate this interaction between the mental and the physical realm.  It is important to note 
that sense perception can be explained if, and only if this interaction is presupposed.  
Somehow, there has to be a causal interaction between the mind and the brain so one can 
have experiences in the world. 
 As it was mentioned above, the material world is ‘located’ in space and its essential 
characteristic is extension, while the mental world is non-spatial and it is essentially 
consciousness.  However, both of these realms are ‘located’ in time.  They are both 
temporal.  The difference is that the temporality of matter is finite and the temporality of 
mind is infinite.  Consequently, time provides the intersection between the two realms.  
This intersection leads Descartes to infer an interaction between the two realms.  Despite 
the radical separation of the two realms, Descartes believes that mental causes can yield 
material effects and vice versa.  For instance, stepping on a nail (material) can produce pain 
(mental), which in turn prompts the victim to utter a sound (material).  This claim 
                                                
26 Descartes. Works. 255. 
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corresponds to the empirical data that various brain states lead to a variety of bodily 
movements and the bodily movements causally affect brain states. According to Descartes, 
the mind-brain interaction can be pinpointed to one point of immediate contact. Through 
this point, the causal effects of the mind are carried to all parts of the body and the causal 
effects of the body are transmitted to the mind. The location for this causal interaction is the 
pineal gland: 
“It follows that the soul is really joined to the whole body, and that we cannot, properly 
speaking, say that it exists in any one of its parts to the exclusion of the others . . . because 
it is of a nature which has no relation to extension nor dimension, nor the properties of the 
matter of which the body is composed, but only to the conglomerate of its organs . . . It is 
likewise necessary to know that although the soul is joined to the whole body, there is yet in 
that a certain part in which it exercises its function more particularly than in all other . . . In 
examining the matter with care, it seems as though I had clearly ascertained that [this] part . 
. . is . . . a certain very small gland which is situated in the middle of [the brain] and so 
suspended above the duct whereby the animal spirits in its anterior cavities have 
communication with these in the posterior, that the slightest movements which take place in 
it may alter very greatly the course of these spirits; and reciprocally that the smallest 
changes which occur in the course of the spirits may do much to change the movements of 
this gland.”27 
 The pineal gland is a pea-sized organ in the human brain, situated caudal to the 
corpus callosum.  Modern neurosciences have determined that its function is the regulation 
of night and day rhythms based on exposure to sunlight.  One curious fact about the pineal 
gland is that it is the only symmetrical organ in the brain, which has not been divided in 
two lobes.  This could be one reason that this organ grabbed Descartes’ attention.  Another 
reason could be that the pineal gland is light and relatively mobile, and so it would be 
susceptible to movement by the soul.  It seems, however, that Descartes failed to follow his 
own recommendation of suspending judgment until truth can be approached clearly and 
distinctly.  He had no evidence for the designation of the pineal gland as the seat of 
perception, and it seems quite arbitrary.  In any event, the pineal gland is where all 
perceptions of the world are formed.  It is the seat of ‘ideas’, and so it is the interface 
between the mental and the material realms. The interaction between the mind and the 
                                                
27 Descartes, Discourse, pp.  5, 7 - 9, 14 –17, & 22. 
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body, in the pineal gland through formation of ‘ideas’, is explained through the ‘principle 
of substantial union’.  According to this principle, this interaction occurs through the 
intermingling of mind and body.   
 
Fig. 2.6: Pineal gland (www. humanityhealing.net) 
 The theory of interactionist dualism can be summarized as: 1) there are material 
and mental substances. 2) Mental substances are very different kind of substances from 
material substances. Mental substances are non-material things like pure souls. 3) Mental 
and material substances causally interact. The question that arises at this point is whether 
this theory is reasonable. The interactionist part of the theory seems to be reasonable and 
even truistic. It seems reasonable to think that my desire to alleviate my hunger causes me 
to walk to the kitchen and prepare something to eat. Equally, it is reasonable to assume that 
the grumbling of my stomach causes me to feel hungry. However, what about the dualist 
part of the theory?  
  Descartes provides three main arguments in defense of soul substances: 
1. Argument from doubt. 
2. Argument from clear and distinct perception. 
3. Argument from divisibility. 
 Descartes presents the argument from doubt as such after he, supposedly, has 
established cogito ergo sum: 
“I then considered attentively what I was; and I saw that while I could feign I had no body, 
that there was no world, and no place existed for me to be in, I could not feign that I was 
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not; on the contrary, from the mere fact that I thought of doubting about other truths it 
evidently and certainly followed that I existed . . . From this I recognized that I was a 
substance whose whole essence or nature is to be conscious and whose being requires no 
place and depends on no material thing.  Thus this self, that is to say the soul by which I am 
what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easily known; and even if the 
body were not there at all, the soul would be just what it is.”28  
The formalization of the argument from doubt yields: 
1. I can doubt that my body exists. 
2. I cannot doubt that I exist. 
3. Therefore, I must be separate, different, and logically independent from my 
body. 
Here, he argues that he cannot doubt that he thinks and he is a conscious being. On the 
other hand, he can doubt that he has a body. Hence, he concludes that having a body is not 
essential to his existence, while having a mind is essential.   
 To evaluate this argument, we need to clarify what Descartes means by ‘thought’ 
and ‘doubt’. As we discussed above, he uses thought to describe all mental states, events, 
and processes. However, what he means by ‘doubt’ is the logical possibility of a false 
belief. It means that we can doubt a belief, if it is logically possible that our belief is 
mistaken. Seeing a snake in the dark can be doubted, because it is logically possible for the 
belief to be false. Hence, a statement S is doubtful, if it is logically possible to be mistaken 
in believing S. On the other hand, S is indubitable, if it is logically impossible to believe S 
and be wrong about it. Hence, the first premise states that it is logically impossible for him 
to be mistaken about the belief that he is a thinking substance. While, in the second premise 
it is stated that it s logically possible for him to believe falsely that he has a body, and is a 
material substance. The question is whether his conclusion follows from his premises.  
 The conclusion that: ‘I am essentially a thinking thing, and having a body or being a 
material thing, is not essential to my being what I am’ seems to assume that there is a link 
between what is indubitable and what is essential. However, this is a mistake. The 
argument amounts to saying that ‘I cannot doubt the existence of X’ and ‘I can doubt the 
existence of Y’. Hence, ‘X is not identical to Y’. This is clearly invalid.      
                                                
28 Descartes, R., (1970) Philosophical Writings. Trans. Geach & Anscombe. New York: Nelson, p. 32. 
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  Another problem with the argument from doubt seems to be that it confuses the 
concepts of intension and extension.  The intension of a term is its meaning, its sense.  The 
extension of a term is its reference in the real world.  It is the set of all objects in the world, 
which can be subsumed under that meaning.  In other words, it is the set of all objects that 
the intension picks out in the world.  For example, the intension, or meaning, of ‘bachelor’ 
is ‘an unmarried man’.  The extension of bachelor is all the unmarried men in the world.  
Another important fact is that the extensions of a term do not have necessarily the same 
intension.  What they have in common is that they refer to the same object.  For example, 
Morning star does not mean Evening star, but both terms refer to the same object, Venus.  
The problem is that just because one does not know all the extensions of a term, one cannot 
assume that they do not refer to the same object.  This is the point that Descartes fails to 
realize.  This mistake can be illustrated by the following argument: 
1. Bob knows Venus to be the brightest star that illuminates the evening sky at 
dusk, the Evening star. 
2. Bob does not know Venus to be the brightest star that illuminates the morning 
sky at dawn, the Morning star. 
3. Therefore, the Morning star and the Evening star are not identical. 
Clearly, the lack of knowledge with respect to all the members of a set of extensions 
of any term does not warrant the claim that any two of the terms, in that set, do not refer to 
the same term.  In other words, just because Descartes is not aware that he and his body and 
mind are identical, it does not mean that he can assert the existence of one without the 
other. 
 The next objection is a reformulation of the concern in the first objection, but using 
‘mental state’ language and properties.  The objection is that arguments that use intentional 
states – such as ‘believing’, ‘doubting’, ‘knowing’, ‘understanding’, ‘imagining’, and so on 
– cannot be successfully employed in establishing the non-identity of two terms.  The 
reason for this is that intentional states are ‘about’ things.  This ‘about-ness’ is because they 
have representational content.  Furthermore, this ‘about-ness’ is ‘aspectual’.  This means 
that the same content can be represented under different aspects.  It follows that just 
because one knows an intentional object, or representation content, under one description 
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or aspect, and not others, it does not mean that the two aspects are not representations of the 
same content or object. 
 The last objection to the argument from doubt is that it is simply circular and it 
begs the question it seeks to resolve.  Descartes, already, assumes that his body and mind 
are separate.  The assertion that one can doubt the existence of one without the other is 
nourished by that presupposition, and it is made in light of that presumption. 
The argument from clear and distinct perception is presented in the Sixth Meditation: 
“I know that whatever I clearly and distinctly understand can be made by God just as I 
understand it; so my ability to understand one thing clearly and distinctly apart from one 
another is enough to assure me that they are distinct, because God at least can separate them 
. . . Now I know that I exist, and at the same time I observe absolutely nothing else as 
belonging to my nature or essence except the mere fact that I am a conscious being; and 
from just this I can validly infer that my essence consists simply in the fact that I am a 
conscious being.  It is indeed possible . . . that I have a body closely bound up with myself; 
but at the same time I have, on the other hand, a clear and distinct idea of myself taken 
simply as a conscious, not an extended, being; and on the other, a distinct idea of body, 
taken simply as an extended, not a conscious, being; so it is certain that I am really distinct 
from my body, and could exist without it.”29 
 
The formulation of this argument looks like this: 
1. I have a clear and distinct understanding of myself as a conscious, but not an 
extended, thing. 
2. I have a clear and distinct understanding of my body as an extended, but not a 
conscious, thing. 
3. Therefore, I can clearly and distinctly understand myself as a non-extended 
conscious thing apart from the extended body, and I can clearly and distinctly 
understand my body as an extended nonconscious thing apart from myself as a 
conscious thing. 
4. God can bring about whatever I can clearly and distinctly understand. 
5. Therefore, God brings it about that I, as a conscious non-extended thing, can 
exist apart from my extended, nonconscious, body. 
                                                
29 Descartes, Writings, pp. 114 – 5. 
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Descartes heavily relies on his concept of God in inferring the conclusion of this 
argument.  The reason for this reliance can be understood by our discussion of ‘ideas’ 
previously.  Remember that the ‘ideas’ are mental states, which represent the objects of the 
world.  They are the interface between the mind and world.  The truth of these ideas is the 
function of their clarity and distinctness.  There are some ideas, which are so clear and 
distinct, that nothing in the imperfect world can take away from their truth, such as the idea 
of a triangle.  This is a semi-platonic notion.  Consequently, since these ideas cannot be 
inferred from the world, they must be innately with us.  They are gifts from God.  Since 
God is benevolent, God’s gifts must be true.  Therefore, the innate ideas are the truest and 
the most clear and distinct of our ideas.  Descartes believes that the clarity and distinction 
by which he can conceive of the Separability, and independence, of him from his body 
prove the truth of this conception, because it is guaranteed by God’s benevolence. 
Descartes presents God as the guarantor of his clear and distinct ideas.  This 
presupposes that he can prove the existence of this guarantor.  Descartes’ proof for the 
existence of God can be stated as such: 
1. Everything, including our ideas, must have a cause. 
2. Human beings have an idea of God. 
3. Only God is perfect enough to cause the idea of God. 
4. Therefore, God exists. 
Descartes illustrates the above argument in the following passages: 
“[The] idea . . . a stone cannot exist in me unless it has been placed within me by some 
cause, which possesses within it at least as much, reality as that which I conceive to exist in 
the . . . stone . . . Although it maybe the case that one idea gives both to another idea, that 
cannot continue to be so indefinitely; for in the end we must reach an idea whose cause 
shall be so to speak an archetype, in which the whole reality which is so to speak 
objectively in these ideas is contained formally.”30 
 
The problem with this argument is that it assumes we have a clear and distinct idea 
of God, while a tremendous amount of credible religious traditions and scriptures contradict 
it.  God’s nature is usually presented as beyond all conception and ineffable in one sense or 
another.  Even if we had a clear and distinct idea of God, this does not necessarily mean 
                                                
30 Descartes, Writings, p. 347. 
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that God is the cause of this idea.  This proof is another version of Anselm’s Ontological 
Argument. Hence, it falls to the same objections raised against the former. Consequently, it 
can be proposed that Descartes’ reliance on the idea of God is not justified by the proof he 
is providing.  At this point, let us turn our attention to the first part of the argument. 
 Earlier we established, in our discussion of the argument from doubt, that no 
intentional state can be used as evidence in the construction of an argument that denies the 
identity of two items.  The reason for this is that intentional states are characterized by 
‘about-ness’.  This means that they have representational content.  Furthermore, this ‘about-
ness’ is ‘aspectual’.  This means that many items can fall under the same representational 
content.  Well, perception and understanding are intentional states and a fortiriori 
‘aspectual’.  Hence, they cannot be used to prove the non-identity of any two items. 
Argument from Divisibility can be stated as such: 
1. The body is divisible into parts. 
2. The mind is not divisible into parts. 
3. Therefore, the mind must be of an entirely different nature from the body.  The 
mind is essentially non-material. 
The problem with this argument is that both of its premises can be proven false. 
Not all matter is divisible.  Modern physics has shown us that some elementary particles, 
such as photons and electrons, are irreducible and non-divisible.  This clearly contradicts 
premise one. Another problem is that although qualitative states, such as pains and itches, 
are not divisible, some intentional states are divisible.  For example, belief structures of 
knowledge can be broken down into smaller and atomic components, such as individual 
beliefs. 
 In our logical analysis of the arguments for dualistic part of the theory, it seems 
reasonable to assume that none of the arguments really works. However, one might assume 
that such proof exists not in the form standard logical proof, but in the form of empirical 
data. Specifically, it can be claimed that the out-of-body experiences might provide such 
evidence. These are the cases, in which the patient is pronounced clinically dead by the 
attending physician, but after a while the person ‘comes back to life’.31 These patients 
occasionally report that they left their bodies that they float over their bodies that they 
                                                
31 Maslin, An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind. 
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could observe the events in the room as they happened, and that they could even observe 
their own bodies lying on the bed. However, they report that they could not interact with 
anybody in the room. Finally, they report that they returned to their bodies and they were 
revived. These cases should be taken seriously and they cannot be rejected without 
consideration. 
 Out-of-body experiences seem to provide evidence for dualism, because the thing 
that leaves the body seems to be conscious; and it seems to have mental states independent 
of the body. This can only be an immaterial soul. These reports also seem to prove the 
survival of the soul after the death of the body, and hence the immortality of the soul. They 
are, however, some valid criticism against this argument. One objection is that the patient 
may not be dead, even though he is pronounced dead by the attending physician. It is quite 
possible that the individual is in a state that brain activity is so weak that it cannot be 
monitored by our instruments. The instruments are not simply sensitive enough. Hence, the 
proper description of these experiences is near-death experiences, and not out-of-body 
experiences. Another possibility is that the brain engages in some activity similar to what 
happens in dreams, when the sense of self is projected to some other location.32 These 
objections are not conclusive, but they provide an alternative and simpler explanation of a 
phenomenon. This is all that is required of an objection. 
 
2.2.1 Some Objections: 
At this point, we should decide whether interactionist dualism obtains. This 
question can be answered only in light of five traditional objections toward interactionist 
dualism. There are three philosophical and two scientific objections to this theory. 
I. The first philosophical objection poses the question: where does interaction 
occur? According to dualist interactionism, mental events causally interact with brain 
events. This implies that the interaction occurs in the brain. This entails that, since two 
causally related events are located where the interaction happens, mental events are located 
in the brain. However, interactionist dualism denies mental substance and events have any 
extension. This means that mental events have no spatial properties. Mental events are 
temporal, but never spatial. Consequently, the doctrine seems to be self-contradictory. It 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
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seems that interaction requires mental events to be in the brain, while it is denied that 
mental events can have spatial properties.  
A possible solution is to deny that causally related events must be located in the 
same place. This point is reinforced by empirical data from physics, which makes action at 
distance quite plausible and possible. An example is the gravitational force between 
heavenly bodies. The problem is that even in the case of action at distance the two bodies 
occupy a location. It is true that the location of the two bodies is not adjacent, but there is a 
location nevertheless. The point seems to be that causal interaction requires some location. 
However, mental substance cannot have any location. The only possible response is to 
resort to some form of mysterianism. 
II. The second philosophical objection poses the question: how can interaction come 
about? The interactionist dualism insists that mental events and brain events are 
fundamentally different kinds of events. This implies that they have different kinds of 
causal powers. In the material realm, causal effect is achieved through exertion of force 
from one object to another. Now, this force is defined in terms of mass and acceleration. 
Therefore, any object that exerts force on a material object must have mass and it must be 
capable of acceleration. However, mental substances have no mass and they are not capable 
acceleration, because they cannot travel a distance. Consequently, mental substances cannot 
causally affect material substances, since they cannot exert physical force.  
One defense for the interactionist position is to differentiate between proximate and 
other types of causes and to claim that mental substance act as proximate causes of material 
events.33 One event is a proximate cause for another event, if there are no intermediary 
steps on a causal chain between the two. Here, the first event immediately affects the 
second event without a third, or fourth, event separating them. The point is that a proximate 
cause should be taken as brute fact, because there is no way to explain it. Usually, one can 
explain an event through the intermediary events that led to it. Hence, explanation is 
possible only through remote causation and not approximate causation. For example, the 
heating of water causes the pressure to rise inside the container. This can only be explained 
in terms of the intervening steps of increased kinetic energy of the molecules, the change in 
                                                
33 Ducasse C J, (1991) In Defense of Dualism, in S. Hook, ed., Dimensions of Mind , Collier Books, New 
York, p. 88. 
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the velocity of the molecules, and the rapid displacement of the molecules. If there were no 
intervening steps, then the increased pressure due to heating could only be taken as a brute 
fact. The same holds for mental causation. The mental events should be taken to be the 
proximate of material. Hence, they should be taken as unexplainable brute facts. 
The problem with this solution is that it compounds the mystery. Now, we have 
immaterial mental events, which have no spatial property, or any property, which enables 
them to exert physical force, causally interacting with material events in an ineffable and 
inexplicable manner. Another problem is that how is this proximal interaction verifiable, 
observable, and predictable in any meaningful scientific way. In other words, the notion of 
proximate causation falls outside the scientific scope, since it lacks any explanatory power. 
Hence, it is mysterious and unreliable.  
III. The third philosophical objection is formulated in terms of the problem of other 
minds. If, as interactionist dualism claims, the mind is a fundamentally different kind of 
substance from body, then it becomes impossible to justify the common sense belief that 
there are other beings with mind. However, ascribing mental states to others seems to be 
commonsensical and intuitively correct. There is nothing in our interactions, which would 
lead us to believe that others are automata. The consequence of this problem is that there is 
no way to determine that there are persons in the world. All I can observe and verify is 
physical behavior and physical states. However, bodily states are radically different from 
mental states. Hence, observation of physical states does not prove the existence of any 
form of mental life. Furthermore, there is no way to verify whether the physical states are 
accompanied by mental states in others, while I can do that for myself. However, this 
seems to be quite counter-intuitive.  
The objection toward interactionist can be stated as such: if the interactionist 
dualism is right, then no statement about physical states entails a statement about mental 
states. Consequently, I cannot use any deductive argument based on my perception to 
justify the existence of other minds. For that reason no premise about my perception entails 
conclusions about other minds. Moreover, the only cases, in which I know that that mental 
states complement physical states is my own experience. However, my own experience can 
never provide sufficient evidence for the conclusion that other physical states are also 
accompanied by mental states. Hence, there is no inductive argument, which can justify my 
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belief in other minds. The overall conclusion is straightforward. If interactionist dualism is 
right, there are no deductive, inductive, or non-inferential perceptual ways to prove the 
existence of other minds.  
Up to now, we raised philosophical objections to interactionist dualism. However, 
interactionist dualism has to answer the charge of science as well. Hence, we turn to two 
major scientific objections of interactionist dualism. 
IV. The first scientific objection is that interaction violates the principle of 
conservation of energy.  This principle sates that the amount of energy in a closed physical 
system remains constant. However, provided that dualism is correct, if there is a causal 
relationship between the mental and the material, this principle is violated. When some 
material event causes a mental event, the physical energy involved in the material event is 
not transferred to anything else. Hence, the energy is lost. Conversely, when a mental event 
causes a material event, the gained or lost energy by the resulting material event has not 
been transferred to anything material in a way that the amount of the energy changes. All 
this means that any interaction between the mental and material events, as they are defined 
in interactionist dualism, violates the conservation principle.  
A possible solution to this problem is to deny that all cases of causation involve 
transfer of energy. If “energy is meant to designate something experimentally measurable 
then “energy” is defined in terms of causality, not “causality” in terms of transfer of energy. 
That is, it is not known that all causation or, in particular, causation as between the 
psychical and physical events, involves transfer of energy.34  
This response reflects an important truth that nothing in the definition of causation 
entails that all cases of causation should include transfer of energy. Hence, it is logically 
possible for some cases of causation between mental and material events not to involve 
transfer of energy. The question is, then, should we accept or reject this logical possibility, 
if the Ducasse’s definition of energy is correct. Modern physics seems to have assigned a 
much more fundamental role and definition to energy than it is assumed by Ducasse. 
Energy stands as the brute fact in physics along with time and space. This means that all 
material events are explained in terms of time, space, and energy. Hence, it is quite unlikely 
that the scope of any material interaction can fall outside of energy. 
                                                
34 Ducasse, In Defense of Dualism, p. 88-89. 
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V. The next scientific objection is based on the structure and function of nervous 
system. From a physiological standpoint, it seems that there is no place for mental causes 
for human behavior. Broad states this objection as: 
“It is admitted that the mind has nothing to do with causation of purely reflex actions. But 
the nervous structure and the nervous processes involved in reflex actions; they differ only 
in degree of complexity. The variability, which characterizes deliberate action, is fully 
explained by the variety of alternative paths and the variable resistance of the synapses. So, 
it is unreasonable to suppose that the mind has any more to do with causing deliberate 
actions that it has to do with causing reflex actions.”35 
   
According to this argument, physical events can be fully explained in terms of physical 
chain of events. This means that material events provide a sufficient condition for the 
presence of each other. There is no explanatory or causal gap, in the material world. Hence, 
there is no need to postulate immaterial causes to explain material events.  
At this point, it seems reasonable to assume that interactionism has failed to provide 
a coherent account of its version of dualism. Hence, it is equitable to reject interactionism. 
However, we should mention the lingering influence of Cartesian dualism on subsequent 
theories, especially materialism. Dennett makes this point explicit, when he claims that 
many materialist theories postulate a central place where consciousness exists and someone 
for whom consciousness exists. Dennett believes that this is dualism in hiding. He calls 
such views Cartesian materialism. If a theory postulates some type of metaphysical space, 
in which conscious experiences happen and where “it all comes together and consciousness 
happens”36, then that theory is implicitly Cartesian. 
                                                
35 Broad C. D., (1962) The Mind and Its Place in Nature, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 110.  
36 Dennett, D. C., (1991) Consciousness Explained, Boston and London: Little, Brown and Co., p.39 
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Fig. 2.7: Cartesian theatre (www.sharp.bu.edu)  
 
At this point, the question is whether substance dualism can be salvaged in any 
other way. Two historical attempts at saving dualism by sacrificing interactionism were the 
parallelism of Malebranche and Leibniz. However, we turn first to Spinoza’s critique to 
Cartesian dualism and his substance monism. 
 
2.3 Spinoza’s substance monism: A Cartesian critique   
Spinoza’s notion of monism is formulated in the proposition 14 of his Ethics37. 
According to this proposition, ‘there can be, or conceived, no other substance but God’. 
The significance, or lack thereof, of this proposition clearly depends on his definition of 
substance. From the Cartesian perspective, there are two distinct notions of substance. 
According to one sense, a substance is that which is independent of all else. This is a strict 
sense of the term and it applies to God only. God is independent of all else in that the 
existence of God can be explained by the essence of God. There is no external factor that 
needs to be appealed to for explanation of God’s existence. This notion of grounds for 
existence is intimately tied with the concept of causality. When one claims that God’s 
existence is explained by God’s essence means that God has no external cause. The second 
sense of the concept of substance, according to Spinoza, is looser. All finite matter and 
                                                
37 Spinoza, (1969) Ethics, translated by Elwes, H. M., Bell, London. 
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minds are also substance since modes inhere in them. The difference in the notions of 
substance has tremendous implications for Spinoza’s argument. Application of the second 
notion of substance (the looser definition) reduces Spinoza’s proposition into 
inconsequential colloquial point. According to this interpretation, he is making a 
recommendation about the usage of the concept of substance with respect to God and other 
entities in the philosophical discourse. This sounds more like call for a change in linguistic 
conventions than a serious philosophical claim. Therefore, this option seems unlikely since 
it is assumed that Spinoza is attempting a serious philosophical claim. This statement is not 
just based on the principle of charity, but the fact that Spinoza is considering everything in 
the universe as a mode of God. This claim is radically divergent from the Cartesian 
position. Therefore, Spinoza is using the strict sense of substance. He claims that there is no 
substance other than God. This is due to the fact that God possesses all attributes (infinite 
number of attributes), and no two substances ‘can share the same attributes’. Therefore, 
there is only one substance and that substance is God, because God exists. The validity of 
this argument is determined by a close inspection of the concepts of mode, attribute, and 
substance. It also depends whether Spinoza proves the existence of God.   
A substance is ‘in itself’ and conceived through itself. This means that a substance 
is independently conceived and its concept is not dependent on any other concept. The 
nature of a substance is intelligible through its attributes. No external factor is necessary to 
explain the nature of the substance. This conceptual independence, for Spinoza, translates 
into independence from an ontological perspective. Therefore, since a substance is 
conceived independently from everything else, it exists independently from everything else 
as well. A substance is not caused by anything else. It is self-caused, because it is self-
conceived. The explanation for the existence of a substance is not found externally but 
internally. ‘The existence of a substance’ belongs to the essence (the nature) of the 
substance; hence a substance is necessarily self-caused. Here Spinoza radically diverges 
from the Aristotelian notion of substance. According to Aristotelian tradition, entities such 
as humans, cows, cars, trees, etc. are substances in which attributes inhere. This also a 
departure from the Cartesian system, in which substance, although considered the fabric of 
ultimate reality, is manifold (God, finite minds, and matter) and they are independent from 
everything else. Spinoza holds that the Cartesians were right in diagnosing substance as the 
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ultimate reality, but they were wrong to believe that substance is many and they were 
nearsighted by not seeing the implications of independence of substance. That implication 
is that substance is self-caused and necessary. 
Aristotle distinguished between attributes and substances. Spinoza gives an attribute 
a whole new definition and distinguishes between modes and substances. Modes exist in 
other things. This means that modes are dependent for their existence on other things. The 
existence of a mode can only be explained by an external factor; modes are caused by other 
factors. Therefore, they are contingently existent and other-caused. For Spinoza, modes are 
not just properties, but individuals are modes as well. Therefore, all the people, animals, 
and all entities in the universe are modes, because they depend for their existence on 
another factor, namely God. Our existence is contingent on the existence of God and the 
will of God. Our existence is contingent, because our concepts are not necessary. In other 
words, it is conceivable for us not to exist. Our existence does not belong to our essence. 
This definition of mode is hence broad for it includes properties, individuals, facts, 
relations, and processes. Modes exist in substance and they depend for their existence on 
substance. This means that substance is logically prior to modes, because without the 
substance the mode can’t be conceived and it doesn’t exist.  
An attribute is ‘ a way of conceptualizing the nature (essence) of a substance’. Does 
this mean that the attributes of a substance are subjective projection onto the substance? An 
attribute is our intellectual perception of what a constituent of the substance is. This means 
that what we consider as attributes of substance is limited by our intellectual abilities or 
limitations of intellectual abilities. But this does not mean that attributes are fabrications of 
our minds. The attributes are a reflection of what we can conceive. Therefore, the attributes 
are real and not fabricated. The attributes are different ways of intelligibly describing the 
essence of substance. The claim that a substance has two attributes means that the 
substance is conceptualized in two different ways. In the Cartesian tradition, there are two 
principal attributes: thought and extension. Attributes of the substance are not available 
through an empirical investigation of the senses but the attributes are revealed to the 
intellect solely through a process of abstraction. An attribute of a substance constitutes its 
essence. Spinoza follows Descartes’ suit by accepting that substance has two attributes, 
namely extension and thought. This means that God has two attributes: thought and 
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extension. Accordingly, God’ essence is perceived by us in two distinct and independent 
way, as material and mental. Our physical sciences are as much the study of divine nature 
as our inquiries in the realm psychological and spiritual. These two constitute two distinct 
and independent inquiries. One cannot be substituted by another. An analogy might help. 
The nature of light can be perceived either as waves or as particles. There are 
corresponding equations for either approach and both approaches are equally correct. But 
neither explanation can replace the other. In the same manner God’s nature is perceived and 
understood by a material investigation or a mental investigation. There are both equally 
valid. These raise a concern at the first sight. Does this imply that God has two, and only 
two, attributes? If the answer is affirmative then it is possible to conceive of an additional 
attribute that God hasn’t. This would imply that there would be another substance 
independent of God hence there is no monism. Spinoza in his premises for proposition 14 
covers this basis by saying that God has all attributes even if they are infinite. This claim 
then implies that there are infinite ways to conceptualize the nature of God, but our 
conceptual machinery allows two ways, namely material and mental.  
A further claim set forth by Spinoza is that no two substances can share the same 
attributes. The reason for this as following: attributes distinguish between the substances. 
This distinction of substantial based on attributes is due to the fact that attributes constitute 
the essence of a substance. For two substances to share the same attribute is to be 
indiscernible. This implies plurality and plurality excludes necessary existence since it 
implies being caused by another factor. But God is conceived as self-caused. God’ nature 
determines its existence. Therefore, God exists necessarily. An objection to this line of 
argumentation by Spinoza can be introduced. A round square ‘cannot be caused to exist by 
anything else’ therefore, ‘it must be self-caused’, and hence it must exist necessarily. 
Spinoza would argue that a round square is an idea and therefore it is a mode. A round 
square is not a substance. Ideas can be wrong when they don’t correspond externally to 
facts and when they are internally inconsistent and contradictory. The correctness of ideas 
depends on the aforementioned factors and their general correspondence and relation to the 
system of ideas as whole, such as logical relations. A round square is a false idea because it 
is internally inconsistent. The notions of squareness and roundness are mutually exclusive 
and they are contradictory. The reason that such an object cannot be imagined is a 
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testimony to the fact that it is inconceivable and non-existent. A round squared is not self-
caused or other-caused. It is not cased at all, for it is inconceivable and non-existent. The 
fact they can be formed in language is by the same reason that the sentence can be uttered: 
’bachelors are married men’. Even after its formation this sentence is false and 
contradictory. In the same token no conclusion can be drawn about round squares. 
The only plausible objection against Spinoza and his proposition that ‘ there can be, 
or conceived, no other substance but God’ is the link between conceivability of a substance 
and its existence. Spinoza and other rationalists propose that what is conceivable is existent. 
The objection against this idea is along the lines of a general empiricist objection to 
rationalism. There is no direct proof that the world is as we conceive it. According to the 
empiricists, our knowledge of the world arises from experience and it is experience 
dependent. This dependency on experience renders our knowledge of the world contingent. 
Therefore, our concepts can never exist necessarily. Kant exposed the weakness of the 
empiricist position by proving that our knowledge begins with experience, but it doesn’t 
arise from experience. We don’t observe our experience but objects of our experience. The 
knowledge of experience requires knowledge of objects of experience. The manifold of 
sense-impressions does not present this knowledge; therefore, the knowledge is already 
present as a priori concepts that find their content in experience.  
It seems as if Spinoza can establish the link between conceivability and existence it 
is a plausible proposition. His definition of attribute, substance, and mode clarifies his 
premises. The conclusion of his argument follows from his premises as they stand and he is 
presenting a valid argument. For the sake of summary his argument is presented again: 1) 
‘God exists’, 2) ‘God possess all attributes by definition’, 3) ‘no two substance can share an 
attribute’. Therefore, ‘there can be, or conceived, no other substance but God’. 
With the advent of quantum mechanics and the theories of relativity, the monism of 
Spinoza finds more resonance in our era than any other philosopher from his epoch. 
Spinoza moves away from an individuated and personal deity to a universal divinity. 
Modern physics tells us that all entities in the universe are built from the same ‘stuff’, 
namely stings. The string theory also unifies the multiplicity of the physical laws. The 
ultimate property of all entities is described within the concept of inertia, which 
incorporates motion and rest. Spinoza’s notion of God is not apart from nature and 
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universe. For Spinoza God is universe, self-caused, self-explanatory, and self-sufficient. 
There is no reason to posit another entity to explain the existence of God, the universe. This 
is a closed system. All the entities stand in a causal relationship to each other, but the whole 
is self-caused. This is all in line with the findings of modern physics.  
Another charge leveled against Spinoza is that his notion of God is not God 
anymore. This is not a valid criticism, since the Judeo-Christian concept of God is not the 
only notion. There are billions of people who have different concepts and there are no 
objective criteria to prefer one to the other. The Vedic and Buddhist notion of the absolute 
are far from the concept of personal god, but no one from a philosophical perspective can 
claim that they are wrong. Such objection at the end comes down to personal convictions. 
Benedict Spinoza was mistaken in some of his assumptions and arguments. But his 
intellectual achievement is in the windows he opened to us. He should be applauded and 
revered for this very fact.                                        
 
2.4 Parallelism:         
 Similarly, to interactionism, parallelism postulates that there are two fundamentally 
different, and independent, kinds of substances: the material and the mental. According to 
parallelism, humans are made of both substances. However, there are no casual interactions 
between the two realms. Mental and material events happen in the same person, but they 
are causally independent of another. This is not to deny that sometimes mental and material 
events regularly precede each other. However, the sequence of events is not causally based. 
For example, breaking a leg is regularly succeeded by pain. However, a broken leg does not 
cause pain. These events parallel each other. This means that certain mental events are 
always accompanied by certain material events and vice versa.  
An obvious objection is that parallelism, as it is formulated above, cannot explain 
the observed regularities. If parallelism is taken to be correct, then mental and material 
events ensue completely independent of each other, then there is no reason for a regular 
relationship between them to exist. It seems unreasonable that these regularities can be 
explained terms of chance, because the concepts of regularity and chance are contradictory. 
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Malebranche and Leibniz attempt to resolve this problem by proposing the theories of 
occasionalism and pre-established harmony respectively.38  
Occasionalism proposes that on the occasion that certain material events occur, God 
causes certain mental events; and on the occasion that certain mental events occur, God 
causes certain material events to happen. There is no direct causal interaction between mind 
and matter, but God makes this interaction indirectly possible.  
 
Fig. 2.8: Parallelism (www.ship.webspace.edu) 
 
Pre-established harmony claims that the sequence of mental and material events 
proceed according to God’s pre-established plan. In essence, it is predetermined which 
mental event follows which mental event and what material event follows what material 
event. Moreover, the sequence of the mental and material events is harmoniously pre-
determined. Hence, Leibniz replaces the concept of causality with one of divine pre-
established harmony.  
 
Fig. 2.9: Parallelism (www.ship.webspace.edu) 
Leibniz asserts that consciousness and matter constitute two independent and 
separate realms.  They cannot produce change in each other.  If substances could cause 
                                                
38 Kim, Philosophy of Mind. 
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change in each other, then they would not be self-sufficient anymore and there would be no 
substances.  He offers what is called the argument from knowledge in support of the dualist 
position. 
“Suppose that there be a machine, the structure of which produces thinking, feeling, and 
perceiving; imagine this machine enlarged, but preserving the same proportions, so that you 
could enter it as if it were a mill.  This being supposed, you might visit inside; but what 
would you observe there?  Nothing but parts, which push and move each other, and never 
anything that could explain perception.”39 
 
The point is that knowledge about physical workings of the brain does not reveal anything 
about consciousness.  Hence, consciousness is separate and independent of the body and 
physical brain.  If this is the case, then how do we explain experience?   
According to Leibniz, the relationship between mind and body is not one of 
causality, since the physical world is causally closed.  Experience is more like the 
performance of an orchestra in that each member performs his duty independent of others 
and based on directions received from the conductor.  The action of an orchestra could have 
the illusion that the players cause each other to play certain notes, but in reality the 
harmony and synchronicity is achieved through the directions of a creative intelligence.  In 
the case of the universe, this creative intelligence is God.  It follows that God sets the 
actions of mind and matter in motion and synchronizes them at each instant.  This is pre-
established harmony.  
The main difference between occasionalism and pre-established harmony is that for 
Malebranche requires God to be constantly intervening in the natural world. While, for 
Leibniz God is required to pre-program the universe so that mental and material regularities 
occur.  
There are two major problems with both of these positions. First, there is no reason 
to reject interactionism. Common sense points to the validity of interaction between the 
mental and the physical. Parallelism rejects interactionism to save substance dualism, while 
it seems more appropriate to sacrifice substance dualism at the altar of interactionism and 
not vice versa.  
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The second problem is that both positions use an ad hoc hypothesis. The two 
parallelist theories have one main feature in common. They both postulate the existence of 
an unobservable entity, God, to explain the observed regularities between the mental and 
material events. Here, God is considered a theoretical entity, since it is an unobservable 
entity conceived as part of a theory intended to explain a phenomenon. Leibniz justifies his 
conception of God in two ways. First, where postulation is necessary for explanation it is 
justified. In the case of mind-body problem, since interactionism is incapable to resolve the 
problem, it seems justified to postulate God. The second point is that Leibniz believes that 
his postulation is more reasonable than that of Malebranche, because Malebranche’s 
hypothesis needs more action by God than it is necessary. We should hypothesize nothing 
more than it is necessary to explain the observation.  This is the very principle, which 
constitutes the second objection against parallelism.  
As Leibniz noted the principle that if an explanation can be given without 
hypothesizing something, then the postulation should not be made. Occasionalism claims 
that God continuously intervenes at each instance of mind-body regularities. Since Leibniz 
requires God’s intervention only once, occasionalist parallelism should be rejected in favor 
of Leibniz’s parallelism. However, does this principle apply to Leibniz’s theory as well? 
The answer is that we can give up dualism altogether in favor of either mentalism or 
materialism. Hence, it is more in the spirit of the Ocham’s principle to give up dualism 
instead of holding on to dualism by postulating the causal action of an observable entity to 
explain mind-body regularities.  
If it can be shown that by a particular postulation we can explain a phenomenon and 
we can predict facts, then the postulation can be justified. Such predictability is important, 
because it makes the hypothesis testable by observation and experimentation, and by this 
means confirmed or disconfirmed. This is the essence of scientific methodology. However, 
when a hypothesis lacks predictive powers, testability, and it is not necessary to explain any 
phenomenon, then it must be rejected. It would be an ad hoc hypothesis. Moreover, any 
thing it assumes to explain something is a theoretical entity the only use of which is to 
allow its theory to explain what the theory otherwise could not explain. Leibniz’s theory 
has no predictive power. Hence, it is not testable by observation or experimentation. 
Consequently, Leibniz’s theory is ad hoc. 
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In all fairness, however, we should grant that Leibniz had a different concept of 
substance from that of Descartes and most importantly Newton. According to the Cartesian 
and Newtonian perspective, the hallmark of substance is extension, res extensa. Leibniz 
conceives substance as force rather than matter in motion. For Leibniz, the physical world 
is not primarily made of concrete particulars or discrete entities. The true make up of 
universe can be best characterized as a continuum. Leibniz maintains that division, or 
sectioning, of the universe into smaller independent units is at best arbitrary, since this 
separation from the ‘next section’ is ad hoc.  
“Now this is the axiom which I utilize, namely, that “no event takes place by a leap.” This 
proposition flows, in my view, from the laws of order and rests on the same rational ground 
by virtue of which it is generally recognized that motion does not occur by leap, that is, that 
a body in order to go from one place to another must pass through definite intermediate 
places… I do not believe extension alone extension alone constitutes substance, since its 
conception is incomplete…For one can analyze it into plurality, continuity and co-existence 
(that is, simultaneous existence of parts). Plurality has to do with number, and continuity 
with time and motion; co-existence, on the contrary, is the only thing that approaches the 
extension…Hence I believe that our thought of substance is perfectly satisfied in the 
conception of force and not in extension. Besides, there should be no need to seek any other 
explanation for the conception of power or force than that it is the attribute from which 
change follows and its subject is substance itself…Since activity is the characteristic mark 
of substance, extension on the contrary affirms nothing other than the continual reiteration 
or the propagation of an already presupposed effort and counter-effort, that is, resitant 
substance, and therefore, extension cannot possibly constitute substance itself… 
There is nothing in motion itself apart from the reality of the momentary transition which is 
determined by means of force and a nisus for change. In that force, therefore, consists 
whatever there is in material nature apart from its being the object of geometry or 
extension…”40 
The notion of substance continual force is akin to the process ontology, which is 
promoted in this work. Moreover, it brings Leibniz notion of substance into closest 
theoretical relation to Aristotle’s notion of substance and entelechy, as the internal principle 
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of orderly creativeness, which is the hallmark of all processes, as we will see. Leibniz was 
fully aware of this kinship: 
“We…attain here an understanding of the traditional Aristotelian doctrine of the forms or 
the entelechies—which was justifiably regarded as puzzling and appeared scarcely to be 
understood by the authors themselves. Accordingly, we believe that this philosophy, which 
has been accepted for centuries, is not be discarded in general, but only stand in need of an 
elucidation which make it consistent as far as possible. We shall…develop it with new 
truths.” 41        
 
Leibniz maintains that the unit of force is not just a plausible substitute for res 
extensa, but also it provides a basis for a unified world-view. The ambition is to unify 
religion and science based on an equal footing for both. Leibniz calls this unifying principle 
of unit of force monads.42 The question, however, is how do monads produce a universe of 
plurality. In other words, how do monads differ from each other? The problem is that we 
cannot use the notion of size and space—in other words extension—as differentiating 
principles, because according to Leibniz force is a more basic principle than extension. For 
Leibniz, the only other alternative would be difference in psychic qualities. Here, Leibniz 
resorts to the basic Cartesian dualism that the universe can be divided into res extensa or 
res cogitans. Leibniz proposes the primacy of force over extension. However, the dualism 
is nevertheless maintained. This time it is dualism of force and mind as opposed to 
extension and mind. So the argument is that if the monad is not a body, then it must be 
mind. Leibniz bases this conclusion on our subjectivity and qualia. We confirm this 
conclusion by the experience in ourselves of being alive. Hence, according to Leibniz, the 
universe is composed of an immense collection of monads, or lives, or psychic units. 
“Substance is a being capable of action. It is simple or compound. Simple substance is that 
which has no parts. Compound substance is the collection of simple substances or monads. 
Monas is a Greek word which signifies unity, or that which is one…Simple substances, 
lives, souls, spirits are unities…Consequently all nature is full of life. 
Monads, having no parts, cannot be formed or decomposed. They cannot begin or end 
naturally; and consequently last as long as the universe, which will be changed but will not 
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be destroyed. They cannot have shapes; otherwise they would have parts. And consequently 
a monad, in itself and at a given moment, could not be distinguished from another except by 
it internal qualities and actions, which can be nothing else than in perceptions (that is, 
representation of the compound, or of what is external, in the simple), and its appetitions 
(that is tendencies to pass from one perception to another), which are principles of 
change… 
There is also no way of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed in its inner 
being by any other creature, for…the monads have no windows through which anything can 
enter or depart…Nevertheless, the monads must have some qualities, otherwise they would 
not even be entities… 
It follows from what has been said that the natural changes of the monads proceed from an 
internal principle, since an external cause could not influence their inner being.”43  
 
Leibniz’s challenge is to identify that identity which generates the changing states 
while it maintains its unity. For Leibniz, the only proper candidate is consciousness, which 
expresses itself in the conscious existence of existence. In other words, consciousness is the 
unifying principle that guarantees identity and unity through change. Moreover, 
consciousness is the internal principle of change. Consciousness is not just unique to 
human mind. Consciousness constitutes a continuum and every monad is a focus within 
this continuum. Hence, there are many different levels of consciousness and many different 
monads at each level. The individuality of each monad is constituted in the ownership of 
experience of that monad, in other words its apperception.   
“The passing state, which involves and represents a multitude in unity or in the simple 
substance, is nothing else than what is called perception, which must be distinguished from 
apperception or consciousness… 
The action of the internal principle which causes the change or the passage from one 
perception to another, may be called appetition… 
Therefore there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead in the universe, no chaos, no 
confusion except in appearance…We see that each living body has a ruling enetelechy, 
which in the animal is soul.”44   
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In short we can say that, according to Leibniz, reality is comprised of a continuum 
of consciousness-force that manifests itself as centers of consciousness, which differ 
precisely by the degree of ownership of it, experience, or apperception. It is in place of 
causality that Leibniz introduces parallelism, synchronicity, produced through a pre-
established harmony. In the universe every degree of consciousness exists. It follows that 
reality in essence is not a collection of monads but a hierarchy of monads. The drive to self-
fulfillment is the essence of monads. 
“Each monad is a living mirror, or endowed with internal activity, representative according 
to its point of view of the universe, and as regulated as the universe itself…Thus there is a 
perfect harmony between the perceptions of the monad and the motions of the bodies, pre-
established at the beginning between the system of efficient causes and that final causes…” 
45   
It is important to point out that I find deep resonance with Leibniz’s notion of force-
consciousness continuum as the fundament of the universe. Moreover, his presentation of 
pre-established harmony anticipates the modern of synchronicity. However, he gave up on 
the idea of causality too soon and had no intuition for emergence as a viable element in our 
understanding of the fabric of universe. It is to these ideas that we return in the last chapters 
of this work.  Nevertheless, I owe great debt to Leibniz’s intuitions.  
 
2.5 Popperian Interactionist Dualism: 
 Popper presents a modern version of interactionist dualism.46 He takes the existence 
of consciousness as a brute fact of universe. Hence, he does not feel compelled to provide a 
proof for consciousness. Furthermore, he takes the interaction of mind and body, and the 
physical world, as a brute fact as well. Consequently, his project consists of providing a 
viable account of dualism, which accounts for these two truisms. Furthermore, in contrast 
to Descartes, Popper considers consciousness as a process and not as a substance. However, 
he is consistent in his dualism by asserting that the conscious process is not a physical 
phenomenon. Popper rejects the principle of causal closedness of the physical world. In 
fact, he believes that the physical world is open and indetermined. According to him, 
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quantum mechanics provides the gap in the universe for the causal efficacy of 
consciousness.  
  
  
 
Fig. 2.10: Popperian Worlds (www.knowledgejump.com) 
 
Popper believes that we can distinguish three distinct worlds, or realms, of human 
existence and experience.47 One could also call them levels of reality. World 1 is the realm 
of material entities. The objects of World 1 have two basic properties. First, they are 
objective, since they can be experienced, and known, potentially by all minds. This means 
that they enjoy an epistemic symmetry. For instance, two astronomers have potentially 
equal access to a supernova for their investigation. Neither one of them has an inherently 
privileged access to the supernova. This point becomes clear when we compare this case to 
a case of radical epistemic asymmetry such as having a headache. In the case of headache, 
only the person who has the headache experiences and immediately knows the headache. 
Others can only know of the headache through the report, or the behavior, of the owner of 
that experience. Third person perspective has, and can have, no knowledge of the first 
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person, or phenomenal, perspective. Consequently, the case of headache represents an 
epistemic asymmetry.  
The second fundamental property of World 1 objects is that they are autonomous. 
This means that the existence of World 1 objects does not depend on the existence of 
perceiving minds. This is a categorical rejection of Berkeleyian subjectivist idealism and 
any inclination thereto.48 Esse is not percipi.  
World 2 is the world of mental states, events, and processes. It is among the entities 
of World 2 that we find love, hate, desires, hopes, pleasures, pains, thoughts, feelings, and 
desires. Contrary to World 1, World 2 is characterized by non-autonomy and subjectivity. 
They are not autonomous, since they are radically epistemic asymmetrical; and they are 
subjective, because they have no independent existence apart from the subjects, who 
experience them. However, there are other entities, which do not lend themselves to such 
simple categorical classification, such as words, propositions, laws, states, concepts, 
mathematical ideas, art, music, et cetera. These entities are immaterial, but they are 
objective. This means that they are created by human mind, but once they are created by us 
they evolve in a way that is beyond our complete control, direction, and prediction. 
Furthermore, they become objects of critical analysis, argumentation, synthesis, and 
processing by all of us in a symmetric epistemic manner. In this sense, the entities of World 
3 are an intermediary between World 1, and 2. They are created by human mind by taking a 
thought about the World 1 objects and expressing that thought through a medium such as 
language, art, music, film, poetry, etc. Furthermore, this medium makes this private, 
subjective, thought public. Consequently, this creative act turns an epistemic asymmetrical 
one into a symmetrical one. As a result, I can share my private, subjective thoughts, 
feelings, and desires objectively with others. This is the cornerstone of all communication.  
World 3 entities, hence, have three major characteristics. First, they are human 
inventions. Our theories, arguments, arts, language, rituals are lifeless constructs of our 
production. In this respect, they are comparable to bird’s nest, beehive, or ants colony. 
Secondly, they are fallible but they are objective nevertheless. For Popper, all knowledge is 
fallible, including scientific knowledge. However, this infallibility provides the ground for 
criticism, which is the ground for real progress. The objectivity of World 3 theories and 
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constructs depends on the human ability to understand, communicate, and criticize them. 
This is in sharp contrast to the classical definition of knowledge as true justified belief, 
which must pave the road for the infallibility of knowledge. Thirdly, the objects of World 3 
are subject to an evolutionary process, which is both creative and dialectically critical. 
 Entities of World 3 also make critical rationality possible. Critical rationalism can 
be understood as an attitude that I could be wrong in holding a certain view and you may be 
right in holding a different belief. However, we can arrive closer truth by an honest and 
critical intellectual effort. This effort is nothing other than a critical discussion and 
discourse. This is a dialectical process, through which we ascertain a problem, we suggest a 
theory as its provisional solution, we try to eliminate the problems with the tentative theory, 
and through the solidification of the provisional theory we arrive at a new problem. This 
process depends on the existence of the possibility of contradiction. In other words, this 
dialectical process depends on the possibility of propositions that cannot be all true and 
they cannot be all false. This can only be a property of World 3. There are no propositions 
in World 1 and 2, since statements are neither material entities, nor mental things. 
Propositions are produced by human mind, but they affect the world that is totally 
unpredictable to the mind that created them. Hence, they are autonomous. Moreover, 
statements are objective, since they can be understood and critically by all potentially 
equally.  
For Popper, understanding World 3 objects is a critical and creative process: 
“According to my view, we may understand the grasping of a World 3 object as an active 
process. We have to explain it as the making, the re-creation of that object. In order to 
understand a difficult Latin sentence, we have to construe it: to see how it is made, and to 
re-construct it, to re-make it. In order to understand a problem, we have to try at least some 
of the more obvious solutions, and to discover that they fail; thus we rediscover that there is 
a difficulty—a problem. In order to understand a theory, we have first to understand the 
problem which the theory was designed to solve, and to see whether the theory does better 
than any of the more obvious solutions…In all these cases, understanding becomes 
“intuitive” when we have acquired the feeling that we can do the work of reconstruction at 
will at anytime.”49  
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Thoughts expressed through the medium of language, or any other medium, can be 
dissected, analyzed, and investigated the way an anatomist dissects, analyzes, and 
investigates a material body. Through the creative act of creating a proposition, a scientific 
study of World 2 ideas of World 1 becomes possible. The realm of concepts is open to 
analysis, synthesis, and progress like any other realm of scientific investigation. This point 
illustrates a fundamental aspect of Popper’s theory. The entities of Worlds 1, 2, and 3 are in 
constant interaction with each other.  
The interactive nature of these entities is the foundation of the learning process. Our 
minds create, and act upon, the items of World 3. In turn, the entities of World 3 evolve in 
an unpredictable manner and they act upon our cognitions, emotions, and motivations. 
Hence, we contribute to World 3 and we learn from the contribution of others to World 3. 
This is the basis of intersubjectivity. For Popper, a fully conscious self is the highest 
expression, or stage of development, of World 2 in a critical interaction with World 3. 
Furthermore, World 2 and 3 are in constant interaction with World 1. The objects of World 
1 provide the contents of our concepts, thoughts, and propositions.  
The relationship between Worlds 1, 2, 3 is not just interactive, but it is regulative as 
well. World 2 acts as a control system for World 1. In other words, the mind has evolves as 
control system for the body. In return, World 3 has evolved as a control center for World 2. 
This means that our concepts and theories regulate directly our cognitions, emotions, and 
motivations and indirectly our bodies and our physical world. However, the regulative 
relationship is not solely unidirectional as portrayed above. There feedback loops, which 
render this regulational hierarchy bidirectional. There are feedback loops that function as 
control centers from World 1 to World 2 and From World 2 to World 3. In other words, the 
regulative relationship functions both top to bottom and bottom to top. This makes intuitive 
sense since out theories about the world direct our behavior in the world. Moreover, it is 
also the case that the facts of the world shape our theories and thoughts, feelings, and 
desires.  
Popper believes that the interactive and regulative principles serve as counterpoints 
against materialism, particularly eliminative materialism championed by Quine. Where 
Quine complains, “That the bodily state exist anyway, add the others?”50 Popper counters: 
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“I admit that the denial of mental states simplifies matters. For example, the difficult body-
mind problem disappears, which no doubt is very convenient: it saves us the trouble of 
solving it. But I don’t think that Quine is consistent when he asks ‘Why add the others?’ To 
whom does he address the questions? To our bodies? Or to our physical states? Or to our 
behaviour? Quine argues. And arguments, I hold, belong to World 3. Arguments may be 
understood, or grasped. And understanding, or grasping is a World 2 affair: our bodies can 
grasp a stone or stick, but they cannot grasp or understand an argument.”51 
“Also, I am sure that it is Quine’s intention (again a World 2 term) to convince us by his 
argument, or at least to give us something to think about (two more World 2 terms). 
Clearly, he would not be satisfied (also a World 2 term) if he would only evoke a certain 
kind of behavior—such as the noises ‘Exactly!’ or ‘That is so!’ or ‘Well done!’52 
 
Popper widens his critic of materialism by claiming that the reductionistic project of 
materialism amounts to nothing more than a promissory note.53 According to Popper, 
science has less than a stellar track record of successful reductions. The reductionist project 
is fundamentally flawed, since it is beseeched by problems “such as the difficulty of 
reducing to psychology, and then to biology, the ups and downs of the British Trade Deficit 
and its relations to the British Net National Income”.54  
Popper believes that the major culprit for, a large extent, ignoring the study of 
consciousness in natural sciences is the influence of justificationism in scientific and 
empirical epistemology. The scientific version of justificationism is influenced by 
positivism, which rejects any investigation or talk of non-reducible mental events, states, or 
processes such as consciousness as incoherent drivel. However, Popper sees any attempt of 
reduction in this field of investigation as best a promissory note. According Popper, 
consciousness has evolved as an emergent property of World 1 and conscious selves have 
evolves as an emergent property of World 2. Furthermore, as we have seen, World 3 is the 
product of a creative and critical activity of World 2. Interestingly, he postulates that World 
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2 is fixed in World 3 and, in fact, cannot exist without it.55 In fact, his central argument is 
that we must understand (World 2 entity) a World 3 concept or theory before we can utilize 
it to achieve something in World 1. 
Here we seem across a vicious circularity in Popper’s position. The question is how 
is it possible that World 3 is the product of an creative and critical act of human mind and 
our minds depend on it for it existence. How can the mind be dependent for its existence on 
that which has it produced? However, Popper claims that this puzzle can be understood, if 
we realize that the relationship between World 2 and 3 is one of interactive and symbiotic 
co-evolution. The further evolution of mind depends on World 3 and not its original 
coming to existence. 56 
We can summarize Popper’s theory of consciousness as such: animal consciousness 
has evolved as a control system for the body. World 3 has evolved as a synthetic yet 
adaptable control system for the mind. The evolution of human consciousness has evolved 
with higher linguistic functions. The impetus for this evolution is the finding solutions to 
the problem of survival, which face organisms living in World 1. Thus, World 2 and 3 
evolved as adaptations mechanisms for World 1 challenges.  
Popper’s understanding of evolutionary process is based on his dialectical schema 
of how we go about critically to solve a given problem. Let us assume that P1 is the 
problem at hand. So, we begin by proposing a tentative solution, TT, to solve P1. Next, we 
begin a critical evaluation of TT through a process of error elimination called EE. This is a 
critical and creative, which leads to a new state of affairs. The new state of affairs, P2, 
represents simultaneously a solution to P1 and a new challenge and problem, which starts 
the whole process anew. Popper believes that this dialectical process or activity of an 
organism in response to the challenges of its environment (World 1) can account for the 
emergent evolution of new realms of experience such as World 2 and World 3. Popper 
states: 
“P1 may be due to the slow drying up of large pools containing fish. This may pose for 
individual a problem of insufficient supply of food within the pool in which the fish finds 
itself. Then TT may consist in a changed behaviour of this fish. For example, the organism 
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in question may invent a new behavioural aim: the aim of getting from one pool to another 
over dry land. With it, it invents a new problem P2; how to get from one pool to another. P1 
was the problem of how to get food. P2 is the problem of how get over dry land. It is clear 
that these two problems are completely different—qualitatively different.  
Thus P2 may be an entirely new problem—one problem that has never before arisen 
(although it may arise in stages)—while P1 was a very old problem, that of getting enough 
food.  
According to our schema, new behavioural aims, such as getting over land into 
another pool, will be followed by new skills—and these may become traditional in a 
population of fish. If they do, then those anatomic mutations that make it even slightly 
easier to practice the new skills will be of immediate advantage. They will be favoured by 
natural selection.” 57 
 
This passage illustrates the mechanism, through which World 2 can lead to changes 
in World 1. It is important to emphasize that the problems cannot be reduced to World 1, or 
World 2. They emerge as properties of the organism’s interactions with its environment and 
its attempt to survive in that environment. These problems and challenges act as the 
impetus for evolution. Life is a process of problem solving both at the individual and 
species level. At the individual level, testing new behavioral patterns solves problems. 
Species solve their problems by introducing new genetic patterns. Consequently, 
modification of behavioral aims leads to change in behavioral dispositions, which in turn 
may lead to favoring some mutations and anatomical changes over others.  
Human consciousness and self have evolved from a more primitive animal 
consciousness in response to the challenges presented by the environment and the attempt 
to solve these problems. Popper postulates that evolving animal systems exhibit a kind of 
‘genetic dualism’. An organism, accordingly, consists of two distinct yet interacting control 
systems. One system is a ‘behavior-controlling part’ such as the nervous system of higher 
animals. The other system is an ‘executive part’ such as the sense organs and the motor 
system. 58 The interaction between these two systems represents the interaction between 
World 1 and World 2. According to this picture, consciousness represents the behavior-
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controlling unit (World 2), which is in constant interaction with the executive unit 
representing the body in the world (World 1). The interaction between these two systems is 
regulated by our objective knowledge derived from our critical treatment of our problems 
(World 3).  
Central to this notion is the role of language.59 According to Popper, language has 
four distinct functions. The higher functions represent the descriptive and critical roles, 
which provide the foundation for the World 3 objective knowledge. So, there are four 
major functions of language. There are two lower functions and two higher functions. The 
higher linguistic functions presuppose the lower function, but the reverse relation does not 
obtain. The two higher functions are: argumentative or critical function, and the descriptive 
or informative function. The lower linguistic functions consist of the communicative and 
the expressive functions. Thus, the hierarchy of these functions is as such: 
5. Argumentative or critical function. 
6. Descriptive or informative function. 
7. Communicative function. 
8. Expressive function.        
According to this view, organisms, which are capable of the critical or 
argumentative function a fortiriori can describe, communicate and inform. However, an 
organism, which is capable of expression, is not automatically capable of higher functions.  
Whether, an individual will reach the higher functions is a matter of ontogeny and 
phylogeny. For example, cats are capable of the expressive function, but their genetic and 
evolutionary heritage precludes them from reaching the higher functions. A baby, on the 
other hand, at the outset is capable of only the expressive functions. However, through 
subsequent developmental stages the baby can reach the higher functions such as the 
informative function or the critical function.  
It is also worth noting that each function represents a particular realm of human 
experience. The critical function represents the realm of theories and discursive cognition. 
The descriptive function represents the realm of myths, statements, stories, art, and 
symbolic cognition. These two realms represent the basis for World 3, as discussed above. 
The communicative and expressive functions represent the realm of sensations and 
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perceptions, motivations, emotions, and simple cognitions based on perceptions. These two 
functions represent the basis for World 2.  
Popper uses the terms ‘full consciousness’, ‘the self’, and ‘the ego’ interchangeably. 
According to him, ‘human consciousness contains a great many residues of lower forms of 
consciousness, such as all kind vague feelings mingled with more pronounced feelings of 
pain…there is no doubt that we achieve full consciousness—or the highest state of 
consciousness—when we are thinking, especially when we try to formulate our thoughts in 
the form of statements and arguments’ 60  
The self consists of mental and psychological events, processes, and states and their 
logical contents and the self is closely associated with objective knowledge and human 
language. In other words, the self is a World 2 phenomenon ‘anchored’ in World 3. 
Furthermore, the self has an intuitive understanding of World 3: “…theories about space 
and time, about physical bodies in general, about people and their bodies, about our own 
particular bodies as extending in space and time, and about certain regularities of being 
awake and being asleep.”61   
The self is the consequence of placing oneself in an objective light, which enables 
us to see oneself from a third person perspective. This is only possible through a medium of 
a descriptive language. Hence, descriptive function of language makes the self possible. It 
is through descriptive language that we become aware of ourselves. Furthermore, the self 
functions as a ‘plastic’ control center for the body, and it is itself subsumed under the 
control of the theories that it understands (World 3): 
“In all higher organisms we find a hierarchy of controls. There are controls controlling the 
heartbeat, the breathing, and the balance of organism. There are chemical controls and 
nervous controls. There are controls of healing processes and controls of growth. And in all 
freely moving animals, there is the central control of the movements of the animal. This 
control, it appears, is the highest in the hierarchy. I conjecture that mental states are 
connected with this central and highest control system, and that they help to make this 
system more plastic. A control like that which makes us blink when something suddenly 
                                                
60 Popper, Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem, p. 114. 
61 Popper, Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem, pp. 114-115. 
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approaches our eyes I call a ‘non-plastic control’. When the possible reactions cover a wide 
spectrum of possibilities, I speak of a ‘plastic control’.”62   
 
It is important to realize that he does not reject the notion of unconscious control. 
He admits that many of actions are unconsciously controlled. Either, they are automatic in 
nature, or through many sessions of practice they have been relegated to an unconscious 
control. However, what we would consider unique human action is under the plastic control 
of the self.  
At birth, we are not selves. On the contrary, we learn to be selves.63 Learning to be 
a self is a becoming. It is an active process. In this process, at first, we learn to interact 
other human beings. Then, we learn to understand critically and relate to our given culture 
and the body of knowledge and theories left to us (World 3). Lastly, we contribute to our 
World 3 heritage through our own critical understanding. Popper states: “The child learns 
to know his environment, but persons are the most important objects within his 
environment; and through their interest in him—and through learning about his own 
body—he learns in time that he is a person himself.”64 Consequently, becoming a self is 
comprised of two stages. First, we become conscious of others. Secondly, we develop 
theories about others and we make inference about ourselves: 
“Long before we attain consciousness and knowledge of ourselves, we have, normally, 
become aware of other persons, usually our parents…I suggest that a consciousness of self 
begins to develop through the medium of other persons: just as we learn to see ourselves in 
a mirror, so the child becomes conscious of himself by sensing his reflection in the mirror 
of other people’s consciousness of himself.”65    
 
The self is not an unchangeable entity. It is a process of becoming and evolution through 
acquiring of objective knowledge through a process of critical understanding and creatively 
solving the challenges of one’ life. Consequently, learning to become a self is a lifelong 
progression with no predestined ending.   
                                                
62 Popper, Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem, p. 112. 
63 Popper and Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, p. 109. 
64 Popper and Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, p. 110. 
65 Popper and Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, pp. 109-110. 
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At this point, let us critically analyze Popper’s theory. The Popperian theory is 
based on two presuppositions: 
1. Consciousness exists. 
2. There is an interaction between consciousness and the physical world. This 
interaction is mediated through the ideal world of theories. 
He holds these two principles as brute facts about the world. Hence, his project is to prove 
that dualism obtains from these two principles. It is precisely this point, which proves 
problematic for him. It is not quite clear how one can prove the existence the independence 
conscious, or mental, realm by assuming that this conscious realm exists and it interacts 
with the physical world. The only way that one could prove the existence of an independent 
yet causally efficacious conscious realm is to show the prevalence of cases in which there is 
a neural action without physical causes. We should be looking for cases, in which we can 
detect physical effects without any measurable or detectable physical cause. In the case, we 
can conclude that the mental realm interacts with the physical world, but it is independent 
of it. However, such cases have never been found. To say that mental causes happen to be 
accompanied universally by physical causes does not answer the question but it raises a 
further fundamental question of why should it be so, if the two realms are independent of 
each other. Why should two independent realms always accompany each other? If the 
mental events are independent of the physical events, then why should they always be 
attending each other? This speaks of a universal necessity, which dualism cannot account 
for and in fact it undermines dualism.  
 Additionally, it seems that the entities of World 2 and 3 can only be physically 
instantiated. A thought is a thought when it can be spoken, heard, pictorially imagined, 
written down, etc. It is not clear what remains behind, if we take all this elements of a 
thought away. Are we still talking about a thought? This seems to be the case for all 
intentional mental states such as believing and thinking. Even mental states such as 
emotions, which are predominantly phenomenal in character, are anchored in some kind of 
physical change of state. What is fear without rapid beating of heart, the churning of 
stomach, cold sweat, wobbly knees, and so on? It is not my contention that fear or certain 
beliefs are the physical events alone, but it seems quite reasonable that they are intimately 
and necessarily related to some physical event, process, or state.  
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Even the items of the ideal world (World 3) seem to be instantiated by some 
physical entity. Ideas can be efficacious if, and only if they are expressed, and 
communicated, in one form or another. This does not mean that the meaning of a word can 
be reduced to its sounds, but that the physical instantiation of that meaning is necessary in 
its communication. Otherwise, it is a private meaning and we know, from Wittgenstein, that 
private language is nonsense. Language and meaning must be public and publicly 
communicable. Otherwise, they are nonsense.  
It seems to me that Popper is guilty of committing a fallacy of false dichotomy. 
Either we should be able to reduce all phenomena to physical events, or we should accept 
interactionist dualism. This is a false choice. There is such a theory as non-reductive 
physicalism. Popper’s fault is that he ignores this possibility. This does not mean that non-
reductive physicalism is the answer to our prayers, but that it presents a very viable 
position. Physicalism is not synonymous with reduction. Hence, we can safely conclude 
that Popper’s dualism does not prove its case in any consistent manner. However, Popper’s 
theory is full of profound and useful intuitions. Chief among these is his intuition to treat 
consciousness as a process and step away from the traditional substance and property view 
of the world.            
Popper also claims that quantum mechanics provides a gap for the causal efficacy of 
consciousness. This seems to be an arbitrary. We all agree that the workings of 
consciousness seem to be intractable and mysterious. We also know that the quantum world 
seems mysterious as well. Here, we have two mysteries. To say that one mystery can be 
explained in terms of another mystery seems to be quite random. It is like saying: 
1. S does not understand X. 
2. S does not understand Y. 
3. Therefore, X is identical to Y. Or X explains Y. 
This seems flat out fallacious. 
At this point, it seems plausible to assume that dualism is not a viable theory for the 
explanation of mind-body relationship. The remaining choice seems to be monism of one 
sort or another. Materialism is the view that the only type substance existing is material. 
The mental realm is postulated as a property of the material substance or nonexistent. The 
other option is to deny the existence of the material realm. Mentalism is the view, which 
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assumes that only the mind is real. Matter is a perceptual property of mind. It is to these 
forms of monism that we turn our attention. 
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Chapter Three 
Mentalism or Subjective Idealism 
Subjective idealism, or mentalism, is from a historic perspective a discredited view. 
However, a discussion of it is fruitful for one important reason. It closes the historical gap 
in our discussion of this topic. Furthermore, the concerns and the questions it raises are not 
dismissible. We should distinguish between the questions a theory asks and answers a 
theory furnishes. The point is that even if the answers might be wrong, this does not mean 
that the questions can be dismissed as well. 
Subjective mentalism maintains that the qualities of the world, which we perceive 
by means of our senses, are dependent on the mind of the perceiver. All we know is our 
own mental states, which are called ‘ideas’. For example, the property of warmth that we 
perceive in the fire is our own idea. Mentalism claims that the only kinds of things that 
exist are mental states, objects, events, and processes. According to mentalism, minds are 
wholly immaterial in nature. Material entities are collections of mental entities, particularly 
sensations. This notion can be illustrate by the example of perception. Suppose we are 
looking at a ripe, red cherry on a tree. When we do this, we get visual sensations of redness, 
and spherical shape. If we reach out and touch the cherry, we should receive tactile 
sensations; and we were to eat the cherry, we would receive gustatory and olfactory 
sensations. All this sounds commonsensical. However, the mentalist identifies the cherry 
with the group of sensations mentioned above. In other words, the cherry is nothing more 
than the collection of visual, tactile, gustatory, and olfactory sensations. A sensation is 
something, which exists when and only when it is perceived. Therefore, it is a mental 
entity. The cherry qualifies as a mental entity as well, because it is composed of entities all 
of which are sensations. Therefore, the general conclusion of mentalism is that everything 
that we perceive is combination of ideas in our own minds. Let us begin by considering the 
historical development in the thought of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, which culminated in 
the subjective mentalism position. 
 
3.1 Locke’s Theory of Perception and Identity: 
Locke’s epistemology assumes a Cartesian metaphysics that the world consists of 
two types of things, minds, and bodies. Furthermore, the mind knows its own states, which 
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Descartes calls ideas. For Descartes, the ideas represent the external world. For Locke, the 
mind thinks about its own ideas. By ideas, Locke means whatever is the object of the 
understanding when one thinks. This means that to understand the scope of human 
understanding is to investigate the origin of ideas. For example, I have an idea of an 
elephant. Before, I can pass any judgment about the elephant, for example, whether it is 
Indian, or African, I must determine whether there are elephants at all. The only way to 
make this determination is to trace the idea back to its origin. The idea of the elephant can 
be traced backed to sense perception or imagination. If the idea is traced back to sense 
perception, then it is real. Otherwise, it is imaginary. Hence, there are different types of 
ideas. There are ideas of sensation, which are derived from the action of sense organs. 
There are ideas of reflection, which arise from the manipulation of ideas of sensation, such 
as remembering, imagining, comparing, and so forth. The ideas of sensation constitute the 
raw material of all experience. The ideas of reflection comprise the consciousness of the 
operations, which the mind performs on the raw material provided by the sensation.  
Locke rejects the notion of innate ideas. At the beginning, the mind is a clean slate 
and hence all its ideas originate in experience. Therefore, only experience can confirm or 
disconfirm our beliefs. Experience is either the data of external sense, colors, smells, 
sounds, and so forth; or the data of reflection such as imagining, remembering, thinking, 
willing, etc.  
“All ideas come from sensation or reflection—let us then suppose the mind to be, as we 
say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas—How comes it to be furnished? 
… Whence has all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, 
from experience. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives 
itself. Our observation employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal 
operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our 
understandings with all the materials of thinking. These are the two foundations of 
knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.”66   
Locke draws a further distinction between simple and complex ideas. Simple Ideas 
stem from sensations or reflections. Furthermore, simple ideas can enter the mind through 
either a single sense or several sense organs, such as solidity and space respectively. 
                                                
66 Locke, J., (1984) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford University Press, pp. 2-5. 
 84 
Instances of simple ideas of reflection are reasoning, judging, etc. Complex ideas come 
from three different sources:  
1) Simple ideas can be united into complex ideas, such as beauty, a man, and a nation. 
2) Complex ideas can be formed through the relational analysis of two ideas (simple or 
complex). 3) Complex ideas can be formed through a process of abstraction of an idea from 
its accompanying ideas.   
 In our present inquiry, we are chiefly concerned with the ideas of sensation. As we 
just determined, ideas of sensation are objects of thought, which represent the external 
world. Hence, for example, a hot object is brought in contact with the skin, and the 
resulting stimulus is conveyed to the brain, the event in the brain produces the idea of the 
heat in the mind. If the hot object were red, then the idea of redness would be produced in 
the mind as well. Consequently, the set of ideas comprises a group of representations of the 
qualities of the real things. The mind knows the representations of the qualities of the real 
things and not the real things. 
 Locke believes that there are two types of qualities: primary, and secondary. 
Primary qualities are mathematical concepts such as extension in space, number, motion, 
and solidity. The primary qualities are those, which actually belong to objects in the 
external world, because no matter one does to things, they will still exhibit those qualities. 
Burn wood, for example, it will still exhibit some mass, shape, and extension in space. 
Secondary qualities, however, are those qualities, which change with different 
circumstances. In some cases, they disappear altogether. Color, taste, and smell are 
examples of secondary qualities. Secondary qualities change moreover with change in the 
circumstance of the perceiver. For example, if one has a cold, one may not be able to taste 
one’s food. Therefore, secondary qualities do not really belong to external objects; they do 
not really exist out there in the world.  
 Objects also possess intrinsically, in addition to primary qualities, a substance. 
However, we do not experience substances. Idea of substance belongs to the class of 
complex ideas.  Locke claims “the idea…to which we give the general name substance is 
nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which 
we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, without something to support them…”67  
                                                
67 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, xxiii, 1-5. 
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According to Locke, we find a number of ideas of simple qualities continuously associating 
with each other. Hence, we combine these ideas, and give them a single name. 
Furthermore, we appeal to the notion of some support or substratum for the qualities in the 
thing, which produces the simple ideas in us. This concept of support is called substance.  
“An obscure and relative idea of substance in general being thus made we come to have the 
ideas of particular sorts of substances, by collecting such combination of simple ideas as 
are, by experience and observation of men’s senses, taken notice of to exist together; and 
are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown essence 
of that substance….”68  
 
Additionally, the complex idea of substance contains the idea of power. The idea of 
substance acts not only as a support for the qualities of objects, but also as a causal agent, 
that produces changes in other things. We get the idea of cause from the experience of 
succession of events. We get the idea of agency from reflection upon the succession of 
events. Furthermore, the reflection of agency leads us to postulate that to say A causes B is 
to say that A always produces B. The idea of substance, hence, is composed of three 
aspects:  
1) Simple ideas of certain properties,  
2) The idea of a ‘container’, which supports the properties,   
3) The idea of cause, which is understood in terms of a) the idea of 
succession drawn from sensation, b) the idea of agency obtained 
from reflection, and c) the idea of necessity, which is not derived 
from experience but concluded from it. 
 At this point, we can formulate Locke’s theory of perception, called 
representationalism. It asserts that we know the representations, or copies, of external 
things in our minds, and not the external things. These representations are simple ideas. The 
external world is comprised of things, which possess only primary qualities. These entities 
impose upon our sense organs and cause representations of themselves to appear in 
consciousness. The mind knows these representations. However, the representations are 
augmented by the mind with secondary qualities. Now, the mind projects the secondary 
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qualities onto the objects of the external world.  Hence, what is out there in the real world is 
a type of featureless ‘stuff’ without qualities; serve as a substratum for the primary 
qualities, which inhere in it. 
 
Fig. 3.1: Lock’s theory of perception (www.en.wikibooks .org)  
 
John Locke was the first philosopher to introduce the concept of identity into the 
philosophical discourse.69 Locke took an agnostic position toward substance. He insisted 
that we couldn’t know anything about the existence of substances and their essence. 
Therefore, personal identity cannot be absolute, since it cannot be based on substance. 
Personal identity has to be relative.  
 Personal identity is self-consciousness. The continuity of self-consciousness is 
function of the history of this self-consciousness. This history is informed by a backward 
trace in time as long as thought and action can be attributed to this self-consciousness. This 
means that self-consciousness is limited to memory. My past belongs to me as long as I can 
remember my past. The forgotten years don’t belong to my self-consciousness anymore. 
Hence, the forgotten years are not my forgotten years. I was born with the first memory. 
Many people have occupied this body, each with a different history and self-consciousness. 
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This, however, causes tremendous problems with the responsibility of people and their 
moral culpability. Who is responsible for the action committed by me many years ago? If I 
have no memory of those actions, then they don’t belong to me anymore. I am not the same 
person as the culprit of those actions. That person is non-existent. Locke attempts to solve 
the problem of culpability by introducing bridging principle of the intervening years. It is 
true that I have no memory of my childhood, but my childhood was remembered in my 
teenage years and I can remember my teenage years. Therefore, an indirect link can be 
established my adulthood and my infancy. However, this strategy will not work for other 
scenarios. Imagine transfer of contents of self-consciousness could be transferred from one 
person to another. In this case, if I commit a heinous crime and transfer the content of my 
self-consciousness to somebody else, then that person would be responsible for those 
crimes. It seems that Locke would have to go along with this scenario. However, this seems 
highly counterintuitive to most people. It seems that our concept of identity far surpasses 
contents of memory. For us ‘memory does not create personal identity’. 
 Definition of self-identity by memories is a risky proposition. Memory is a 
neurologically dependent cognitive faculty. It is subject to disease and degradation like 
anything physical. Identity, on the other hand, could be, and in fact is, informed by physical 
characteristics. But it is not identified with our physicality. We define much of its 
characteristics through our actions and our aspirations for the future. Therefore, a 
reductionist approach to the problem of identity is ill advised, since it leaves the most 
important aspect of our identity out, namely our ‘forwardness’. 
 
3.2 Berkeley:  
 Berkeley departs from Locke on two major points; he rejects the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities, and he gets rid of the notion of substance. The 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities is arbitrary. Berkeley claims that any 
argument, which shows a secondary quality, such as heat, is an idea in the mind of the 
perceiver, applies also to primary qualities such as size. In the argument from primary and 
secondary qualities, Berkeley states: 
“They who assert that figure motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do 
exist without the mind, in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that 
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colours, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not; which they tell us are 
sensations, existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different 
size by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particle of matter…. Now, if it 
be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible 
qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows 
that they exist only in the mind…. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my 
power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give some colour 
or other sensible quality, which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, 
extensions, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, inconceivable. Where 
therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must be also, to wit, in the mind and 
nowhere else.”70 
 
In this argument, Berkeley shows that primary and secondary qualities are inseparably 
united. Furthermore, the qualities are relative to perceivers.  
Berkeley’s arguments against the existence of matter are presented throughout the 
Dialogues. Here, the character of Philonous, lover of mind, represents Berkeley’s position, 
while Hylas presents a possible adversary. Berkeley maintains that the notion that the real 
nature of things differs from what we sense needs to be rejected. The main premise in these 
arguments is that what we perceive are our own ideas. This notion is presented in the 
dialogues through a discussion of heat. Hylas maintains that heat is a property of external 
objects. Furthermore, the quality of heat varies according to the degree of heat, which we 
perceive. However, fire can generate an intense degree of heat that is perceived as pain and 
that is not in fire. Philonous, however, points out that heat at a gentler level is warmth, 
which is pleasurable. Consequently, the intense heat and pain, just like warmth and 
pleasure, are one simple sensation. Now, if one puts one hot hand and one cold hand in the 
same container of water, the water will feel warm to the cold hand and cool to the warm 
hand. Furthermore, it is absurd and self-contradictory to assert that the water is both cool 
and warm at the same time and the same respect. Any idea that leads to contradiction must 
be rejected. Therefore, as the pain and pleasure are not in the fire, but in the perceiver, so 
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must the intense heat and warmth be in the perceiver.71 Berkley maintains that pain-
pleasure argument holds for all so-called secondary and primary qualities.  
 Consider the primary properties such as shape and size. The size of an object 
increases as we approach it and it decreases as we move away from it. The shape of an 
object, also, changes as we observe it from different angles. For instance, a table looks 
circular from one angle, while it seems to be elliptical from another. It seems that a same 
type of absurdity can be drawn from analysis of primary qualities as well. The conclusion is 
that even primary qualities are not inherent in objects.72   
 At this point, there are two possibilities with respect to the nature of matter. 1) 
Matter is mind-independent substance, which is real in and of itself without any properties. 
2) Matter is an abstract concept, which refers to no idea in experience. Those possibilities 
present matter as an unintelligible notion. In the case of the first possibility, the notion that 
something can exist with no properties is nonsensical. The point is that if such thing 
existed, then it would be impossible for us to have an idea of it. Hence, it would be 
impossible to know it. Knowing it requires reasoning about and experiencing its properties. 
However, since it has no properties, knowledge is impossible. In the case of second 
possibility, matter has the property to support the qualities that we perceive. However, the 
‘support’ quality of matter cannot be experienced. The concept of support is used, 
therefore, in a new sense, which cannot be experienced in the usual sense of the word. 
Since this new sense cannot be defined in any proper way, it must be nonsensical.73 
Therefore, the concept of material substance with no properties, primary, secondary, or any 
other mysterious kind is self-contradictory. Hence, it is an abstract notion with no meaning.  
 What does all this mean for the representational theory of perception? The theory of 
representationalism results in three distinct factors in perception.  
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Fig. 3.2: RTM (www. Courseware.finntrack.edu) 
 
There is the knowing mind, the ideas, which the mind knows, and the objects of the 
external world. The objects in the external world act as causes for the ideas by impinging 
upon the sense organs. As a result, images are thrown upon the screen of consciousness; 
and they are known as ideas. For Locke, when the ideas correspond to reality, we have 
knowledge. The problem is that if the mind always knows its own ideas and never knows 
the objects of the external world, then the mind cannot know anything about the objects of 
the external world directly. Any attempt to obtain knowledge of the objects of the external 
world, would produce only a more extended knowledge of the ideas. In fact, the objects of 
the external world can only be inferred from the ideas. The point is that if we do not know 
anything about the objects of the external world, then there is nothing we can know about 
the objects of the external world. Hence, we cannot know that they have the quality of 
being like the ideas, or being able to cause the ideas. All we know are our own ideas, and as 
far our experience is concerned, the world might be comprised of ideas. This makes the 
postulation of objects of the external world superfluous and unjustified.  
 The representational theory is also undermined by the fact that the idea of substance 
is vacuous. In order to represent material substance, we must use our ideas. However, we 
cannot have idea of material substance, because by definition material substances are mind-
independent and is not comprised of ideas. Hence, no ideas can represent material 
substance.  
 As far as the causal agency of material substance is concerned, matter cannot cause 
any of our ideas. Causal agency requires the correlation of two events. Since we have never 
experienced any material substance being correlated with any other object, state, or event, 
we cannot claim that material substance can cause anything. Therefore, as far we can tell, 
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only mind have the causal power to cause other ideas in other minds. At this point, the 
causal-representational theory must be rejected.  
 At this point, we are left with the fundamental question of what actually exists. It 
seems like there are only two kinds of things that we can know of: minds and ideas. 
However, ideas do not exist without minds. Berkeley asserts this in the first two sections of 
Part I of the Principles: 
“It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge that they are 
either ideas actually imprinted on the senses or else such as are perceived by attending to 
the passions and operations of the mind or, lastly, ideas formed by help memory and 
imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally 
perceived in the aforesaid ways.”74   
 
There are different types of ideas: ideas can be sensations, they may be perceptions of 
mind’s own functions, and they may be memories or imaginations. In all these, it is the 
mind, which is active, and not ideas.  
“Besides all the endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise 
something, which knows or perceives them and exercises various operations as willing, 
imagining, and remembering about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, 
spirit, soul, or myself, by which words do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing 
entirely distinct from them, in which they exist or, which is the same thing, by which they 
are perceived, for the existence of an idea consists in its being perceived.”75 
 
Hence, minds and ideas are distinct. The mind is not one of the ideas. Furthermore, the 
active causal agent is the mind, not the idea. The essence of the mind is thinking. For 
minds, existence is perceiving, thinking, and willing. It follows that the existence of non-
thinking things consists in their being perceived.  
 Even though we have knowledge of two kinds of things, only the mind can be 
called a substance, for a substance is something that exists logically independently of other 
things. Ideas depend on minds. Hence, they are not substances. One important point is that 
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although, minds are substantial and real, we have no ideas of minds. We have notions of 
minds, but we know them by reason, inference, and reflection alone.  
 In what sense, then, does the world exist? If I leave my room at this point, is it true 
that the room goes out of existence and comes back to existence when I return, if no one 
else perceives the room? Berkeley rejects this implication. He asserts that to exist is to be 
an idea in a mind or to be perceived by a mind. However, the mind needs not be mine, or 
any other person’s; it can be God’s mind. Accordingly, the ideas we know exist 
independently of our knowledge, because they continuously exist in God’s mind. Here, the 
distinction between perception and imagination becomes important. Perception is an 
involuntary process, while imagination is a voluntary process. Hence, the ideas we perceive 
are also in God’s mind, which are passed to our minds as well. However, the ideas we 
imagine exist only in our minds and they go out of existence as soon as we cease to 
imagine them. Hence, the world continues to exist even when we cease to perceive it, since 
God’s perception sustains the world. However, unless we are prepared to introduce God 
into our ontological picture with sound justification, we are left with the position that the 
only thing that exists is our own mental states.  
   
Fig 3.3: Berkeley’s metaphysics (www.100megsfree4.com)  
 
At this point, we can summarize the mentalist position by returning to our fresh cherry 
example: 
“I see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it: and I am sure nothing cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted: 
it is therefore real. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and 
you take away the cherry. Since it is not a being distinct from sensations; a cherry, I say, is 
nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: 
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which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given to them by the mind; 
because they are observed to attend one another.” 76 
 
Mentalism claims that if this argument applies to cherries, then it would apply to all 
material bodies, including human bodies and brains. Each material body, hence, is a 
collection of sensations; and it is essentially a mental entity. The question is that why 
would mentalism hold that a cherry is a collection of sensations. The answer for Berkeley 
was that each perceivable quality of the cherry was a sensation. Furthermore, the cherry is 
best understood as a collection of its qualities. The implication of this claim is that if the 
qualities of the cherry were sensation, then it would exist only when it was perceived. In 
support of this claim, Berkeley challenges the opponents to conceive or imagine the cherry 
existing when not perceived. Any attempt would be at the same time perceiving the cherry 
with its qualities. Therefore, since we cannot conceive a cherry existing unperceived, no 
entity exists unperceived.77 The problem with the conceivability argument is that it does not 
distinguish between thinking and perceiving. Thinking of the cherry is not the same as 
perceiving the cherry. 
 
3.3 Hume’s criticism: 
We mentioned above that without God Berkeley’s mentalism is reduced to the 
position that the only entities that exist are our own mental states. Hume begins his 
analysis, exactly, at this point. Hume agrees with the main assertions of Locke and 
Berkeley, and develops the position to its logical conclusion. Hume agrees that the objects 
of sensory knowledge are our own ideas. Furthermore, all our knowledge is derived from 
our ideas.  
In addition, he agrees with Berkley in rejecting the notion of substance as 
unintelligible. However, Hume rejects the idea of God as the guarantor of the reality. 
According to Hume, if we hold to the view that all our knowledge is derived from the 
simple ideas from sense experience, we must acknowledge that we have no experience of 
God. Hence, we cannot invoke God’s existence as the guarantor of the existence of the 
world when we do not perceive it. Remaining faithful to the empiricist position, Hume 
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claims that there is no reason to believe in the existence of anything that we do not 
immediately perceive.  
Hume divides the mental states into two types. There are impressions, which are 
produced by sense experience, passions, and emotions; and there are ideas. Hume expresses 
this distinction in the first passage of the Treatise of Human Nature: 
“All the perception of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I 
shall call impressions and ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the degree of force 
and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought 
or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence, we may 
name impressions; and, under this name, I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and 
emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas, I mean the faint images 
of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by 
the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and 
excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion.”78    
 
It is important to note that the difference between impressions and ideas is based on their 
intrinsic qualities and not their external relationships. Here, Hume attempts to avoid 
Locke’s mistake. If all we know are our own ideas, then the distinction between our mental 
states can only be based on their internal differences and not their external reference. The 
deprivation of the external reference compels Hume to fall back upon a principle of 
intrinsic factor, which he calls degree of liveliness. However, this criterion breaks down in 
the extreme cases, in which the ideas have as great a degree of liveliness as impressions: 
“Every one of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking. The 
common degrees of these are easily distinguished; though it is not impossible but in 
particular instances, they may very nearly approach each other. Thus, in sleep, in a fever, in 
madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our 
impressions: as, on the other hand, it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint 
and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas.”79   
 
In the last analysis, there seems to be no satisfactory distinction between mental contents, 
which Hume believes constitute our knowledge. Our experience is of our own mental 
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states. Some of these mental states are more violent and vivid than the others. We call these 
impressions; and we believe that they have external causes. However, we do not know 
those external causes.  
            Hume also agrees with Berkeley in that our impressions and ideas are fragmentary 
and isolated. They are connected when they enter the mind; and the mind does not actively 
connect them. However, experience requires some sort of connectivity of the sense 
perceptions. Hume claims that some of our impressions habitually go together. For 
instance, impressions of whiteness, sweetness, squareness, and roughness habitually 
combine to yield the conception of sugar. However, this habitual connection is by no means 
a necessary connection. Hence, the unifying principle is “a gentle force, which commonly”, 
not universally, “prevails”, and it is based on the agency of mind. As a result, all we can 
claim is that some impressions naturally cluster together to give us the idea of physical 
things. This clustering is contingent upon factors, which are beyond minds control. 
Hume also criticizes the notion of substance as well: 
“The idea of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of reflexion, if it 
really exists. But the impressions of reflexion resolve themselves into our passions and 
emotions; none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of 
substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other 
meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it.” 80 
 
3.3.1 Hume’s theory of causality: 
 The doctrine of the association of ideas has significant implications. The doctrine 
rejects the necessity of the laws of cause and effect; the law of causality is a further 
example of a particular association of certain ideas, which are habitually found together. A 
close inspection of a causal-relationship reveals that there is no inherent quality about the 
objects of the relationship, which would reveal causal properties. In other words, there is 
nothing about the objects of such relationship that would indicate causality. A causal 
relationship, however, must have the following properties: contiguity, priority, and 
necessity. The cause of an effect must be logically and temporally prior to its effect. The 
cause and the effect must be contiguous. However, priority and contiguity are not sufficient 
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reasons for a causal relationship. Necessity is the factor that is most important in the 
establishment of causal relationship. When we examine the supposed causal-relationships, 
we can establish the contiguity of two factors. We can point out the priority of one factor to 
the other, but we can never positively identify necessity.   
 According to Hume, ideas are distinct and separable from each other. Therefore, the 
existence of one idea is not necessarily caused by another idea. Hume invites to imagine a 
container full of water. This container is sitting on the top of a stove. We can imagine that 
water boiling without any heat applied to it. Hume argues that the idea of boiling is distinct 
and separate from the idea of heating. The two ideas are independent from each other; 
hence they can be imagined independent of each other. The imagination of separate ideas 
implies their possibility and this possibility are all needed to point out the absence of a 
necessary connection. Put in the modern terms, Hume warns against the analyticity of the 
terms cause and effect.81 Every cause has an effect and vice versa. This is a true statement 
by the virtue of their concepts. The concept of the effect is already implied by the concept 
of the cause. This is an analytic statement. It is always true just like the statement ‘ all 
bachelors are unmarried men’ is always true. But this doesn’t imply that next man who we 
confront and doesn’t wear a ring is a bachelor. At same token, the existence, and coming to 
existence, of an idea does not guarantee its being caused. Absence of causes is imaginable 
and indeed possible as it was illustrated by the boiling water example, according to Hume. 
The notion of causality can’t be extracted from our experiences. When we look at a 
hammer hitting a nail, we can see the hammer’s movement. We can observe the moment of 
contact between the hammer and the nail. We can see the movement of the nail as it is 
driven into the piece of wood. But we can’t observe the causality. In other words, we can 
observe contiguity and priority, but we never observe the necessity. There is nothing in the 
sense-impression that reveals causality. We cannot deduce a causal relation from our 
experience.  
    Hume points that in the ‘causal relationships’, we observe an additional factor to 
contiguity and priority. This additional factor is regularity. Causal relationship between two 
objects is observed as a regular event. The ‘ causal relationship’ happens with a predictable 
regularity. However, regularity doesn’t yield necessity, but necessity is the hallmark of 
                                                
81 Kenny, History of Western Philosophy. 
 97 
causality. Regularity only reveals repetition in predictable intervals; it doesn’t lead to 
necessity. However, contiguity, priority, and regularity produce a psychological effect in 
the observing individual. This psychological phenomenon is expectation. When the light 
turns red at the intersection, the cars stop. Observing this event regularly and constantly in 
the order described will lead me to expect the cars to stop at the next red light. This 
expectation leads to an idea of determination from the red light to the stopping of the cars. 
This determination leads to a sense of necessity between the two events. Therefore, the idea 
of necessary connection between two events results from regular conjunctions between the 
events. This necessary connection is nothing but product of thought and imagination. The 
necessary connection is a reference drawn from past regular conjunctions between two 
events. Therefore, we come to necessary connection via inductive reasoning and not 
deductive reasoning. 
 Causality is the projection of a necessary connection as it is inferred from a regular 
conjunction between two events. Therefore, causality is nothing further than the 
contiguous, prior, and regular conjunction of one event with another as it is fabricated as a 
necessary connection between the two events by the imagination and projected onto the 
world. Hume, as mentioned before, argues that the necessity is inferred inductively from 
past events. Therefore, this type of inductive demonstrations and arguments are based on 
probability and not truth and falsity. Inductive arguments can’t establish truth-values. In 
fact the truth and falsity of an inductive argument can neither be established by intuition 
nor demonstration. It is important to remember that Hume rejects the notion of causality as 
a necessary connection between two events. However, he insists that in our every day life 
we infer causality and we are not wrong in doing that. It is that causality is not based 
necessity but regular conjunctions. 
“It appears then, that this idea of necessary connexion among events arises from a number 
of similar instance which occur of the constant conjunction of these events…But there is 
nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to 
be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is 
carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect it usual attendant, and to 
believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this 
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customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the 
sentiment of impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion.”82  
  
 It is important to point out that Hume believes that principle of sufficient reason 
cannot be intuited or demonstrated as well. The principle of sufficient reason is formulation 
of necessary connections and causal relationships. In his ‘no argument’ argument, Hume 
makes it clear that there is no mode of argument that will take us from the cause to the 
effect. Inductive arguments are based on likelihood and therefore, they are inconclusive. 
There is no deductive argument that would prove causality conclusively as well. The 
problem is that why set the standards at an unnecessary level. The Earth is about five 
billion years old. This means that the sun has been setting and rising for about 1.5 trillion 
times before. I believe that this would give a good indication of what will happen in a few 
hours. This is as certain as we might or should expect. Another problem is that deductive 
argument only establishes the derivability of a conclusion from its premises. It does not and 
cannot make any claim about the truth of the premises or the inference rules. In this respect, 
deduction is very limited. 
 
3.3.2 Hume’s theory of identity:   
 A further momentous implication is the denial of the unity of the self. Hume 
eliminates the notion of self and replaces it with by a succession of psychological states that 
normally are assumed to belong to the self. Hume asserts that all there is a stream of 
consciousness, which includes psychological events such as moods, fears, hopes, wishes, 
thoughts, ideas, and sensations. In other words, there is no unifying, and continuing self 
who has the moods, fears, hopes, wishes, thoughts, ideas, and sensations. 
Hume invites to imagine that we can look into our minds. As I look into my what is 
that I find (some would say that I will find vast space and nothing else but let’s be positive 
for the present purposes). As I look into my mind I find passing perceptions. Some of these 
perceptions resemble sense-impressions and some other resembles other ideas. Some of 
these ideas are characterized by vivacity and Hume calls these ideas memories. The 
majority of the content of the mind are memories. Therefore, the mind is made up 
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perceptions that resemble each other in a direct or indirect manner. Memories alone cannot 
account for identity, since they don’t account for continuity of identity over a lifetime. We 
believe that we are the same individuals from infancy to old age. Another problem with 
memories is that memories fade away, but we don’t consider this degradation to undermine 
our identity. Therefore resemblance alone cannot account for personal identity. 
“If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably 
the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives, since self is supposed to exist after that 
manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and 
joy, passion and sensation succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It 
cannot, therefore, be from any of these impression or from any other, that the idea of self is 
derived; and consequently there is no such idea… 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or 
pleasure. I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and can never any thing 
but the perception. When my perceptions are removed at any time, as by sound sleep; so 
long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my 
perception removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate 
after the dissolution of my body. I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is 
further requisite to make me a perfect a non-entity. If any one upon serious and 
unprejudiced reflexion thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can 
reason no longer with him.” 83  
  
Hume claims that the concept of identity is derived from positing a causal 
relationship between perceptions. Causal relationship between the perceptions introduces 
an element of explainibility. This means that my past explains my present and my present 
explains my future. My life is made into a coherent and intelligible narrative, in which each 
event is explainable by another event since they are in causal relationship. However, this 
causal relationship is a product of imagination. Causality is not an inherent quality of our 
world but it is a product of our mind in its search for intelligibility. Perceptions are not in 
reality causally connected, but they are conjunctions of resembling sense impressions and 
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ideas. They are formed by imagination for the sake of coherence and out of habit. Personal 
identity is a fiction. This is a universal condition of all humanity.  
“I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or 
collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable 
rapidity, and in a perceptual flux and movements…The mind is a kind of theatre, where 
several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and 
mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it 
at one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine 
that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are 
successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion 
of place, where these scenes are represented, or the materials, of which it s composed.”84   
 
The problem is that universality leads to necessity and Hume denied the former. In 
other words, why is it necessary and universal for all human beings to fabricate the fiction 
of identity? The answer to this question is up to empirical psychology, but the condition 
that raises this question is a contradiction in Hume’s theory. It seems that activity of 
imagination is based on a universal and necessary conditions. In fact the universal and 
necessary condition is presupposed by imagination.  
 The second problem is the rejection of self-consciousness. Hume’s invitation to 
self-reflection presupposes self-consciousness. The fact that self-consciousness is not 
observed is that it is the observer. I can see the world with my eyes, but I cannot see my 
own eyes. The question that skepticism asks is if the world really is at it seems to me. The 
very condition that makes the skeptical question possible refutes skepticism. That is self-
consciousness.  
 At this point, let us trace back the mentalist position in its philosophical and 
historical outlines. Locke postulated three parts to his theory of perception:  
  1) The knowing mind,  
  2) The ideas, which are known,        
  3) the objects, which cause the ideas.  
 Berkeley rejects the objects of the external world (3). He introduces the concept of 
God as the guarantor of reality. However, the assumption of God’s mind is inconsistent 
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with the premise that all knowledge is rooted in sense experience. Hume, by rejecting the 
concept of God due to empiricist consideration, eliminates the existence of external objects 
(3). Moreover, through his analysis of the concept of self, he eliminates the knowing mind 
(1) as well. Consequently, all that is left are the ideas (2). According to Hume, the ideas are 
conscious and known, but there is no self to know the ideas and be conscious of them. 
Hence, the world is reduced to a set, and succession, of known and conscious ideas, which 
are not ideas of anything and are by illusion mine. This is the logical conclusion of the 
mentalist position. This is solipsism. 
 Solipsism states that, because all we know is are our own mental states, nothing 
other the mental states can be known to exist. There is no justification for believing in the 
existence of an entity that cannot be known. Hence, as far as I can tell, my mental states 
constitute the universe. This position seems to be logically irrefutable. However, there 
seems to be no reason to think it to be true. We will return to this point later, in our 
discussion of the phenomenological position. The solipsist position seems hard to accept, 
because it ignores one of the fundamental properties of consciousness: intentionality. It is 
of the nature of consciousness to be of something. The fact that consciousness is necessarily 
directed toward objects does not resolve the question of the existence of the external world, 
but dissolves it.   
 Another reason that solipsism may be unacceptable is that in order to know that a 
thought is true we must know that it refers to something other than itself. However, if we 
know only the contents of our mind, then this criterion can never be satisfied. Hence, we 
can never know that a thought is true. Consequently, we can never know solipsism to be 
true. At this point, it seems that the logical conclusion of mentalism, solipsism, should be 
rejected, because it is self-refuting and it denies the intentionality of consciousness.  
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 Fig. 3.4: Solipsism and the physical world (www.en.wikipedia.org) 
 
3.4 Further Problems and Conclusion: 
 There seems to be two further major problems with mentalism. First, if objects exist 
only in our minds, then what becomes of them when we do not perceive them? If 
empiricism is incompatible with knowledge of God, there seems that the object would pop 
out of and into existence randomly. However, this seems to against our experience of the 
continuity of objects. When I light a candle before I leave my room, upon my return to the 
room the candle has burned continuously. I know that, because I can observe the physical 
changes in the shape and the height of the candle. This can be if and only if the candle 
existed during my absence. Hence, experience points to the existence of unperceived 
objects, while mentalism denies their existence.      
 The second problem with mentalism seems to be that it denies the possibility of 
science. The question is that what the laws of nature are, and how is scientific inquiry 
possible. If mentalism is true in what it asserts, the scientist’s world and the methods, by 
which he/she explores it, are composed of ideas in minds. However, science assumes 
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matter to be real. Therefore, no conclusion drawn by scientific methodology can be true. 
The point is that if everything is an idea in somebody’s mind, then science is also an idea in 
somebody’s mind as well. This means that science is relative to the perception of the 
perceiver. This seems highly unreasonable based on our interactions and experience in the 
world. Our everyday use of technology points to the other direction.  
At this point, it seems reasonable to assert that mentalism is an untenable position. 
Hence, it must be rejected. 
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Chapter Four 
Reductive Materialism 
 As we have discussed in a previous chapter, the classical theory of dualism is 
substance dualism. This position maintains that there are two distinct, and independent, 
realms of reality. One realm consists of mental entities. The other realm is comprised of 
material substances. Furthermore, these two dominions of reality are associated with two 
kinds of properties: mental and material. Hence, substance dualism entails property 
dualism. As we have seen in the chapter on dualism, substance dualism has been largely 
abandoned. Even the proponents of dualism, such as Popper, have given up substance 
dualism in favor of a kind of dualism, which treats consciousness as a process rather than a 
substance85. 
 Today, the dominant position is ontological physicalism.86 According to ontological 
physicalism, there are no concrete existents, or substances, in the spatio-temporal world 
other than material existents. Material monism seems to be the undisputed view. However, 
the discussion revolves around the nature of properties of material substances. The 
outstanding question is how material and mental properties are related to each other and to 
material substances. In this discussion, the point of contention is whether mental properties 
are reducible to material qualities. The view that contends that mental properties are 
reducible to material properties is called reductive materialism. Consequently, ultimately, 
there are no mental properties. All mental properties are, in the final analysis, reducible to 
material attributes. The position that maintains that mental properties comprise a dependent 
yet irreducible realm of attributes is called non-reductive materialism, or property dualism. 
For non-reductive materialism, mental properties comprise a kind of higher-level 
properties, which make up an autonomous and irreducible realm of qualities. It is not that 
we don’t have the proper tools to undertake a successful reduction, but such reduction is 
inherently impossible, because mental attributes occupy a different aspect of reality from 
the material properties. Hence, psychology cannot be reduced to physics, since psychology 
describes a different and higher level of reality than physics. 
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 In this chapter, we take on the task of exploring reductive materialism. In the next 
chapter, we devote our attention to the understanding and critical analysis of non-reductive 
materialism. However, we should start our investigation by exploring two general, but very 
important questions. What is materialism in general? And what is reduction? 
 
4.1 Defining Materialism: 
 We saw that the difference between dualism and materialism is the denial, or the 
acceptance, of the proposition that a detailed description of our physical make-up is enough 
to explain the mental aspect of our existence. Views that uphold this proposition are 
materialistic, or physicalistic; positions, which reject this proposition, are dualistic. 
However, this definition of materialism is at best imprecise and incomplete. We can 
achieve a bit more clarity by introduction and exploration of two main questions: 
1. What entities count as physical? 
2.  What does it mean to say that the physical entities comprise the necessary and 
sufficient condition for the description of the mental world?    
  Let us begin by investigating what would count as a physical entity. The short 
answer to this question is that physical world is made of entities posited by the physical 
sciences. This includes physics, chemistry, biology, and the related fields. Materialism, 
furthermore, maintains that the entities posited by social sciences, such as psychology and 
sociology, are physical in nature as well. Hence, psychological events, processes, and 
states, which are described within the context of social sciences, are by definition material 
entities.  
 Materialism, in general, falls in two camps.87 This typology depends on the relative 
strength of the description of the relationship between the material and mental properties. 
Let us recall that all materialists subscribe to the principle of ontological physicalism, 
which posits the existence of only material substances. The difference in the physicalist 
point of view comes about in the description of the nature, and relationship, between 
material and mental properties.  
 Reductive materialism makes a strong claim about the nature of mental properties. 
It states that mental properties are nothing above and beyond material attributes. One can 
                                                
87 Heil, Philosophy of Mind.
 106 
see mental concepts as having the same extension, or reference, as neurobiological 
concepts. The only difference is in the intension, or sense, of these concepts. This implies 
that mental and material concepts are synonymous. The difference is only in the language, 
which describes the same phenomenon in two different contexts. This is, essentially, the 
view championed by the identity theorists. To clarify this point, let us remember what the 
concept of meaning means within the philosophical discourse. According to Frege, a 
concept’s meaning is comprised of two aspects: its sense or intension and its reference or 
extension.88 A sense of a concept is its definition. For example, the sense of the concept of 
‘bachelor’ is ‘an unmarried male’. This is in essence the definition of the concept of 
‘bachelor’. The reference, or the extension, of the concept of ‘bachelor’ is all the males in 
the world that satisfy the requirement of being male and unmarried. Hence, extension is 
what we find in the world and intension is how we define a concept as a society or 
linguistic community. 
 There is, however, a more radical version of reductive materialism, which proposes 
that the talk of mental concepts is, in the final analysis, not only unnecessary, but also 
misguiding and destructive.89 Mental concepts, according to this view, are the product of 
deluded human intellect reflected as folk psychology. Talk of mental concepts should be 
eliminated altogether. 
 A weaker version of physicalism maintains that the mental attributes comprise an 
autonomous, irreducible, yet dependent realm. Mental properties depend for their existence 
on material substances. However, they are neither identical, nor reducible to mental 
properties. This relationship is expressed in terms of the principle of supervenience.90 We 
will discuss this principle in more detail in the following chapter. At this point, it suffices to 
point out the cardinal claims of weak physicalism, also called non-reductive materialism or 
property dualism.  
 Mind-body supervenience principle states that mental attributes supervene on 
physical properties in a way that any two entities, exactly identical in physical qualities 
cannot differ in mental attributes. Consequently, physical indiscernibility entails mental 
indiscernibility. In other words, there can be no mental difference without physical 
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differences. However, the converse relationship does not hold. Accordingly, two 
organisms, which are psychologically indistinguishable, are not necessarily physically 
indistinguishable. This means that mental states, processes, and events can be realized by a 
variety of neural, or theoretically non-neural physical, structures.  
 The other pillar of non-reductive physicalism is the anti-Cartesian principle. This 
principle states that there can be no purely mental entities. This implies that no entity can 
have a mental attribute without a physical base. This affirms the dependence, and 
determination, of mental properties on a physical base. This implies that psychological 
attributes are dependent on, and determined by, biological properties. This point expresses 
the third foundation of weak physicalism: the Mind-body dependence principle. The 
dependence principle is an affirmation of the priority and primacy of physical substances as 
it is stated in ontological physicalism.  
 The dependence principle also imparts to non-reductive physicalism its explanatory 
powers. Accordingly, all mental events, processes, and states can be explained by 
describing their higher-level concepts and by investigating their physical base. So, the 
study of psychology becomes:  
1. The study, and critical analysis, of psychological theories and concepts 
themselves. 
2. The study of neural correlates of those psychological events, states, and 
processes.  
This is one of the advantages of non-reductive physicalism. It does not sacrifice complexity 
and variety at the altar of simplicity. It maintains that both of these aspects are equally 
important in an explanatory project.  
At this point, we can summarize weak physicalism as a position, which maintains the 
principles of: 
1. The Mind-body supervenience principle. 
2. The Anti-Cartesian principle. 
3. The Mind-body dependence principle. 
Now, we can ask the general question of what defines materialism. The answer is 
that all varieties of materialism are based on three main principles: 
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1. The principle of ontological physicalism, which states the priority and primacy 
of physical substances. 
2. The principle of physical determination, which maintains that all mental 
attributes, or any other higher-level properties, are dependent on, and are 
determined by, physical properties. 
3. The principle of the causal completeness of the physical world, which states that 
physical conditions are necessary and sufficient for the existence of all 
phenomena.   
We saw earlier that Popper denies these three principles as the basis for his dualism. He 
rejects the ontological primacy of material substances by appealing to subjective experience 
as being irreducible to them. Furthermore, he dismisses the physical determination 
principle by claiming that the universe is, in fact, indetermined and open. He relies heavily 
on quantum mechanics for substantiation of his position.91 But does quantum mechanics 
support such claim? 
 It is true that quantum mechanics rejects Newtonian mechanics by claiming that in 
the universe, at the quantum level; no event can be predicted with certainty. The occurrence 
of events is based on probability functions. So, no physical cause can absolutely determine 
an effect. All it can accomplish is to set a probability of something occurring. However, 
this notion of indeterminacy does not seem to affect the principle of physical determination, 
since the relevant point is that physical events are determined by physical causes. Quantum 
mechanics does not claim that non-physical causes can determine physical events. This is, 
exactly, the claim that dualism needs. Principle of Uncertainty puts the strictness of 
determination in question and not the nature of the determinant. In other words, it does not 
doubt the fact that physical entities set the probability for occurrence of other physical 
entities. Quantum mechanics denies the validity of Newtonian mechanics at the micro-
level, but it is not an argument for dualism.  
 Popper, further, rejects the causal completeness principle. Carnap formulated this 
principle. However, it is not a conclusion of the failed positivist project. The causal 
completeness theorem is the philosophical formulation of the Law of Conservation of 
Energy. According to this law, when one physical body, B1, applies force to another 
                                                
91 Kenny, History of Western Philosophy. 
 109 
physical body, B2, in order to do work within the context of a closed system, the total 
amount of energy in this closed system before and after of the application of the force must 
remain equal: 
 (1) For any closed system S,  EBEFORE= EAFTER.   
In the case of causal completeness theorem, we replace the term energy with cause, because 
energy by definition is the ability to do work, to perform something, or to bring about some 
change in the world. This is what we mean with cause as well. Now, we should ask 
ourselves what kind of forces could be taken in consideration. In physics, there are four 
fundamental forces: 
1. The gravitational force. 
2. The electromagnetic force. 
3. The weak nuclear force. 
4. The strong nuclear force. 
In physics, this seems to be an exhaustive list. To introduce any force different from these 
four forces will entail the destruction of energetic equality between the pre-application of 
force and post-application of force states. The post-state will have more energy. This is a 
violation of this fundamental law of physics. To sacrifice this law at the feet of dualism 
seems unreasonable. Mental causes can make only sense in terms of mental energy 
bringing about some change in the physical world. However, mental force is not part of this 
list and it is not identical with any one of these forces. Hence, it seems that introduction of 
mental causation is a rejection of causal completeness principle and the law of conservation 
of energy. On the other hand, there is the evidence of first-person perspective and its 
indubitability.  This subjective experience seems to be undeniable. What can we do? In any 
event, dualism seems to rip no benefit from this dilemma.  
 Next, we will devote our attention to the second important question of our original 
concern in this chapter.  
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4.2 What Is Reduction? 
Reduction, primarily, serves an explanatory role in order to simplify the diversity of 
the world in terms of known phenomenon. It is a simplification process. There are four 
different types of reduction:92 
1. Ontological reduction. 
2. Methodological reduction. 
3. Semantic reduction. 
4. Theoretical reduction.   
Today, reduction is, primarily, based on a relation between two scientific theories. 
The most promising type of reduction is theoretical reduction. In this sense, a theory is 
comprised of a set of statements, which represent the laws of that theory. A theory is 
usually comprised of three components:93  
1. Axioms: all the foundational laws, upon which other claims of the theory are 
built. 
2. All the statements, which are logically, and mathematically, derived from the 
axioms. 
3. The specific vocabulary, which act as the set of descriptive expressions, such as 
mass, energy, genes, etc. 
The task of reduction of theory T2 to the theory T1 consists of deriving the laws of T2 from 
the laws of T1. In other words, the theorems of T2 can be proven from the theorems of T1. 
This derivation is accomplished through bridge laws.94 Let us explore the notion of bridge 
laws by going through an abstract example.  
 Imagine one of the laws of T2 is: 
(1) For anything x, if x has property P, then x has property Q. 
It is important to note that P and Q are properties expressed in T2 expressive vocabulary. 
We cannot simply plug them in the set theorems of T1. That would be nonsensical, since P 
and Q are not part of the set of descriptive expressions of T1. Here, we need principles that 
close the gaps between the theorems of T1 and T2. This function is accomplished by bridge 
principles. Consequently, bridge laws are those principles, which relate P and Q to the 
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expressive vocabulary of T1. Now imagine that we can produce two bridge principles for P 
and Q. 
 (2a) For anything x, x has property P if, and only if, it has property P*. 
 (2b) For anything x, x has property Q if, and only if, it has property Q*. 
Note that in this case, P* and Q* are predicates from T1. Using (2a) and (2b), we can make 
the following statement: 
(3) For anything x, if x has the property P*, then x has the property Q*. 
We can see that through bridge principles (2a) and (2b), a lawful principle of T2 can be 
proven by T1. We could say that T1 substantiates T2. Hence, T2 is reduced to T1, provided 
that all laws of T2 are logically and mathematically derivable from T1 aided by appropriate 
bridge principles, which connect the expressive terms of T2 to the expressions of T1.  
 Bridge principles can be thought of as translators. For every T2 expression and 
principle, the appropriate bridge law gives us the correct T1 phrase and theorem. The 
question is then how is this act of translation possible. There seems to be two distinct 
possibilities, which can be interrelated. First, bridge laws can be definitions, which describe 
and identify T2 expressions in terms of T1 phrases. The second possibility is that bridge 
laws can be empirically observed lawful relationships between two parameters. Theses two 
possibilities, however, are not mutually exclusive of each other. 
 The other important characteristic of bridge laws is that they are expressed in the 
form of biconditional statements—if and only if.95 There is an important reason for the 
usage of biconditional statements. Propositions of the biconditional type guarantee the 
derivability of the laws of T2 from T1 by identifying the expressive terms of T2 with those 
of T1. In our case, P=P* and Q=Q*. This implies that the facts of T2 are nothing above and 
beyond the principles of T1. These are the same facts expressed in two different theoretical 
languages. Consequently, the identity relationship becomes the basis for reduction, since 
identity guarantees reduction. 
 At this point, let us examine the benefits of reduction. There seems to be two main 
advantages of reduction: 
1. Ontological simplicity. 
2. Explanatory power. 
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The ontological simplicity of reduction consists of the ability of reduction to systematize 
and unify our theories and knowledge. When we reduce one theory to a base theory, we 
reduce our independent assumptions about the world. The world is not comprised of many 
independent facts and entities, but a few facts, which can be expressed in many ways 
depending on the context of our interest.  
The second major advantage of reduction is that it gives us the most direct avenue 
for explanation of a phenomenon. This explanatory task is the trademark of scientific 
investigation. When we, for example, explain why the relationships within Mendelian 
genetic laws obtain, we refer to the properties, and action, of DNA during cell division in 
Mitosis and Meiosis. This is a sort of explanation, which is only possible by a reduction to 
more fundamental facts about the world. In fact, almost all explanatory attempts in science 
are reductive in nature. When we come across a new phenomenon, we have to explain it. 
This explanation cannot succeed by branding the new phenomenon as simply a brute fact. 
This does not explain our problem; it only names it. Explanation can only succeed, if we 
can relate the given phenomenon to other known phenomenon.  
 At this point, the pressing question is whether mental events, processes, and events 
can be reduced to physical events based on the conditions we formulated above. The 
majority of antireductionist positions point out the unfeasibility of bridge laws in the 
reduction of mental states to physical structures.96 In particular, the attainment of bridge 
laws in form of biconditionals seems to be doubtful. This project would require the 
presentation of nomologically necessary and sufficient conditions in physical terms for 
mental terms. This is not an unjustified requirement. In fact, it seems appropriate, since the 
biconditionals guarantee the success of the reductive endeavor, as we discussed above.  
  
 
Fig 4.1: Reduction of mental states (www.reference.findtarget.com) 
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The next problem is that the only available, and reducible, psychological terms are 
those provided by folk psychology. However, folk psychology is the very concept, which 
reductive materialism wants to eliminate. In other words, reductive materialism needs folk 
psychology for its reduction of mental concept to physical concepts, while it rejects folk 
psychology. This seems to be contradictory.  
 Another reason for requiring biconditional statements, as we have seen before, is 
that they provide identity relationships between physical properties and mental attributes. 
This leads to a simplification of our ontology, which is one of the major advantages of 
reductionism. Hence, requiring biconditional forms seems justified and appropriate.  
 
Fig. 4.2: Reductionism and explanatory scheme (www.pep-web.org) 
 
4.3 Classical Materialism:   
Thomas Hobbes presents the classical formulation of reductive materialism. The 
center point of Hobbes theory is his notion of sense, which is the source of all imagination, 
cognition, dreams, and memories, “for there is no conception in a man’s mind, which hath 
not at first, totally or by parts, been gotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived 
from that original.”97 He further claims, “Some internal motion in the sentient, generated by 
some internal motion of the parts of the object, and propagated through all to the innermost 
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parts of the organ.”98 This internal motion would be any physical event in the central 
nervous system. Consequently for Hobbes, everything mental is either a part of sense, or 
derived from it. For instance, pain is a physical event in the central nervous system within 
the person. For Hobbes, mental states are reducible purely to material states. In fact, any 
mental states can be explained in terms of material mechanisms. Hobbes makes this point 
explicit in Leviathan: 
“For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part 
within; why may not say, that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and 
wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart but a spring; and the 
nerves but so many strings, and the joints but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole 
body such as was intended by the artifice?” 99 
 
Living things, including humans, are essentially no different from non-livings 
entities. Living things are in principle machines, but much more complicated. One can 
predict and explain all the workings of machines by applying the laws of mechanics. By the 
same laws, one can explain and predict the behavior of living things. The laws of 
mechanical physics are sufficient to explain and predict the behavior of both inanimate and 
animate objects. Hobbes’ version of materialism is mechanistic. However, it is important to 
note that mechanism is not essential to materialism, for materialism does not entail 
mechanism. It is quite logically possible for materialism to be true and some events happen 
by chance; and chance events are mechanistically explainable. Hence, materialism can 
survive the demise of mechanism. This fact was reflected by the rise of behaviorism, which 
is rooted in logical positivism. Here, the emphasis was shifted from a mechanical 
explanation to a behavioral explanation of mentality through the fulfillment of the criteria 
of verification and observability.   
 
4.4 Behaviorism: 
There is no doubt that there is a close link between behavior and mentality. 
However, what the relationship between behavior and mentality is, is the subject of 
controversial debate. William James, in his Principles of Psychology, points out the 
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importance of behavior to mentality by stating: “The pursuance of future ends and the 
choice of means for their attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the presence of 
mentality.”100 For James, behavior acts as an indication for the presence of mentality, as a 
sort of signpost for mental states. In contrast to James, behaviorism maintains that behavior 
constitutes mentality. Consequently, having a mind is nothing above and beyond 
exhibiting, or having the disposition to exhibit certain publicly observable, and verifiable, 
behavior.  
The behaviorist claim that mentality is constituted by behavior is in stark contrast 
and opposition to the intuitive view of mind as being, primarily, subjective and private. All 
aspects of mental life, being emotions and sensations that are mostly phenomenological in 
nature, beliefs and thoughts that are mainly intentional in character, or desires that are 
naturally both phenomenological and intentional, enjoy an epistemic asymmetry, which can 
only be accounted for through the subjective and private nature of mental states, processes, 
and events. Others can only know of the content of my mental experience through my 
testimony, but they can never know my mental states directly. There is a definite qualitative 
difference between the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective. Hence, the 
intuition is that behavior is a semi-reliable indicator of mental states. Behavior is semi-
reliable, since we know we can fake a mental state by exhibiting a different behavior. We 
can pretend to act exuberant, while we are furious. In fact, most acting, in an artistic sense, 
is based on feigning.  
The major philosophical consequence of this intuition is the problem of other minds. 
The point is that if behavior is a semi-reliable indicator of the presence of a specific mental 
state, or mental states in general, and behavior is all that is publicly observable and I have 
no direct access to the subjective experience of others, then I cannot really know whether 
there are minds other than mine. This dilemma becomes one of the starting points of the 
behaviorist project. In fact, behaviorism accepts the conclusion of this dilemma, of the 
impossibility of knowing other minds, and concludes that postulation of other minds as an 
entity independent of behavior is unnecessary and harmful. So, why should we believe that 
there exists anything other than behavior, which is the only observable and verifiable 
entity?  
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Wittgenstein’s Beetle in the Box metaphor inspired this conclusion of behaviorism, 
and logical positivism.101 Let us imagine that each one of us has a little box. In each box, 
there is something. However, only the owner of the box has access to his, or her, box. No 
one can look into another person’s box. Now, each of us claims that he, or she, has a Beetle 
in their box. However, the problem is that there is no way for anyone of us to know that 
others mean the same thing by claiming to have a Beetle. There is no guarantee that the 
term Beetle refers to the same concept for all of us. It is logically conceivable that we all 
own radically different objects, which we call Beetle. What does this say about the concept 
of Beetle then? It implies that the concept of Beetle is vacuous, since we cannot know what 
others mean by Beetle, or what does it really refer to. Wittgenstein maintains that, in this 
case, the idea of Beetle cancels out and it becomes meaningless. It can play no role in 
meaningful discourse.  
 
Fig. 4.2: Behaviorism (www.edtechguy.wordpress.com) 
 
Behaviorism maintains that postulation of any internal mental state will pose the 
same dilemma and conclusion as is the case of Beetles. In other words, the mind is like the 
box and the content of the mind is like the Beetle in the box. Talk of private, and 
subjective, mental states such as ‘having a belief’ are like saying that one has Beetle in 
one’s Box. Hence, such talk is nonsensical, since it is not verifiable and publicly 
observable. The only tangible element is behavior. Hence, the only entity that should be 
posited is behavior. In this sense behaviorism is akin to eleminativism. It seeks to do away 
with mentality altogether. However, what constitutes behavior? 
Behavior is characterized by two basic features.  
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1. Behavior must be observable, verifiable, and measurable. 
2. Behavior must be intentional. 
We have to explain what we mean by intentional. There is an important difference between 
something that I do and something that is done to me. The difference is in causal 
explanation of certain action. So, here intentional refers to the ultimate cause of an action 
and not some sort of purpose. My stepping on your toe whether it was intended, in the 
regular sense, or not is my action, since I am the ultimate cause of that act. However, if I 
am pushed so that I step on your toe, then this act is not my act, since I am not its ultimate 
cause. It is true I am the proximate cause of this act, but I am not its ultimate cause. Only 
through ultimate causation one can assign ownership of a behavior to a person. The next 
question is what kind of things would count as behavior? 
1. Physiological reactions and responses. 
2.  Physical acts and movements. 
3. Mental acts. 
Needless to say that behaviorism does not consider mental acts as proper behavior. For 
behaviorism, only physiological reactions and physical acts count as proper behavior. This 
implies that behaviorism eliminates mind from the discussion and concentrates on 
quantifiable parameters of behavior. In this sense, behaviorism is a form of eliminativism.  
            
4.4.1 Logical Behaviorism: 
Logical behaviorism uses definitional bridge laws to establish the reducibility of 
mental properties to physical attributes. Accordingly, if any mental expression M can be 
assigned a behavioral definition B, then that would provide us with bridge principles such 
as: ‘M if, and only if B’.102 Hence, a complete system comprised of such principles would 
reduce all mental attributes to physical behavior.  Logical behaviorism maintains that all 
sentences using mentalistic terms can be converted by semantic analysis into sentences 
with terms referring to some sort of bodily behavior. It is true that some true sentences 
invoke mentalistic terms, but this does not imply that there are such things as mental 
entities, for one can reformulate any one of those sentences such that one uses only material 
objects, events, and states. The point is that to admit that a sentence is true does not commit 
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one to posit the existence of what it refers to. The claim is that what mentalistic sentences 
really refer to are physical, bodily behaviors. The key is the semantic analysis of the 
sentences. This analysis occurs in two ways:  
1) Explicit definition: this method provides another linguistic expression, the 
analysans, synonymous with the expression to be analyzed, the analysandum. 
2) Contextual definition: this method provides analysans such that a) each is 
synonymous with certain key terms containing the analysandum; and b) none 
includes any terms synonymous with analysandum. 
            Let us illustrate these by way of examples. ‘Human’ can be defined explicitly as 
‘rational bipedal animal’. We would also define ‘bachelor’ explicitly as an ‘unmarried 
man’. However, the term ‘existent’ in the following sentence ‘many astounding things are 
existent’ can be contextually defined, as ‘there are many astounding things’. In this case, 
the contextual definition does not contain any synonymous term with ‘existent’. However, 
the two sentences are semantically equivalent. Hence, one term within a sentence can be 
analyzed by providing another semantically equivalent sentence. Furthermore, if for every 
sentence using the term ‘existent’, we can have a synonymous sentence, which does not 
contain ‘existent’ or any synonymous term; we have a complete contextual definition for 
the term ‘existent’.  
 The implication of this type of analysis is that one can explain away, or eliminate, a 
term altogether without losing any meaning. It is to this analysis through contextual 
definition that logical behaviorism appeals. Logical behaviorism claims that all mentalistic 
terms can be explained by contextual definitions. For example, the sentence ‘Mary has a 
stomachache’ is synonymous with a sentence, which describes a set of publicly observable 
behaviors such as complaining, wincing, moaning, and clutching the stomach. Hence, the 
original sentence is synonymous with ‘Mary is moaning, wincing, complaining, and 
clutching her stomach’. If it is true that the second sentence is synonymous with the first 
sentence, the second sentence has provided a contextual definition for the mentalistic term 
‘stomach ache’. Consequently, the mentalistic term is completely replaceable with 
physicalistic terms provided by the contextual definition. This implies that we can eliminate 
the mentalistic term altogether without loosing any explanatory or predictive powers. 
Moreover, the mentalistic term does not refer to any real entity. If we perform this analysis 
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for all mentalistic terms, we can replace all mentalistic terms with verifiable physicalistic 
terms; and eliminate all mental entities.  
 The argument can be formalized as such: 
1) It can be shown that every sentence, which uses mentalistic terms, is 
semantically equivalent to a sentence, which uses exclusively non-
mentalistic, behavioristic terms.   
2) Therefore, there is no need to use mentalistic terms and mentalistic 
sentences to explain human behavior.  
3) Hence, there is no need to assume that mental terms refer mental entities. 
4) Consequently, one is justified in postulating that there are no mental 
objects, events, or processes. 
The success of this argument depends on the acceptability of the first premise. Hempel 
argues for the acceptability of this premise by claiming: 
“All psychological sentences which are meaningful, that is to say, which are in principle 
verifiable, are translatable into propositions which do not involve psychological concepts, 
but only the concepts of physics. The propositions of psychology are consequently 
physicalistic propositions. Psychology is an integral part of physics.” 103   
 
Take the sentence “Mr. Jones suffers from intense inferiority feelings of such and such 
kinds….”104 Since this sentence can be confirmed or rejected by Jones’s behavior, the 
sentences essentially “means only this: such and such happenings take place in Mr. Jones’s 
body in such and such circumstances.”105 The conclusion for this case can be generalized to 
all mentalistic sentences, since this particular case is no different from any other case 
involving mentalistic assertions. Hence, the meaning of any mentalistic sentence is the 
behavior of some person or persons under certain conditions. This implies that for every 
mentalistic sentence one can find a physicalistic sentence having the same meaning. These 
physicalistic sentences refer to physical events, objects, and processes. The conclusion is 
that all mentalistic terms can be analyzed into behavioristic terms. If this is the case, logical 
behaviorism prevails.  
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 It seems quite plausible to accept that we verify psychological sentences about 
people by observing people’s behavior. However, Hempel also asserts that the meaning of 
sentences is the conditions of their verification. However, this assertion presupposes a 
certain theory of meaning, namely verifiability theory of meaning. According to this theory, 
all declarative sentences can be divided into two types: those that have truth-value and 
those that lack truth-value. Those sentences that have truth-value can be either true or false. 
Only those sentences that have truth-value are meaningful. The question is that how can 
one determine whether sentence have truth-value. According to this theory, sentences have 
truth-value only if they are analytically true (true by definition), or they are empirically 
observable and verifiable. All other sentences are simply meaningless; they are neither true, 
nor false. Mentalistic sentences, according to this view, are declarative as far they are 
verifiable by observation.  
 The problem with all this is that the verifiability theory of meaning is self-defeating. 
The theory claims that only analytic and empirically verifiable sentences are true. These 
requirements apply to the theory itself. However, the statement of the theory is not 
analytical, for the concept of the predicate is not included in the subject. In other words, it 
is not true by definition. The formulation of the theory is not empirically verifiable either. 
Take the sentence ‘all humans are mortal’, this sentence seems to be undeniably true, but 
according to verification theory of meaning this is a meaningless sentence. Hence, there 
seems to be good reason to reject the verifiability theory of meaning.  
 A further objection against logical behaviorism is that it cannot analyze belief 
sentences.106 Chisholm maintains that all attempts to analyze belief sentences in terms of 
behavioral sentences fails. Chisholm believes that all attempts of analysis will ultimately 
culminate in either the ‘synonymous’ term actually not being synonymous, or that it has 
turned synonymous by some ad Hoc technical term, which is superfluous. He considers 
four main types of behavioral analyses of belief sentences: the specific-response analysis, 
the appropriate-behavior analysis, the satisfaction analysis, and the verbal-response 
analysis. Let us use the sentence ‘Jones believes that there is a fire nearby’. The specific-
response analysis would say that this sentence is synonymous with ‘Jones exhibits fire-
responses to his immediate environment’. Here, ‘fire-response’ is a technical term, which 
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seems to be quite ad Hoc. The question is what does ‘fire-response’ mean? The answer 
could be that ‘Jones is exhibiting the behavior which he exhibits when and only when there 
is fire’. This entails that Jones exhibits those behavior whenever there actually is fire. 
However, Jones can be wrong about his beliefs. The analysis cannot use the term 
‘whenever he thinks there is fire’, because that contains a psychological term ‘thinks’.  
 The appropriate-behavior analysis would analyze the original sentence as: ‘under 
circumstances relevant to there being a fire nearby, Jones would behave in a way 
appropriate to there being a fire nearby’. Now, let us suppose that Jones is involved in a fire 
drill. Here, he would behave as if there were a fire, but no one can ascribe the belief that 
there is a real fire to him. The satisfaction analysis would yield the following analysis: 
‘Jones is in a bodily state which would be satisfied if and only if a fire were to occur 
nearby’. The counterexample for this case would be that Jones has heard on the radio that 
there is a fire nearby, and he has been searching for the fire, but he has not been able to find 
the fire. In this case, he cannot be ascribed to have to belief, while he might be showing the 
physical markers. Hence, the analysis fails again.  
 The verbal-response analysis yields ‘Jones has relation B to ‘There is a fire nearby’ 
as a sentence in English’. Here, ‘relation B’ is an ad Hoc technical term to explain away the 
psychological term. Hence, it is superfluous and it must be rejected. At this point, it is 
reasonable to assert that the attempt to establish eliminative materialism via logical 
behaviorism has failed. Ontological behaviorism constitutes an attempt to reduce mentality 
to behavior ontologically. This is a strict sense of behaviorism and reductive materialism, 
which deals with facts and not statements. 
 
4.4.2 Ontological Behaviorism 
 Another method of reduction, which is pursued by behaviorism, is an ontological 
reduction of mentality to behavior. According to ontological behaviorism, there exist no 
mental facts above and beyond behavioral facts. Moreover, there exist no mental states 
above and beyond actual or possible behavior. This claim denies any causal role to mental 
states. Let us clarify this point. Consider, the following statements: 
(1) Pain= grimaces and grunts. 
(2) Pain= the cause of grimaces and grunts. 
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Ontological behaviorism accepts (1) and rejects (2). Ontological behaviorism states that in 
the world there are no private and subjective experiences such as pains, itches, or aches. 
There are only observable behaviors or inclinations or tendencies to behave in a certain 
way.  
 The claim of ontological behaviorism is counterintuitive, since it seems to us, from 
our experience, that being in a certain phenomenological mental state causes grunts and 
grimaces, namely pain. So, our experience supports statement (2). This creates a problem 
for ontological behaviorism, since it claims to be empirical in nature. The aim of an 
empirical research project is, primarily, to explain experience and not explain it away 
necessarily. The task of any scientific theory is to exhaust all avenues of explanation. 
Explaining away a phenomenon should always be the last resort and not the first option.107 
Our intuition about our behavior is not based on some enigmatic and mystical premonition. 
It is based on the fact of our experience, in this case the phenomenology of my sensation of 
pain. It is the task upon the behaviorist to prove why our private and subjective behavior 
nothing other than illusion. The burden of proof is on the side, which makes the unintuitive 
claim. The fact that ontological behaviorism cannot account for the full range of human 
experience, and denies the first-person perspective without giving a good argument in favor 
of this denial, constitutes its failure. In fact, it seems like that a sensation like pain is 
nothing other than how it feels, its qualia.  
 
4.4.3 Methodological Behaviorism:    
Methodological behaviorism affirms a weaker version of ontological behaviorism, 
mainly, for the purpose of setting the parameters of the behaviorist project in psychology. 
According to this view, there is no necessity to posit private, inner, and subjective events, 
states, and processes, because they are, essentially, subjective. Purely subjective concepts 
can play no role in communication, because discourse is intersubjective by definition. 
Hence, subjective concepts cannot be scientifically studied. According to this view, mental 
concepts can have sense, or intension, but they definitely lack any reference, or extension. 
For instance, the states of being in pain could mean some inner state, but it does not refer 
anything that actually exists. Take the case of unicorn, for example. Unicorn has a definite 
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meaning and intension. However, the concept of unicorn does not pick out anything out 
there in the real world. It does not have a reference, or extension. It is not clear how this 
linguistic analysis of subjectivity makes any sense. The problem is that concept of unicorn 
is epistemically symmetrical, but having a pain is epistemically asymmetrical. It is not clear 
how a private and epistemically asymmetrical state such as having an itch has meaning but 
no reference.  
The emphasis of methodological behaviorism, however, is the application of 
behaviorist philosophy to experimental psychology. Hence, it is a method of 
experimentation and therapy based on philosophical behaviorism as John B. Watson and B. 
F. Skinner envisioned it. The basic tenets of methodological behaviorism are: 
1. Behavioral data constitute the only reliable and admissible type of 
information in psychological research. 
2. Psychological theories may not invoke, or refer to, internal, 
subjective, and private mental states in their explanatory scheme. 
The reason for the first requirement is that only behavior constitutes an observable and 
verifiable entity. That is because only observability and verifiability ensure testability of 
data by many different researchers. The second tenet maintains that parameters such as 
positive and negative reinforcement, punishment, stimulus, and response are the only 
experimental and methodological factors that are needed to produce a complete 
psychological theory for explaining the behavior of individuals. Moreover, the difference in 
the behavior of individuals can be explained by the history of reinforcements and 
punishments that a person receives. In other words, two organisms exhibit different 
behaviors to the same stimulus based on their past histories of external stimuli, elicited 
behaviors, rewards, and punishments. Here, it seems vague what the basis of the postulated 
history can be. It sounds like some sort of memory, complex or simple. However, 
memories are mental states and they cannot be anything else. It seems what behaviorism 
kicks out of the front door (mental states) is sneaked back in from the back door (history). 
There is, at least, a tension here, if not a clear contradiction. 
 The failures of methodological behaviorism are evidenced by the rejection of 
modern neurosciences and cognitive psychology, of the basic tenets of methodological 
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behaviorism as inadequate, and to some extent false, in the scope of its assumptions and 
methodology. I take this fact as self-sufficient and I will not say more about it.         
The failure of behaviorism to establish mind-body reduction through definitional 
bridge principles, semantic reduction, or any other type of reductive method discussed 
above. It gives rise to the notion that we should look for empirically based bridge laws. 
This requires the establishment of psychophysical laws, which correlate mental and 
physical properties. This implies that the reduction of psychology to physical theory should 
be nomological and not definitional. Then, the question is whether there are a sufficient 
number of these psychophysical laws to act as bridge laws for a successful reduction.  
 
4.5 Eliminative Materialism:  
Eleminativism is definitely the most radical version of physicalism. Eleminativism 
advocates materialism not by identifying mental states to physical states, or by 
supervenience of mental states on the subvenient physical states. Eleminativism promotes 
physicalism by denying the very existence of mental states. It is important to realize that, 
according to this view, only propositional attitudes such as beliefs will be eliminated from 
our ontology. Sensational and perceptual states are identical to brain states and admissible 
to our ontology. Eleminativism maintains that desires and beliefs will go the way of aether 
and phlogiston in our eventual ontology; they are nothing other than illusions of folk 
psychology. 
 
Fig 4.4: Eliminativism (www.medlibrary.org) 
Eleminativism also constitutes a prominent attempt at the establishment of 
psychophysical laws. The most prominent version of eliminative materialism is put forth by 
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the Churchlands.108 This theory relies heavily on the recent astounding findings of 
neurosciences. The point is that in the future our explanation of behavior, which now is 
based on mentalistic language (folk psychology), will eventually be replaced by 
neuroscientific terminology. The argument can be summarized as such: 
1) The usual ways of thinking about the mental objects, events, and processes yields a 
theory (folk psychology), by which human behavior is explained and predicted. 
This includes language such as ascribing beliefs, hopes, desires to describe 
behavior. 
2) Folk psychology provides at best insufficient and at worst defective and nonexistent 
explanations of human behavior, such as neurosis and unconscious beliefs 
respectively. 
3) Future neuroscience will provide much more accurate and informative explanations 
of human behavior. 
4) Therefore, it is justifiable to assert that folk psychology is a defective theory. 
5) Hence, the theoretical entities can be eliminated in favor of neuroscientific entities.  
6) Consequently, eliminative materialism is justified.109 
It seems like eliminative materialist position revolves around two central points. 
One point focuses on the way we envisage the nature of propositional attitudes such as 
beliefs and desires. The other point of concern is the developmental history of science.110  
The origin of our conception of beliefs and desires is rooted in a commonsense 
theory, which seeks to illuminate the causes, or better purposes, of behavior. This 
teleological nature of our commonsense explanation is in deep contrast to the explanatory 
mechanisms of accepted and advanced sciences. For instance, I see a friend getting up from 
her chair and walking to the refrigerator. She opens the door of the refrigerator. She 
removes a bottle of water and opens the cap. Lastly, she drinks water from the bottle. In my 
explanation of her behavior I introduce the purpose of drinking water, or the desire for 
water, as the cause of her behavior. Through this explanatory scheme we have introduced 
inner mental causes, such as private beliefs. Moreover, we predict and explain behavior in 
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terms of these private propositional attitudes. Hence, the private propositional attitudes 
assume the role of causes of behavior. Eliminativists call this dynamic folk psychology.  
The history of discovery in science provides the second point of the eleminativism 
argument. Accordingly, the history of science is replete with concepts, which once played a 
vital explanatory role in our world paradigm such as phlogiston, aether, ghosts, vital force 
etc. However, modern science discredited these concepts and replaced them with proper 
scientific explanation. Hence, any need for reference to these notions was eliminated from 
our Weltanschauung. Eleminativism maintains that the same fate awaits folk psychology.        
There are three main objections to this argument. First, even it turns out that folk 
psychology is a defective theory; it is not sufficient to conclude that things like emotions, 
cognitions, and volitions are non-existent. All it proves that folk psychology cannot explain 
mental events, processes, and states adequately. The other problem with the theory is its 
reliance on futuristic explanation of neuroscience. Neuroscience, like any other science, is 
occupied with structures, dynamics, and functions. It is not quite clear how the present 
methodology can explain such things as intentionality, and phenomenology of mental 
events. The point is that maybe neuroscience will accomplish what Churchland proposes, 
or maybe it will not. It is not quite sure how Churchland can predict facts about future, 
based on inductive argumentation. Hence, it seems quite reasonable to work with facts at 
hand, rather than predict facts. 
The last, and in my view the most important, objection is that eliminativist’s 
premise based on the history of scientific discovery is based on a false analogy. Hence, it is 
fallacious. Churchland compares the case of mental entities to that of ether etc. However, 
these two cases are not epistemologically analogous. In the case of ether or any of the other 
targets of eliminativist ridicule, we are dealing with an epistemically symmetrical notion. 
All the individuals, including scientists, have potentially equal epistemological access to 
investigation of these concepts. So, once enough information has accumulated and the 
scientific framework has sufficiently evolved, then all of us can see the falsity of concepts 
such as vital forces. However, that is not the case about mentality. It is essentially 
epistemically asymmetrical. There is no level playing field for all observers. The owner of 
experience is the only party, which has direct access to mental events, states, and processes. 
The third-person perspective is necessarily dependent on the first-person perspective for 
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attainment of knowledge about subjective experience. There seems to be a qualitative 
difference between the two perspectives, which seems to be intractable. Hence, the 
conclusions about ether, and such concepts, do not apply to mentality. It is upon 
Churchland to show how science, which is primarily occupied with structure and function, 
can explain subjectivity or the illusion of subjectivity. To label a problem as an illusion 
does not absolve the accuser of the burden of proving how that illusion came to existence.    
In the final analysis, it is reasonable to assert that eliminativist position is not 
tenable. Hence, it must be rejected.  
 
4.6 Identity Theories:  
 We start our discussion of identity theories with the discussion of the meaning of 
the concept of identity. What does it mean when we claim that X is identical with Y? In 
some instances, it means that there is an equality in magnitude between X and Y. In some 
other cases, we mean that X is an instance, or token, falling under the same type, or 
category, as Y. Furthermore, there are occurrences when we mean proper, or strict, identity. 
Hence, there are three senses of identity: 
1. Strict identity. 
2. Token identity. 
3. Equal magnitude identity. 
Two geometrical figures are identical when the sum of their internal angels is equal. This is 
the case of identity based on equal magnitude. However, when I say that I drive the same 
car as you. I don’t mean that I drive your car, but our cars are two instances, which fall 
under the same type or category. This is token identity. Identity based on equal magnitude 
and token are identity in the loose sense. However, there is a proper sense of identity, 
which is strict. Strict identity implies numerical identity. This means that strict identity 
instantiates one thing alone. There are no two examples of it. All we can say, ultimately, is 
that X is identical with X. Or we can say that X is known as A and X is known as B. 
Therefore, A is identical to B. Here, we are saying that X is known through its extensions 
under two different descriptions A and B. In other words, A and B refer to X. let us take an 
example to clarify this point. Consider the statements: 
1) I have visited the Capital city of Austria. 
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2) I have visited the largest city in Austria. 
In this case, both terms ‘Capital city of Austria’ and ‘largest city in Austria’ refer to 
Vienna. Hence, they are identical with each other. Hence, the statements (1) and (2) are 
identical with each other. In the final analysis, there is only one Vienna known under 
different descriptions and extensions. One interesting, and important, point is that 
ignorance of this fact that (1) and (2) both refer to the same concept, Vienna, can lead to the 
claim that I have visited two different, and independent, locations on my trip. This mistake 
is exactly the source of the illusion of dualism, since it does not realize that mental concepts 
are a different description of particular physical concepts and not something independent 
and distinct, according to identity theorists. 
The question is how do we discover identity between two sets of facts. This is an 
epistemic question. From an epistemological perspective, we come to know identities in 
two distinct ways: 
1. Independent of experience or a priori. For example, 2+2=4. 
2. Dependent on experience or a posteriori. For instance, heat is 
identical with average kinetic energy of molecules in motion. 
Identity of mind and brain, according to this view, is an empirically discovered truth. 
Hence, it is a posteriori. This means that the establishment of this identity requires rigorous 
scientific research. It cannot be established through logical analysis alone, since it is not a 
priori.  
Strict identity is ruled by two principles. The principle of indiscernibility of 
identicals states that if X is identical with Y, then X and Y share all attributes in common. 
This implies that for any property P, either both X and Y possess P, or they both lack it.111  
The second governing principle of strict principle is the Leibniz’s Law or the 
principle of identity of indiscernibles. This tenet maintains that if X and Y have all their 
attributes in common, then X is identical Y.112  
The important implication of these two principles is that in order to falsify the 
identity of X and Y, all we need is to show that one enjoys a property, which the other 
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lacks. In other words, the discovery of a differentiating property P falsifies the identity of X 
and Y.  
As we noted earlier, the central claim of identity theory is that mental entities such 
as cognitions and emotions are nothing over and above physical entities, such as brain 
processes. This reductive materialist theory implies that each mental object is identical, in a 
strict sense, with a purely material object, such as a brain or neural entity of some type. 
This type of theory is usually called type-type identity theory; it identifies types of mental 
objects with types of material objects. Any mental type such as pain, belief, and desire is 
postulated to be identical with a material type, such as a neural pathway. Another type of 
identity theory is the token-token identity theory. This theory of identity asserts that each 
instance or token of a mental entity, such as a specific belief or a particular twinge of pain, 
is identical with an instance, or token, of a mental entity, such as a particular neural 
activity. 
 The central position of reductive identity theory postulates mental states as inner 
causal states of a person.113 This puts identity theory in direct contrast with behaviorism, 
since in behaviorism the causal role of mentality was rejected. For a mental state to be a 
causal state, it means that the state is itself caused; and it is the cause of a further mental 
state (i.e. physical state) itself. This argument can be formalized as such: 
1) The notion of mental state is analyzable in terms of an inner causal state. 
2) Therefore, mental states are inner causal states. 
3) Neurological states satisfy the causal roles attributed to these inner causal states. 
4) Consequently, mental states are identical to neurological states.          
At this point, it is important to be clear about the nature of the claims of identity 
theories. The theory does not claim that talk about mental states has the same intension as 
the talk about physical states. For example, to say ‘X is pain’ is not synonymous with the 
statement ‘X’s C-fibers are firing’. Hence, the claim that ‘pain is identical with C-fiber 
firing’ is not like the statement ‘All triangles are three-sided figures with internal angel of 
180 degrees’. The difference is that to deny that all triangles are three-sided figures with 
180 degrees internal angel is self-contradictory. However, to deny that pains are C-fiber 
firing is false, but not self-contradictory. The reason is that in the case of triangle ‘three-
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sided figures with 180 degrees internal angel’ is the intension of the term, while in the case 
of pain that is not the case. The ‘triangle’ statement is an analytic statement, and so 
necessarily true by definition. The statement is true by the virtue of the terms it contains. 
However, the case for the ‘pain’ statement is different. 
According to the identity theories, the meaning of mental statements is not the same 
as the meaning of brain statements. From this, however, one cannot deduce that mental 
states are not identical to brain states. Let us use an example to illustrate this point: the 
meaning of the term ‘Morning star’ is not the same as ‘Evening star’. However, this does 
not mean that ‘Morning star’ is not identical with the ‘Evening star’. In fact, the terms are 
identical, because the planet named in both instances is Venus. Consequently, the non-
synonymy of two terms in an identity does not rule out the truth of the identity assertion. 
This point becomes further clear when one distinguishes between the intension and 
extension of a term. The intension of a term is its meaning. For example, the intension of 
‘Morning star’ is ‘the star that appears in the morning’. However, ‘Morning star’ refers to 
Venus. Hence, Venus is its extension. The same type analysis holds for ‘Evening star’, 
where ‘the star that appears in the evening’ is its intension, while ‘Venus’ is its extension. It 
is quite possible, hence, to have a thoroughgoing and independent discourse about the 
‘Evening star’ and ‘Morning star’, without realizing that one is hypothesizing about the 
same object, if one does not realize that they refer to the same object, namely Venus.  
Identity theory claims that the same conditions holds for the relation between the 
mental and brain states. Identity theory claims that discourse about the brain events and 
mental events are discourse about the same set of events, depictable in two different 
vocabularies. Consequently, it seems that we are in possession of two sets of distinct facts 
about two different sets of events. However, in truth the two sets of facts relate to a single 
reality expressible in both mental and material terms. 
Before we turn our attention to a closer investigation of the two types of identity 
theory. We should say a brief word about the benefits of adopting identity as a possible 
solution to the mind-body problem. There are two potent motivating factors. These two 
factors are simplicity and parsimony. In essence, the benefits of identity are the same as 
reduction. Identity, hence, promotes ontological simplicity and explanatory potential. Smart 
expresses this notion: 
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“Why do I wish to identify sensations with brain processes? Mainly because of Occam’s 
razor…There does seems to be, so far as science is concerned, nothing in the world but 
increasingly complex arrangements of physical constituents. All except for one place: in 
consciousness. That is, for a full description of what is going on in a man you would have 
to mention not only the physical processes in his tissues, glands, nervous system, and so 
forth, but also his states of consciousness: his visual, auditory, and tactual sensations, his 
aches and pains. That these should be correlated with brain processes does not help, for to 
say that they are correlated is to say that they are something “over and above.”…So 
sensations, states of consciousness, do seem the one sort of thing, left outside the 
physicalist picture, and for various reason I just cannot believe that this can be so. That 
everything be explicable in terms of physics…except the occurrence of sensations seems to 
me frankly unbelievable.” 114   
The standard formulation of identity theory is in terms of saying that mental events 
are physical events in the brain: 
 (1) Every mental event is a physical event.  
 Hence, there is a talk of events. So, the question is what is an event in this context? 
There seems to be two different ways to understand what an event is, and they are both 
compatible with identity theory. According to one alternative, an event is a basic concrete 
particular, similar to the notion of material objects. Furthermore, events, like material 
objects, have properties and they can be subsumed under different classes and types. For 
example, a toothache is an event falling under the general category of pain. Furthermore, a 
particular pain can have the property of being dull, sharp, and so on. According to identity 
theory, a particular pain event is also a brain event subsumed under the brain event category 
of C-fiber pathways activity, for example. Consequently, under the view that an event is a 
concrete particular, a given pain event is subsumed under two event categories, pain and C-
fiber pathway activity. In other words, this particular event has the property of being both a 
pain and a C-fiber pathway activity.  
Events can be understood in an alternative way as well. According to this 
formulation, an event is an instantiation of a property by a concrete particular, an object, at 
a certain time. This implies that events are time-dependent. Hence, my headache of 
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yesterday was the instantiation of being in pain was an event, which is a distinct event from 
having a headache today. These are different events, since they have different temporal 
characters. So, for two events to be identical, they must be exemplifications of the same 
attribute by a numerically identical object (strict identity) at the same time.  
Mental events, then, are instantiations of mental properties by a material object at a specific 
time. In a similar manner, a physical event is the exemplification of a physical property at a 
specific time by a material object. Here, the talk of substance is avoided, but the term object 
cannot be anything other than a substance.  
 We noted above, that both alternative understandings of the nature of events are 
compatible with identity theories. Choosing one formulation over the other does not make 
an interesting difference. In fact, the second formulation blurs the difference between the 
type-type and token-token theories. So for the sake of clarity, we formulate type theory and 
token theory in terms of the first formulation of the nature of events. 
(1a) Type physicalism states that mental event types are physical 
event types. Moreover, mental properties are identical with physical 
properties. 
(1b) Token physicalism states that all events subsumed under the 
category of mental event should be also subsumed under the 
category of physical event. In other words, every event, which has a 
mental attribute, has also some physical attributes. 
At this point, we will discuss each version of identity theory in a bit more detail. It must be 
noted that for this theories events and states are interchangeable terms. 
 
4.6.1 Type-type identity theory:                 
 As we stated above, the type-type identity theory claims that each type of mental 
event is identical with a given type of a brain state. Just like, water, as a type of 
phenomenon, is identical to H2O, as another type of phenomenon; lightning is identical to 
pattern of electric discharge; so pain is identical to C-fiber firing. Hence, if there is a one-
to-one correlation between being in pain and a particular type of brain state, such as firings 
of C-fibers, in all the observed cases, then the best explanation is the identity of the mental 
and brain events.  
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 As we have noted identity theory of any kind, rejects the analytic reduction of 
mental terms to physical terms. However, it claims that description of mental events always 
fall under the same type of physical descriptions. In other words, mental terms and physical 
terms have different intensions, but they have the same extensions. Consequently, any 
mental state obtains if, and only if, a particular brain state obtains. This is a direct 
consequence of the claim that mental states are identical with brain states. This is the 
ontological reduction of two terms.  
 Ontological reduction is based on the notion that one set of phenomenon, which is 
seemingly numerically distinct from another set of phenomenon, refers to the same set. As 
we have seen before, this relationship is expressed in terms of the phrase ‘if and only if’, a 
biconditional form. The ambition of the type-theory is that it can furnish regular, orderly, 
predictable relationships based on the biconditionals. These would be biconditional bridge 
psychophysical laws, which connect particular mental types with physical types.  
The implication of these claims is that not only mental events are identical with 
physical events, but also mental properties are identical with physical properties. Mental 
concepts are not synonymous with physical concepts, but the respective properties are one 
type of property expressible under two different terminologies. This is comparable to the 
situation in physics with respect to the description of heat in terms of average kinetic 
energy of molecules in a compound.  
 The theory claims that each type of mental event is identical with a type of physical 
event and there are no exceptions to this rule. The central thesis of this theory makes a very 
strong statement. Particularly, mental states are identified with physical states that are 
found in humans and higher mammals. This seems to be species- chauvinistic, in that it 
allows mental processes for those creatures that have a nervous system somewhat like 
humans and higher mammals. This, however, goes against empirical evidence, which 
ascribes mental states, such as sensations to other creatures other than humans and higher 
mammals.115 Furthermore, imagine that one day humanity will discover other creatures on 
other planets. It is conceivable that their ‘nervous system’ is made form other material, 
such as silicon. It is quite conceivable that these creatures could have mental states as well. 
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At least, it seems implausible to reject that possibility a priori. For these creatures to have 
mental states, all that is required that they are in states with typical causes and effects 
associated with the particular mental state in question. Consequently, mental states exhibit 
multiple realizability. This means any entity, regardless of its constitution, can realize a 
mental state as long as that entity is capable of realizing the states that have the required 
causes and effects associated with the mental state. Consider the mental state M, which 
enjoys a set of physical realizers P1, P2,…, Pi. For Pi to be a realizer of M, the following 
propositions must hold: 
(3) If Pi, then M. 
This means that each physical realizer should be a lawful sufficient condition for the 
realization of M. Suppose that Pi stands for firing of C-fibers and M for pain. Then, 
according to (1), every time C-fibers fire, it guarantees the occurrence of pain. However, 
since P1, P2,…, Pi are each different from each other, each constitutes a sufficient condition 
for M and not a necessary condition for M. In other words, P1 is sufficient for M, but it is 
not necessary for it, since M can occur in absence of P1 such as it is the case in P2 or any 
other, P, physical realizer of M. This implies that there are no biconditional laws for any P. 
This means that no P can be on its own the necessary and sufficient condition for M. 
Hence, the statement: 
(4) Pi if, and only if M 
does not obtain. This means that none of the Ps is a nomic extension of M. Furthermore, 
this implies that the statement: 
(5) Pi=M 
does not obtain. Hence, reduction of M to P is not possible. The reductionist response to 
this objection is the disjunction strategy. According to this approach, since P1, P2,…, Pi are 
all physical realizers of M, and M is instantiated only if one of the Ps is instantiated, we 
could take the disjunction of the Ps as the necessary and sufficient condition for M. in other 
words: 
(6) Either P1, or P2, or…Pi if, and only if M. 
However, we should remember that the list of Ps is an open-ended list. In other words, the 
set of possible physical realizers of a mental state is potentially infinite. This raises the 
question of how an open-ended set can act as a necessary and sufficient condition for 
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anything. It is not clear whether an open-ended disjunctive set is a real property. 
Furthermore, since the disjunctive set brings potentially diverse group of realizers under the 
same setting, it is questionable of how a unified scientific theory can be derived from this 
set. Take the example of intelligence, the physical realizers of intelligence can be a 
neurobiological circuitry, or silicon based circuitry in a supercomputer, or any other 
imaginable, functionally equal, physical structure. There seems to be no overarching 
principle, which is strict enough, to achieve a coherent reductionist theory of intelligence. 
One cannot appeal to common function as the overarching principle, because, then, we 
have non-reductive functionalist physicalism and not reductive identity physicalism. 
Moreover, scientific theorizing needs finitely characterizable entities. An open-ended 
disjunctive set is the opposite of a finitely charaterizable entity. Hence, an open-ended 
disjunctive set does not produce a scientific theory. This is precisely the possibility that 
type-type identity theory must produce. Hence, the type-type theory fails and it must be 
rejected.  
In The Language of Thought (1976)116, Fodor presents a different but related argument 
against desirability of reductionism. Fodor proposes that the notion of explaining a set of 
phenomena by another set of lower level phenomena will not yield ‘nice’ reductions. In 
fact, they run the danger of being nonsensical. This arises from the lack of any systematical 
relation between say the concepts of cognition and the concepts of physiology. Let us 
formalize Fodor’s point of view. 
Assume that P1xP2y expresses a macro-level principle, which explains a certain behavior 
or cognition. For instance, P1x is the desire to drink a cold beer. P2y, on the other hand, is 
the act of walking to the refrigerator, taking a bottle of beer out, and moving it toward the 
lips. Thus, we can formulate P1xP2y as ‘desire to drink beergetting beer (as described 
above). According to Fodor, the relevant parameters here are the P states, namely desire 
and action. However, we know that ‘below’ P states there are N states, which represent the 
physiological states and constitute the micro-level phenomena. There are many N states 
that can correspond to our P1 state such as: being simply thirsty, being stressed and desiring 
calming affect of alcohol, being hot and desiring the cooling affect of cold beer, having 
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alcohol craving, etc. N states corresponding to the P2y would also be various depending on 
your position in the room and the position of the beer in this context. So, the P states can be 
cashed out in terms of different N states. Fodor’s main argument and concern is that when 
we look at the totality of this situation, it is unlikely that these various underlying N states 
can hang together in a way that conveys sense or any coherence. Therefore, we could state 
that P1x corresponds to a set of variable disjunctive N states and P2y is a collection of 
disjunctive N states. Hence, any attempt to explain a P state in terms of its many possible N 
states in a lawful manner is incomplete and “reductionism loses its ontological bite, since 
we can longer say that every event which consists of satisfaction of a P-predicate consists 
of the satisfaction of an N-predicate”117. This means that reductionism produces no 
advantage. To explain a cognitive phenomenon, we should remain in the realm of cognitive 
discourse. Any attempt to descend to a ‘lower-level’ of explanation leads to nonsense. This 
points out the failure of reductionism, but it seems to be an overreaction to the 
shortcomings of reductionism as well. We should not treat consciousness, cognition, and 
mind as phenomena limited to one dimension of the universe isolated and irrelevant to the 
others. A proper theory would require us to explain the emergence of mind in terms of 
totality of universe. We seek an integrative theory of mind and not an isolating theory.   
 
4.6.2 Token-token identity theory:   
 The token theory is formulated in response to the multiple realizability problem of 
the type theory. To understand the token theory, we need to reiterate the distinction 
between types and tokens more clearly. This distinction can be explained by the use of an 
example: water is identical with H2O. If water is taken to be the type, each individual 
instance of water such as rainwater, pool-water, etc. are tokens of the water type. The 
token-token theory states that every token of a type of a mental state is identical with a 
token with a type of a physical state. However, it does not have to involve the tokens of the 
same type of the physical state. Furthermore, this implies that type theory entails token 
theory, but not vice versa. Token theory allows for multiple realizability.  
                                                
117 Ibid., p.22 
 137 
 
Fig. 4.5: Variety of monism (www.absoluteastronomy.com) 
 
This means that every token of the belief ‘I have pain’ is identical with some token 
brain state, such as C-fibers firing. However, this does not imply that it will be identical 
with a token of the same type of the physical state. For example, ‘I have pain’ can be 
identical B-fibers firing in another creature. In fact, the same mental state token can be 
identical with different physical state tokens on different occasions. Hence, the same 
mental type can be realized in different instances, or tokens, of that type by different 
physical tokens. Token theory’s ability to allow for variability and multiple realizability can 
account for parallel processing of mental functions, in which multiple pathways perform 
the same type of mental task; and in case of damage to one pathway the process is 
continued such as it is shown in stroke victims.  
 The token identity theory can be stated in two ways: narrow and wide.118 Wide 
token identity theory states that each mental state token is identical to some physical state 
token or other. Narrow token identity theory asserts that each mental state token is identical 
to some neural state or other. The difference is that wide token identity requires that each 
mental state token to be identical with some physical state token, not necessarily a neural 
state. Narrow token theory entails wide token theory, but not vice versa. According to the 
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narrow formulation, a robot cannot have a mental state but organic creatures do. However, 
according to the wide formulation, even robots can theoretically have mental state.  
 At this point, let us examine the criticisms of the token theory. Token theory suffers 
from what identity theory suffers in general. They fail at accounting for the 
phenomenology, or qualia, of mental states; and they cannot account for the intentionality 
of consciousness.  
 Qualia of mental states refer to the subjective aspect of how some mental aspect 
feels to the individual. For example, the deciding criterion whether a sensation is painful to 
the subject is not whether C-fibers are firing, but whether one ‘feels’ pain. States of 
consciousness are known immediately. One does not have to inspect the contents of one’s 
experience to know whether one is pain. The pain is known immediately and distinctly. 
This is exactly what distinguishes conscious states. Hence, it seems like subjectivity is not 
reducible to physical state. Furthermore, conscious states enjoy epistemic asymmetry. This 
implies that conscious states are immediately available to the subject, but they are hidden 
from the observer. Leibniz makes the same point in his Knowledge argument: 
“Suppose that there be a machine, the structure of which produces thinking, feeling, and 
perceiving; imagine this machine enlarged, but preserving the same proportions, so that you 
could enter it as if it were a mill.  This being supposed, you might visit inside; but what 
would you observe there?  Nothing but parts, which push and move each other, and never 
anything that could explain perception.” 119 
The point is that knowledge about physical workings of the brain does not reveal anything 
about consciousness.  Hence, consciousness is separate and independent of the body and 
physical brain.  
 The second major shortcoming of the identity theory is that it cannot account for the 
intentionality. One of the most important distinctive qualities is that they are directed to an 
object. This means that consciousness is always about something; or it is consciousness of 
something. However, this ‘aboutness’ or ‘ofness’ is not reducible to physical states, 
because physical states are not about anything. This argument can be formalized as such: 
1) States of consciousness are intentional, in that they are about states of affair external 
to themselves. In other words, they have representational states. 
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2) Physical states are not intentional; they have no representational content. 
3) Therefore, states of consciousness cannot be identical with physical states.  
A further property of conscious states seems to widen the gap between the two 
realms even further. The intentional mental states seem to be subject to the rules and 
restrictions of rationality and normativity. Beliefs, for example, can contradict each other. 
In cases of conflict between beliefs, the conflict must be reconciled either by a dialectical 
process, or by rejecting one of the terms of the discourse. However, the constraints to 
physical states are the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology. Hence, it is apparent that the 
two realms are subject to different restriction. This points to the improbability, or even 
impossibility, of psychophysical bridge laws. Consequently, the whole project of the 
identity theories is undermined.120 
 We mentioned that token theories suffer from the general problems of the identity 
theories. However, token theory suffers from a specific problem of its own. The problem 
seems to be that there seems to be no systematic relationship between the type of mental 
event a token instantiates and the physical type it exemplified. It seem like the token theory 
is guilty of being too liberal in its relationships, while the type theory is too restrictive. 
There seems to be no systematic way to describe why particular tokens co-exemplify a 
mental types and physical types. The existence of mental types seems to be independent 
and irrelevant to the existence physical types. Accordingly, the two types co-exist as a 
matter of brute fact. Now, this would be fine for any type of dualism, but from a materialist 
standpoint, it is unacceptable. 
 At this point, it seems that both type and token theories fail. Type theory falls to the 
multiple realizability objection, while the token theory fails because of its inability to 
formulate systematic, orderly, and predictive relationships between mental and physical 
events. Reductive materialism, in general, seems to have failed, because it cannot account 
for the intentionality and the subjectivity of mental states. It seems, therefore, reasonable to 
proclaim reductive materialism as unobtainable. Hence, it must be rejected.  However, the 
case is not lost for token theory. The point is that if one could formulate token relationships 
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in a way that it could furnish an orderly relationship between mental and physical events, 
then token theory could be a promising candidate. 
The attempt to make token relationships more systematic is made through the 
principle of supervenience. This principle states that mental events depend for their 
existence on physical events in a way that there can be no change in mental events unless 
there is a change in underlying physical events. This relationship does not hold conversely, 
because tokens of different types of physical events can exemplify tokens of the same type 
of mental event. This relationship expresses the multiple realizability of mental states. 
Supervenience seems to bring mental and physical events in a closer systematic 
relationship. It is to the analysis of this relationship that we turn our attention in the next 
chapter. However, functionalism is traditionally considered as the solution to the problems 
of the identity theory and reductive materialism in general. We now turn to a short 
discussion of functionalism and its shortcomings. However, the problems with non-
reductive physicalism, which includes functionalism as well, will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
4.7 Functionalism: A way out? 
As we can infer from the previous discussion reductive materialism portrays mental 
states in terms of causal relations. Accordingly, certain causes and effects characterize a 
mental state. To be in certain mental states is nothing above and beyond being in a state, 
which is typified by certain causes and corresponding effects.   
 
Fig. 4.6: Functionalism (www. (www.edtechguy.wordpress.com) 
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Functionalism concurs with this fundamental intuition of reductive materialism. So, 
for functionalists being in a certain mental state is also being in a state that is caused by 
certain parameters and has certain effects as consequence. Such effects can be certain 
behaviors or they can be further mental states. This causal-effect relationship can be 
formulated in terms of an input-output relationship. According to Functionalism, hence, 
what makes something a thought, desire, pain (or any other type of mental state) does not 
depend on its internal constitution, but solely on its function, or the role it plays, in the 
cognitive system of which it is a part. We could formulate this thought by stating that what 
makes a mental kind is a functional-causal kind. More precisely, functionalist theories take 
the identity of a mental state to be determined by its causal relations to sensory 
stimulations, other mental states, and behavior. Ned Block states: 
“metaphysical functionalists characterize mental states in terms of their causal roles, 
particularly, in terms of their causal relations to sensory simulation, behavioral outputs, and 
other mental states…A…functionalist theory of pain might characterize pain in parts in 
terms of its tendency to be caused by tissue damage, by its tendency to cause the desire to 
be rid of it, and by its tendency to produce actions designed to separate the damage part of 
the body from what is thought to cause the damage.”121  
For instance, as we can see functionalist theory typifies pain as a state that tends to 
be caused by bodily injury, to produce the belief that something is wrong with the body—a 
tissue damage detector—and the desire to leave that state and, in the absence of any 
stronger, conflicting desires, to cause wincing or moaning. According to this theory, all and 
only creatures with internal states that meet these conditions, or play these roles, are 
capable of being in pain. 
Suppose that, in humans, there is some distinctive kind of neural activity (C-fiber 
stimulation, for example) that meets these conditions. If so, then according to this 
functionalist theory, humans can be in pain simply by undergoing C-fiber stimulation. But 
the theory permits creatures with very different physical constitutions to have mental states 
as well: if there are silicon-based states of hypothetical Martians or inorganic states of 
hypothetical androids that also meet these conditions, then these creatures, too, can be in 
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pain. As functionalists often put it, pain can be realized by different types of physical states 
in different kinds of creatures, or multiply realized.   
 The driving intuition behind functionalism and behaviorism before was 
Wittgenstein metaphor of Beetle in the box.122 Let us recap by imagining that each one of 
us is in the possession of a little box. In each box, there is something. However, only the 
owner of the box has access to his, or her, box. No one can look into another person’s box. 
Now, each of us claims that he, or she, has a Beetle in their box. However, the problem is 
that there is no way for anyone of us to know that others mean the same thing by claiming 
to have a Beetle. It is logically conceivable that we all posses various objects that we call 
Beetle. What does this state about the concept of Beetle at all? It implies that the concept of 
Beetle is inane, because we cannot know what others mean by Beetle, or what does it really 
refer to. Wittgenstein maintains that, in this case, the idea of Beetle cancels out and it 
becomes meaningless. It can play no role in meaningful discourse.  
Wittgenstein writes further: “An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” 
(section 580). In other words, in order to be justified in ascribing a “mental state” to some 
entity, there must be some true claims about the observable behavior of that entity that 
entail that the entity has the mental state in question. If no true claims about the observable 
behavior of the entity can play any role in the justification of the ascription of the mental 
state in question to the entity, then there are no grounds for attributing that kind of mental 
state to the entity. 
We can see that from the perspective of theoretical structure functionalism is very 
much akin to reductive materialism and behaviorism. For both functionalism and 
behaviorism is the main criteria for presence of mentality is sensory input (stimulus) and 
behavioral output (response). However, functionalism distinguishes itself by allowing for 
the possibility that many different beings can realize the input-output relationships, which 
exemplify mental states. In other words, functionalism allows for multiple realizability that 
was the Achilles’ heels of reductive materialism. In fact, organic brains and nervous 
systems are not the necessary condition for the presence of mentality. What is required is 
the presence of the relevant input-output relationship regardless the matter that manifests 
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such relationships. It can be DNA based or it can be silicon based or any other material 
stuff. This allows for the possibility of computers or robots to be conscious and have 
mental states. This makes functionalism irreconcilable with behaviorism and type-type 
identity theory. In fact, functionalism is compatible with Cartesian dualism. A soul is 
confined within a physical body. So it is physically manifested and the soul; or mind, can 
be understood as a functional software housed in this physical shell.  
Another point of difference between behaviorism and functionalism is their 
respective position toward the reality of internal mental states. Behaviorism approaches 
internal states as predispositions to behavior or actually behavior itself. For functionalists, 
on the other hand, internal states are real causes of behavior. Thus, functionalists are 
realists with respect to internal states. While, behaviorists approach internal states from the 
standpoint of instrumentalism. The instrumentalist-behaviorist perspective treats internal 
states in terms of conditional propositions: if X, then Y. ‘P is in pain’ is defined as ‘ if P 
steps on a needle, then P winces and cries’. On the hand, ‘P is in pain’ means that P is in 
certain mental state, which causes wincing and moaning. Moreover, this mental state is 
brought forth by external stimuli or internal stimuli such as other mental states. So, we can 
summarize by that for behaviorists internal states are nothing other than stimulus (input) 
and response (output) correlations. According to functionalists, internal states are actual 
and real causes of behavior. This means that internal states enjoy a real ontological status.  
Another important point that emerges from the above discussion is that according 
functionalism mental states can be causes of behavior or other internal states. This allows 
for a chain of mental states leading to behavior, a causal network made of internal states. 
Behaviorism does not allow for this internal chain. Stimulus and response may be only 
physically observable and measurable.  
However, the question is that what kind of entities satisfy the criteria of functional-
causal kind to be considered to have a mind. A typical answer to this question is that the 
prototype of a mind can be found in Turing machines.123 A Turing machine is an abstract 
computational construct capable to perform calculation of input data and production of 
output behavior. This computation is performed according to certain algorithms. The 
machine receives the input; it translates the input into certain symbols, performs certain 
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symbolic manipulations according to its given algorithm, translates the result into expected 
output form, and finally produces the results or behavior. We can see that, at the core, a 
Turing machine is symbolic manipulator, a syntactic machine.  
In the traditional sense, a Turing machine is a deterministic automaton. This means 
that knowledge of input and the algorithm makes precise prediction of the outcome 
possible. Output is determined by input and internal workings of the machine. However, we 
could modify this to fit the workings of the real minds by introducing the notion of Turing 
machines as probabilistic automaton. This means that minds are indeterministic meaning 
the input and the algorithm make an outcome probable and not determined. This does not 
mean that probabilistic automata are chaotic in nature. Their behavior is legislated by 
certain rules of action. According to functionalism, mind is a probabilistic Turing machine 
or automaton. In fact, an organism has a mind just in case it has a Turing machine of a 
certain complexity level and certain functional capability. This allows for multiple 
realizability of a Turing machine or a mind.       
The major objections to functionalism, of any type, revolve around two major 
points. The first concern is whether any functional theory can capture the representational 
content of intentional states. This is the question of intentionality, which states that 
conscious states are necessarily about something. Hence, they are intentional. It is not clear 
how a functional state can be about something. This type of objection is exemplified by the 
China Room argument by John Searle, as we will discuss next chapter. 
 The other topic of deep concern is that no such characterizations can capture the 
qualitative character, or “qualia”, of experiential states such as perceptions, emotions, and 
bodily sensations, since they would leave out certain of their essential properties, namely, 
“what it's like” (Nagel, 1975) to have them. Ned Block’s argument illustrates this objection 
further, which will be discussed in the following sections.  
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Chapter Five 
Non-reductive Materialism 
 Up to this point, we have discussed a variety of theories about the nature of 
consciousness and its relationship to the body. Substance dualism claimed that they are two 
distinct, and independent, realms of mental and material. However, substance dualism 
could not account for the relationship between the mind and the body in such a way that 
could explain experience. Mentalism denied the idea of material substance; and it claimed 
that all there is mental in nature. Mentalism turned untenable, because it logically 
culminated in solipsism. Furthermore, mentalism cannot account for the problem of 
continuity. In other words, it cannot do justice to our experience and observation. 
Reductive materialism took the opposite approach of either denying the existence of the 
mental realm altogether, or reducing it to nothing above and over the physical. Reductive 
materialism failed, because it could not account for the intentionality and qualia of mental 
states. Furthermore, the whole reductive project seemed to fail, because of the multiple 
realizability problem. The failure of the reductive materialist theory is a direct effect of it 
taking no interest in consciousness in particular. To reductive materialism, consciousness is 
just another mental state.  It seems like we need a theory that finds a middle path between 
reductive materialism and dualism, provided that one is convinced of the validity of 
materialism. The compromise must be such that one can assert materialism, while taking 
consciousness seriously.  
 This compromise is offered in the form of non-reductive materialism or property 
dualism. This theory is non-reductive, because it does not assert that mental properties are 
identical with physical properties. Mental properties are of a different kind from physical 
properties, but they are ontologically dependent on them. In other words, there is only one 
type of substance, the material, while the material substance can have two kinds of 
properties: mental and material. The relationship between the material substance and their 
mental properties is described through the principle of supervenience. However, we should 
clarify some key concepts first. 
We can give a more clear account of the statements of supervenience theory by 
discussing the notion of ‘possible worlds’ and some relevant concepts.124 We can think of 
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the notion of ‘possible worlds’ as a tool to perform effective thought experiments. In this 
scheme, one possible world represents how things actually are in every infinitesimal detail. 
This is the actual world. The actual world is a collection of all the facts about the world 
past, present, and how things might be in the future. However, the facts of the actual world 
are mostly contingent. This means that they could have been different, if the constellation 
of facts in the initial condition were different. The other possible worlds represent the 
different combination of how things would have been, all the different possibilities with 
their assigned probabilities.  
 The notion of ‘possible worlds’ is not some strange, unintuitive product of 
philosophical discourse. It is rooted in common sense and intuition of everyday problem 
solving skills. It is used daily under the titles of ‘hypotheticals’, ‘possible scenarios’, 
‘various options’, ‘how things could have been’, and so on.125 In fact, any rational decision-
making process is based on a survey of different possibilities and their allotted probability 
values and the priorities of the individual making the decision within the context of the 
realm of possibilities. The philosophical concept of ‘possible worlds’ is an extension of the 
same process. This concept enables us to depict a complete way things are, and might be.  
In any possible world, all the details are presented and determined in one way or 
another. Now, the question is how do we decide the constitution of details of a possible 
world? How do we decide that a particular fact belongs to one world as opposed to another? 
This goal is achieved through two distinct considerations. 
1. Logical or metaphysical possibility. 
2. Nomological possibility.     
It seems to be a matter of logical impossibility that in no possible world ‘one plus one is 
three’, or the sum of the internal angles of a triangle is 180 degrees. So, the scope of our 
imagination and conceivability is limited by logical possibility of combination of facts. 
 The second determining factor of what is allowed and conceivable is not 
metaphysical possibility, but physical possibility. In other words, what the laws of nature 
allow is also the arbiter of assignment of facts. For example, the speed of light corresponds 
to some constant value in our universe. Nothing in our universe can travel faster than 
299,792.458 kilometers per second. This value limits what we can imagine about our 
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universe lawfully. However, there is no logical reason that this value could have been 
different. This constant is a contingent fact about our universe. It could have been different, 
if the initial conditions were different. A different constant for speed of light is inconsistent 
with the laws of nature. Therefore, it is nomologically impossible.  
 The nomological possibility, hence, presents a subset and a narrower sense of 
logical possibility. So, all that is nomologically possible is also logically possible, but some 
things are logically possible but nomologically impossible, such as the example of a 
different constant for the speed of light. 
 Another distinction worthy of our attention and relevant to our concern is the 
difference between necessity and contingency. The concept of necessity and contingency 
relates to the truth of sentences. Generally, there are two types of sentences. Those that 
have a truth-value and those that lack truth- value. Truth-value refers to the fact that a 
sentence can be either true or false. The sentences, which have truth-value, are called 
statements or propositions. This encompasses most of sentences we utter. Questions and 
commands comprise the class of sentences, which have no truth-value. Is does not make 
much sense to ask whether a question is true or false. A question is a kind of thing that 
seeks truth or falsehood.  
 The question whether a statement is true or false can be answered by saying that 
there is a set of possible worlds, where a given statement is true. The set of possible worlds 
corresponds to all the conditions under which the proposition’s capacity for truth is 
actualized. Hence, a proposition is true, if it is true in the actual world. A statement is 
necessarily true, if it is true under all conditions, or all possible worlds. A proposition is 
contingently true, if it is true under some conditions and false under others. Alternatively, it 
is true in some possible worlds and false in some others.  
 We need to discuss one more concept before we engage our topic properly. That is 
the notion of entailment or implication. One fact A entails another fact B if, and only if it is 
necessary that if A is true, then B is true. We can express this in terms of ‘possible worlds’. 
A entails B if, and only if in every logical possible world where A is true, is also a world 
where B is true. 
 One can use the notion of ‘possible worlds’ to talk about properties as well. An 
accidental property is an attribute that an individual has in the actual world and not in other 
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possible worlds. An essential property is an attribute that an individual has in all possible 
worlds. For example, the property of having mass is an essential property of all physical 
objects. However, being poor is my accidental property. I could have been rich in other 
possible worlds. (However, somehow, that is not much of a consolation, when the bills 
arrive at the beginning of the month.) 
At this point, we have enough conceptual tools to begin our discussion of the principle of 
supervenience properly. 
 
5.1 The Principle of Supervenience: 
 Although we alluded earlier to the concept of supervenience, it is important to 
discuss it in more detail. Supervenience is a relationship between two sets of facts. 
According to this concept, one group of facts can fully determine another set of facts. The 
materialist position states that the higher-level facts (supervenient-facts), or mental facts, in 
the universe supervene on the lower-level facts (subvenient-facts), or the physical facts. 
Once the physical facts are laid out, that is all there is to explain the universe. No further 
facts are necessary to describe any phenomenon in the universe. These subvenient-facts are 
the fundamental entities in physics; it is their spatio-temporal distribution in the universe. It 
is also a matter of stipulation to include the laws of physics as physical facts. Therefore, the 
supervenience principle declares that: higher-level facts supervene on the lower-level facts, 
if no two possible situations are identical with respect to their lower-level properties while 
differing in their higher-level properties. For example, the facts about biology supervene on 
the facts about physics insofar as two possible worlds that are physically indiscernible, 
there are also biologically indiscernible.  
Supervenience can be applied locally and globally. Local supervenience concerns 
individuals and it can be defined as: the lower-property of an individual entails the higher-
level properties of that individual. Local supervenience is concerned with differences 
within worlds. This is exactly the limitation of local supervenience. It does not give us 
much information about the truth-value of a statement. Let us remind ourselves, truth of a 
proposition is determined by applying the standards of truth to a statement between the 
possible worlds. All that local supervenience states is that individuals that are alike in a 
certain respect physically are exactly alike in their psychological states. Global 
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supervenience, in contrast, is concerned with facts between the worlds. This fact makes 
global supervenience instrumental in determining truth-value. Global supervenience states 
that any two possible worlds that are physical duplicates of each other are also 
psychological duplicates. In our discussion, it is global supervenience that is relevant. 
Accordingly, all the higher-level facts in the world globally supervene on the physical facts. 
This means that once all the physical facts are known, nothing further is needed to explain 
the higher-level facts as long as the higher concepts are provided. The physical facts entail 
all other facts.  
Another important distinction is between logical and natural (also called nomic) 
supervenience.126 Higher-level facts supervene on the lower-level facts if no two logically 
possible situations are identical with respect to their lower-level facts but distinct with 
respect to their higher-level facts. The logical possibility corresponds to the conceivability 
of a situation. Therefore, logical supervenience needs not to be constrained by the natural 
laws. It is solely constrained by the criterion of rationality, the principle of non-
contradiction. It is logical to conceive of a world, in which dogs can fly. However, it is 
logically impossible to conceive of square circles, or married bachelors. Logical 
supervenience is defined in terms of logically possible worlds and not deducibility in any 
system of formal logic.127 Biological facts supervene on the physical facts. This means that 
once the physical facts are established in their entirety, the biological facts are also 
established in their entirety. No further work is necessary. In all the worlds, which are 
physically indiscernible from this world, there is an identical copy of me who is also 
writing a work on consciousness. Descartes’ evil demon, for example, would have 
complete knowledge of all higher facts once he knows the distribution of fundamental 
elements and he has the relevant concepts. Therefore, in a logically supervenient 
relationship all the higher-facts are entailed by the lower-facts.  
Natural, or nomic, supervenience is the narrower type of supervenience. Natural 
supervenience establishes a structural and functional relationship between two sets of facts 
in the natural world. This relationship obeys the governing laws of the natural world. High-
level properties naturally supervene on the physical properties if any two naturally possible 
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situations with the same physical properties have the same high-level properties. In other 
words, higher facts supervene nominally on lower facts if, and only if, any world (with our 
laws) that is lower facts identical is also higher facts identical. Therefore, it is naturally 
impossible to conceive of a world, which has no gravity. However, it is logically possible 
to conceive of such a world. Natural possibilities are much more stringent than logical 
possibilities. Natural possibility has to obey natural laws. The difference between logical 
and natural supervenience is a crucial one.   
According to the logical type, once all the physical facts are established the higher-
level facts are established as well. No further work is needed, to establish the high-level 
facts. In a merely naturally supervenient relationship, once the physical facts are established 
more work is needed to establish the higher-level facts. More has to be done to establish the 
relevant laws between the physical properties and higher-level properties.  Physical facts do 
not determine higher-level facts fully. Laws have to be established to regulate relationship.  
The implications of both logical and natural supervenience are immense for 
materialism. These ramifications are ontological: that is for the matter of what there is in 
the world. Logical supervenience implies that once the physical facts are known, then the 
higher-level facts are also known. The explanations for the higher-level facts are re-
descriptions of the physical facts. The higher-level facts are different facts, but they are not 
further facts about the world. With respect to natural supervenience, the situation is 
different. Evolution provides a prime example. The relationship between the lower-level 
facts and higher-level facts is established through natural laws that are further facts. 
Physically identical worlds are not necessarily naturally identical. It is naturally possible to 
conceive a world in which dinosaurs evolved to be intelligent creatures instead of 
mammals. This is not necessarily logical supervenience.  
Materialism claims that all facts in the universe are logically and globally 
supervenient on the physical. Materialism is true if the physical facts logically entail all 
other facts. If an exception can be found to this claim, then materialism is false. Notice the 
case for or against materialism deals with logical possibilities and not natural possibility. 
This is a priori knowledge, independent of a posteriori considerations. 
Here, we have to note that the entailment claim holds for logical supervenience. 
Nomological supervenience asserts that the lower facts determine the higher-level facts. 
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Hence, a nomological supervenience would accept the supervenience claim, but not the 
assertion that the lower facts entail the higher facts. Consequently, the difficulties facing 
logical and nomological supervenience are somewhat different. Logical supervenience is 
concerned with logical conceivability, while nomological supervenience is concerned with 
violation of laws of nature and causal closedness of the physical world. In our analysis, we 
will consider logical supervenience first. We will turn to nomological supervenience later.  
 At this point, we can summarize supervenient relationships in terms of three main 
properties:128  
1) Irreducibility: supervenient facts are not either analytically (through definition), or 
ontologically reducible to subvenient facts. In this case, mental properties 
(supervenient properties) are neither analytically, nor ontologically reducible to the 
subvenient, physical facts. 
2) Co-variation: this implies that there can be changes in the supervenient properties, 
if and only if, there are relating changes in the subvenient phenomena. However, a 
change in the subvenient phenomena does not necessarily entail a change in the 
supervenient property. This implies that phenomena cannot differ in their 
supervenient qualities if there is no distinction in their subvenient characteristics. 
Two entities that are indiscernible in their subvenient features must be indiscernible 
in their supervenient qualities. This means that two physically identical must 
mentally identical as well. This accounts for multiple realizability.  
3) Dependence: this implies that supervenient qualities are dependent for their 
existence on subvenient phenomena. This is, however, an asymmetric relationship; 
in that, subvenient phenomena exist independently of supervenient phenomena. In 
the context of our discussion, this means that mental properties emerge and depend 
for their existence on neurological entities, but not vice versa. 
The question is whether consciousness is logically supervenient on the physical. The 
answer to this question determines the fate of materialism. 
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5.2 Is Consciousness Supervenient on the Physical?  
The main concern of this question is whether qualia can be explained through the 
principle of supervenience. It seems reasonable to accept that some functions associated 
with consciousness have physical basis. Here we have to distinguish between phenomenal 
consciousness and physical consciousness, or awareness. Awareness supervenes on the 
physical; hence, it is functionally analyzable and reductively explainable. Awareness is a 
measurable and observable mental activity, and so it lends itself to third person analysis. 
The function of awareness is to access information in different contexts. This means that 
awareness is manifested in different functions. Awakeness is one of the functions of 
awareness. Awakeness is a physical phenomenon and it is functionally analyzable. It has 
been found that clusters of neurons in the brain stem, known as the reticular formation, are 
crucial to the function of arousal and awakeness. Dopamine and epinephrine are the 
neurotransmitters that play the pivotal role. Fluctuations in the level of these chemicals in 
substantia nigra and the pons formation lead to a continuum of arousal: from completely 
alert to coma. 
 Introspection is another function associated with awareness. It is of absolute 
evolutionary necessity that an organism is able to monitor its own internal states, 
psychological and physiological. This self-monitoring will lead to constant adjustments of 
strategy in the environment. Constant evaluation of the internal states will lead to a higher 
evolutionary fitness.  
Reportability is another function associated with awareness. It will lead to better 
communication and cooperation within a social structure. It will also lead to better sharing 
of information between the members of the group. Thus, it increases the fitness of the 
group as a whole. Reportability is the function that makes awareness empirically available 
to an observable.  
Self-awareness is another function associated with awareness. It gives the individual 
a sense of individuality. Self-awareness provides the critical ability to evaluate one’s 
position with respect to future projects and experiences. It provides the centrality to one’s 
life. It is important functionally and evolutionary since the individual will struggle to be a 
participant in the future gene pool. Self-awareness has evolved with the evolution of 
complex social structures. 
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 Awareness is also associated with voluntary control. This is another measurable 
function, whose evolutionary and functional importance is obvious. Awareness is also 
synonymously used with knowledge. This is a linguistic evolution. It is a physically 
entailed activity, since language can be functionally analyzed within a physically causal 
system.  
All these functions are logically supervenient on the physical and functionally 
analyzable. However, there is an element, which seems to be not physically reducible. That 
element is qualia. Phenomenology of an experience is not functionally analyzable; hence, it 
seems that not logically supervenient on the physical. It is perfectly coherent from an 
evolutionary standpoint to have all the aforementioned function without any 
phenomenology. The question is: why should any organism have a phenomenological 
experience of its mental life? It is logically and naturally conceivable to have awareness 
without consciousness. A mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in 
that mental state. Consciousness is that qualitative feel, or qualia, of any mental state. 
Qualia are superfluous from a functional standpoint. However, the qualia is present in most 
mental states, or it could be proposed that it is present in all mental states but to a degree. 
Qualia are not present in most autonomic functions of the nervous system. For example, 
qualia are not present in blood flow in the circulatory system. This also proves that 
phenomenology does not play functional role. Pain is another instance that can be described 
functionally in a very efficient manner using token-functionalism. However, pain has also 
phenomenology, a sense of subjectivism, which is ineffable but real nevertheless. Any 
attempt to describe pain from functional standpoint is incomplete, and it will face the 
multiple realizability problem. A complete description of pain is physical as well as 
phenomenological.  
From the evolutionary and physical standpoint, qualia are not necessary. Any other 
functional phenomenon such as altered state of vision, a ring in the auditory process; 
change in the color of the skin would have accomplished the job (with respect to pain) 
without the qualia and its agony. 
Thomas Nagel, in his essay “what it is like to be a bat?”129 forcefully brings this 
issue to the forefront. Nagel proposes that the issue of subjectivity is impenetrable. Nagel 
                                                
129 Nagel T., (1974) What is It like to Be a Bat?, Philosophical Review 83.4, pp. 435-450, 438, 439. 
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sets out his argument in several steps. First, he says, “no matter how the form may vary, the 
fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically that there is 
something it is like to be that organism”. An “organism has conscious mental states if and 
only if there is something it is like to be that organism- something it is like for that 
organism…. We may call this subjective character of experience”. Secondly, he argues 
that: “if physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must themselves be 
given a physical account”. Thirdly, he argues that it is not possible: “but when we examine 
their subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible. The reason is that every 
subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems 
inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon the point of view”. The quale of 
experience “is fully comprehensible from only one point of view”. Therefore, “any shift to 
greater objectivity- that is less attachment to a specific viewpoint- does not take us nearer to 
the real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us farther away from it”. Further, he argues, 
“this bears directly on the mind-body problem. For if the facts of experience- facts about 
what it is like for the experiencing organism are accessible only from one point of view, 
then it is a mystery how the true character of experience could be revealed in the physical 
operation of that organism”. He proposes that this can have detrimental consequences for 
materialism: “physicalism is a position we can not understand because we do not at present 
have any conception of how of how it might be true”.  
In his book, Consciousness Reconsidered, Owen Flanagan admits that: 
“consciousness did not have to evolve. It is conceivable that evolutionary processes could 
have worked to build creatures as efficient and intelligent as we are, even more efficient 
and intelligent, without those creatures being subjects of experience. Consciousness is not 
essential to highly evolved intelligent life. This claim is true and important”.130 It can be 
argued, therefore, that phenomenal consciousness is neither logically, nor naturally 
supervenient on the physical.  
Phenomenal consciousness seems to be a further fact about the universe that is not 
entailed by the physical facts. Even when the entire question about the physical world is 
answered, one question remains unanswered: why is there a subjective experience or 
phenomenal consciousness? If this is true, this puts consciousness beyond the physical 
                                                
130 Flanagan, O., (1992) Consciousness Reconsidered, MIT press, Cambridge Mass, p. 60. 
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facts. These statements are, however, in need of more qualification and argumentation. One 
can take multiple approaches. One can think of logical conceivability and possibility. 
Another approach is to use epistemological argumentation. In addition, the last approach 
presented here is direct functional analysis or lack thereof in the case consciousness. In any 
case, once it is proved that consciousness is not logically supervenient, then materialism is 
proven false. Jackson, Chalmers, present arguments in addition to Nagel that are worthy of 
serious consideration.131  
 
5.2.1 Argument of logical possibility of a zombie world:132 
Zombie world is microphysically indiscernible from ours, but it contains no 
conscious creatures. Zombies are creatures that are physically and psychologically 
(functionally) identical to human beings but they lack consciousness. They lack qualia, the 
subjective experience. For example, my zombie twin is physically and psychologically 
identical with me in every detail, but he lacks my subjective sense and phenomenology. My 
zombie twin does not have the subjective feel of being him. However, he functions as well 
as I do, physically and psychologically. In his world there is nothing like being a zombie. 
My zombie twin is aware of his environment. He is capable of introspection. He can report 
his mental states. He is self-aware; he can distinguish himself from his surrounding. He is 
as alert as I can be. However, none of theses functions is accompanied with a subjective 
experience.  
The possibility of such a creature and such a world is not only logically possible, 
but it is also naturally possible. According to Chalmers, evolution and natural selection 
cannot distinguish between my zombie twin and me. Natural selection selects for adaptive 
functions and not qualia. In the natural world, consciousness is usually accompanied by 
awareness, but the latter does not have to be accompanied by the former and this is the 
crucial point. 
 
 
 
                                                
131 Kim, Philosophy of Mind. 
132 Chalmers, Consciousness, pp. 131-33. 
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5.2.2 China Brain:  
Another way of coming to this conclusion is through nonstandard realization of 
zombie’s functional organization. The China brain, by Ned Block, provides an example.133 
The people of China organize themselves in a causally and functionally isomorphic 
manner, with every single person acting as a neuron with proper connections. Now, the 
function of the Chinese population is to simulate a program. This program imitates the 
workings of human brain at the neuron-to-neuron level. Since, neurons are essentially 
input-output devices. This program allows for the simulation of an input-output system. 
Accordingly, the members of the population are provided with two-way communication 
devices. So, essentially one person will act as a neuron in this scheme.  
The kind of communication devices they are equipped with tells them the number of 
other individuals who call in. Furthermore, the individuals are taught that certain 
combination of incoming calls will prompt them to take up certain actions, namely 
contacting other members of the population. So, when individual X receives contacts from 
individuals A, B, and C in a specific spatial and temporal order, then individual X will, in 
turn, contact individual Y. The program will provide precise and clear instruction about the 
workings of this system to each individual within the population. The original signal, which 
will start up this process, comes from outside of China. This fact allows this system to 
imitate the environmental inputs to the brain. The output will also culminate in some 
observable and verifiable action of Chinese nation. This is akin to the behavior of the 
individual after receiving an input from the environment, processing that input, and finally 
behaving in a certain way.           
It is certainly granted that the China brain presents an inferior analogy system to 
organic brains in both the quantity and quality of its connections. However, it seems fair to 
ask the questions whether China brain, as a whole, can have phenomenal consciousness or 
qualia. Is there something like being China? One could certainly argue successfully that 
such system would enjoy empirical consciousness and awareness. However, it does not 
seem like it would have qualia. Hence, it is logical to postulate that such system lacks 
phenomenal consciousness. In fact, it would be dubious if one insisted that such system had 
                                                
133 Block, N., (1978) Troubles With Functionalism, Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science 9, pp. 261-
325, 278-280.  
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qualia. This is exactly the importance of this analogy. Whether in the natural world such 
system would be accompanied with, consciousness is an empirical matter at best. The fact 
that this system does not have to be phenomenally conscious seems to prove the point that 
phenomenal consciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical. One might argue 
that China brain does not present the full complexity of the brains connections. However, 
one has to prove that extra number of connections would allow qualia.  
One might argue that biochemistry and molecular biology has to be taken in 
account. This argument is in dire need of qualification as well. If one insists that it is 
biochemistry and molecular biology that are responsible for conscious experience, then one 
has automatically committed to the position that consciousness is only possible for DNA 
based life forms. Moreover, consciousness cannot arise from silicon-based life forms. This 
is a logically and naturally implausible position to take. Hence, it can be concluded: it is 
logically possible to have world, which is physically identical to the actual world, but it (the 
counterfactual world) is devoid of conscious creatures. Therefore, consciousness seems to 
be not logically supervenient on the physical. Consciousness seems to be a further fact. 
 
5.2.3 Chinese Room argument: 
 John Searle’s Chinese room thought experiment presents another avenue in our 
investigation of the question whether phenomenal consciousness supervenes on the 
physical brain events.134 Imagine the case of an English speaking person, who does not 
speak, or understands, Chinese. This person is locked in a room, which has an in-chute and 
an out-chute. He also possesses a book containing instructions in English with respect to 
operation of Chinese characters. Our individual receives occasionally questions and stories 
about those questions through the in-chute. These questions and stories are in Chinese. Our 
individual uses the instruction book to find the proper answers to questions. Moreover, he 
copies the Chinese symbols corresponding to the answer on a piece of paper and places the 
paper in out-chute. It is important to note that our individual does not understand the 
meaning of the questions and the stories, because his instruction book is not a dictionary. 
The instruction book simply gives the individual the proper formula of what to do when 
                                                
134 Searle, J., (1991) Minds, Brains, and Programs, reprinted In The Nature of Mind, editor David M. 
Rosenthal, Oxford University Press, New York. 
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he/she sees a specific Chinese symbol or strings of symbols. Hence, the individual’s action 
is purely mechanical, syntactical, and in no way semantical. Our individual simply 
manipulates Chinese symbols based on the English instructions provided by the manual.  
 Form the perspective of somebody outside of the room, who provides the questions 
and stories to our individual, it would seem that this system understands Chinese and it is 
an intelligent system. From the third person perspective, we are dealing with an 
intelligently communicating system, since for all of our intelligible questions we receive 
intelligent answers. However, the story seems quite different from the first-person 
perspective of the individual inside the room. In fact, it seems quite wrong to infer that the 
individual understands Chinese. This point to a very important point that seemingly 
intelligible behavior does not prove the existence of an intelligence behind the façade. We 
can apply the same conclusion to qualia. Hence, seemingly purposeful and planned 
behavior does not automatically entail the presence of phenomenal consciousness behind 
the behavior. This seems to allude to the fact that physicality does not necessarily entail 
qualia. Consequently, qualia constitute an extra fact about the world, which is not entailed 
by physical entities.  
 
Fig 5.1: The Chinese Room (www.gla.ac.uk) 
 
It is important to note that the individual and the system will pass the Turing Test.  
However, the Turing Test does not seem to guarantee a phenomenal conscious mind. 
According to the Turing Test, if a machine can trick us into believing it has consciousness, 
then it passes the Turing Test. However, it seems like the Chinese Room argument proves 
that the appearance of qualia is not a reliable indicator of the presence of the real thing. A 
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system that passes the Turing Test may be simulating a conscious mind, this does not that it 
really has a conscious mind. This conclusion seems to apply to any physical system, which 
shows stereotypic behavior.   
 
5.2.4 The inverted spectrum argument:135 
If there is a world, which is physically identical to ours, but the facts about 
conscious experience in it are different, then it is established that consciousness is not 
logically supervenient on the physical. As long as some positive fact about experience in 
our world is not identical in a physically identical world, then consciousness does not 
logically supervene on the physical. It is logically possible to conceive of a world, in which 
conscious experiences are inverted. In a counterfactual world, there is a person who is 
physically identical to me (atom for atom), but he has inverted conscious experience. 
Where I experience red, my inverted twin will experience green, and vice versa. The 
important thing is that experience he has of the thing we both call red is the experience that 
I have of the thing we both call green.136 My inverted twin and I are input and output 
equivalent, but we have different inner lives. One could argue that in a case of such 
inversion the two individuals would not be identical with respect to their neurophysiology. 
Nevertheless, this is a gross misunderstanding of the facts in that field. Color perception is 
a highly subjective process, and no rewiring of the neural pathways is necessary to achieve 
various subjective qualia. 
  
Fig. 5.2: Inverted Spectrum (www.absoluteastronomy.com) 
                                                
135 Heil, Philosophy of Mind. 
136 Flanagan, Consciousness, p. 68. 
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Flanagan admits this point but he proposes the emphasis should be put on the 
undetectibility of such phenomenon. He proposes that color perception could be linked with 
emotions or feels. Some colors have cool tone, while others have warm tone. This needs 
qualification. If this is true, then there should be laws that govern such relationship. 
Otherwise this too would be to subjective experience (as it obviously is), and so it would 
empirically unavailable. Further, the argument can be formulated in such a way that would 
avoid this issue altogether. It is logically possible to conceive a world that has creatures 
with color perception devoid of any emotional content and it is equally logically possible to 
conceive a counterfactual world (to the first world) which has creatures that physically 
identical to the actual world but they have inverted perceptions. It is also coherent to state 
that color perception can be inverted without any reorganization of the neurons. Facts about 
consciousness don’t to be entailed by the physical facts. Qualia do not logically supervene 
on the physical. Consciousness is a further fact.  
 
5.2.5 Epistemic asymmetry argument: 
Our knowledge of consciousness is a personal one. It is based on our internal life 
and it is subjective. Our knowledge of other’s consciousness is based on indirect evidence. 
We cannot observe other’s qualia. We have to take their word for it. There is nothing in the 
physical world that would give us a clear causal relationship to consciousness. This puts 
consciousness in a distinct class. This problem does not exist for physically supervenient 
facts. There is no problem of other lives. I do not have to take your world for it that you are 
alive. I can perform a functional analysis and come to that conclusion myself. Life is third 
person observable and functionally analyzable. Our knowledge of consciousness is, in 
contrast, first person based. It does not lend itself to empirical analysis unlike awareness. 
Another example would be memory. Memories are third person available. They can be 
verified through tests. Their neural circuitry is to some extent clear. It involves the 
hippocampus, tertiary cortex, frontal lobe, and etc. clinical cases of amnesia and Alzheimer 
point to the physical nature of memories. The only thing that escapes definition is the 
qualia of memory. Again, this argument seems to prove that consciousness is logically 
supervenient on the physical. 
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5.2.6 The knowledge argument:137 
It can be imagined that we live in an age of completed neurosciences. All that there 
is to know about mental life from a neuroscientific standpoint is known. In this world, 
Mary has been raised in a black and white room. She has never seen any color other than 
black and white and shades of gray. However, Mary is the leading neuroscientist in the 
world. All the physical facts about brain and mind are available to her. She is in possession 
of all concepts that she would need to give a reductive and functional explanation of the 
higher-facts. She knows everything about neural visual processing and optics. Now she is 
taken out of her room. She is shown a red dot. At this point, she might have known 
everything about the physical description of red, but this is the first time that she 
experiences what red is like. This is further fact that she has learned. This further fact, 
about the qualia of seeing red, stands beyond all her physical knowledge. The phenomenal 
experience of seeing red could have never been captured by any amount of reasoning. This 
point fits well with Nagel’ argument about other organisms. Even if we come to know all 
the physical facts about bats, we could not know how it feels to be a bat. We could imagine 
how the bat interacts with its environment, or we come to know its internal states through 
monitoring. However, we could never know the qualia that go with all these processes: 
“from the physical facts about a bat, we ascertain all facts about a bat, except the facts 
about its conscious experience”.138  
 
Fig. 5.4: The Knowledge Argument (www.knol.google .com) 
                                                
137.Jackson, F., (1982) Epiphenomenal Qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32, pp. 127-136, 130. 
138 Nagel, What is like to be a Bat? 
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Jackson’s argument is highly contested. If it is proven that Mary has learned a new 
fact, then it is a direct blow to materialism. The disputes are centered on the question, 
whether Mary has actually learned a new fact. Churchland suggests that Mary has gained 
new knowledge, but she is in possession of no new fact. Mary has learned an old fact in a 
new way, under a new “mode of presentation”.139  
Whenever one has knowledge of a fact under one mode of presentation but not 
under another mode, there will be a different fact that one has no knowledge of- a fact that 
connects the two modes of presentation.140 For instance, if one knows: watery stuff is 
water. Nevertheless, he does not know that H2O is water. Then that person lacks the 
knowledge that watery stuff is H2O. Once he comes to know this new mode of presentation, 
then he has a further fact about the relationship that he was ignorant about. 
Lewis argues that Mary is not in possession of any new facts but a new ability. 
Mary has gained the ability to imagine the sight of red things and to recognize them later. 
Mary’s knowledge is a knowledge of how and not a knowledge that. It is ability rather than 
a fact. There is no argument that Mary has learned a new ability, but that ability is 
experienced subjectively. These qualia are a further fact about the ability. Before, Mary had 
all the physical knowledge. She had a concept of red, but she never knew how it was like to 
see red. It could have been that way, this way, or like nothing at all. Now she knows that 
seeing red is like this and not like that. Seeing red is like something rather than nothing.  
To explain the problem of Mary’s knowledge, Dennett has taken a more radical 
approach. “Dennett quines qualia”.141 He denies the existence of qualia altogether. Dennett 
proposes that Mary has not learned anything at all. This is highly implausible, because of 
our first hand knowledge of qualia. Dennett proposes a connectionist model with an 
evolutionary twist. This is in essence a pandemonium cognitive model, in which there is no 
“headquarters” but smaller agents competing for attention among them. Undoubtedly, this 
is a fascinating model of awareness with emphasis on attention. However, it provides no 
solution to the problem of subjective experience. However, to deny that qualia are 
nonexistent seems very desperate.  
                                                
139 Churchland P. S., (1988) Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain, MIT, Cambridge 
Mass. 
140 Chalmers, Consciousness, pp. 103-04. 
141 Flanagan, Consciousness, pp. 97-102. 
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It is clear that Mary has come to know a further fact about the world. A fact that 
was not available to her in her repository of physical knowledge. Therefore, consciousness 
does not seem to supervene logically on the physical. 
 
5.2.7 The absence of analysis argument: 
Here the burden of proof is shifted to the materialist position. Materialism has to 
provide a functional analysis for consciousness. A functional analysis is a more 
illuminating and a less burdensome task than a purely reductive description. With respect to 
consciousness, this functional analysis seems to be nowhere to be found. The route that is 
usually taken is to collapse consciousness and awareness into one concept, and then 
proceed to describe awareness. Consciousness and awareness are not one concept but 
accompanying phenomenon. It is logically and naturally possible to have awareness 
without consciousness. Description of all physical facts about awareness still leaves one 
question outstanding: why does it have qualia? This further fact is not entailed by the 
physical facts.  
 
5.2.8 Some alternative approaches: 
 Empirical science has done a valiant job to resolve this issue, but so far, they have 
only succeeded in a functional account of awareness. Francis Crick expresses it best: “well 
let’s first forget about the really difficult aspects, like subjective feeling, for they may not 
have a scientific solution. The subjective state of play, of pain, of pleasure, of seeing blue, 
of smelling rose- there seems to be a huge jump between the materialistic level of 
explaining molecules and neurons and the subjective level”.142 In a way, this “huge jump” 
is leap of faith that needs to be reconsidered and reevaluated. Crick, however, proposes a 
theory of binding. Awareness involves many areas of the brain. Since there is no structural 
command center yet found, this poses a problem. There needs to be unifying principle, 
which brings together all aspects of one experience. Crick and Koch show that these 
elements are unified through certain oscillation (such as 40-kHz in visual cortex). 
Therefore, phase and frequency of certain neural structures and networks can unify 
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different elements into one experience. This fascinating theory is quiet with respect to 
qualia. 
Modern physics provides other avenues of research. Quantum mechanics entails 
elements of nonlocality and indeterminacy, which could provide some answers to our 
questions. Penrose suggests that laws that reconcile quantum mechanics and general 
relativity can solve the problem of consciousness.143 There are unknown gravitational 
effects that can cause the collapse of the quantum wave functions. This is nonalgorithmism. 
Penrose suggests that the collapse of quantum wave functions by gravitational forces could 
happen in microtubule proteins. Since consciousness is also nonalgorithmic, consciousness 
could be caused by these collapses. There are three specific problems with this proposal. 
One, it is highly speculative and no evidence is present to even vaguely point to this 
possibility. Two, why microtubules? These are proteins present in all kind of cells. They 
are responsible for intracellular transportation and cellular architecture. They are of the 
same family proteins as, myosin and actin (muscle proteins). The problem is that why the 
collapse of wave function would happen in neurons and not other cells. And if this collapse 
happens in all kinds of cell, then why it would give rise to consciousness in nervous system 
alone and not other systems. It seems that either the authors of this theory have given some 
answers and qualifications, or they will have to commit to a form of panpsychism. The 
latter option is unlikely since these are committed materialists. Three, physics deals with 
structures, functions, and dynamics. A new kind of physics will also continue these analytic 
methods. There is no evidence that this kind of analysis would give an account of 
phenomenology. The question remains. The logical possibility of a world remains that will 
have all the quantum elements without qualia. The questions of ontology of consciousness 
and reductive explanability (in a functional sense, or purely reductive sense) are closely 
related. 
The presented arguments have a direct bearing on the ontological question: is 
consciousness physical? Consciousness does not seem to supervene logically on the 
physical. One might argue that the presented arguments prove a case against materialism 
based on logical supervenience, and sentential materialism, while they don not affect 
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ontological materialism, and nomic supervenience. Sentential materialism is the position in 
the defense of reductive description of all higher-level facts in terms of the physical facts. 
As shown, the reductive explanation is not necessarily a systematic regressive analysis to 
the level of fundamental elements. It can, and to large extent it is, a functional analysis that 
establishes a physical causation at any level. This is plausible since the physical world is 
causally closed. Ontological materialism is a factual statement about the world; it states that 
all the facts in the universe are logically supervenient, or nomically, on the physical facts. 
The arguments presented suggest that consciousness does not seem to be logically 
supervenient on the physical. This affects sentential materialism. However, does it affect 
ontological materialism? The argument can be presented as such:  
1) It is an undisputable fact, based on our subjective knowledge consciousness 
exists. 
2) It is logically possible to conceive of a world that is physically identical to ours, 
but it is devoid of conscious creatures or it has different facts about consciousness.  
3) Therefore, consciousness is a further fact about the world that is not entailed by 
the world.  
4) For materialism to be true, all the facts in the world must be supervenient on the 
physical facts.  
However, we need to provide more evidence to reject nomic supervenience, since the 
rejection of materialism based on logical supervenience does not automatically entail the 
rejection of natural supervenience.   
If consciousness is not physical and the physical world is causally closed, then how 
is consciousness interacting with the physical world. How can it cause behavior? There are 
different strategies to deal with this problem. One is to propose that consciousness is 
merely naturally supervenient on the physical. There are certain laws that regulate the 
interaction of these two entities. This implies certain kind of property dualism. However, 
there is a problem for nomological supervenience of consciousness, which stems from the 
thesis that the physical world is causally closed and that mental and physical events do not 
overdetermine their effects. The point is that a physical event is sufficient to give rise to 
another physical event. This is a direct consequence of the causal- closedness of the 
physical world. All physical events have sufficient physical causes, which bring about 
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those events. A mental event supervenes on the physical events. Moreover, the physical 
event determines the existence of the mental event; and the mental event cannot change 
without a corresponding change in the physical event. The nature of this determination of 
the mental by the physical cannot be anything other than causality for nomological 
supervenience theory. Now let us consider the following case: 
1) P1 (C-fiber firing in a particular neural pathway) causes P2 (twitching of the left 
eye).  
2) M1 (pain) supervenes on P1 (C-fiber firing). 
3) M1 (pain) causes P2 (twitching of the left eye). 
     
 
(1)     (2)    (3) 
                                                                                                                            
                         M1         M1 
                   
P1   P2   P1         P1P2 
      
Fig. 5.5: Mental causation 
 
Now, P1 should be sufficient for the occurrence of P2, if the theory of the causal closedness 
of the physical is true. However, if one denies that M1 causes P2, then one advocates 
epiphenomenalism. The acceptance of (2) means that either P1 is not sufficient for 
happening of M1, which contradicts the principle of closedness; or it means that both M1 
and P1 are sufficient for occurrence of P2, which means that physical events are 
overdetermined. Now, the question whether overdetermination is something that 
physicalism can live with. Overdetermination is the notion that there can be two, or more, 
distinct, and individually sufficient, causes for any physical effect. There seems to be five 
different types of overdetermination:144 
1) Preventive overdetermination. 
2) Potential overdetermination. 
                                                
144 Braddon-Mitchell, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. 
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3) Sequential overdetermination. 
4) Emergent overdetermination. 
5) Actual overdetermination. 
Preventive overdetermination is the case where A and B are both individually 
sufficient causes for the effect E. However, through chance one prevents the other from 
becoming causally efficacious. Hence, the remaining potential sufficient condition causes 
E. For instance, A is one billiard ball and B another Billiard ball. The effect E is the sinking 
of the black ball in corner pocket. Here, both A and B are set in motion and each can sink 
the black ball alone. However, somehow ball A hits ball B in a way that B is diverted but 
A, itself, goes on and sinks the black ball. Here, we don’t have a proper overdetermination. 
The effect E was actually caused by one factor alone. Moreover, which factor, A or B, 
succeeds is a matter chance and not rule. Hence, it seems such type of overdetermination 
should be ruled out for the case of mental causation. 
Potential overdetermination introduces the occurrence where E comes to existence 
in the presence of both A and B. However, there is temporal discrepancy between the 
effectiveness of A and B. One condition predates the other. For instance, B becomes 
efficacious five seconds after A. This is the case where B could have caused E, provided 
that it had occurred in a more timely manner. Here, E is not actually overdetermined, but it 
could have been. This point makes it, hence, irrelevant to the case of mental causation.  
Emergent overdetermination submit the instance where A and B combine in a 
unique way and a new factor AB emerges from them, which is a sufficient condition for the 
causation of E. In this instance, it is actually AB which causes E. It is neither A, nor B. 
Hence, A and B are not necessary conditions for E, but they are necessary conditions for E. 
The problem is that in our case AB would present a hybrid between a physical event and 
mental event. It is not clear what kind of entity this emergent event would be. That forces 
us, moreover, to introduce a whole new set of mysterious phenomenon into our ontology. 
That is not necessarily a disaster. What is disastrous for us is that, this scenario assumes 
what we want examine and prove. It already assumes that the mental and physical entities 
can interact. This is precisely the point of contention here. Hence, any argument resorting 
to emergent overdetermination would be fallacious.   
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Sequential overdetermination presents the case of chain of events. Here, each 
member of the chain is a sufficient condition for the next member of the chain. So, A is a 
sufficient condition for B, B is a sufficient condition for C, C is a sufficient condition for D, 
and D is the sufficient condition for E. Consequently, A causes B, B causes C, C causes D, 
and D causes E. It is needless to say that this type of overdetermination is irrelevant to the 
case of mental causation. It cannot answer the question whether a mental event can be the 
sufficient condition for the causation of a physical event. 
Actual overdetermination, alludes to the situation where A and B are both sufficient 
conditions for the causation of E. Moreover, A and B simultaneously cause E. Here, the key 
is the temporal simultaneity, since it guarantees that overdetermination is actual and proper. 
There are, however, two main problems with this case. First, there are no known 
established and undisputed cases of proper overdetermination in the physical world. We 
cannot simply say that mental case is the only case. That would be an arbitrary solution to 
our problem, because we solve any problem like that. Assigning the label of brute fact to a 
phenomenon should be the last resort and not the first option. The second problem is that 
even if we agreed that actual overdetermination could be a viable option for mental 
causation, it is still violates the laws of conservation of energy and the principle of casual 
completeness of the physical world.  
Indetermination, also, does not provide a way out of this dilemma. As we discussed 
before, the physical explanation, which describes that each physical event maybe 
irreducible and probabilistic, based on the laws of quantum mechanics, still requires these 
indeterminate probable causes to be physical. There seems to be no room for non-physical 
stuff in the quantum picture.              
It does not seem that overdetermination presents an acceptable alternative. Hence, 
nomological supervenience (and supervenience theory in general) must embrace 
epiphenomenalism, or it must be rejected it. So, what is epiphenomenalism? 
 
5.3 Epiphenomenalism 
An epiphenomenon is a causally inefficacious by-product of some process. 
According to epiphenomenalism, although mental events are caused by physical events, 
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they are only epiphenomenon. Consequently, mental events are events incapable of causing 
any further events.  
This means that mental events are causally inert; they are causally inefficacious. 
Epiphenomenalism, therefore, is characterized by a one-way causal interaction. In other 
words, physical events cause mental events as a by-product. However, mental events cause 
nothing whatsoever. Thomas Huxley presented the classical formulation of 
epiphenomenalism: 
“All states of consciousness in us, as in brutes, are immediately caused by molecular 
changes of the brain-substance. It seems to me that in men, as in brutes, there is no proof 
that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of matter of the 
organism. If these positions are well based, it follows that our mental conditions are simply 
the symbols of consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the 
organism; and that, to take an extreme illustration, the feeling we call volition is not the 
cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate 
cause of that act. We are conscious automata…” 145  
 
Traditional substance dualism: 
 
 
Fig. 5.6: Traditional substance dualism (www.en.wikipedia.org) 
 
Epiphenomenalism: 
                                                
145 Huxley, T. H., (1893) Methods and Results, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, p. 244. 
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Fig 5.7: Epiphenomenalism (www.en.wikipedia.com) 
 
Epiphenomenalism can be an appealing theory for several reasons. First, 
epiphenomenalism is compatible with the evolutionary theory. Here, consciousness is by-
product of evolution of ever more complicated physical forms, while consciousness is 
causally inefficacious toward the material events. Secondly, epiphenomenalism is 
compatible with a desire of scientific controllability. If this theory is true, then explanation 
and prediction of behavior becomes a much more manageable project. This makes 
psychology much easier. The third apparent advantage of epiphenomenalism is that will not 
introduce a gap in the fabric of the physical universe. Moreover, it will not violate the laws 
of conservation of energy and the principle of causal completeness of the physical world.   
In spite of the appeal, epiphenomenalism is an implausible view for various reasons. 
First, it rejects the effects of people’s minds on the course of events. This objection 
addresses the un-intuitiveness of epiphenomenalism. This view denies the role of thoughts, 
beliefs, desires, dreams, joys, or sorrows in the development of personal and humanity’s 
history. This view diminishes human history to a ridiculous position. It makes the practice 
of psychotherapy and psychiatry meaningless. However, this is quite objectionable. 
Moreover, it is the burden of the proponent of this view to prove why mental events seem 
‘as if’ they are causally efficacious.  
Secondly, epiphenomenalism does not fit the materialist ontology. The materialist 
ontology is about phenomenon and their qualities. The laws of nature explain the 
relationships of these phenomena. However, epiphenomenalism introduces a new entity in 
this ontology, the epiphenomenon; but there is no room for this new entity within the 
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materialist ontology and the natural laws presented by science. Hence, epiphenomenalism 
requires a new set of natural laws to describe natural relations. 
The third problem with epiphenomenalism is that it makes its own justification 
impossible. J. B. Pratt presents this objection: 
“To say that a thought is even in a minute degree a co-cause of the following thought would 
be to wreck epiphenomenalism. In the process known as reasoning, therefore, it is a mistake 
to suppose that consciousness of logical relations has anything whatever to do with 
result…We may happen to think logically; but if we do, this is not because logic had 
anything to do with our conclusion, but because the brain molecules shake down, so to 
speak, in a lucky fashion. It is plain, therefore, that no conclusion that we men can reach 
can ever claim to be based on logic. It is forever impossible to demonstrate that any thesis is 
logically necessary.” 146  
Pratt insists that this conclusion applies justifiably to the epiphenomenalism theorist’s 
conclusion.    
 The fourth problem raised against epiphenomenalism is that it requires nomological 
danglers. Herbert Feigl raises this objection. Feigl maintains that epiphenomenalism will 
lead to some peculiar interpretation of scientific laws: 
“It accepts two fundamentally different sorts of laws—usual causal laws and laws of 
psychphysiological correspondence. The physical (causal) laws connect the events in the 
physical world in the manner of a complex network, while the correspondence laws involve 
the relations of physical events with purely mental “danglers”. These correspondence laws 
are peculiar in that they may be said to postulate “effects” (mental states as dependent 
variables) which by themselves do not function, or at least do not seem to be needed, as 
“causes” (independent variables) for any observable behavior.” 147 
This means that the epiphenomenalism forces us to postulate two different types of causal 
laws. In the usual case, causal laws express causal connections between events that each is 
the member of the causal chain being determined by the previous member in the chain and 
determining the next member in the chain. Consequently, the standard causal laws connect 
events, which, while caused, are themselves causally determining factors of what happens 
after them. Epiphenomenalism, however, introduces the need for a new type of causal 
                                                
146 Pratt, J. B., (1922) Matter and Spirit, McMillan Publishing CO., Inc, p. 21. 
147 Feigl, H., (1971) Mind-body, Not a Pseudoproblem, Hook, Dimensions of Mind, University of Minnesota 
Press, p. 37. 
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explanation. The psychophysical laws proposed by epiphenomenalism would be radically 
different. These new laws would legislate the causal relationship between physical event 
that are part of physical chain, and mental events that are not members of any physical 
chain. So, mental events function as factors, which although integral part of certain laws, 
dangle uselessly, since they are unnecessary for the explanation and prediction of human 
behavior. Hence, they are ‘nomological danglers’.  
 The collective power of these objections seems to render epiphenomenalism 
untenable. However, the question is what happens to non-reductive materialism of the 
nomic variety. Now, it is beyond dispute that there is a great degree of automaticity in 
human behavior. However, this does not go to prove that all human mental events are 
automatic and the efficaciousness of mental events, processes, and states is an impotent 
illusion. Empirical research bears witness to the efficaciousness of mental events. We will 
discuss this point in more detail in future.  
At this point, we can summarize the fate of the supervenience theory as such: 
logical supervenience fails, because it cannot account for phenomenal consciousness; while 
nomic supervenience fails, because it leads to causal overdetermination or 
epiphenomenalism. Consequently, both are false. It seems like we have ended up on a quite 
hopeless station. The question then is where do we go from here.  
At this point, we must produce an alternative position, which will become the 
corner stone of the position advocated in this project. The strategy is to advocate the 
concept of the intrinsic nature of the world. The fundamental entities in the world are only 
characterized in a relational sense. The fundamental entities are defined in terms of their 
causal relationships with other entities. This picture of the world is a “giant causal flux”. 
However, this never tells what the causation relates. There is a void when it comes to the 
intrinsic nature of the entity. The causation describes the relationship between these voids, 
but it never describes the void. Therefore, the relational analysis cannot supply the whole 
picture. The desperation of our situation warrants a fundamental change in our paradigm, 
which begins from the ontology that we have presupposed in all our discussion so far, and 
it will end in a preliminary exposition of the nature of mind. In other words, we need a new 
ontology in order to give a better theory of mind. The only viable option seems to be save 
both physicalism and mind. We cannot sacrifice one at the feet of the other.  
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Part Two 
 
This section constitutes the constructive, synthetic, and analytic part of the work. In this 
section, I present the outlines of what I believe to be the correct direction of handling the 
question of nature of mind and consciousness. It comprises chapter 6 (Kant’s Criticism), 
chapter 7 (the hermeneutic phenomenological criticism), chapter 8 (the fundamentals of 
process ontology), and chapter 9 (applying process ontology to consciousness, emergence, 
and logic). 
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Chapter Six 
Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism 
Kant was intellectually born into a world torn between the dreamy illusions of the 
rationalists and the mundane practicality of the empiricists. Rationalists believed that the 
truth about the world is accessible to human mind independent of all experience. We can 
know the truth without our engagement in the world. Truth is something that can be arrived 
at by a rational abstractive intellectualization. In other words, all true knowledge is 
independent of experience, because experience is contingent. Hence, the knowledge 
derived from experience is uncertain. For the rationalists, true knowledge must be universal 
and necessary. It follows that it must be independent of experience, a priori.  
On the other hand, the empiricists believed that the world is, as it seems. All our knowledge 
of the world is based on our experience and experience is nothing more than sense 
perception. In other words, all knowledge is a posteriori.  
 Kant set out to find a third way, a correct way of arriving at truth. Not a path on 
which our perspective evaporates into irrelevance as rationalists proposed. In addition, not 
a path on which the world is reduced to mere appearances, as the empiricists suggested. 
Kant’s project is to establish our place, as sentient and rational beings, in the world.148 
Kant’s reconciliation of the rationalist and empiricist positions consists in denying 
that the material of experience is raw. Kant asserts that we never have experience of the 
world as it is in itself. The material of experience is a composite, which has already been 
processed and structured by our minds. Consequently, the rationalists’ principles of reason 
apply to empiricists’ raw material of experience. What we know is not nature as it is, but 
nature to which our minds have already given meaning. The world we know is the world 
our minds articulate—the phenomenal world, and not the world as it is itself—the 
noumenal world.    
Kant’s system mediates between empiricism and rationalism, by recognizing the 
contentions of both in a system, which transcends both. The a priori knowledge applies to 
the world, because it is partially the architect of the world we know. Kant rejects the notion 
that all we know consists of our own ideas and our knowledge is limited to the contents of 
                                                
148 For a more involved discussion of Kant consult: Hoeffe, O., Immanuel Kant, translated by M. Farrier, State 
University New York  Press, Albany, 1994, pp. 31-107. 
Allison, H., (1983) Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, Yale University Press. 
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our minds. In fact, Kant claims that we become conscious of ourselves only by knowing 
something that is other than ourselves. This is in direct refutation of mentalist views of 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Humans do not invent the concept of a world outside of 
themselves and project it from their inner consciousness. On the contrary, we start with the 
consciousness of outside objects. Subsequently, we become conscious of our own mental 
states.  
Consequently, as far as Kant claims that something other than ourselves is implied 
in our experience of the outside world, he is a realist. However, in so far as, he asserts that 
the thing other than ourselves is never experienced independent of ourselves, and the forms 
of intuition and the principles of understanding shape it, Kant is an idealist. This is, in 
essence, the doctrine of transcendental idealism and empirical realism. In other words, the 
world is empirically real and transcendentally ideal.   
The starting point of Kant’s inquiry is the scientific methodology of finding the 
truth about a state of affairs under investigation. For Kant, it was a matter of fact that 
Descartes and the subsequent thinkers preceding Kant did not realize the importance of the 
fact that scientific investigation is comprised of both an empirical as a rational aspect. The 
post-Cartesian philosophy was characterized by upholding the importance one or the other 
factor and dismissing the aspect altogether. The failure of the rationalist as well as the 
empiricist proponents culminated in the inability to give a proper account of what 
knowledge is. In other words, how do the empiricist and rationalist components combine in 
cognition to generate knowledge?  
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Kant makes two main observations in his investigation of the scientific method. 
First, it were true that the test of truth in the science is the strict correspondence of mind 
with external state affairs and objects, then science is in the position to discover only 
particular truths. This means that science could never be able to make universal claims, 
since we can never describe, or observe, all states of affairs. Consequently, the strict 
correspondence of mind with external objects or states cannot be the test for universal 
truths. Secondly, at the core of scientific methodology is design and implementation of 
experiments. However, experiments presuppose a set of questions, which the scientist puts 
to nature. This act of questioning testifies to the fact that the mind plays an active role and 
not a passive observer of events. So, truth is not the just the product of correspondence of 
mind external state of affairs, but also the agreement of the external objects with the mind. 
Consequently, knowledge is a cooperative affair.  
To prove his point, Kant makes a crucial distinction between form and content. 
Take the proposition ‘some roses are red’, for instance. Kant does not claim that the truth of 
this statement is determined by the agreement of the content of this proposition with the 
mind. That is clearly false. The content of this proposition clearly describes a state of 
affairs of the world, which can be verified by observation. Kant, however, makes the point 
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that all the judgments we make can be subsumed under certain categories such as an object 
has certain quality, an object enjoys a certain degree of a quality, an event is ground for 
another event—or it has been caused by another event—so on and so forth. Accordingly, 
knowledge is a cooperative affair, in which the external affairs account for the relata of a 
judgment, while the mind provides the relation, and attributions, of the content of a 
judgment. So, the mind does not decide whether some roses are actually red, but it relates 
the concepts of roseness and redness in terms quality attribution, qualification, 
quantification, universality, particularity, causality etc. The mind provides the form of 
judgments and not their content. The mind does not determine whether the book is on the 
table, or on the chair, or on the sofa. However, all of these descriptions have a spatial 
relation ‘on’, which cannot be derived from the content of the experience but it is 
presupposed by the experience. Or in the case of the judgment ‘this rose is red’, the 
experience provides the fact that this rose is whether red or another color. However, the 
mind supplies the ‘is’. Remember that the mind experience an object through various 
modalities such as olfactory, gustatory, auditory, or visual. It is the mind’s role to subsume 
all these streams of information under one concept and then establish qualifications for this 
class of object such as universality, particularity, causality, substantiality, etc. We could 
also say that in a scientific, or any other inquiry, the mind asks questions based on its own 
attributions and the nature responds to these specific questions. Nature is a witness on the 
witness stand in a court of law, who answers only the questions posed to it by the 
prosecution and defense. The nature does not engage in a free narrative. More importantly, 
even if the nature did engage in a free narrative, we would not able to understand this 
narrative, because the attributions of the mind are a reflection of the structure of mind. This 
how the mind necessarily understands the world. 
For Kant, a judgment is a cognitive act, which connects and combines two objects. 
This is possible, since the mind identifies a connection between the objects. The mind 
establishes this connection mainly through experience. For instance, through sense 
experience we pass the judgment that ‘the house is tall’. This instantiates the case of a 
posteriori or empirical proposition. However, there are judgments that are independent of 
all experience. That the sum of the internal angle of a triangle is hundred eighty degrees is 
derived from the definition and not the successive measurement of triangles in the world.  
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“Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise. First, 
then, if we have a proposition which in being thought is thought as necessary, it is an a 
priori judgment…Secondly…if, then, a judgment is thought…in such a manner that no 
expectation is allowed as possible, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely 
A priori. 
…Necessity and strict universality are thus sure criteria of a priori knowledge, and are 
inseparable from each other.”149 
 
Kant makes a further distinction between the analytic and synthetic judgments. In the 
analytic proposition the concept of the predicate is included in the in the subject. Take the 
proposition’ murder is wrong’. Here the concept of wrongness is included in the concept of 
murder. There is no such a thing as righteous murder, since murder is defined as wrongful 
killing. However, in the statement of ‘roses are flowers’ is not an analytic statement, since 
the idea of flowerness is not implied by the concept of roseness. One must go out into the 
world and verify the truth of this proposition. Statements of this sort are called synthetic 
propositions. They say something about the world above and beyond definitions.   
 The combination of this two pairs of possibilities yields four possible types of 
judgments: analytic a posteriori, analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, and synthetic a 
priori. The first combination is impossible. There can be no analytic a posteriori judgments, 
since all analytic judgments are universal and necessary. While, synthetic judgments are 
contingent and they describe everything particular and contingent. In the case of analytic a 
priori propositions, since all definitions fall under this category. An example would be the 
statement: ‘all bachelors are unmarried men’. Here the concept of ‘unmarried men’ is 
implied by being a bachelor. Furthermore, once we accept this linguistic convention, then it 
becomes universal and necessary. There is no unmarried man, who is not a bachelor. 
Hence, this combination is quite unspectacular and beyond controversy. The propositions 
of this class are subject to the control of laws of contradiction as the test of truth. The case 
of synthetic a posteriori propositions is quite uncontroversial as well, since they describe 
the state of affairs in the world. The test of truth for this class of judgments is observation. 
In other words, they are warranted empirically through experience. 
                                                
149 Kant, I., (1921) Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Kemp-Smith N., Maximillian, London, B xii-xvii, 
B 3-4.    
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 So the outstanding question is whether synthetic a priori judgments are possible and 
what they say about the world. Moreover, what would be the test for their truth or falsity? 
The standard for the truth of synthetic a priori is not the law of contradiction such as 
analytic a priori, because these are synthetic statements. Hence, the concept of the 
predicate is not involved in the subject. The truth of synthetic a priori judgments cannot be 
determined by experience either as is the case of synthetic a posteriori propositions, since 
these propositions must be universal and necessary. Now question presents itself whether 
there is a standard besides logic and experience, which can be used as an arbiter of truth. 
Hume quite clearly rejects such possibility. Consequently, he undermines the possibility of 
synthetic a priori judgments. According to Hume, judgments can be only called matter of 
facts—synthetic a posteriori. Or propositions can be about relation of ideas—analytic a 
priori. In fact, Hume bases his rejection of causality and inductive reasoning on the 
possibility of these two types of propositions. Kant maintains, in contrast, that there are 
statements that describe matter of facts, which are also universal and necessary—synthetic 
a priori.   
 Now whatever synthetic a priori look like, traditionally there have been surmised to 
come up in metaphysics, mathematic, and natural sciences. Kant rejects the possibility of 
synthetic a priori in metaphysics. The role of reason in metaphysics, according to Kant, is 
regulative. Any constitutive use of reason in metaphysics leads to falsehood or antinomies, 
Kant called them. Kant also agrees with Hume that most statements in natural sciences are 
synthetic a posteriori in nature. Here, it most important to point out that Kant does not 
believe that all propositions of natural science are synthetic a posteriori. For example the 
statement that ‘genetic mutations can cause disease’ is certainly a posteriori. However, the 
statement ‘every event has a cause’ cannot be derived from experience. It is, hence, a 
priori—universal and necessary. In fact, this very fact is at the core of natural scientific 
propositions and laws and it validates the role of inductive reasoning in scientific 
methodology. Mathematics provides the major source for synthetic a priori judgments, 
according to Kant in opposition to Hume, who maintained that mathematical claims are 
analytic in nature.  
 We could reformulate Kant’s position in terms of content and form, as we 
established to be important distinction in Kantian thought. Accordingly, the mind provides 
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certain forms and structures, which organize the content of experience as they are provided 
by sensibility. The universal and necessary aspect of judgments is not their content, but it is 
precisely these forms and structures of cognition. Hence, the universality and the necessity 
of these forms of judgments make them a priori. Moreover, they are synthetic, because 
their content is provided by experience and observation. This provides a bridge between the 
rationalist and the empiricist world-view. 
“But through all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises 
out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what 
we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible 
impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself. If our faculty of 
knowledge makes any such addition, it may be that we are not in a position to distinguish it 
from the raw material until with long practice of attention we have become skilled in 
separating it. 
This, then, is a question which at least calls for closer examination, and does not follow of 
any offhand answer:--whether there is any knowledge that is thus independent of 
experience and even all impressions of the senses. Such knowledge is entitled a priori, and 
distinguished from the empirical, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience.” 
150              
                                           
6.1 Transcendental Aesthetics:151 
Kant distinguishes between two faculties of knowledge. The lower faculty of 
knowledge is sensibility. The higher faculty is divided in two parts. One is the strict sense 
of understanding in concepts and the other is the faculty of judgments.  
There are two stems of human knowledge, namely sensibility and understanding, 
which spring from a common, but to us unknown, root. Through the former, the objects are 
given to us; through the latter, they are thought. The interaction of the two is complex and 
profound. The constitutions of the sensory machinery furnish the content of the experience 
and the constitutions of understanding provide the form of experience and so the a priori 
structure. The interaction between the two is that of reciprocity. They are both equally 
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important in knowledge. It should be emphasized that this knowledge is not a psychological 
learning, but it is logical process and structure. 
“Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would 
be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concept are blind. It is, 
therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them 
in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. 
These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can 
intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge 
arise.”152   
  
Fig. 6.1: Sources of knowledge (www.en.wikipedia.org) 
 
Transcendental aesthetics is study of necessary and universal presuppositions of 
human sensibility. It is important to remember that sensibility in this context is 
interchangeable with sense perception, sensation, and the activity of the sensory organs. 
Sensibility is considered as a passive ability to receive external data. Intuition is the 
awareness of entities. The direct inference of knowledge to objects and the point of 
orientation for all thought is intuition, which directly grasps a particular. Sensibility is 
nothing but the capacity of the mind to be affected by objects.  However, Kant makes a 
distinction between matter and form. Matter is that which is directly derived from 
sensation. Form is that which makes the ordering and structuring of those materials 
                                                
152 Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, A 51/B 75. 
 182 
possible. The form of sensible intuition is a priori. The process of sensibility can be 
summarized as such: the given object affects the mind. This capacity of the mind to be 
receptive is sensibility. This effect of the object on the mind is called sensation.    
The forms of sensible intuition are obtainable through a process of abstraction. In 
the course of this investigation, it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible 
intuition, serving as principles of a priori knowledge, namely, space, and time. Kant makes 
distinction between the inner sense and the outer sense. The form of the outer sense is space 
through which we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all without exception in 
space. The form of the inner sense is time through which the inner states are ordered and 
organized. By saying that space and time are forms of intuition, it is said that all sensations 
must always bear the stamp of temporal characteristic and sometimes spatial characteristic. 
Time is the form of our inner sense. This pertains to our mental states and it suggests that 
no mental state can be experienced outside of temporal organization. This experience does 
not have to correspond to an objective reality. Space is the form of outer sense. These are 
intuitions of an independent world. Nothing can appear to us independent of us without also 
appearing spatially. Things are always besides, above, below, behind, etc. of each other in 
the world of appearances. The phenomenon of visual field testifies to this claim. In 
furnishing the answer to the question what time and space are, Kant provides a distinction 
between the metaphysical exposition of an a priori concept and a transcendental exposition. 
According to the metaphysical exposition, space and time are presuppositions of experience 
and not derived from experienced. We can imagine space and time without objects and not 
vice versa. Transcendental exposition attempts to show how is it that we know objective 
and scientific truths about space and time if they are based on intuition. These are synthetic 
a priori after all. Space and time are neither absolute nor relative properties of things. This 
implies that space and time are not real. A Kantian answer to this charge would be that 
space and time are empirically real and transcendentally ideal. Time and space are 
phenomena as they are available to our minds. The true nature of things, things-in-
themselves (the noumenal), is unavailable to us. Does this entail that we live in a world of 
illusion? It is not necessarily so. From the perspective of the empirical world, there is 
reality and appearance. The rain is real and the rainbow is an appearance. From the 
transcendental ideal perspective, not only is the rainbow is an appearance but also the 
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shapes of the raindrops for they correspond to geometrical forms. These are expressions of 
the forms of sensible intuition. 
 With regards to space, Kant states: 
“Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experience. For in 
order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me (that is, to something in 
another regions of space from that in which I find myself), and similarity in order that I may 
be able to represent them as outside and alongside one another, and accordingly as not only 
different as in different places, the representation of space must be presupposed. The 
representation of space cannot, therefore, be empirically obtained from the relations of 
outer appearance. On the contrary, this outer experience is itself possible at all only through 
that representation. 
Space is a necessary a priori representation, which underlies all outer intuitions. We can 
never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as 
empty of objects. It must therefore be regarded as the condition of possibility of 
appearance, and not as determination dependent upon them…  
Space is not a discursive or, as we say, general concept of relation of things in general, but 
a pure intuition. For, in the first place, we can represent to ourselves only one space; and if 
we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space. 
Secondly, these parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space, as being, as it were, 
constituents out of which it can be composed; on the contrary, they can be thought only as 
in it. Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and therefore the general concept of 
spaces, depends solely on limitations. Hence, it follows that an a priori, and not an 
empirical, intuition underlies all concepts of space.” 153   
 
The other pressing issue is that why time and space are considered a priori forms of 
intuition and not a priori concepts. Concepts are general notions and they imply 
instantiations. There can be infinite instances of a general concept. Constituents of a 
concept synthesize the concept. Time and space, however, can be divided in constituents, 
but no synthesis of all constituents will give the whole of time and the whole of space. 
Therefore, time and space do not have instances but they are necessarily one. This means 
that there is one space and one time, which can be divided, in smaller units. The ideas of 
transcendental aesthetic, then, can be put as such. Objective knowledge has two sources: 
                                                
153 Ibid., A 23-25 = B 38-40. 
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sensibility and understanding. For the experience to occur and knowledge of the experience 
to be present, sensibility has to conform to understanding and vice versa. This means that 
concepts, judgments, and references must find their primary application in time and they 
must be temporally constrained. For example, the concept of substance must be applied, 
primarily, not in Leibnizian monads or Platonic Forms, but as an ordinary temporal thing 
that endures through time and it is subject to change. Moreover, if such substance is 
objective, meaning it appears independent of me, and then it must be spatial. Therefore, the 
challenge to prove the objectivity of the world is to prove and justify the every-day world 
of objects and mental states organized in space and time.  
   
6.2 Transcendental Analytic and the Analytic of Concepts:154 
Here the focus is to be shifted from transcendental aesthetics to transcendental 
logic. This is the a priori concept of understanding. Understanding transforms the objects 
of intuition into objects of thought. Understanding and sensibility play an equal and 
interdependent role in knowledge.  Without sensibility no object would be given to us, 
without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind. The understanding can intuit nothing and the senses 
can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise.  
 
Fig 6.2: Kant’s theory of perception (www.en.wikipedia.org) 
                                                
154 Beck, Kant Selection, pp. 110-115. 
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In this context, logic refers to rules of the operation of understanding. There are two 
types. General logic contains the absolute and necessary rules of thought without which 
there can be no employment whatsoever of understanding. Particular logic applies to the 
methodology of particular sciences. General logic in turn can be of two types: pure and 
applied. The latter, applied logic is concerned with empirical conditions for understanding, 
such as psychological factors. Pure general logic is, however, exclusively with the form of 
thought and not its content. Pure general logic is not concerned with the origins of thought 
and it is independent of psychology and logically prior to it.  
Transcendental logic is concerned with a priori knowledge of logical applications. 
This endeavor can be divided into two distinct enquiries: the analytic and the dialectic. The 
transcendental analytic provides the criteria for valid empirical use of understanding. The 
transcendental dialectic provides a critique for the false and dogmatic use of reason.  
The function of understanding is to produce concepts and to comprehend principles. 
The distinction between the concepts and principles can be illustrated by analogous 
distinction between the words and the sentence, where concepts correspond to words and 
principles to sentences. Hence transcendental analytic consists of two parts: the analytic of 
concepts and the analytic of principles. Analytic of concepts is largely devoted to deduction 
of categories. Here the methodology is first metaphysical and then transcendental. 
For Kant, thinking is judging. Judging is a kind of cognitive combining and 
knowledge is the culmination of the judging process. As we discussed above, judging is 
always comprised of two components: an aesthetic sensory constituent and a conceptual 
structural factor. Hence, all knowledge, accordingly, must be made of an experiential 
component—which includes concrete data of sensory data and perceptions, and structural 
and relational aspect—which organizes the precepts and the sensory data by subsuming 
them under concepts. Hence, it gives them meaning. This is what Kant means when he says 
that “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concept are blind. It is just as 
necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to bring them under concepts”.155 So, here 
Kant makes a revolutionary discovery, namely precepts and concepts must be distinguished 
from each other.          
                                                
155 Ibid., A 51, B 75. 
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In the metaphysical deduction, Kant provides a list of candidates for categories. In 
doing this, first, he determines that judgment requires form. In any proposition, the subject 
and the object provide the content of the proposition, while the verb provides the form of 
the judgment. Furthermore, Kant claims that perception is not a passive reception of sense 
data, but it is a type of judging. This is in stark contrast to the empiricist view. Hence, if 
perception is a type of judgment and if judgment has a form, then categories are forms of 
judgment. 
 Kant took over the concept of categories from Aristotle, which he found to be 
inadequate. Aristotle meant by categories the list of all possible attributes that can be 
predicated of a person. The list contained ten items: substance, quality, quantity, relation, 
place, time, posture, action, passion, and dress. Empiricist claims that all knowledge is 
derived and it is reducible to sensory intuitions. They claimed that concepts must 
correspond to sensory stimulus and there are no concepts that can derive their meaning 
from a different source. Kant believed the empiricist position to be implausible. The 
empiricists confuse sensation with experience. The understanding of experience results 
from the concepts that are already presupposed by experience. These concepts can be 
derived from senses, since these provide no structure. Therefore, understanding must be 
replete with concepts prior to sensory experience. Through, these concepts, I can apprehend 
the world that appears as mine. Not to have these concepts means not to have experience 
and knowledge at all.  
“The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also 
gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in 
its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same 
understanding, through the same operation by which in concepts, by means of analytical 
unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content 
into its representations, by means of synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general. 
On this account we are entitled to call these representations pure concepts of understanding, 
and to regard them as applying a priori to objects—a conclusion which general logic is not 
in a position establish. 
In this manner there arise precisely the same number of pure concepts of the understanding, 
which apply a priori to objects of intuition in general, as…there have been found to be 
logical functions in all possible judgments. For these functions specify the understanding 
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completely, and yield as exhaustive inventory of its powers. These concepts we shall, with 
Aristotle, call categories.”156  
  
 By rejecting the empirical claim, Kant introduced the metaphysical deduction of 
categories. Kant’s notion of category, in the metaphysical exposition, is based on the 
relationship between concepts and judgments. For Kant, a concept is a power to make 
certain judgments. To have the concept of plants is the power or ability to use plant in a 
variety of sentences. Each category corresponds to a form of judgment. Kant’s abstraction 
of categories from forms of judgment is a four-step process. First, manifold of sense 
impression has to be structured and determined in order to become an object of thought. 
This needs regulation. This requires a correct synthesis of concepts into coherent linguistic 
structures, most notably the subject- predicate form. The a priori capacities of judging as 
soon as the content of sentences are dispensed with. Here symbols can replace the concrete 
concepts. The remaining structures are concepts of pure judgment, which correspond 
directly to structures of formal logic. These structures constitute pure understanding. 
Categories also constitute pure understanding. Therefore, a priori judgments and concepts 
correspond directly to each other. Establishment of this link constitutes the second step. 
Hence, each category corresponds to a form judgment. Therefore, the list of categories can 
be derived from logical forms. The extraction of the table of judgments constitutes the third 
step. According to Kant, there are four classes of judgments. These are also called points of 
view. Each class has three forms of judgment. This gives twelve forms of judgments. The 
first class of judgments is quantity. It is comprised of three forms: universal (every man is 
mortal), particular (some men are mortal), and singular (Kant is mortal). The second class 
is quality. It consists of three forms: affirmative (man is mortal), negative (man is not 
mortal), infinite or limitative (the soul is non-mortal). The third point of view is that of 
relation. It is comprised of categorical (there is perfect justice), hypothetical (if there is 
perfect justice, then the obstinately wicked are punished), disjunctive (the world exists 
either through chance, or necessity). The fourth point of view is that of modality. It consists 
of three forms: the assertoric is existence-nonexistence, problematic is possibility-
impossibility, and apodeictically is necessity-contingency. In the fourth step of his 
                                                
156 Ibid., A, 79, B 104-05. 
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metaphysical deduction, Kant assigns a category to each form of judgment. Therefore, there 
are twelve a priori concepts and forms of thought. The following table tries to illuminate 
the relationship between the judgments and categories: 
 
Judgments  Categories 
Quantity  Universal  Unity 
Particular  Plurality 
Singular  Totality 
 
Quality  Affirmative  Reality 
Negative  Negation 
Infinite  Limitation 
 
Relation  Categorical  Substance (inherence and subsistence) 
Hypothetical  Cause (causality and dependence) 
   Disjunctive  Interaction (reciprocity b/w agent-patient) 
 
Modality  Problematic  Possibility—Impossibility  
Assertoric  Existence—Nonexistence  
Apodeictic  Necessity—Contingency 
 
Kant took over the distinction between different kinds of judgments from 
Aristotelian logic and he derived the categories from the judgments. The categories are 
tools to understand and cope with the world. These are indispensable concepts of 
understanding. 
In the metaphysical deduction of categories, Kant proposed that the categories are 
indispensable nuclei of understanding. Transcendental deduction deals with the relationship 
and application of categories to intuitions. It proposes that without the concept of 
categories, we could not understand nor conceptualize the fragmentary and disordered 
material and the forms of intuitions and experience. In fact, there would be no experience. 
In broader sense, the transcendental deduction deals with the indispensable notion that it is 
a self, who knows the world and objects. In other words, it is a self, who judges the object 
of the world.    
Three elements are involved in the conceptualization of experience. First, there is 
the structuring of intuitions in time and space. Secondly, it is the unification of intuitions 
under one consciousness. Thirdly, it is the ability to organize all the intuitions into concepts 
of categories.  We can formalize Kant’s transcendental deduction as follows: 
 189 
1) All experience is comprised of the content, which is supplied by sensory data. 
2) These sensory data can be formed into a perceived experience, only if they 
united for a consciousness.  
3) As a result, the unity of experience entails the unity of consciousness and self. 
4) However, the unity of self is an object of experience as well. Here, Kant is 
referring to empirical self as opposed to transcendental self or the transcendental 
unit of apperception. 
5) Consequently, the experience of self and objects is based on a previous act of 
synthesis, which are not subject of experience themselves.  
6) Kant maintains that this previous function of synthesis is performed by the 
categories.     
 The prerequisite to all these, as we have alluded, is the possibility of self-
consciousness. The manifold representations, which are given in an intuition, would not be 
all my representations, if they did not belong to one self-consciousness. As I sit here and 
type these words, there is a sharp pain traveling through my head. However, there is no 
doubt that this pain is mine. I have no doubt that the thoughts rushing through my mind are 
mine. I have no doubt that the struggle to find the right words is mine. It does not feel as if 
there is pain in this room and I cannot locate its owner. I have no doubt that I am the owner 
of my experience. Where does this knowledge come from? I cannot arrive at this 
knowledge by inspecting the items of my experience. There is nothing in the sense data that 
would make this knowledge possible for me. In fact, all my experiences presuppose this 
ownership of my experience. Without this unity of apperception, I could not have any 
experiences at all. The knowledge of ownership of my experiences is not a posteriori, since 
it is presupposed by experience. Hence, it is a priori knowledge. 
“We have stated above that appearance are themselves nothing but sensible representation, 
which, as such and in themselves, must not be taken as objects capable of existing outside 
our power of representation. What, then, is to be understood when we speak of an object 
corresponding to, and consequently also distinct from, our knowledge? It is easily seen that 
this object must be thought only as something in general = x, since outside our knowledge 
we have nothing which we could set over against this knowledge as corresponding to it. 
Now we find that our thoughts of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it 
an element of necessity; the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of 
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knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some 
definite fashion. For in so far as they are to relate to an object, they must necessarily agree 
with one another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object.  
But it is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and 
since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing us—being, as it is, something 
that has to be distinct from all our representations—the unity which the object makes 
necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the 
manifold of representations. It is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the 
manifold of intuition that we are in a position to say that we know the object. But this unity 
is impossible if the intuition cannot be generated in accordance with a rule by means of 
such a function of synthesis as makes the production of the manifold a priori necessary, and 
renders possible concept in which it is united… 
All knowledge demands a concept, though that concept may, indeed, be quite imperfect or 
obscure. But a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a 
rule… 
All necessity, without exception, is grounded in a transcendental condition. There must, 
therefore, be a transcendental ground for the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the 
manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts of objects in general, 
and so of all objects of experience, a ground without which it would be impossible to think 
any objects for our intuitions; for this object is no more than that something, the concept of 
which expresses such as necessity of synthesis”.157      
  
 Kant assigned the role of transcendental unity of apperception to transcendental 
consciousness. This unity of consciousness accounts for the ownership of experience. The 
ownership of experience is not subject to dispute. The empirical investigation might reveal 
the content of consciousness, but not its ownership. Apperception refers to all experience of 
which the subject is able to say’ this is mine’. Therefore, apperception is the foundation of 
self-consciousness and perceptive consciousness. Kant described it as the ‘I think’ that can 
be attached to all perceptual experience. It is the awareness that the perceptual experience 
belongs to me. Unity of apperception defines my point of view. Kant states: “it must be 
possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something 
would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to 
                                                
157 Ibid., A 104-06.  
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saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. That 
representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition. All the manifold 
of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the ‘I think’ in the same subject in which 
this manifold is found”.158 
“There can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connections or unity of one mode of 
knowledge with another, without unity of consciousness which precedes all data of 
intuitions, and by relations to which representation of objects is alone possible. This pure 
original unchangeable consciousness I shall name transcendental consciousness… 
This transcendental unity of apperception forms out of all possible appearances, which can 
stand alongside one another in one experience, a connection of all these representations 
according to laws. For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind in 
knowledge of manifold could not become conscious of the identity of function whereby it 
synthetically combines into one knowledge. The original and necessary consciousness of 
the identity of self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of 
the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is, according to rules, which not 
only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object for their 
intuition, that is, the concept of something wherein they are necessarily 
interconnected…”159    
 
There is never a doubt about the ownership of my experience. A doubt in the unity of 
apperception would mean that I stop having self-consciousness and empirical experience.  
 In the Aesthetic, Kant asserts that the self is known only as appearance. This means 
that through inner sense I identify myself in terms of temporal, empirical objects. In this 
respect, Kant follows Hume’s example, when he states: “no fixed and abiding self can 
present itself in this flux of inner experience”.160 Furthermore, “the empirical 
consciousness, which accompanies different representations, is in itself diverse and without 
relation to the identity of subject.”161 
 However, Kant, in contrast Hume, maintains that this cannot be the whole story. 
Exactly, for the reason that the self cannot be given empirically, there must be a priori 
                                                
158 Kant, I., (1929) Critique Of Pure Reason, translated N. Kemp-Smith, Macmillan, pp. 131-132. 
159 Ibid., A 107-08, 111, B 164-65.  
160 Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, A 107. 
161 Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, A 133. 
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transcendental unity of apperception, which is “pure original unchangeable 
consciousness”.162 
 Consequently, as we pointed out above, it is necessary, with respect to all 
representations, which qualify as mine that they assigned to one single subject. In other 
words, it “has necessarily to be represented as numerically identical”.163 In B deduction 
presents the same idea of the requirement of transcendental apperception under a different 
formulation:  
 “It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations;   
For otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and 
that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be 
nothing to me.”164   
 Kant does not claim that each of my representations must be actually attended by 
the consideration that it is mine. It is not also required that all my representations be 
thought in one grand comprehension encompassing the totality of my experience. What is 
required is that just each of my representations must be such that it is possible for me to 
recognize them as mine in any feat of contemplation. This condition can be met only 
through an unchanging, a priori representation devoid of empirical content; “otherwise I 
should have as many colored and diverse a self as I have representations that I am 
conscious.”165 Consequently, transcendental apperception cannot be identified with the 
cognition of anything that can be brought under the concept of substance or res cogitans. 
Transcendental apperception is consciousness of mental states. Hence, it provides the 
ground of our representation of ourselves as spontaneous. Moreover, apperception “is 
something real”.166 Apperception is “something which actually exists”.167 However, we 
have no concept of apperception. According to Kant, it cannot even be brought under the 
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category of existence.168 Apperception gives us a sense or feeling of existence without the 
concept thereof: “we cannot even say that this is a concept.”169  
 Now, for Kant, this amounts to neither knowledge of transcendental consciousness, 
nor an intuition of apperceptive consciousness. However, this is where we differ from Kant. 
According to our theory, this feature of apperceptive consciousness is the manifestation of 
intellectual intuition. Kant rejects the possibility of such faculty for human beings and 
believes only God would have intellectual intuition. However, we maintain that without 
intellectual intuition the notion of self becomes an illusion of faculty of reason. Kant shows 
this clearly in the Dialectic. For Kant all knowledge is subsuming of sense data under 
categories of understanding. However, apperceptive consciousness can be subsumed under 
neither sense data, since it is not perceivable, as Hume showed us, nor any categories of 
understanding including existence. Hence, it is not knowable, but we have a feeling for it. 
For us, this feeling is nothing other than intellectual intuition. The question is what is 
intellectual intuition.   
 For a subject capable of intellectual intuition, the act of thinking and being 
presented with an object are one and the same event. In other words, the same presentation 
in the subject would perform both functions. This means that the same faculty that thinks 
objects also intuits them. There is need for sense data in this mode of knowledge, since to 
think of an object is also to be presented with it. Furthermore, there is no need for 
application of concepts, because the object would be grasped immediately in its full 
individuality. This is exactly how the knowledge of ownership of experience is presented to 
us. Hence, we know appercetive consciousness through intellectual intuition. Alternatively, 
transcendental consciousness presents itself through intellectual consciousness.  
 Furthermore, the distinction between the actual and the possible is abandoned by 
intellectual intuition, since such differentiation is a function of discursive cognition in 
general. A further implication of intellectual intuition is the dissolution of act of knowing 
and creation. Hence, intellectual intuition is the foundation of creativity and imagination. 
Another feature of transcendental apperception is that it is not only represents the principle 
of unity, but also identity. Kant states, “numerical identity is inseparable from it, and is a 
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priori certain”.170 This means that the condition of apperception is that all representations 
and mental states be related to something that represents itself as identical in relation to 
them. 
 Apperception is the awareness that the perceptual experience belongs to me. 
Consequently, unity of apperception defines one’s point of view. There is never a doubt 
about the ownership of my experience, as emphasized above. A doubt in the unity of 
apperception would mean that I stop having self-consciousness.  The point of 
transcendental deduction is to show that the unity of consciousness is only possible in an 
objective world. The transcendental unity of apperception is only possible if the categories 
of understanding describe an objective world. This does not require an understanding of 
things-in-themselves, but an understanding of things as they appear. This idea ties the 
notion of subjectivity with the idea of objective truth. Here, the task is to prove the 
existence of an independent entity, in which my point of view is manifested. In other 
words, if it can be shown that the pure concepts of understanding are sufficient foundation 
for me to utter ‘I know that this is a pen’, then the ‘I’ of that statement and the concepts I 
use to speak that judgment are necessary, a priori foundation that experience is possible. If 
Kant is successful at this, he makes the skeptical question absurd. 
“The deduction is the exposition of the pure concepts of the understanding, and therewith of 
all theoretical a priori knowledge, as principles of the possibility of experience—the 
principles being here taken as the determination of appearances in space and time in general 
and this determination, in turn, as ultimately following from the original synthetic unity of 
apperception, as the form of the understanding in its relation to space and time, the original 
forms of sensibility”.171  
Consequently, the transcendental deduction is based on the proof that the categories are the 
necessary condition of all experience. The cornerstone of the transcendental deduction is 
that the transcendental unity of apperception is necessary condition of all experience. 
Hence, the argument goes as follows: 1) the transcendental unity of apperception is the 
necessary condition of all experience; 2) this entails that experience is comprised of 
judgments; 3) all judgments require form; hence, the necessary conditions of experience are 
the forms of judgment.    
                                                
170 Kant, Critique Of Pure Reason, A 113. 
171 Kant, Critique. p. 175. 
 195 
In order to introduce his notion of subjectivity, Kant introduces the section on 
refutation of idealism. The point, here, is that we have experience of the world. We do not 
imagine the world. The crux of this argument is that inner experience is possible only on 
the assumption of outer experience. There are three major thoughts that are present in the 
refutation. The proof of refutation is the proof for objectivity. 
 First, identification of experience. We do not observe our experience but we 
observe objects of our experience. The knowledge of experience, therefore, constitutes 
knowledge of its objects. This knowledge is not possible unless the objects can be 
recognized as continuous in time. However, continuity in time is only possible if the object 
exists even if it is not observed. Therefore, there exists independent world of my 
observation, and it has an objective truth. 
 Second, identity of the subject through time. I can characterize my experience as 
mine only if I can identify my experience in time. I have to be a subject who endures in 
time. Duration in time requires continuity in time. My continuity in time is only possible if 
I am a substance. Substantiality requires causality. This means that there must be causal 
link between my past, present, and future. Duration requires causality. Therefore, 
consciousness of experience requires a causal relationship with a world that is accurately 
described by the categories. In other words, there can be no self-consciousness without an 
objective world. 
Third, experience can be ordered in time. If I can know my present experience, I 
have to be able to distinguish it past and present. Reality of time is presupposed in my 
experience and an objective world, in which I can observe change and to which my 
experience is referred, presupposes the reality of time.  
 The common motif in all these thoughts is movement from unity of consciousness 
to identity and the possibility of identity only with respect to an objective world. In the 20th 
century, Wittgenstein proposed a similar argument. In his private language argument, he 
proposes that knowledge of experience has to presuppose a public world. My experience is 
understandable to me immediately through concepts that get their meaning from the public 
world. The publicity of language guarantees the objectivity of its reference. The 
transcendental deduction contributes immensely to the philosophical discussion. It proves 
the objectivity of the world only by using our points of view in the world. We do not have 
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to find a perspectiveless stance to find objectivity. Our perspective is the proof for 
objectivity. Heidegger said it best when he said the scandal of philosophy is not that it fails 
to provide a proof for the objective world, but that such proof is required. Kant makes the 
world ours again.  
 At this point, it would be profitable to see what Kant proposes with respect to the 
categories of substance and causality. Kant agrees with Hume in that he too maintains that 
we can never experience substances. Neither, do we experience necessary connection—
hence causality. However, here Kantian and Humean notions of causality and substantiality 
diverge. As mentioned previously, Hume assumes that we simulate necessary connections 
and substantiality. Kant, in contrast, maintains that causality and substantiality are a priori 
concepts of understanding. Consequently, permanence and regular sequence, or necessary 
connection, are mind’s necessary and universal mode of generating experience for sentient 
being like us. Kant derives the categories of substance of causality and substance by 
arguing: 
 “ Experience is an empirical knowledge, that is, a knowledge which determines an object 
through perceptions. It is the synthesis of perceptions, not contained in perception but itself 
containing in one consciousness the synthetic unity of the manifold of perceptions. This 
synthetic unity constitutes the essential in any knowledge of objects of the senses, that is, in 
experience as distinguished from mere intuition of sensation of the senses. In experience, 
however, perception come together only in accidental order, so that no necessity 
determining their connection is or can be revealed in the perceptions themselves. For 
apprehension is only a placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition; and we can 
find in it no representation of any necessity which determines the appearance thus 
combined to have connected existence in space and time. But since experience is a 
knowledge of objects through perceptions, the relation (involved) in the existence of the 
manifold has to be represented in experience, not as it comes to be constructed in time but 
as it exists objectively in time. Since time, however, cannot itself be perceived, the 
determination of the existence of objects in time can take place only through their relation 
in time in general, and therefore only through concepts that connect them a priori. Since 
these always carry necessity with them, it follows that experience is only possible through a 
representation of necessary connection of perception. 
The three modes of time are duration, succession, and coexistence. There will, therefore, be 
three rules of all relations of appearance in time, and these rules will be prior to all 
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experience, and indeed make it possible. By means of these rules the existence of every 
appearance can be determined in respect of the unity of all time.”172   
With respect to Substance Kant states: 
“…our apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore 
always changing. Through it alone we can never determine whether this manifold, as object 
of experience, is coexistent or successive. For such determination we require an underlying 
ground which exists at all times, that is, something abiding and permanent, of which all 
change and coexistence are only so many ways (modes of time) in which the permanent 
exists. And simultaneity and succession being the only relation in time, it follows that only 
in the permanent is the substratum of the empirical representation of time itself; in it alone 
is any determination of time possible…if we ascribe succession to time itself, we must 
think yet another time, in which the sequence would be possible. Only through the 
permanent does existence in different parts of the time-series acquire a magnitude which 
can be entitled duration. For in bare succession existence is always vanishing and 
recommencing, and never has the least magnitude. Without the permanent there is therefore 
the substratum of all determination of time, and, as likewise follows, is also the condition of 
the possibility of synthetic unity of perception, that is, of experience. All existence and all 
change in time have thus to be viewed as simply a mode of the existence of that remains 
and persists. In all appearances the permanent is the object itself, that is, substance as 
phenomenon; everywhere, on the other hand, which change belongs only to the way in 
which substance or substances exist, and therefore to their determinations… 
Permanence is thus a necessary condition under which alone appearances are determinable 
as things or objects in a possible experience.”173        
  
 So for Kant, a substance is an experience of permanence of an intricate 
configuration of sensory data. Here, the configuration, and pattern, is permanent and not the 
content material. In fact, the content is constantly changing and dynamic. It follows that 
substantiality is a way that our minds shape our experience and there are no substances 
above and beyond that. Substances are relative permanent configurations of our experience. 
In other words, objects of the world are not necessarily substance, but our minds organize 
experience substantially.  
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 Kant holds the same view with respect to the idea causality. The mind orders the 
complexes of sensory data according to the rules of succession and this is experienced as 
objects being causes and effect to another. In other words, the notion of causality is 
necessarily true and the grounds for this necessity is the structure of the mind.     
 
6.3 Analytic of Principles:174 
  Every principle corresponds to a category. Principles are rules for the objective 
employment of categories. Principles are a priori truths. Principles are a priori forms of 
judgments. Two aspects characterize them. One, they regulate thinking. Second, they tell us 
the structure of the intelligible world. In other words, if we hope to make sense of our 
world by thinking, then we have to use principles. Judgments constitute a third faculty of 
knowledge. Judgments classify and group manifold intuitions under concepts of 
understanding. In fact, judgments play an intermediary role between manifold intuitions 
and categories of concepts. The classification of intuitions under concepts is possible due to 
schemata. These are representative class of principles. Schemata mediate between intuitions 
and understanding, and they are produced by imagination. The role of schemata becomes 
clearer when one realizes that manifold intuitions are indeterminate and formless (not in 
temporal and spatial sense). Concepts give the intuitions determinacy and form. However, 
if we stopped at this point all language would be just occupied with analytic statements. No 
further claims could have been made, because faculty of knowledge would be present to 
apply connect and apply different concepts to each other. Schemata (principles) make this 
possible. It is important to clarify that schemata stand to principles as concepts to 
categories.  
 Without schemata, categories are abstractions, which have no relevance to the 
empirical world. This means that categories must be schematized, or given temporal 
version, in order that they can be applied to experience. For Kant, time act as an 
intermediary between the pure categories and appearance. Time is both a priori and 
sensible, since it is the a priori form of sensibility. Consequently, categories relate to 
experience as they establish the necessary temporal features of consciousness.  
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 The principles are temporalized categories. Principles are necessary for experience, 
because they make the distinction between objective and subjective time possible. The 
principles, according to twelve categories, come in four groups of three: 
1) Axioms of intuition: these principles correspond to the three categories of quantity: 
unity, plurality, and totality. The corresponding principles state that everything in 
space and time must be subsumed under the category of quantity. This means that 
the axioms of intuition have magnitude. This says that all experience is extended, 
meaning it is comprised of distinct parts. 
2) The anticipations of perception: this principle corresponds to the category of 
quality: reality, limitation, and negation. This principle introduces the notion of 
degrees of quality. This implies that sensation has degree of magnitude expressed in 
relative and superlative. 
3) The analogies: these principles correspond to the categories of relation: substance, 
cause, and reciprocity. They determine the connection between objects and events 
in the world. This claims that experience is possible only necessary connections are 
found among perceptions.  
4) The postulates of empirical thought: these principles correspond to the category of 
modality: necessary, actual, and possible. “Something is actual if it connects with 
some actual perception in the accordance with the analogies”.175 As we will see, this 
entails that being actual does not require perception. Possibility, for Kant, is causal 
possibility and not logical possibility. In a similar manner, by necessary he means 
causal necessity and not logical necessity.  At this point, let us explain the principles 
in more detail. 
              The analogies signify a relationship. Experience is signified by a necessary 
temporal combination. Analogies are identities of relationship of perceptions to each other. 
These relationships are because experience is build upon intuition. Perceptions can be 
combined in three different manners. They can be permanent, successive, and coexistive. 
These three possibilities produce three analogies: 1) permanence of substance, 2) 
succession in time according to concept of causality, and 3) coexistence based on the 
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concept of reciprocity and community. Experience is possible through these necessary 
connections of perceptions.   
            The first analogy claims that time cannot be perceived. Here it is postulated that 
change can occur in respect to a background of permanence. Time is the duration of an 
experience, which cannot be supplied by experience itself. The notion that a substance is 
permanent is signified by this principle. Permanence of substance acts as reference point 
for change to occur. This puts permanence at a deeper level than appearance. Change is not 
in substance but at the level of appearance. This implies that there is no absolute change 
only relative change. This is clearly an attempt to illustrate the roots intelligibility of the 
law of conservation, which is one of the principal principles of physics. 
            The second analogy suggests that perception is successive. This means that our 
perception of an event is not comprised of disjointed intuitions, but there is an order to it 
that can be reversed. This reversibility suggests a causal connection between the fragments, 
which would be impossible without causation. This also implies that causation is prior to 
experience and a priori, since experience is ordered with it. With causality, temporal order 
is established.  
            The third analogy addresses coexistence. The idea of coexistence is impossible 
without causality. Only if we stand in a causal relationship with two entities, we can say 
they exist simultaneously. If they are in causal isolation from us, then we cannot make such 
claims. The analogies are designed to provide arguments against Humean empiricism.    
               This is the refutation of idealism of the variety proposed by Descartes and 
Berkley. The common thread in both kinds is the claim that the inner is better known than 
the outer and the outer objects are inferred from inner experiences. Kant’s argument is as 
follows: we are aware of our changing mental states and therefore we are conscious of our 
existence in time. However, as argued in the first analogy the perception of change requires 
a perception of permanence. However, we are not the source of the perception of 
permanence. Therefore, its source has to be outer experience, which enables me to make 
judgments about the past. The boundaries of the empirical thought are determined by the 
category of modality. They determine possibility, actuality, and necessity. Stepping over 
the realm of these categories that are informed by intuitions leads to illusions in our 
knowledge of the empirical thought. For example, an affirmative proposition does not 
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imply existence. Having the ability to say God is great is to make an affirmative 
proposition from a qualitative category. It is not justified to conclude from the affirmative 
judgment the truth of a modal judgment such as God exists. 
 
6.4 Transcendental Dialectic: 
  As we have seen, Kant makes a distinction between the phenomenal and the 
noumenal worlds. The phenomenal realm corresponds to empirical reality. Our knowledge 
of the world is limited to the empirical realm. We have no positive knowledge of the world, 
as it is itself, the noumenal world. We must assume the existence of the noumenal as a 
transcendental condition for the empirical world and our knowledge of the empirical world. 
In this respect, we can see that Kant’s position is open to a similar criticism raised against 
Locke’s representationalist theory of perception.  
Kant’s theory of perception has three entities: the knowing mind, the world of 
phenomena, and the world of the noumena that underlies the world of phenomena and it is 
its partial cause. The other cause of the phenomenal world is the contributions made by the 
knowing mind through the forms of intuition and the principles of understanding. The 
theory states that the knowing mind knows the world of phenomena, but it never knows the 
noumenal world. Hence, the knowing mind cannot know anything about the noumenal 
world. The question arises that how, then, the knowing mind can know that the noumenal 
world exists at all, or that it has the property of underlying or being the cause of the 
phenomenal world. Kant claims that we know the noumenal through our moral experience 
of autonomy and freedom. However, moral experience does not in itself does not inform us 
that reality is comprised of noumena. This information is obtained through our 
interpretation of moral experience, and this interpretation is the function of understanding.  
In the transcendental dialectic, Kant maintains that the application of the categories 
of understanding to the things-in-themselves leads to illusion and emergence of questions 
that the pure reason can raise but never appropriately answer. The three main cases of such 
mistaken usage of pure reason, called antinomies, are God, being-in-general, and Self—
empirical self. It is not that there is no God, being-in-general, or Self—according to Kant. 
But the derivation of arguments and application of the categories of the understanding to 
prove these is at best misguided. The existence of God, being-in-general, and the Self 
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cannot be understood through speculation of the mind, but through the actions of an agent 
in a world in which he must act purposefully and meaningfully. Hence, the world of values 
and practical reason is the domain of these notions. With respect to the self, Kant states: 
“…since the proposition “I think (taken problematically) contains the form of each and 
every judgment and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is evident that the 
inferences from it admit only of a transcendental employment of the understanding…We 
therefore propose to follow it, with a critical eye, through all the predicament of pure 
psychology… 
(1) In all judgments I am the determining subject of that relation which constitutes the 
judgment. That the “I,” that thinks, can be regarded always as subject, and as something 
which does not belong to thought as a mere predicate, must be granted. It is an apodeictic 
and indeed identical proposition; but it does not mean that I, as object, am for myself a self-
subsistent being or substance…   
(2) That the “I” of apperception and therefore the “I” in every act of thought, is one, and 
cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and consequently signifies a logically simple 
subject, is something already contained in very concept of thought…But this does not mean 
that the thinking “I” is a simple substance… 
The analysis, then, of the consciousness in thought in general, yields nothing whatsoever 
towards the knowledge of myself as object. The logical exposition of thought in general has 
been mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the object…”176     
 
Kant’s notion of self can be criticized by claiming that Kant bifurcates, in the same 
way he bifurcates reality, he divides the notion of self. Accordingly, there is the self of 
whom we become aware by introspection, the phenomenal, or the empirical self; there is 
also the transcendental self. The transcendental self is the source of moral experience of 
duty and autonomy and is a member of the real world. Both selves are known. The 
empirical self is known through introspection, while the transcendental self is known in 
moral experience. The empirical self makes us a member of the phenomenal realm, as the 
transcendental self makes the member of the noumenal world. However, the question is that 
what the relationship between the selves is. Kant asserts that the empirical self is a 
manifestation of the transcendental one. The result is that it leaves us with two selves, 
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which are separated from each other and in some cases confront each other. One self is real 
and moral and the other is phenomenal and amoral. However, we are conscious of 
ourselves in moral experiences in the same way we are conscious of ourselves in any other 
kind of experience. It follows that it is inadmissible to introduce the bifurcation between 
moral experience and any other type of experience. Furthermore, according to Kant, the 
transcendental self determines and prescribes to the empirical self. In this capacity, the 
transcendental self produces causal effects upon the empirical self. Causal relation, 
however, belongs to the phenomenal world. Consequently, by virtue of the effects it 
produces in the phenomenal world, the transcendental self loses its property of being purely 
real and purely transcendental. The above objections arise from internal inconsistencies in 
the Kantian view. However, Kant’s treatment of the apperceptive aspect of consciousness 
and the function thereof is of invaluable service to our understanding of the nature of 
consciousness. This proves that consciousness is not causally ineffective as it is claimed by 
epiphenomenalism, as we shall see. Moreover, also proves that substantiality and causality 
must be treated as principle of our understanding and not necessarily the nature of the 
world in itself.  
 
6.5 The Bergsonian Critique: 
 The Kantian notion of unattainable reality in itself prompted criticism from its 
inception particularly in the philosophies of Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Bergson. Hegel 
based his critic on idea that Kant presents an incomplete notion of rationality itself. He 
assumed, as we shall see later, that rationality itself is a process of unfolding, which is 
characterized by conflict and final consolidation of seemingly contradictory and opposing 
aspects of reality, a triadic movement from thesis to antithesis to synthesis—the dialectic 
process. The dialectic process is not just a hallmark of rationality itself, but it is the 
foundation of reality. Hence, reality is rational. 
 Bergson begins his project by agreeing with Kant that rationality as such is not 
capable to comprehend the world beyond its own categories and constructions. However, 
he disagrees with Kant that such capacity is fundamentally impossible. Kant’s rejection of 
such possibility was a consequence of his cognitive theory in that he assigned to intuition a 
purely sensible role and rejected the notion of intellectual intuition for humans. Again, he 
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does not reject the possibility intellectual intuition, but the possibility that it can be part of 
our cognitive furniture. Intellectual intuition, according to Kant, is a divine capacity. This is 
exactly the diverging point for Bergson. According to him, intellectual intuition is part of 
our cognitive machinery. It is in fact our window into reality itself—as duration. Hence, the 
true objective of metaphysics is to explore the scope of this intuition, which goes beyond 
discursive reasoning, because reality transcends conceptual understanding. 
“Metaphysics…is only truly itself when it goes beyond concept, or at least when it frees 
itself from rigid and ready-made concepts in order to create a kind very different from those 
we habitually use; I mean supple, mobile, and almost fluid representations, always ready to 
mould themselves on the fleeting forms of intuition… 
Concepts…generally go together in couples and represent two contraries. There is hardly 
any concrete reality which cannot be observed from two opposing standpoints, which 
cannot consequently be subsumed under two antagonistic concepts (for example, the self is 
both a unity and multiplicity). Hence a thesis and antithesis which we endeavor in vain to 
reconcile logically, for the very simple reason that it is impossible, with concepts and 
observations taken from outside points of view, to make a thing. But from the object, seized 
by intuition, we pass easily in many cases to the contrary concepts; and as in that way thesis 
and antithesis can be seen to spring from reality, we grasp at the same time the two are 
opposed and how they are reconciled.” 177    
 
As we can see, Bergson does accept the Hegelian notion as a triadic movement of thesis-
antithesis-synthesis. Bergson, however, maintains that rationality can pose the contradiction 
but it cannot resolve the contradiction, as Hegel envisioned. The resolution of the 
contradiction—thesis-antithesis—requires a different faculty, which cannot incorporate and 
resolve the contradiction at once—namely intellectual intuition. 
So, the question is what does intuition reveal to us. In other words, what is the 
nature of reality? The interesting aspect of this position is that in order for us to understand 
the nature of reality we must look within. What intuition there reveals is, according to 
Bergson, duration, change, dynamics, and life. In other words, this is not just an experience 
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of changing states in time, but an experience of change itself. This is an experience of 
flowing time.  
“I find, first of all, that I pass from state to state, I am warm or cold, I am merry or sad, I 
work or I do nothing, I look at what is around me or I think of something else…I change 
then, without ceasing. But this is not saying enough. Change is far more radical than we are 
at first inclined to suppose. 
…Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which 
swells as it advances. And as the past grows without ceasing, so also there is no limit to its 
preservation…In its entirety, probably, it follows us at every instant; all that we have felt, 
thought and willed from our earliest infancy is there, leaning over the present which about 
to join it, pressing against the portals of consciousness that would fain leave it outside. The 
cerebral mechanism is arranged just so as to drive back into the unconscious almost the 
whole of this past, and to admit beyond the threshold only that which can cast light on the 
present situation or further the action now being prepared—in short, only that which can 
useful work. At the most, a few superfluous recollection may succeed in smuggling 
themselves through the half-open door. These memories, messengers from the unconscious, 
remind us of what we are dragging behind us unawares…Doubtless we think with only a 
small part of our past, but it is with our entire past, including the original bent of our soul, 
that we desire, will and act.” 178       
 
So, we can deduce that Bergson consider the nature of reality as well as self as duration, or 
process. Moreover, this process—duration—is creative and efficacious. In fact, for Bergson 
the driving force of evolution lies not in the survival of species but in creation of new 
forms. Here, Bergson combines an empirical claim with a metaphysical statement. That 
species evolve is an empirical assertion, but the claim that the underlying reality thereof is a 
process or duration is an ontological statement. We could claim that this is a weakness of 
this theory. However, all empirical theories such as physics are based on some fundamental 
ontological presuppositions, which are not presented in every formulation of these theories, 
but they are there as the foundation of these theories. Take the notions of randomness, 
force, energy, causality etc. These are ubiquitous in any empirical theory. For instance, the 
theory of Darwinian evolution does not prove the randomness of emergence of variability 
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through genetic mutation, among other mechanism. It simply assumes it. The presence of 
ontological commitments does not weaken an empirical theory. It, however, highlights the 
importance to bring our ontological house in order. 
 Another of our peeves against Kant was that he introduces a gap between pure 
reason and practical reason. Hence, he separates our capacities as spectator of the world and 
agents who act in articulation of the world. The starting point of understanding 
consciousness must always be, according to processual point of view, the acting agent. In 
fact, understanding of cognition must begin from action of an embodied agent in a specific 
environment. This holds for us as well as the simplest cell as an information processing 
entity.   
“Between mobility and consciousness there is an obvious relationship.  No doubt, the 
consciousness of higher organisms seem bound up with certain cerebral 
arrangements…but…it would be as absurd to refuse consciousness to an animal because it 
has no brain as to declare it incapable of nourishing itself because it has no stomach…Even 
the humblest organism is conscious in proportion to its power to move freely.” 179           
This does not minimize the importance of nervous system. It claims that the evolution of a 
nervous system is also a product of an evolutionary strategy to move more freely and 
choose in order to defend oneself and procreate. Hence, greater mobility led to emergence 
of higher levels of consciousness. The emergence of the highest levels of consciousness 
occurs in intelligent animals, since here intelligence offers the organism the most options to 
act. This means that animal has the option to explore various alternatives. Consequently, 
consciousness in its highest manifestations presents itself always as choice and vacillation. 
“Consciousness is the light that plays around the zone of possible actions or potential 
activity which surrounds the action really performed by the living being. It signifies 
hesitation or choice. where many equally possible actions are indicated without there being 
any real action (as in deliberation that has not come to an end), consciousness is intense. 
Where the action performed is the only action possible (as in activity of the somnambulistic 
or more generally automatic kind), consciousness is reduced to nothing…From this point of 
view, the consciousness of a living being may be defined as an arithmetical difference 
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between potential and the real activity. It measures the interval between representation and 
action.” 180 
 
And what is the role intelligence? Well, the role intellect is to create tools to actualize some 
potential in contrast to some others based on the needs of the organism in its environment. 
This distinguishes intellect from instincts.  
“The normal work of the intellect is far from being disinterested. We do not aim generally 
at knowledge for the sake of knowledge, but in order to take sides, to draw profit—in short, 
to satisfy an interest…To try to fit a concept of an object is simply to ask what we can do 
with the object, and what it can do for us. To label an object with a certain concept is to 
mark in precise terms the kind of action or attitude the object should suggest to us…” 181 
 
This function of intellect in a community of individuals, who need to communicate and 
learn from each other, presents itself in form of language. Hence, language is a 
manifestation of intellect. Language does not have to be only the human mode of 
communication. Any form of communal exchange of information can be considered 
language. This practical role of intellect is ultimately its limitation in understanding the 
metaphysical truths and inner nature of beings. Intellect is interested in manipulation to 
satisfy the needs of the agent.  
“There are two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we 
move round the object; the second that we enter into it. The first depends on the point of 
view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The 
second neither depends on a point of view nor relies on any symbol. The first kind of 
knowledge my be said to stop at the relative; the second, in those cases where it is possible, 
to attain the absolute… 
It from this that an absolute could only be given in an intuition, whilst everything else falls 
within the province of analysis. By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by 
which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and 
consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the 
object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects. 
To analyze, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself. All 
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analysis is thus a translation, a development into symbols, a representation taken from 
successive points of view…It goes on, therefore, to infinity. But intuition, if intuition is 
possible, is a simple act… 
The inner life is all this at once: variety of qualities, continuity of progress, and unity of 
direction. It cannot be represented by… concepts, that is by abstract, general, or simple 
ideas…Concepts…have the disadvantage of being in reality symbols substituted for the 
object they symbolize…” 182  
 
So, as we can see the role intellect is intimately linked to practical concern of the 
individual. Hence, intellect takes the form of hypothetical reasoning: If X, then Y. 
According to Bergson, a type of substantive reasoning—which gets to the core—is 
principally beyond the capacity of intellect. That is the function of intuition—intellectual 
intuition.
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Chapter Seven 
An Existential Phenomenological Challenge 
 The question of the nature of self and personal identity is one of the perplexing 
enigmas of philosophical discourse. This confusion is the result of a specific view of 
consciousness and its relations in the world. However, few philosophical traditions have 
attempted to change the attitude of the inquiring mind. Instead, most attention and effort 
has been spent to unravel the enigma. This seems futile since the consciousness that is the 
source of the problem is asked to solve the problem.  
 The traditional concept of consciousness is based on four assumptions.183 First, 
the notion of consciousness is intimately linked to, and in fact inseparable from, the idea of 
the inner as opposed to the outer. Hence, it is deeply rooted in Cartesian dualism. Second, 
the idea of consciousness is related to the idea of representation, which is the subject 
picturing the object. Third, the concept of consciousness is based upon a conception of time 
as the present, and failing to notice the importance of past and future. Fourth, the traditional 
notion of consciousness and self is based on substance ontology. We reject these 
assumptions and suggest the importance of human existence as process as opposed to being 
a substantial subject, for which the world is an object. In contrast to traditional idea of 
consciousness, which is substantial subject, in whom the world is represented. Being in the 
world is tied to the world through care and concern. In traditional idea of consciousness, 
the subject is constantly present to itself. However, human existence is constantly ahead of 
itself in its projects and ultimately toward death. 
 
7.1 A Paradigm of Perception: 
 We can use the case of perception of a cube as the paradigmatic case of perceptive 
consciousness. When we look at a cube, we can observe the cube from one particular 
perspective. This means that from any one instance, only one perspective is available to me 
and I am barred from perceiving the other perspectives. However, this does not mean that I 
cannot experience the other sides of the cube. In fact, I do experience the hidden sides of 
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the cube in that I co-intend the other sides that are hidden as potentially visible but actually 
absent aspects of the cube. This means that the hidden sides are given, but given as absent. 
The absent, or hidden, sides constitute my experience as much as the present, or the 
revealed, sides. Consequently, my act of perception is comprised of an intended present 
part and an intended absent part. So, the act of perception is a blend of filled and empty 
intentionality.184  
   
Fig. 7.1: Gestalt images (www.noologie.de) 
  
 Another fact about my perception of the cube is that it is dynamic and not static. 
This means that I know I can walk around the cube or move the cube in such a way that 
previously absent sides become apparent and vice versa. This implies that the dynamism of 
my perception guarantees that the potentially perceived becomes actually perceived and the 
actually perceived slips into absence.  
 So far, we have talked about the presence or absence of sides of the cube. 
However, we can take our analysis a step further. Note that if I move each side in a 
different angle, then the rectangular side will be perceived as a trapezoid. Consequently, we 
can say that each side has also different aspects. This is also a function of dynamism of 
perception. Moreover, I can separate each aspect temporally and take snap shots of each 
aspect at different times. So, each aspect can be perceived as different profiles. 
Consequently, we can define a profile as a temporarily individuated presentation of an 
object.   
 Another important factor is that my perception will also be informed by my 
disposition and mood at any moment. If I am dizzy, I will have a different perspective from 
being elated. Hence, the profiles can be influenced by the physiological status as well. 
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However, it is important to realize that relativity and subjectivity of my perception of my 
perception refers to my perception of the cube and not the actual sides of the cube.  
 At this point, the pressing question is of what does the identity of the cube consist. 
It seems self-evident that when I experience various aspects of the cube from various 
angles and through various profiles, I perceive all these manifolds as belonging to one and 
the same cube. There seems to be a continuity persisting through the manifold. However, it 
would seem misguided to say that the cube is the sum of all its profiles. The identity of the 
cube, it seems, belongs to a different dimension from the sides, the aspects, and the 
profiles, but it is manifest as the identity in the sides, the aspects, and the profiles. As I 
move around the cube, the continuous flow of profiles is unified by being of the single 
cube. This means that consciousness is of something in the sense that it intends the identity 
of the object. This is much more than a mere flow of appearance that is presented to it. 
Hence, identity belongs to what is given in experience and recognition of identity belongs 
to the intentional structure of experience. This does not claim infallibility of the intentional 
act. In fact, we can intend presence and absence and we can be mistaken about it.  
 One implication of our analysis is that our experience of all phenomenal objects 
needs a three-layered treatment. Each phenomenal object and the experience thereof needs 
to be analyzed in terms: 1) parts and whole, 2) presence and absence and the identity 
between them, and 3) identity in manifolds. 
 For Merleau-Ponty, perception is not simply a cognitive event.185 In a 
foundational way perception, which is a function of perceptive consciousness, is 
preconscious or apperceptive. Perception is also holistic. Phenomenal realities come to us 
as meaningful wholes or Gestalten—as phenomenal fields. This phenomenal field is 
composed of a background and a foreground of meaning and significance for us. The 
meaning and significance can be shifted between background and foreground through our 
own willed shifts of attention and self-consciousness. 
 Merleau-Ponty uses the notion of intentional arc to describe perception.186 In an 
intentional arc our intellectual and perceptive experiences presuppose the possibility of 
pointing our consciousness into different directions. He uses the metaphor of a projector or 
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searchlight to illustrate this point. Moreover, we have the ability to train our projectors in 
all directions, inside and out, to situate ourselves in the world. This is called motility, which 
accounts for the dynamism of perception. We will see that this is compatible with the 
global workspace theory of Baars. Merleau-Ponty states: 
“Beneath intelligence as beneath perception, we discover a more fundamental function, a 
vector mobile in all directions like a ‘searchlight’, one through which we can direct 
ourselves towards anything, in or outside ourselves, and display a form of behavior in 
relation to that object. Yet the analogy of the searchlight is inadequate, since it 
presupposes given objects on to which the beam plays. Whereas, the nuclear function to 
which we refer, before bringing objects to our sight as knowledge, makes them exist in a 
more intimate sense, for us. Let us, therefore, say rather, borrowing a term from other 
works, that the life—is subtended by an ‘intentional arc’ which projects about us our past, 
our future, our human setting, our physical, our ideological and moral situation, or rather 
which results in our being situated in all these respects. It is this intentional arc which 
brings about unity of senses, of intelligence, of sensibility, and motility.” 187           
 
Accordingly, all our conscious experience and the very possibility of empirical self 
presupposes the intentional arc, which projects around us and places in the world. 
Consequently, we are centers of meaning. It is due to this intentional arc that we can have a 
continuous trail of meaning linking together the moment of our lives into an experienced 
unity. In other words, this is an overarching and meaning giving principle that connects the 
disconnected pieces of my life into a coherent narrative. The world becomes meaningful for 
us, insofar, as we become meaningfully situated among the objects of the world. This 
implies that phenomenal structures are not merely realities that independent of us, but they 
are bound to us as bestowers of meaning. 
  
7.2 The Hegelian Background: 
For Hegel, consciousness is the universal principle, which is the basis of the 
subjective and objective classifications of existence; consciousness directs their 
functioning. Consciousness comprises not only the internal mental states, but also it is 
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constitutive principle of the objective world. However, in the objective world 
consciousness is latent. The categories of thought are both the different forms through 
which we apprehend the world, they are the constitutive material of the world, and they 
reveal the working of the world process. Hegel notes: “to speak of thought or objective 
thought as the heart and soul of the world, may seem to be ascribing awareness to the 
things of nature. We feel certain repugnance against making thought the inward function of 
things, especially as we speak of thought as making the divergence of man from nature. It 
would be necessary, therefore, if we use the term thought at all, to speak of nature as the 
system of unconscious thought, or to use Schiller’s expression, a petrified intelligence. In 
addition, in order to prevent misconception, thought-form or thought-type should be 
substituted for the ambiguous term thought…. If thought is the constituent substance of 
external things, it is also the universal substance of what is spiritual. In all human 
perception, thought is present; so too thought is the universal in all the acts of conception 
and recollection; in short, in every mental activity, in willing, wishing, and the like. All 
these faculties are only further specializations of thought. When it is present in this light, 
thought has a different part to play from what it has if we speak of a faculty of thought, one 
among a crowd of other faculties such as perception, conception and will, with which it 
stands on the same level. When it is seen to be the true universal of all that nature and mind 
contain, it extends its scope far beyond all these, and becomes the basis of everything.”188  
It seems like that thought, or consciousness, is the constitutive principle of all the 
subjective and objective orders of existence. Consciousness is an all-embracing unity. This 
is a unity within which all the differences, including the distinction between the subject and 
object and the knower and the known. It is important to note that Hegel does not refute the 
existence of matter. In other words, the ultimate nature of matter is consciousness; this does 
not deny the reality of matter as we experience it. For Hegel, matter is one aspect of reality. 
However, materialism takes matter to be the sole poise of reality. Therein lies the difference 
between Absolute idealism and materialism.  
Thought, for Hegel, is conceived quite differently form the ordinary conception of 
the term. In the ordinary sense, thought is understood as solely analytic and abstract. 
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However, Hegel deems thought to be concrete, synthetic, and dynamic as well. The 
difference between two notions is that thought as solely static and analytic cannot reconcile 
the contradictions; it cannot realize the unity lying behind the world-process and 
comprising its essence. Hegel uses the term Geist to express his notion of thought and 
consciousness. For the speakers of the English language, the apprehension of this term is 
difficult, since there is no corresponding word that captures the full sense of Geist. In the 
German language, the term Geist has two distinct senses: one sense is that of mind, mental 
life, and consciousness; the other meaning is spirit such as Zeitgeist or ‘the spirit of time’. 
However, Geist is not necessarily a ghostly and disembodied entity. Hegel uses the term in 
its sense of consciousness, but he expands the sense to include the dynamic, synthetic, and 
concrete qualities of it.  
For Hegel, as we have seen, the main concern of philosophy in general and logic in 
particular is the possibility of genuine knowledge, which is not the knowledge of 
appearance of reality, but knowledge of reality itself. Hegel rejects the skeptical position as 
self-refuting. If we are supposed to doubt everything, then we should not spare the skeptical 
claim that we cannot know anything. The skeptical position starts from two 
presuppositions. First, skepticism assumes that there is a reality and knowledge is an 
instrument of apprehending that reality. Second, it presupposes that the subject is separate 
and distinct from reality. The obvious implication of these two assumptions is that 
knowledge and reality are cut off from each other. However, skepticism, paradoxically at 
the same time, takes the knowledge to be real and part of reality. The problem of 
skepticism is that it treats mind and knowledge as an instrument, which separates 
knowledge from reality as it is.  
In order to understand reality, to know reality as it is, one must plunge into the 
stream of consciousness, which is the starting point of all knowledge. This can be done 
through an inspection of consciousness internally as it appears to itself. This is the 
phenomenology of consciousness. The starting point is not doubt, but it is a simple form of 
consciousness, which assumes itself to give genuine knowledge. However, this elementary 
form of consciousness does not yield genuine knowledge. Consequently, consciousness 
evolves into other forms until genuine knowledge is reached. 
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Fig. 7.2: Hegel, consciousness, and history (www.politeia-station.org) 
 
Hegel starts with the most primal form of consciousness, called sense-certainty. 
This is the type of consciousness, which only grasps the object in front of it at any moment. 
Sense-consciousness picks up the material received from sense organs. Sense-
consciousness represents the knowledge of the particular thing present to the sense organs. 
Sense-consciousness does not order or categorize the sense data. This means that this form 
of consciousness cannot name the data of experience as this or that specific object. Sense-
consciousness is simply certainty of ‘this’ or of the ‘here’ and ‘now’. Sense-consciousness 
is directly aware of ‘this’, without subsuming it under any conceptual scheme including 
space, time, or any other categories. Sense-consciousness is the awareness of the thing as it 
is. However, as soon as, sense-consciousness tries to articulate its knowledge, it becomes 
unintelligible. The ‘this’, ‘now’, and ‘here’ are incoherent terms. Consequently, sense-
consciousness cannot convey any fact or truth. In fact, sense-consciousness cannot be 
expressed in language at all, since sense-consciousness is the awareness of the pure 
particular. On other hand, language concerns subsuming something under a general or a 
universal term. This implies that knowledge is impossible without universal concepts. 
Furthermore, this means that sense-consciousness does not constitute genuine knowledge.   
One of the hallmarks of sense-consciousness is its passivity. This passivity is, in 
fact the reason why sense-consciousness can provide genuine knowledge. Hence, in the 
subsequent stages of the development of consciousness, it will become more active and 
dynamic. Every subsequent stage of evolution of consciousness is marked by a greater 
degree of activity than the previous one. Perceptual-consciousness follows sense-
consciousness. At the stage of perceptual-consciousness, consciousness categorizes objects 
under universal properties. However, perceptual-consciousness does not provide genuine 
knowledge, since it cannot subsume experience under lawful and orderly patterns, which 
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makes the world intelligible, describable, and predictable. In other words, perceptual-
consciousness cannot yield scientific knowledge of the world. Hence, consciousness 
evolves into a more dynamic and synthetic higher form.  
The next stage in the evolution of consciousness is apprehending-consciousness. 
The apprehending-consciousness subsumes the raw material of experience under lawful 
relationships of scientific laws. At this level, for the first time consciousness reflects on its 
own abilities and contents. Through the scientific investigation, consciousness reflects on 
its own principles of understanding. Apprehending-consciousness signifies the emergence 
of self-consciousness. At this point, consciousness has itself for its object. This implies that 
consciousness can contemplate itself. Apprehending-consciousness represents latent self-
consciousness.  
For Hegel, self-consciousness cannot exist in isolation. In order for consciousness to 
produce an accurate image of itself, it an entity from which it can differentiate itself. Self-
consciousness requires the other in order to know itself. While self-consciousness requires 
an external object, this object outside of itself is still something alien to it. Consequently, 
there is an attraction-repulsion attitude toward the outside object. This attraction/repulsion 
relationship manifests itself as desire. Desiring entails possession of the object of desire, 
but not to destroy it, while stripping the object the desire from all its foreignness. However, 
self-consciousness based on desire is plagued constantly by wanting, lack, and 
dissatisfaction. Hence, consciousness has to evolve into a higher form. 
The next stage in the evolution of consciousness, according to Hegel, comes about 
in the attempt to be fully self-conscious. The ripe self-consciousness becomes possible 
when self-conscious being finds another self-conscious being. In other words, the ultimate 
self-consciousness is experienced through a relationship with another self-conscious being. 
This implies that self-consciousness can develop fully in a context of social interaction. In 
absence of social interaction, one would possess a mere perceptual consciousness. Self-
consciousness is the product of social life.  
Now the two self-conscious beings confront each other. Each being needs the other 
to establish his/her awareness of him/herself. What is required from the other being is a 
sense of acknowledgment and recognition. Essentially, one needs to be assured that others 
recognize one’s personhood and the autonomy that comes with it. From a therapeutic 
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standpoint, the sense of worth of person needs to be recognized by those, on whom the 
person depends of self-identity, such as family members. If this recognition is denied, then 
the person will end up with a completely shattered sense of identity. This process of 
demanding recognition is not limited to the consciousness of individuals. Nations have the 
same need, in that a nation achieves legitimacy, only if it is recognized by other nations. 
History of humanity is full of instances, in which a nation goes to war to achieve that 
recognition from others through force. Another complementary path to achieve full self-
consciousness is to give one’s creativity a free reign. By transforming the world by the 
content of one’s imagination, one achieves deep knowledge of who one is. Hence, 
creativity reveals one to oneself. For Hegel, freedom is the ultimate manifestation of full 
self-consciousness. Freedom is the ability to choose unforced by other people, by social 
forces, or by natural desire. However, freedom presupposes knowledge of these factors. 
The higher the level of knowledge is, the freer an individual is. This knowledge becomes 
only possible by the emergence of self-consciousness. Freedom is not the ability to do what 
one pleases; freedom consists of freedom of mind, and this is facilitated by self-
consciousness. The last step f the evolution of consciousness is the realization of the 
universality of consciousness as the ultimate principle reality. At this level, self-
consciousness is all-inclusive. At this stage, self-consciousness realizes the unity behind 
diversity and identifies itself with that principle. This is Absolute knowledge.  
 
Fig. 7.3: History and the dialectical process (www.politeia-station.org) 
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For Hegel, the dialectical process also characterizes human existence, in that it 
involves a profound tension and conflict between opposing facets. Hegel distinguishes two 
aspects that comprise a human being. From one perspective, human beings are natural 
organisms among others in nature. They are members of the animal world with needs and 
desires similar to other animals. From another perspective, humans are different from 
animals. While lower animals are limited to the immediate needs and drives of their 
environment and cannot transcend those limits, the presence of self-consciousness in 
humans signifies a qualitative difference from other animal life. As Hegel notes: 
“Consciousness, however, is explicitly the notion of itself”.189 This implies that human 
beings have the ability to reflect on their lives and evaluate themselves in the light of some 
overarching principle and ideal. Here, consciousness introduces a fissure into the order of 
nature. Consciousness introduces the ability to retire from its own dealings in order to 
examine and question those dealings. In other words, consciousness transcends its own 
limits and since these limits belong to it, consciousness transcends its own self. Heidegger 
reiterates the same point of transcendence by claiming that our being is at issue for us. To 
be human is not just to be happy with simply fulfilling one’s basic needs and desires. 
Humans care about what kind of beings they are. Consequently, humans reflect on the 
value of their desires in the light of their overarching ideals. Humans are able to have hopes 
and aspirations, which rise above their immediate needs and wants. Consequently, humans 
have the ability to create desires about their immediate desires and they can control their 
immediate responses in the light of higher goals and purposes. This implies that in our 
reflection on our immediate existence and the statement of requirements put forth by our 
immediate desires, we can say ‘no’ to our immediate tendencies. As a result, humans 
introduce a “not” into the order nature. Humans break with the mere factual givenness of 
their existence by taking a stand on it, which affects their active lives. 
Self-consciousness introduces a rift in the human existence. Having the ability to 
take a stand on oneself creates the perpetual possibility of saying ‘no’ to all that has been 
and is. Consequently, according to Hegel, “consciousness suffers…violence at its own 
hands; it spoils its own limited satisfaction”.190 The rift created by self-consciousness leads 
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to continuous desire to close up the rift by realizing the ideals introduced by self-reflection. 
As a result of this desire, life is experienced as an emptiness, which perpetually seeks to fill 
itself up. Hence, human existence “can find no peace”191, since it is continuously disturbed 
ideals, which go beyond immediate needs and desires. Consequently, human existence is a 
tension between two facets of the self: the in-itself-- our given, natural aspect as finite and 
empirical beings—and the for-itself, the reflective aspect that leads humans to transcend 
their givenness by interpreting their dealings in the world. Hegel believes that this tension 
in consciousness between our immediate desires and ideals can be resolved through a 
rational dialectical process.  
 A further implication of looking at human existence as a struggle is that human 
existence is no longer a static thing, but it is an unfolding event or process. What defines 
the identity of a person is not an enduring set of properties persisting through time, but 
human identity is an event of becoming, in which the person struggles to find an answer to 
the conflict, which defines one’s situation in the world.  
 Looking at human existence as an unfolding process means that human existence 
has a certain temporal structure. From a temporal perspective, human existence is not just 
persistence through a series of ‘nows’. Human temporal existence has cumulativeness and 
purposefulness. This is the realization, which motivated Heidegger and the existentialist 
thinkers in their understanding of human existence. First, the unfolding process of human 
existence has a unique ‘futural’ quality. According to Hegel, humans are inexorably guided 
by a desire to be something and close up the rift at the core of their being. This desire 
continuously pushes humans into the future, moving toward the realization of those ideals, 
which define their transcendence. The future-orientedness of human existence also 
influences their interpretation of their past and present in relation to their ideals. The past 
and the present situation is a success or failure in the light of one’s plans for the future.    
 Another fundamental characteristic of self-consciousness is alienation. Alienation 
begins with the consciousness’ separation from itself; it’s opposing itself to the world and 
nature. Alienation is a state of unhappiness caused by self-consciousness search for self-
knowledge and freedom. According to Hegel, consciousness manifests itself in five 
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different aspects, which in a dialectical process will eventually propel consciousness to a 
realization of its true nature as the foundation of all reality.  
 In one grim aspect of alienation, man contrasts him/herself as a spiritual being 
against nature. In this case, humans contrast themselves with their own bodies. This mode 
of alienation characterized the prevailing consciousness of the medieval and Christian 
ascetic mentality. Here, alienated from the natural world, people think themselves as 
immaterial souls. The animal functions become an embarrassment. Sensual longings pose a 
threat to one’s real self, the soul. The threat of the demands of the body must be repelled by 
ascetic practices, self-flagellation, celibacy, etc. St. Augustine presents this consciousness 
when he pleads for chastity and continence, only not yet. 
 One implication of alienation from body is alienation from other humans as well. 
This is alienation from the other. This alienation is best described best in the ‘master and 
slave’ dialectic, when humans try to assert themselves, though futilely, through an attempt 
to enslave the freedom of the others. The alienation from others also leads to certain view 
of humanity as a heap of human atoms, independent from each other and lacking any sense 
of identification with the other.  
 The Age of Enlightenment signifies the advent of the world of self-alienated 
spirit.192 Hegel supports the attempt of the Age of Reason to dispel the superstitions. 
However, he believes that those stories captured the important truth that the world is replete 
with meaning. Hegel claims that by treating the world as a mere mechanism, and value as 
something purely subjective, Enlightenment made the world a more rational place, but also 
a foreign place. Consequently, the world is a meaningless mechanism, which will evoke a 
sense of nihilism in humanity, as it was evident in the French Revolution.  
 Another consequence of the alienated consciousness from nature and itself is the 
sense that humans are mere perceivers and spectators of an objective reality; and they play 
no role in the articulation of that reality. The world becomes utterly other and one cannot 
help but feel at the mercy of forces unknown, unseen, and unintelligible. This mode of 
alienation does away with individual responsibility. Man becomes a victim of the world.  
 Finally, alienated humans are not capable of freedom. For Hegel, as we indicated, 
freedom is to be independent of anything outside of oneself. Furthermore, one is free only 
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if one knows that one is free. Alienated person, however, feels that the world is dominating 
him/her. The alienated person constantly feels that he/she is at the mercy of nature or 
others. Hence, alienated humans cannot be free. In short, alienated humans feel divorced 
from their own bodies and from their fellow human beings. They regard the world as 
devoid of value and meaning, as a structure to which they are inessential, and as cogs in the 
machinery of the world. However, the darkness of the alienation is the springboard for the 
realization of freedom. This is the essence of the dialectical process and consciousness’ 
attempt to know itself in this process is philosophy.                    
At this point, the question is whether the Hegelian system can fulfill its promise of the 
highest level of consciousness. Hegel’s system use of rigid categorization puts limitation on 
reality. According to Hegel, reality is a closed and rigid system. In fact, Hegel is guilty of 
the same as formal logic. Formal logic is guilty of circumscription of reality within the 
extent of its principles. Hegel also limits reality within the confines of mental categories. 
Reality cannot be restricted to the mental categories regardless how significant, all-
inclusive, and significant they are. Thought is too limited and limiting to be the ultimate 
principle of reality. The world-process is not adequately explained by thought. The problem 
is that Hegel applies the principles of thought a priori to the world-process. As a result, the 
facts about the world have to be twisted to fit the ready-made container of a system. 
 
7.3 Human Existence as Being-in-the-World:  
Western philosophical tradition, for the most part, has promoted a view of human 
beings as things or objects of a particular kind. The essence of a human being is considered 
either a body, or mind, or a combination of both. Human consciousness is considered as a 
thing or substance occupying a corner of the world. Consciousness stands in a causal 
relationship to other things. In other words, it is the principle of causality that relates 
consciousness to other things. This is best illustrated by Descartes’ cogito, which relates 
contingently to substantia cogitians. This view holds that consciousness might have never 
been directed to its objects and consciousness and its objects are logically independent of 
each other.  
Traditional philosophy, especially Cartesian and British empiricism, postulates a 
self-contained realm of consciousness. Here consciousness is analyzed in two ways. Either 
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consciousness is the ego and its cogitations, such as thoughts, perceptions, and sensory 
experiences, or consciousness is the label for the stream or the bundle of sensations and 
perceptions, as Hume believed it. However, these views of consciousness are inadequate 
and false, as we discussed before. Their shortcoming is in that they cannot explain the fact 
that it is of consciousness’ nature and essence to be of objects. They cannot account for 
intentionality. Either, as in Descartes and Lock, they postulated that we make constant 
inferences from the cognitive life to the outside world, or, as in Hume, objects are treated as 
complex bundles of sensations that are inferred from those very experiences. Neither view 
is, however, faithful to our phenomenological experience that our experience of the world 
is holistic.  
We do not experience the sense data and then make inferences about the world. We 
experience the world immediately. Furthermore, both views cannot account for our ability 
to conceive of enduring objects. As for Lock, the endurance of objects is necessarily 
outside of experience and for Hume there are no uniting criteria that can unite the bundles 
into an intelligible and holistic experience. How could bundles of sensations create the 
experience of what we call ‘listening to music’ or ‘seeing a mountain in the distance’ over a 
distinct period? The fact that this question is justified alludes to the fact that the traditional 
theories cannot account for the reflexivity, or qualia, of consciousness either.   
A conscious act can, and should, be analyzed in terms of ego, cogitatio, and 
cogitatum. It is not that these are separate entities, which though inseparable from one 
another, we must analyze one at a time. The conscious act is a directed act, in which the 
consciousness intends an object. The directedness or intentionality is the essential feature of 
consciousness. The intentionality of consciousness is essential and fundamental because it 
cannot be reduced to any other feature of consciousness and neither can it be inferred from 
elements that are more fundamental. Intentionality cannot be inferred from the stream of 
sensations. Intentionality of conscious acts can explain the holistic nature of experience in 
that conscious acts have meaning by the virtue of intending an object. In other words, our 
consciousness of objects is mediated by meanings. Human existence is hopelessly semantic 
and as Merleau-Ponty claimed:” we are condemned to meaning”.193  
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7.3.1 Intentionality: 
Brentano distinguishes between psychical and physical phenomena. According to 
him, there are at least three distinguishing characteristics between them. (1) Psychical 
phenomena are unextended, while physical phenomena can be both extended and 
unextended. (2) All psychical phenomena are essentially intentional. (3) All psychical 
phenomena are conscious of themselves.  
Another important facet of Brentano’s view is the elucidation the relation between 
presentations and phenomena. For Brentano, the concept of presentation implies the notion 
of presentation of a phenomenon. A phenomenon is an appearance, but it is always an 
appearance of something to someone. In other words, there are no appearances of 
something without a subject who receives the appearance. We can formalize Brentano’s 
view in four cardinal theses: 
1) The presentation or the act of presentation is to be distinguished 
from the object of presentation.194 
2) All psychical phenomena are presentations or they are based on 
presentations. 
3) All mental phenomena have the attribute of intentionality. This is 
equivalent to immanent objectivity, or intentional inexistence of 
an object.  
4) All psychical phenomena have to property of being conscious of 
themselves. 
We need to explore each thesis in more detail and scope of application.  
 Thesis 1 implies that a presentation is an act that apprehends an object. For instance, 
the act of seeing presents a color as the object. In general, all acts of presentation portray an 
object that is different from the very presentation. Here, Brentano departs from Hume and 
the empiricist psychologists, for whom sense-impressions are confused with the act of 
sensing. In the case of our example, the act of seeing the color should not be confused with 
the phenomena of color itself. As we alluded to above, the concept of presentation implies 
the idea of the object presented. This is what a phenomenon is, according to Brentano. 
                                                
194 Brentano, F,, (1973) Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, translated by Antos C. Rancurello and 
Linda Lopez McAllister, Routledge & Kegan, New York, p. 79. 
 224 
Consequently, the presentation is always different from the phenomenon that is introduced. 
For example, the presentation of color is not colored. This sounds like a very elemental 
statement. However, its establishment is crucial, since it will act as a presupposition for the 
ensuing thesis. Another important implication of this thesis is that it is not found among 
any physical phenomenon.  
 Thesis 2 asserts that the list of psychical phenomena includes not only acts such as 
presentations but also mental acts such as feeling, judging, desiring, and so on. This thesis 
asserts that presentation is the necessary condition for having any other psychical 
phenomenon. This implies that nothing can be felt, desired, or judged unless it was 
presented before. We could state that the phenomenon of presentation is the presupposition 
of any other conscious phenomenon.  
 Thesis 3 introduces the notion of intentionality as the distinguishing property of 
conscious phenomenon. “Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by what the 
philosophers of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, 
and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction 
toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent 
objectivity”.195 Furthermore, “every mental phenomenon includes something as object 
within itself”.196 Brentano, analyses the notion of intentionality on three dimensions: a 
psychological dimension, a gnoseological aspect, and an ontological aspect. 
 The psychological dimension maintains that intentionality is an essential component 
of all conscious phenomena. Brentano describes the property of intentionality as the 
reference to an object, or the direction toward an object. However, he does not give a proof 
for intentionality, since he believes that e doe does not need to. Intentionality is a property 
revealed directly by inner perception, or inner consciousness. Intentionality is a 
fundamental datum we perceive internally. However, the question arises about the 
relationship between emotions and intentionality.  
Emotions seem not to have the attribute of being intentional. It seems like emotions 
are marked by qualia and self-reflexivity alone. Feelings don’t seem to refer to anything at 
all. Brentano contends that this assertion is faulty. According to him, emotions do refer to 
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something and they are intentional as well. Take the example of pain; we feel pain in a 
head, a stomach, or a finger. Now, the source of the pain could be vague, but there is 
always an object distinguishable from the conscious phenomenon of pain. Moreover, this 
object does not need to be external; it can be also internal. Brentano draws the analogy to 
words. Words have meaning. This implies that they can refer to something, which is not 
necessarily part of the external material world. Words are signs and symbols that represent 
something. However, the meaning and intentionality of a word requires a subject. In other 
words, we need a speaker to use words, and a listener to comprehend the meaning relayed 
by the speaker. Intentionality and meaning require consciousness.  
The gnoseological aspect of intentionality asserts that consciousness does not have 
to be necessarily directed at individual things. It can be non-things as well. To understand 
this claim, we must distinguish between “things in general” (Ding), “individual thing” 
(Realität), “actuality” (Wirklichkeit), and existence (Exsitenz). Accordingly, Brentano 
maintains that the object of intention does not have to be a concrete thing, it can be an 
abstract object, including imaginary objects, as well. This means that the object of 
intentionality does not have to have tangible existence the ways trees and tables do. 
Unicorns, fictional characters, aesthetic values, or ethical ideals can also be objects of 
intentionality. Conversely, this thesis implies that just because something is object of 
intentionality, it does not mean that it really exists.  
In the ontological analysis of intentionality, Brentano maintains that any conscious 
phenomenon is ontologically characterized by the intentional inexistence. Here, the term 
inexistence is used in its original medieval usage. Accordingly, existence means effective 
existence. The term inexistence does not mean nonexistence, but existence-in-the-intention. 
Brentano illuminates this distinction by referring to the distinction between the modificative 
and determinative use of a word. Let us illustrate this difference by using an example. 
Consider the expression ‘a brave man’. Here, the adjective brave determines the meaning 
and reference of the word man to by subsuming it under the class of men who are brave. 
Now, consider the expression ‘dead man’. If the definition of the word ‘man’ entails ‘a 
living human being’, then the word ‘dead’ is modificative. A ‘dead man’ refers to a corpse 
and not to a man, according to our definition. Moreover, the phrase ‘dead man’ seems to 
contain a contradiction. Brentano maintains that the same analysis applies to the term 
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‘existent’. In the expression ‘an existent man’, the word ‘existent’ is used in a 
determinative way. However, in the expression ‘the existence in the intention of the object 
of Hamlet, the word ‘existent’ is used in a modificative manner. All this implies that the 
intentional inexistence of an object is the existence intentionally referred to the object.   
Thesis 4, as we stated, maintains that all conscious phenomena are conscious of 
themselves. This thesis is usually used to prove that Brentano rejects the possibility of 
unconscious mental acts. I believe that this is a wrong conclusion of this thesis drawn by 
Brentano. To illuminate this claim, let us see what Brentano says about this. Brentano 
asserts that there is no possibility of intentionality without consciousness of oneself. This 
means that the presentation of a mental act must always accompany the possibility of that 
presentation to be accompanied by the possibility of being asserted that this presentation is 
my presentation. Brentano calls this inner perception or inner consciousness. Furthermore, 
inner consciousness must be distinguished from attention. Inner consciousness has the 
following properties: 
1) It is noticing our own mental acts. It is the inner self-consciousness of 
any psychical phenomenon. Moreover, it is always present with the 
occurrence of experience.  
2) Inner consciousness is not identical with retrospection, because requires 
two acts, but inner consciousness is one act.  
3) Inner consciousness occurs only when one is having an experience of an 
object.  
4) Inner consciousness is not attention, since attention always has different 
degrees, but inner consciousness has always the same degree.  
5) Inner consciousness is responsible for the unity of consciousness. 
Looking at this list, we can infer that what Brentano means by inner consciousness is 
nothing other than appercetive or transcendental consciousness that we postulated in the 
last chapter. So, what Brentano asserts is that perceptive consciousness is essentially 
intentional. Even emotions are intentional. We believe that intentionality and self-
reflexivity provide different degrees on the same spectrum. Moreover, he maintains that 
perceptive is based on a foundational, unchanging inner consciousness, which is distinct 
from attention. We agree and call this inner consciousness appercetive or transcendental. 
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We both agree that apperceptive consciousness unifies experience. Moreover, Brentano 
maintains that inner consciousness is the primary source of knowing that there is a subject 
of all our mental acts. This subject is the cause of the unity of consciousness. In other 
words, through inner consciousness I know directly and immediately that the subject that 
sees is the same as the one that hears, desires, remembers, judges, infers, doubts, feels, and 
so on. That is transcendental consciousness. The difference between conscious and 
unconscious is not discontinuity of consciousness, but the degree of reflexivity of a 
conscious act.  
 Husserl maintains, in contrast to Brentano, that the immanent contents of 
consciousness do not need to be only intentional acts, such as immanent data of sensation. 
He differentiates between different kinds of intentional acts. This differentiation is based on 
the phenomenological description of these acts. In this description, we can infer that the 
intentionality as the essential property of this act, in which the intentional act has an 
intentional object. Husserl states “an intention that in this determinateness makes up 
precisely what we call the intention toward this object”.197 Furthermore, “there are…not 
two things present in immanent experience the object, which would not be immanently 
experienced and then next to it the intentional, immanent experience, of which the essential 
descriptive characteristic is precisely the relevant intention.”198 This simply implies that 
when we experience an intentional act, we don’t have an immanent experience of this act, 
and separately, an external experience of its object. The different kinds of intentional acts, 
consequently, correlate to the different kinds of intentional objects. Hence, we can 
distinguish between acts of thought, acts of memory, and so on, inasmuch as there are 
different intentional objects, such as propositions, memories, and so on.  
 Husserl distinguishes between the quality and the matter of an intentional act. The 
quality of an intentional act objectifies, or presents, something in different subjective 
attitudes, such as desiring, doubting, imagining, and so on. The quality of an act is 
responsible for different kinds of intentional experiences.199 Through the matter the 
intentional act has the intentional reference to a determinate intentional object. “Matter was 
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classed as that moment in an objectifying act which makes the act present just this 
object.”200 “The matter firmly determines not only the object as such, which is meant by the 
act, but also the way in which it is determined.”201 This implies that matter determines both 
the denotation (Bedeutung), namely, which object the intentional act will refer to and 
connotation (Sinn), namely, the attributes of the object. The matter is responsible for 
making the intentional act refer to a table, or a tree, and so on, while the quality is 
responsible for making the intentional act refer to these intentional objects in the different 
modes of representations, such as thinking, imagining, remembering, etc. 
 The question that arises from this formulation is that how can different intentional 
acts be directed towards the same object. Husserl formulates his answer in terms of noesis 
and noema. These represent the conscious act and the content of consciousness 
respectively. Husserl states “noema is…a generalization of the idea of meaning (Sinn) to 
the field of all acts.”202 A perception, for example, “contains a noema or meaning in virtue 
of which it intends an object. Experiences contain in their own essence this peculiar feature 
of being related to…things through their…posited meaning.”203  
 Husserl rejects the classical theories of knowledge of phenomenalism and 
representationalism. Phenomenalism, as proposed by Hume, does not differentiate between 
the mental act and the intentional object. For instance, Hume does not distinguish between 
the color red and the idea of red. As we have seen, Husserl distinguishes between the object 
of intentionality and the intentional act. This means that while the act of intention is real, 
the object of intentionality can be real or unreal. Representationalism maintains that the 
object is represented in consciousness by means of an image. This implies that the image in 
consciousness is responsible for the intentional direction toward an object. Husserl rejects 
this notion for two reasons. First, images require physical support. Secondly, all images are 
what they are by presupposing the intentionality of consciousness.    
The notion of intentionality of the conscious act has tremendous consequences for 
our view of the world and the place of humanity in that world. The standard view, as it is 
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promoted in Cartesian and the British empiricist traditions, presents the world as a 
collection of substances and discrete objects. These objects stand primarily in a spatial, 
temporal, and causal relationship to each other. These discrete objects are distinguished 
from each other through their intrinsic properties. Furthermore, they exist in logical 
isolation from each other. It is logically possible to imagine a world, in which John Doe 
exists alone. This view of the world can be described as a spectatorial one, in which human 
beings act as spectators of the world events. Understanding of world is a matter of being 
caused to receive sensory data and perceiving those sensory data and finally making 
constant inferences about the external world from our perceptions. Humans are just 
perceivers of the reality and they play no metaphysical role in the articulation of that 
reality. Knowledge of the world is an empirical one of discrete objects, their intrinsic 
properties, and their interrelations. Our consciousness stands, primarily, in a causal 
relationship to this reality. This relationship is contingent and the two entities are logically 
independent of each other. 
The standard spectatorial view of the world is not necessarily wrong. However, this 
is hardly the point of contention. The problems arise when this view is considered the only 
correct view and the immediate one. The spectatorial standpoint is the product of the 
reflective and passive interaction with the world. This standpoint, however, is parasitic on 
another attitude, which is immediate. This is the belief that the structure, organization, 
articulation of the world is a function of human agency. Sartre expressed this notion when 
he claimed that “the world is more the image of what I am than I am a mirror of it”204. The 
world is not primarily a causal one. In fact, the fabric of causality is discovered in reflection 
on the world and not the moments of immediate encounter with the world. The world is 
characterized primarily as sign-like, purpose-full or instrumental, and negative. These are 
three features that we come to see and understand the world through immediately as we act 
in the world. The world is a system of referential-totalities. Human existence is understood 
in terms Umwelt, one’s interaction with the physical environment, Mitwelt that is one’s 
interaction with other humans, and Eigenwelt refers the metaphysical care for one’ 
existence, which can only inferred from the ownership of experience.  
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7.3.2 The Umwelt: 
According to Heidegger, we encounter the objects in the world in two distinct ways. 
One is proximal and the other is reflective. The reflective mode is parasitic on the proximal. 
In other words, the reflective mode presupposes the proximal one. He calls the proximal 
attitude ready-to-hand (zuhanden) and the reflective approach present-at-hand 
(vorhanden). We come to discover objects as equipment that will fulfill our purposes and 
needs. For example, the blowing of winds and the movement of clouds are first discovered 
as they affect human purposes as in farming or shelter-building and not meteorological 
curiosity. The contents of the world are understood with respect to our projects and 
purposes and once they are proximally encountered and named then they can be subject of 
analysis and retrospection. Our proximal encounter with the world is not one of intellectual 
curiosity but one of concern for our projects and concerns. Therefore, the contents of the 
world have this feature of being-for-the-sake-of something. Our understanding of the world 
is not primarily a spectatorial one; rather we understand and discover the world through our 
agency. In fact, objects in our world come to exist through their relationships to our 
projects and how they can fulfill our needs. We should concur with Wittgenstein in his 
puzzlement about why a broom is considered one object rather than two or many. This is a 
matter of linguistic convention, which only makes sense within the context of our projects. 
The act of hammering creates the hammer, as Heidegger points out: “the hammering itself 
uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ of the hammer the kind of being which equipment 
possesses – in which it manifests itself in its own right – we call readiness to hand”.205  
Another feature of the world, which is essentially a human one, is that its contents 
stand as signs to each other. The world is a ‘referential- totality’, in which objects serve as 
signs and symptoms for each other and events. However, nothing can function as a tool in 
isolation from the ‘referential totality’ to which it belongs. The hammer is one item inside 
of carpenter’s toolbox and workshop. A pen exists as a pen only in the context of paper, 
ink, writing, and the human project of writing which itself belongs to the context of 
communication. The rise of the temperature and the melting of the ice and snow are not the 
causes of spring, but they are signs that spring is upon us. The monsoon is not the cause of 
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the end of summer in India but it refers to the end of summer. Heidegger uses the example 
of a car signaling. The signal highlights the intention of the driver and it brings to attention 
that intention to all those affected by that intention. The signal does not primarily stand in a 
causal relationship to the pedestrian, but it stands primarily as a sign of the driver’s 
intentions.  The signal acts as a focal point for that context. “A sign is an item of equipment 
which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with 
it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself”206. A sign guarantees the 
worldly nature of the context of our practical concerns.  
Our understanding of the world is first through reference, directionality, and 
intentionality. It is through these features that we build a network of meanings and 
semantics values. Intentionality is the very essential feature of our consciousness. Once the 
world is understood proximally through our purposes and the referential system, then that 
understanding can be subject of the spectatorial attitude and retrospective inquiry. 
However, what need or impulse drives us to assume the reflective attitude? The reflective 
stance is taken when our proximal dealings with the world is subject to breakdown. 
Meteorology arises out of a breakdown in that referential system that is involved in our 
project of farming and sailing. Geology arises out of our need for better farming lands, 
better shelters, and our need to be secure from the elements. This element of breakdown is 
the third feature of our proximal encounter with the world. It is important to point out that 
the sense of breakdown and lack is a proximal one and not its remedy, namely the reflective 
attitude. Sartre calls this element of lack the negative. 
The utility of any ready-to-hand object presupposes an end product and this 
highlights the towards-which quality of the ready-to-hand entities. However, this whole 
enterprise presupposes the availability of material which lend themselves to ready-to-
handness and so we encounter the whereof in the world. The last aspect of this complex 
web of meaning and reference is the recipient of the letter, the customer for whom the 
carpenter fashions a table. This aspect points to the ‘publicness’ of the world.  Hence the 
nature of ready-to-hand is essentially an ‘in order to’, a ‘for the sake of ‘. The being of such 
entity can be understood in relation to the context, and referential totality to which it 
belongs.    
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Sartre agrees with Heidegger’s view of the sign-like and instrumental nature of the 
world. The world ‘is a world of tasks’, where ‘the original relationship between things is 
instrumentality’207. However, the task-like nature is the function of something more 
fundamental and profound dimension of reality.  In order for ‘being to order itself around 
us as instruments, it is necessary that negation rise up as the rubric which presides over the 
arrangement of being in things.’ Negativity is part of the constitution of reality. 
‘Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being – like a worm’208. Sartre claims that when he 
goes to meet a friend in a coffee shop and he fails to find his friend, the absence of his 
friend is as much the part reality of that café for him as the sounds, the furniture, the 
patrons, etc.  
In Sartre’s ontology the negative also includes destruction, cleaning, fragile, etc. 
The earthquake destroys a building because we are kind of beings who have criteria for 
recognizing that building no longer exists after the earthquake. Cleaning a desk is not 
displacement of material but it is removal of material from where they should not be. ‘The 
glass is fragile means it carries in its being a definite possibility of non being when it is 
struck’209. Sartre claims that a being that cannot experience the negative could not 
experience destruction, cleaning, fragility, or such terms. Therefore, negativity is the 
necessary condition for the intelligibility, functionality, and indeed the existence of discrete 
objects in a human world. It is, however, important to remember that Sartre and Heidegger 
are not talking about existence of things independent of us but they talk about the fabric of 
reality in relation to us. In fact, no other reality is comprehensible to us. Negativity is a real 
dimension of the reality but ‘man is the being through whom nothingness comes to the 
world’. ‘The world is human because it is one we cannot conceive of except in terms of the 
negatives which we, with our concerns, expectations, hopes and fears, bring to the 
world’.210 The sort of negativity that lies at depth of human’s being is lack. For Sartre, 
‘lacks are negatives which appear as the essential condition of instrumentality’. Objects 
become instruments when they fulfill a lack and they satisfy a purpose in our projects.  
                                                
207 Raymond, Existentialism, p. 220. 
208 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 190. 
209 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 180-185. 
210 Raymond, Existentialism, p. 250. 
 233 
The possibility or the actuality of a ready-to-hand object losing its for-the-sake-of 
character propels us into a present-to-hand relationship with that object. Heidegger 
provides three scenarios for this possibility. When a tool is damaged, it becomes evident in 
its inability to be a tool for that context. When a tool is absent from the station it occupies 
in its referential system, its absence catches our eye as conspicuous. Moreover, when 
impediments arise in our dealings with the world, then the source of the impediment will 
propel us into the reflective mode. In all these cases the readiness-to-hand turns into 
unreadiness-to-hand and consequently to presence-at-hand. “When an assignment has been 
disturbed – when something is unstable for some purpose – then the assignment becomes 
explicit … The context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a 
totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the 
world announces itself”211.  Paradoxically, we mostly do not realize the readiness-to-hand; 
it is veiled from our attention because we are engulfed by the demands of the task at hand. 
The contemplation on the being of the entities is unveiled for us when they breakdown and 
consequently we associate their being with presence-at-hand.        
Heidegger continues his analysis by providing a new understanding of human 
situatededness in the world. For Heidegger, humans are not in space the way objects, as 
present-at-hand are. It also does not mean for humans to be tool-like as ready-to-hand 
objects are. The human world is spatial but in a different sense than the Cartesian one. 
Humans are situated in the world such that they deal with the entities in the world 
“concernfully and with familiarity”212. Heidegger characterizes human’s spatiality as 
deseverance; we bring entities close to us and we give them directionality. Our world 
consists of up and down, in front of and behind, left and right. Spatiality is a fundamental 
way of our existence in the world. The implication of our spatial existence is that we belong 
to the world. Spatiality means that we are involved with the world. Our spatiality opens up 
a sphere of interest to us in which we engage the world.  
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7.3.3 The Eigenwelt: 
At this point, it is time to answer the questions: what is the essence of a human 
being and what is the relationship of humans with the world? Human existence is described 
by Heidegger and Sartre as Dasein and Being-for-itself. These terms are not the product of 
literary and philosophical style. They carry great import in our quest to answer our 
outstanding question. Human existence is marked by two opposing elements that are in 
constant strife and struggle. On one hand, we exist biologically. We belong to the animal 
kingdom and as such we have needs and desires that produced by our physiological 
functions. On the other hand, our existence is marked by transcendence. This transcendent 
element of our existence is the function of our consciousness.  
Self-consciousness makes qualitative difference in our existence. Self-conscious 
beings are capable of self-reflection and self-evaluation in the light of some overarching 
idea. In other words, humans are capable of evaluating their status quo in reference to their 
vision of themselves. Self-consciousness introduces a gap in the fabric of reality. 
Consciousness is able to step back from its interactions with the world and evaluate those 
interactions in terms of its ideals. Hence consciousness is capable of transcending its own 
limits and since those limits are self-imposed consciousness is able to transcend itself.  
Sartre and Heidegger express this notion by claiming that human existence is such 
that their own being is “at issue” and “in question” for them. Satisfaction of our basic 
physiological needs and desires is not all that matters to us because we care about what 
kind of beings we are. This element of care leads us to reflect on the worth of our wants 
and desires. In the light of our evaluation of our needs and desires and our reflection upon 
their worth, we form higher order desires and needs which are more in line with our vision 
of ourselves. This is because we are capable of having aspirations toward things that 
transcend our immediate desires and needs. Hence the higher desires can regulate our 
striving toward the basic wants in light of the overarching principles we want live our lives. 
Although, I am hungry and have no money and the other person is not looking; I will not 
steal the loaf of bread, because I might be hungry. However I don’t want to be a thief and a 
dishonest person. Hence, self-consciousness introduces an element of negation to our 
existence by reflecting on what we are and saying ‘no’ to our immediate wants and 
inclinations.  
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We take stand on our factual givenness. Taking a stand on our givenness creates the 
possibility of saying ‘no’ to what there is and all that there has been. This gap or 
“nothingness”, as Sartre calls it, creates a perpetual desire to be filled for consciousness 
suffers from the presence of this gap. However, this gap can be closed only by realization 
of those higher ideals. Hence, human existence is in a tension between our immediate 
desires and our ideals. Our existence is characterized by our givenness or in-itself and our 
ideals or for-itself. There is a conflict between what there is and what there should be. 
However, the question of our essence still remains unanswered. If the self is considered as a 
perpetual tension between our facticity and our ideals rather than a discrete object in the 
world, then we could look at the self as an event.  
  In a famous passage of Existentialism and Humanism, Sartre utters the famous 
existentialist slogan: “existence precedes essence”. Sartre writes:” a paper-knife … has 
been made by an artisan who had a conception of it … Let us say, then …that its essence – 
that is to say the sum of the formulae and the qualities which make its production and in 
definition possible – precedes its existence … But there is at least one being whose 
existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any 
conception of it. That being is man”.213 Here, Sartre tries to undermine the age-old notion 
that human being has a definite and fixed makeup. Personal identity is not a set of enduring 
qualities over time, but it is a perpetual event of becoming in which the gap between 
facticity and ideals is attempted to be filled. Personal identity consists of what one makes of 
himself/herself throughout the course of his/her life.  For Heidegger, the world is not the 
sum of all entities occupying it but the whole of them all. The world is the context of all our 
experiences. It is not a natural concept but it is related to our immediate experience. It is the 
encompassing context of all our experience and humans are those beings around which this 
context is arranged. Human existence, Dasein, must be understood as being-in-the-world. 
“Being-in-the-world indicates in the very way we coined it, that it stands for a unitary 
phenomenon”214. This one phrase expresses the holistic nature of our relation to the world 
that cannot be reduced. The ‘in’ represents a relational interaction rather than a traditional 
spatial one. The world is necessarily human and Dasein is necessarily worldly. From the 
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outset, Heidegger makes two basic assumptions about Dasein that drive his existential 
analytic project. First, Dasein’s being is at issue for him/her. The continuation of Dasein’s 
existence as the mode that this existence takes confronts Dasein with questions that he/she 
must find answers to and subsequently he/she must live up to those solutions or seek solace 
in already provided solutions without questioning them. The second assumption is that “the 
Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine”215. Being and 
the concern for it is not just a theoretical concern that its resolution will lead to relief of 
intellectual cramps. It is something proximal and immediate. It strikes each one of us 
intimately. 
The essence of Dasein is understood by three a priori structures: its past, facticity 
revealed through attunement; its present, revealed through discourse; and its future, its 
possibilities revealed through understanding. Through attunement, the being of Dasein is 
manifested to him/her immediately. Attunement reveals Dasein’s care for his/her being 
through emotions such as fear. Attunement also adjusts, or tunes in Dasein to other beings 
and it allows other beings to be revealed for Dasein emotionally articulated such as 
fearsome, joyful etc. Through attunement, Dasein finds him/herself already in a world 
among other beings and depending on them. Attunement not only discloses those beings as 
present but also present in a particular way. Attunement is the ontological expression of 
Dasein’s facticity. Dasein always finds him/herself in a particular attunement or mood. 
Dasein can change its moods but it can never be without attunement. The fact that we 
always find ourselves in a specific mood indicates our ‘thrownness’ in the world. 
Attunement shows that we do not have complete control over ourselves.  
Everyday Dasein understands the world, other beings, and itself in a pre-conceptual 
mode, which is different from the conceptual cognition. In fact, conceptual cognition is 
parasitic on and presupposes the pre-conceptual understanding. Understanding, partly, 
constitutes our being-in-the-world because all acts of knowing and explanation in the world 
presuppose an a priori understanding of what is to be asked. This understanding does not 
consist in understanding of any particular item, but an understanding of the world as the 
context of all experience and a whole and the Dasein’s place in it as the center around 
which this whole is arranged.  
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Understanding is an existential structure, through which Dasein understands the 
world as introducing to him/her an array of possibilities for its future. In understanding, 
Dasein projects itself. When Dasein understands, it shows to him/herself possibilities. 
Through specific moods, Dasein projects possibilities for him/herself. When we are joyful 
and successful in our jobs, we come to see our possibilities from that perspective. We 
purchase homes. We buy retirement plans. We plan the future of our family. In projecting 
these possibilities, Dasein discloses the world to him/herself. In fact, Dasein interprets 
him/herself. “In interpretation, understanding does not become something different, it 
becomes itself”.216 Interpretation discloses our engagement in the world. Understanding is 
that precondition that makes any interpretation possible. However, understanding also is 
always from a point of view. Moreover, it can only be interpreted with respect to already 
available concepts, inherited from one’s civilization. These elements of understanding have 
two major implications. First, understanding is always with presuppositions. We cannot 
know anything from a purely objective, independent standpoint. We always understand 
from the standpoint of our dispositions and available concepts. Second, understanding 
always involves language and discourse. 
  The present for Dasein is the intersection between past and present, between its 
thrownness and possibilities. Therefore, Dasein’s presence always confronts it with a 
choice to either take ownership of its future possibilities (being authentic) or delegate that 
responsibility to the common practices and ready-made solutions without contemplation 
(inauthentic being). Dasein inherits a value system and referential totalities from its past 
which engage him through discourse and language in the present and reveal his possibilities 
for the future. Discourse for Heidegger is that a priori condition that makes formal 
language possible. Discourse involves both the words and silence since both are 
constitutive of understanding meaning. “Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility”.217       
Dasein’s being is at issue for him/her as he/she is already present in the world, 
depending on and in presence of other beings, being-with other Daseins, and projecting into 
future through its possibilities. Dasein’s existence is always hovering between ‘here’ and 
‘there’. Dasein is described as ‘thrown projection’. Dasein always already finds itself in the 
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world looking to the future. This is what the spectatorial philosophy of Descartes and 
company fail to realize and which has alienating consequences for man’s position in the 
world.       
Human existence has a distinct temporal character that differentiates it from other 
beings. The temporality of our existence is marked by goal-directedness. In other words, 
our existence is oriented toward the future. This notion claims something more than the 
obvious that all creatures move forward in time. It is true that all beings subsist and persist 
through time, but it is of human nature that our existence is future oriented in that we 
constantly our in pursuit of actions that will close that rift at the core of our being. Our 
movement into future is always in reference to those projects and ideals that define our 
transcendence. Our ideals also shape our interpretation of our present and our past. It is in 
the light of my future projects and my care for those projects that I come to see my past 
history in a distinct light. My past has been good investment or a waste of time depending 
on its relationship to where I want to be. The events of the past have this accumulative 
character and effect toward the future. The present is the crossroads between the 
cumulativeness of the past and goal-directedness of the future. The present actions are 
utilization of the fruits of the past to actualize the ideals of the future. The idea that human 
existence is marked by a temporal organization that is accumulative with respect to the past 
and directional toward the future leads to a further step of viewing our every action as 
playing a constitutive role in our lives as a whole. Human beings are self-creating beings; 
their actions shape their identity. In other words, we are what we do. The events of one’s 
life resemble a narrative rather than a causal chain of events for two distinct reasons. First, 
the relationship of our consciousness to the world is not primarily one of causality. The 
consciousness does not stand immediately in a contingent relationship to the world. The 
consciousness is necessarily directed and our relationship to the world is one of a 
referential totality, which is motivated by our lacks and our purposes. We stand in a 
semantic relationship to the world. The second reason for the rejection of the primacy of 
the causal relationship is the anticipatory nature of our existence. Future plays a 
fundamental role in our existence in that our existence is one of goal-directedness. 
Heidegger puts it best when he says that human existence is ‘ahead-of-itself. Human 
existence is always on the way of becoming something. There are no exhaustible sets of 
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properties that can define a human being since our ideals are not realized but they define us 
as much as any tangible characteristic. This is what Dasein means. 
As mentioned above the events of one’s life resemble a narrative. The events of 
one’s life are stages that belong to the story as a whole. For example, take the story of 
Crime and Punishment by Dostoevsky; Raskolnikov’s meeting with the young prostitute 
was not causally necessitated by his murdering of the old pawnbroker woman. These are 
two events that belong to this narrative and furthermore each episode looks backwards and 
more importantly forward as a coherent participant in the whole of the narrative. This is not 
to assert that causal interactions are illusory but the point is that our existence cannot be 
defined by causal relationship alone. Our existence and identity can only be defined with 
respect to the accumulativeness or our past, and our ideals for the future. Sartre puts this 
point explicitly when he says, “our relationship to the world is one of valuing”. “The world 
only emerges, and things take on their contour through the upsurge of values”. This 
element of care and value, however, is what actually defines us. Sartre asserts that “value in 
its original upsurge is not posited by the For-itself; it is consubstantial with it”.218  
The inevitable result of the spectatorial stance is that I can never have the assurance 
that my experience of the world is genuine. I know the world indirectly through inferences 
from sense data hence I never know if those inferences are reliable because there are no 
independent criteria of verification. This is the essence of the problem of external world, 
which is a result of an implicit dualism in our paradigm between the world and us.  
The objection is that this pseudo-problem arises from a false view on the world, the 
spectatorial view. Heidegger’s strategy is not to provide an answer to this ‘problem’ but to 
dissolve the question. At the end of division one of Being and Time, he says that the 
“scandal of philosophy” is not that it cannot provide a proof for the existence of external 
world but “that such proof is expected”.219  
The problem has two connected flaws. One, it is based on a false view of Dasein. 
Second, it assumes a false view of the world. Dasein can only be understood as being-in-
the-world. This means that Dasein and the world are inseparable: “the compound 
expression being-in-the-world indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for 
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a unitary phenomenon”.220 The world is the setting of all Dasein’s experiences. The world 
is the encompassing background of Dasein’s encounters. The world is not the sum of all 
entities experienced by Dasein. Dasein does not begin separate from the world. Dasein is 
always already in the world. This being-in-the-world is one of an engaged relationship with 
the world. Dasein is not a world-less subject but an agent already in a world of common 
practices and concerns. Dasein is essentially in the world and its understanding of it is 
ontological and not mediated. Dasein encounters his/her own being as facticity through 
attunements: I am already here in presence of other beings and I am dependent on them. 
Dasein has a past. Dasein’s being is also revealed through his/her understanding of his/her 
possibilities and projection into future presented to it by the world. Dasein’s being in 
present is revealed to him/her through discourse with other Daseins in a shared world of 
‘referential totalities’. Being-in-the-world is not a natural property of Dasein, but an a 
priori, ontological, structure of its existence. There is no world without Dasein and no 
Dasein without the world. 
 
7.3.4 The Mitwelt:          
 At this point, let us shed some light on how Dasein encounters others like him/her. 
This issue can be illuminated within the context of the so-called ‘problem of other minds’ 
and the existentialist treatment of this problem.221 The problem of other minds can be stated 
as such: while I cannot doubt that I am a conscious being, I cannot have the same certitude 
about other’s consciousness. In fact, I can never have knowledge of others being conscious 
being as opposed to being automata. I can observe other’s behavior but I cannot know the 
mental states underlying those behaviors. Therefore, the only thing I can do is to advance 
an argument by analogy, which asserts that since others are seemingly analogous to me 
based on observable criteria such as behavior, others are similar to me in unobservable 
ways such as thoughts, intentions, and ultimately consciousness. However, arguments by 
analogy are unreliable and weak. Hence, our knowledge of the others is based on shaky 
grounds.  
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The problem of other minds is the progeny of a view of consciousness that treats 
mind and body as contingently related and logically independent of each other. This view 
also asserts that our experience is intelligible in a world of other consciousnesses. However, 
the existentialist already has shown that our proximal understanding of the world is one of a 
referential totality, tasks, and surfaces. However, a referential system can only be 
meaningful, if it is a public one. Therefore, the world is experienced as a referential totality 
if and only if it consists of entities that have meaning and purpose for others whom I am 
‘with in the world’. Another argument against the problem of other minds can be expressed 
as such: It is through the conflict with the consciousness of the other that I come to see my 
being-for-other via existential emotions. Hence at the core of the problem of other minds 
lies the misguided view of consciousness as a substance, thing-like entity. The problem of 
other minds is posed if and only if the intentional nature of consciousness is ignored. 
Sartre’s solution to the profound problem of other minds is not based on deductive 
argumentation. Sartre claims that human beings have a “pre-ontological comprehension of 
others”. The pre-ontological comprehension is not a matter of induction or deduction; it is a 
matter of “factual necessity”222. Sartre asserts that the fundamental characteristic of our 
consciousness leaves no doubt that our being is one of being-for-others or as Heidegger 
calls it being-with-others as well as being-for-itself. According to Sartre, ”we encounter the 
other, we do not constitute him”.223 The being-for-others is realized through our daily 
activities and our encounters with others. Our existence within a social group and culture is 
a constant toil with consciousness of others. Sartre presents three specific conditions where 
the struggle between my consciousness and the consciousness of the other rushes to the 
forefront. These are examples that relatively easily will illustrate his point. The first 
situation is ‘the theft of my world’. Here Sartre provides telling example. Imagine you are 
walking around a park and nobody is around. Here, the objects in the park “organize 
themselves” around your presence and your intentions. Every entity in the park stands in a 
relation to you and these relationships define those objects. The lawn is behind you. The 
old oak tree is in front of you and the benches are beside you. All of a sudden you realize 
the presence of the other in the park. If he were a mere object, then he would be organized 
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around your presence and intention the same way the oak tree does. However, he is 
recognized as a man and an embodied consciousness. He becomes a center of 
“disintegration” of your world. “Everything is in place; everything still exists for me; but 
everything is traversed by an invisible flight and fixed in the direction of a new object … 
we are not dealing here with the flight of the world toward nothingness or outside itself. 
Rather it appears that the world has kind of drain hole in the middle of its being …”.224 
Sartre believes that we are all engaged in strife for the absolute conscious ownership of the 
world.  
 Another example of encounter with the other and the ensuing struggle between the 
consciousnesses is the phenomenon called “the look”. The experience of “the look” is the 
experience of the gaze of the other. The instant result of ‘the look’ is to focus our attention 
not on the other but ourselves. The gaze of the other makes us conscious of ourselves as 
objects in the field of sight of the other. We feel vulnerable and sometimes even helpless as 
an object among objects in his world subject to inspection. All our focus is shifted toward 
ourselves and we try to decipher what he sees and what the other’s consciousness intends. 
This effect of gaze of the other is only possible of creature with an intentional 
consciousness.  
Our understanding of our being-for-the-other is relayed through strong emotional 
response of pride and shame and other such feelings. These are ‘existential emotions’ that 
reveal the nature of our consciousness to us. Shame, for example, is indicative of the 
exposure of our being to the consciousness of the other. Suppose that you are doing 
something vulgar or crude such as peeping through keyhole and there is nobody to catch 
you. However, suddenly you realize that somebody is looking at you. Then you feel shame. 
“Suddenly I realize the vulgarity of my gesture, and I am ashamed … By the mere 
appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing judgment on myself as an 
object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other … Shame is by nature recognition. I 
recognize that I am as the Other sees me … Shame is an immediate shudder which runs 
through me from head to foot without any discursive preparation … Nobody can be vulgar 
all alone!”.225 The important element in the feeling of shame is that we see ourselves as an 
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object of the other’s consciousness. Pride is the other ‘existential emotion’ that reveals the 
being-for-the-other aspect of my consciousness. “My original fall is the existence of the 
Other. Shame – like pride – is the apprehension of myself as a nature … as given attribute 
of this being which I am for the Other”.226 
For Heidegger, the eqiupmental and the sign-like nature of objects in the world 
others is a manifestation of the same phenomenon. Heidegger assumes that the Being, 
which is in question for Dasein, is in every case ‘mine’. However, this does not mean that 
Dasein is a logically isolated self. Dasein is always absorbed in relationship with others. 
Others are those with whom Dasein shares a world. Dasein’s mode of existence in 
relationship to others is a Being-with. Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is deeply connected 
with others; it is a Being-with others. Dasein’s relationship is based on common care. It is 
manifested either as concern for objects in the world of ready-to-hand and present-to-hand, 
or it is of solicitude for others. Dasein is engaged with others in common projects. Others 
make up Dasein’s world by three different ways. First, others are another entity that Dasein 
encounters. Second, either Dasein’s projects are aimed at others or they are received from 
others. This is signified by the ‘whereof’ and the ‘towards-which’ of the referential totality. 
Third, every equipment within the referential totality is a tool for all the members of that 
totality and not one Dasein alone. In other words, readiness-to-hand is necessarily 
intersubjective. This also applies to present-to-hand since that is not a separate entity but a 
separate way of interaction with the same entity. Hence, Dasein’s world is necessarily 
social.  Heidegger makes this point in the following passage:” in our description of the … 
work-world of the craftsman … the outcome was that along with the equipment to be found 
when one is at work those Others for whom the wok is destined are ‘encountered’ too … 
The Others who are thus encountered, in a ready-to-hand, environment context of 
equipment are not somehow added on in thought to some Thing which is proximally just 
present-at-hand; such ‘Things’ are encountered from out of the world in which they are 
ready-to-hand for Others – a world which is always mine too in advance”.227  
For the most part, not only Dasein shares a world with others, it is utterly absorbed 
in the world of ‘they’. “This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein 
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completely into the kind of being of ‘the Others’, in such a way, indeed, that the Others, 
distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and 
unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the ‘they’ is unfolded. We take pleasure and 
enjoy ourselves as ‘they’ take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as 
‘they’ see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we 
find ‘shocking’ what ‘they’ find shocking.228 
For Heidegger, Dasein can only be understood as being-in-the-world. This is not a 
contingent and spatial relationship between the Dasein and the world but a necessary one. 
Dasein discovers its being always as already in the world through its facticity. The past or 
the historicity of Dasein is revealed to him through moods. Dasein existence is marked also 
by its possibilities for the future through the understanding of those possibilities. However, 
future possibilities can only make sense in respect to a past and present. The present of 
Dasein is steeped in its interactions within a common referential system with other Dasein. 
Dasein is never an isolated self. It always finds itself in relationship with others. Others are 
not separate beings from Dasein. They are those with whom Dasein shares the context of 
all his experiences, a referential totality, and the world. Dasein’s being-in-the-world is 
necessarily being-with others. This is not a natural property of Dasein; it is a necessary, a 
priori, ontological condition of Dasein’s existence.        
The being of Dasein is always revealed to him as already here with other beings and 
depending on them. Our proximal understanding of the world is one of a referential totality, 
tasks, and equipments. However, a referential system can only be meaningful, if it is a 
public one. Therefore, the world is experienced as a referential totality if and only if it 
consists of entities that have meaning and purpose for others whom I am ‘with in the 
world’.  
 The way Dasein relates to other beings, Dasein or not, is through solicitude and 
concern respectively. It is, however, common, a priori, solicitude that ground the 
relationship of Dasein with others. We are absorbed in common projects with others and 
through this commonality of task; we develop solicitude for each other. We just do not 
encounter each other; we are engrossed in the world with others. “This being-with-one-
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another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind being of “the Others””.229 
Being-with-one-another is a necessary precondition of Dasein’s being-in-the-world; it is 
not a choice.  
In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that the chief characteristic of our daily 
existence is loss of self. The self “evaporates” into the world of daily activities and projects. 
The major contributor to this loss of self is our daily speech, idle talk, or Gerede. Idle talk 
is the shroud that covers true and authentic existence. Through Gerede, the world is 
presented to us in an uncomplicated and self-evident manner. However, this has the effect 
of Gerede closing us off from the true nature of existence and our own true possibilities. 
However, Gerede also provides us with security and comfort by reducing unpredictability 
and hence anxiety. When various factors lead to the collapse of our daily existence, we 
realize that language in its common capacity also collapses. These are moments when one 
face death or the death of a loved one, or any situation in which our values collapse and our 
habits and customs become meaningless. Here anxiety and despair become the dominant 
features of one’s life. This anxiety is what Kierkegaard calls “sickness unto death”. 
Nietzsche describes these moments as at time when “we lose the center of gravity which 
enabled us to live. For a while we lose all sense of direction”.230 Our struggle to carry out 
daily duties hides the true nature of our existence. The collapse of daily routines also 
renders the daily language useless and meaningless. This meaninglessness of daily 
language defies any rationalization and one finds himself in the chaos of meaninglessness 
of daily language and its daily habits and customs. This despair is not necessarily a bad 
thing as long as one is equipped with proper attitude. This realization is beyond ordinary 
experience, since it is without the overlay of daily language. This realization is pure silence 
beyond where the daily language is exhausted. It is the true reality that gives rise to this 
silence and in turn, this silence gives rise to a new language that finds its source in the 
silence. This new language is born to express the silence that gave life to it and nourishes it. 
This spontaneous creation of language out of silence is what Heidegger calls Ereigniss. 
Return to silence is a return to Being. A new language is born out of what Heidegger calls 
“echo of silence”. The creative language that is born out of silence is the true language of 
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Being. It cuts through our oblivion, restructures our meanings, it redefines our daily reality, 
and soothes us. 
Dasein’s present does not have to be dissolved in the ‘they’. Dasein does not have 
to delegate the responsibility for its own possibilities to ‘they’. Dasein can reclaim the 
authorship of his own existence and take over its own possibilities. This is not a radical 
freedom that Dasein enjoys but autonomy within the context of what is socially given to 
Dasein. This is the difference between inauthentic existence and authentic one. Jaspers 
reiterates this point by saying: “although my social I is…imposed upon me, I can still put 
up an inner resistance to it…Although I am in my social I at each moment, I no longer 
coincide with it… I am not a result of social configuration…I retain my own original 
potential.”231  
The issue of this inner resistance is one of the persistent topics in existentialism. 
This is usually formulated in terms of contrast between the life of authentic individual and 
the life that is steeped in the anonymous public, crowd, herd, or mass. In the Present Age, 
Kierkegaard states: 
“A public is…an abstract void which is everything and nothing…the most dangerous of 
powers…the public is also a gruesome abstraction through which the individual will receive 
his religious formation—or sink…More and more individuals, owing to their bloodless 
indolence, will inspire to be nothing at all—in order to become the public.” 232   
We can postulate that the target of these attacks in our age would be the leveling ideologies 
of capitalist consumerism, communism, the mass media, and the glorification of the 
common man. It is not without foundation to assume that the powerful mass media, 
advertising corporations, or entertainment industry promote the legitimization and heroics 
of the lowest common denominator. Nietzsche protests against this by saying that “the 
mentality of the herd should rule in the herd, but not reach beyond it” and “there must be an 
end to its tyranny” in order for authentic existence to emerge.233   
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 The danger of the tyranny of the herd consists in the danger of suppressing the very 
possibility of a distinctively human existence. An authentic person, therefore, is not a 
superman, but a manifestation of the paradigm of what is truly human. Nietzsche warns us 
that “we have to realize to what degree we are the creators of value feelings—and thus 
capable of projecting ‘meaning’ into history”.234 Hence, the authentic person lends meaning 
to his/her life and the world. This is a reflection of the creative and interpretive character of 
human existence.  
 As we have noted above, Heidegger expresses the same idea by applying the term 
they (Das Man). He maintains that “the extent to which their dominion becomes 
compelling and explicit may change in the cause of history”.235 Moreover, he maintains that 
the influence of they is especially pronounced during our age. This is due to the fact that 
technology provides them with tremendous means—through mass media and mass 
production—for leveling down and placing the individual in subjection to them. 
Inauthenticity is an expression of fallenness or absorption in the publicness of the they. 
However, inauthentic existence is not the product of passing social condition from which 
more advanced culture are spared. Fallenness, life in the they, is a necessary a priori feature 
of human existence. There is no future heaven, utopia, where inauthentic existence will be 
eternally abolished. Inauthenticity is a persistent possibility and actuality of human 
existence.  
The reason for this diagnosis is in the fact that we are necessarily with others, since 
the world we encounter is already articulated in terms of equipments (Zeug) in virtue of 
their public usefulness. So, in using the tools of the society I act in a way that it makes me 
one of them. Hence, technology becomes the ultimate leveling-down factor. We could 
reformulate this by saying that since my projects and ambitions intimately involves others; 
I am bound to care about the distance between the others and myself. As a result “we take 
pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure…we find shocking what they find 
shocking. The they which is nothing definitive… prescribes the Being of everydayness”.236 
The tyranny of the they does not have to express itself violently. It can be inconspicuous 
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and this can make subjection to it all the more thorough. What a person loses to the they is 
his/her own most possibilities of being. This cannot mean that, in the they there is no 
opportunity for self-expression, originality, personal opinion, and a kind of self-
exploration. On the contrary, the they often encourages a busy versatility, curiosity, and an 
exaggerated self-dissection. 
 Sartre agrees by admitting that we are mostly “docile instruments of a family, of a 
social group, of a profession etc., saying and hearing what anyone would have said and 
heard.”237 This leads, however, to a mode of alienation and self-estrangement called the 
predominance of the other in the coupling of the other and the self. We get taken hold by 
others and we construe ourselves as we are for others. We conceive our own consciousness 
on the model of the other.  
 There are, however, other forms of bad faith. Another form of bad faith would be 
the opposite of the predominance of other. In this case, we pay no regard at all at how we 
are for others. Another form of bad faith would be when we treat our person or body as 
something to which things simply happen. This is the case of the woman who pretends that 
the hand she leaves in an admirer’s clasp, neither consenting, nor resisting, is a mere thing. 
One could be also guilty of bad faith by identifying too closely with one’s past, thereby 
rejecting responsibility for one’s future.  
We can see that bad faith is a function of self-identity, in the sense that we reflect 
upon who we are and what we are like. This is a direct result of the fact that our existence is 
at issue for us. Sartre states this notion as such: that human being is a “being such that in its 
being, its being is in question”.238  
 
7.4 Dualisms Dissolved:   
 The idea that human existence is one of agency and not spectatorial in the world 
and that human existence is one of projectiveness into future has some major implications 
for some of the traditional dualisms in the philosophical tradition such as subject versus 
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object and mind versus brain. The objection is that these differentiations arise from a false 
view on the world, which is nourished, by the spectatorial view of the world and the false 
belief that consciousness is primarily causally related to its object. In other words, the false 
dualisms stem from not realizing the intentional nature of consciousness. This view is also 
equally adamant that any monistic view is based on reductionism and thus equally 
misguided. 
The first dualism under attack is the distinction between subject and object. The 
point is that our relationship to the world is not one of logically independent objects and 
subjects. Sartre describes our role in the world according to the traditional view of logically 
independent subjects and objects as “flies bumping their nose on the window without being 
able to clear the glass”.239 This dichotomy is based on the view of ourselves as a particular 
kind of thing or substance as opposed to the objects of the world as different substances. 
This view, however, is the progeny of the reflective attitude and the spectatorial role of 
human beings. It ignores the more proximal interaction of human beings in the world as 
agents with projects that see the world as a referential totality. The world comes to exist for 
us through our activities in the world and language is the ‘house of existence’, as Heidegger 
noted. The world is steeped in semantics and meaning. The view that human beings are 
self-contained cognitive centers leads us to view the world as a theatre of spectacles. 
However, the world is essentially human and humans are essentially worldly. We are not 
primarily spectators of the world that play no substantial role in its articulation but we play 
a major role in the articulation of reality in the world. Sartre expresses this point greatly in 
his play No Exit when he writes”: existence is not something which allows itself to be 
thought of from a distance: it has to invade you … pounce upon you, weigh heavily on your 
heart like a huge motionless animal”.240  
The other dualism under contention is that of mind and body. This dualism is also 
the product of the spectatorial attitude this time toward ourselves. Our being as selves is 
inseparably involved in a ‘practical life-world’. Our being as selves is inseparably involved 
in a ‘practical life-world’. We come to understand the world by the meanings imparted by 
our consciousness through the activities of our bodies in the world. The fact that I can look 
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at the mirror and inspect my body or I can use this body as an instrument that is subject to 
my will is secondary and parasitic to the phenomenological given that I live through this 
body. The world reveals itself to my consciousness through this body. Hence, the 
relationship between my consciousness and body is not contingent and I cannot exist 
logically independent of my body or consciousness. A human being is necessarily an 
embodied point of view. 
For Sartre, there are three distinguishable ontological perspectives on human body. 
The first perspective is the perspective I have on my own body apart from the other. Here, 
the body is the locus of reference; this is a viewpoint on the world. This is called body as 
being-for-itself. The second perspective is the viewpoint that I take on the bodies of others. 
From this standpoint, the body is an entity in the world along other entities. However, body 
is a special kind of entity in that its relationship to the world is primarily intentional rather 
than purely causal. This is called the body-for-others. The third perspective is the 
standpoint that I take on my own from the viewpoint of others. This is the perspective that 
makes us proud or ashamed of our own bodies or makes our bodies object of examination 
and observation. This is called body-as-known-by-others. 
The existentialist view of the self and the world is a liberating one in that it puts a 
‘reasonable’ freedom at the core of our existence and emphasizes the authorship role we 
play in the articulation of reality. It advises against pigeonholing of people since there are 
no exhaustive sets of traits that can define a human being. Human existence is one of care, 
and responsibility.  Truth is not something that is only available to the man in the 
laboratory wearing a white coat. The world is utterly and inescapably human. 
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Chapter Eight 
Process Ontology and Evolutionary Emergentism 
One of the main roles of philosophy of mind is to explain the objective nature of 
subjective experience. This account will insure the reality of both the mind and the world. 
The desire is to trace back the intelligibility of experience to some feature of the world 
itself. As we have seen, dualists honor the reality of both the mind and the world. However, 
they do this at a great cost by introducing an ontological, and unsurpassable, gap in the 
fabric of universe. Reductive materialism, in essence, postulated the reality of the physical 
world alone. Consciousness was reduced either to a different description of the physical 
events, or behavior, or an illusion of folk psychology. Non-reductive materialism honored 
the reality of consciousness, but it was left with either a consciousness that is causally 
impotent and inert, or a consciousness that overdetermines causal chain of physical events.     
Kant attempted to prove the reality of the world, and the objectivity of subjective 
experience. However, his implicit commitment to a type of substance metaphysics led him 
to postulate transcendental subjectivism. According to this view, the source of lawfulness 
of experience is to be found in the constructive activity of a transcendentally united, self-
conscious mind. It is the categories of understanding that bestow intelligibility to the 
phenomenal world. The noumenal is utterly unintelligible. For Whitehead, and process 
metaphysics in general, the source of lawfulness, and intelligibility, of subjective 
experience should be placed in the objective world itself. This requires, however, a 
monumental shift in our metaphysical attitude. It requires a shift from substance 
metaphysics to process metaphysics. The entities of the world are indeed self-organizing 
and self-constructing systems. The condition of the unity of an object rests in the self-
constituting and self-organizing activity of objects as such. These objects are self-
actualizing processes. This is a monumental shift from substance-based theories we 
discussed so far. Here the conditions for unity of objects, and the intelligibility of the 
world, are traced back to the processual nature of the world. This is transcendental 
objectivism, or realism.  
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8.1 Aristotelian notion of substance and causality: 
According to Aristotle, things can be divided into those that exist by nature (phusei) 
and those that exist by other causes. He had a different concept of cause than the modern 
sense of the notion. For Aristotle, cause is not just an antecedent event that is sufficient to 
generate a consequent. Cause is also the grounds and reason for an existing thing.241 We 
don’t understand a thing until we understand why it is and what it is. The cause gives us the 
‘why’. To say that something exists by nature is to point out its cause. 
Each natural thing has ‘within itself’ a principle of change and rest. This tendency is 
obvious in the things like animals and plants, but it is also present in other things as well. 
For instance, a stone will strive toward the center of earth until its movement is hindered. 
Nature is an internal principle of change. Things that exist because of an external agent are 
artifacts. For example, a craftsman is the cause for the existence of an artifact he 
manufactures. Here the creative principle is external to the thing itself. In contrast to the 
artifacts, for natural things the creative principle is internal to the thing. Therefore, to 
understand why a natural thing is what it is all attention should be focused on the thing 
itself. Aristotle, consequently, believes that ‘nature is a principle or cause of change or rest 
in that to which it primarily belongs’. The internal principle of things is their nature.  
The internal principle of things is different from its form. The force within each 
thing that determines its future growth and development is its form. The form is the 
potentiality of things, dunamis. Before the potentiality is reached, the form is different from 
the actuality of the thing. Once the potentiality is formed, the form is the actuality. This is 
the mature state of things. In the growth of an organism, the form changes from the 
potentiality to actuality. Therefore, the form is not identical with structure. The form is a 
dynamic principle. The form is the force of realization of structure. The end, telos, of an 
organism is the mature structure, the actualized form. Maturity is ‘that for the sake of 
which’ the organism grows. Hence the growth of an organism is a journey from its 
potentiality of the form to its actuality. 
“Of things that exist some exist by nature, some other causes. “By nature” the animals and 
their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)… 
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All the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things which are not 
constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle which are not constituted 
by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in 
respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration). On the other hand, a 
bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these designations—i.e. in so far 
as they are products of art—have no innate impulse to change. But in so far as they happen 
to be composed of stone or of earth or of mixture of the two, they do have such an impulse, 
and just to that extent—which seems to indicate that nature is a source or cause of being 
moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in 
virtue of a concomitant attribute. 
I say “not in virtue of a concomitant attribute,” because (for instance) a man who is a doctor 
might cure himself. Nevertheless it is not in so far as he is a patient that he possesses the art 
of medicine: it merely has happened that the same is doctor and patient—and that is why 
these attributes are not always found together. So it is with all other artificial products. 
None of them has in itself the source of its own production… 
What nature is, then,… has been stated. That nature, exists, it would be absurd to try to 
prove; for it is obvious that there are many things of this kind, and to prove what is obvious 
by what is not is the mark of a man who is unable to distinguish what is self-evident from 
what is not.”242       
 The form occupies a special ontological station. The order of matter is due to the 
form principle, which is a higher and organizing principle for matter. A human being is not 
a heap of bone and flesh. There is an organizing principle that makes human out of the 
human-matter. Therefore, the form is an additional principle. Maturation of an organism is 
not a property of material structure; it depends on the form of the organism. The form of 
the thing is not observable to the senses. Its presence can only be observed through 
retrospective reasoning.  
Everything that has a nature is a substance (ousia). Reality consists of a hierarchy of 
dependencies. The colors exist as colors of things. At the base of hierarchy of reality is the 
substance. The substance is that on which the existence of other things depends, but it is not 
dependent on anything else. A substance is a self-directing entity. Form is the expression of 
the organism’s true being. Natural substances show some degree of ontological 
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independence, but they are not primary substances. These, the primary substance, require 
absolute ontological independence. Here, we can discern that by substance Aristotle comes 
much closer to the notion of lawful self-organizing process than the scholastic idea of 
substance. Substance is dynamic, according to Aristotle.   
To understand a thing it is necessary to comprehend the ‘why’ for that thing. A 
cause is that which answers the ‘why’ question. This ‘why’ is not a function of human 
curiosity; it is an independent feature of the universe that stimulates our curiosity. To 
understand the ‘why’ of a thing is to understand its primary cause. The ‘why’ can be 
identified with the form. The cause or the answer to the ‘why’ of something can be cited in 
four fashions. The causes are: material, formal, efficient, and final.243  
Material citation of cause is ‘ that out of which a thing comes to be and which 
persists’. Gold can be shaped into a ring. The matter of a ring is gold. Further the gold can 
be shaped into chain. Now the gold is the matter of chain. The formal, efficient, and the 
final cause are description of the same thing, the form. The formal cause is the form 
‘specified as such’. The form is ‘the logos of the essence’. The essential properties of an 
organism express what the organism ‘is’ and not what is true ‘of ‘ the organism. The latter 
are properties such as being red, being wide, and the like. The ‘essence’ is the instantiation 
of order in things. Therefore, essence is intelligible. To understand the order of a thing is to 
understand its essence or logos. This is the definition of that thing. Definition states the 
essence. The formal fashion to state a cause is, therefore, a definition of that thing. Hence it 
is its essence, its logos.  
The efficient fashion to cite a cause is the primary source of the change or rest. The 
parents are efficient cause for the child; the craftsman is the efficient cause for the artifact. 
That which brings about a change is the efficient cause for that which is changed. Change is 
the actualization of potentiality. Cause is, therefore, a single event. When a teacher teaches 
a student, the teaching and the learning are not two events but one. These are two different 
perspectives to describe the same event, namely a change in the student. The event ‘the 
teacher teaching’ is the effect as it is the cause. Therefore it is crucial to distinguish the 
modern notion of efficient cause from the Aristotelian notion.  
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The reason to identify efficient cause with form can be understood by the ways that 
forms are transmitted in the world. Forms have two features: they are internal properties to 
objects and they are dynamic. Transmission of the forms is completed via three 
mechanisms: sexual production, by creation of artifacts, and by teaching. The art, techne, of 
the craftsman is in his soul. The form that he will impose on the artifact first resides in his 
soul. This is the form of the artifact in a stage of pure potentiality. This potentiality is fully 
actualized fully by successful creation of the artifact. Hence the efficient cause is the form 
in the process of transition from potentiality to actualization.  
The fourth way to cite a fashion of cause is the final cause. This is the telos, that for 
the sake of which something is done. For example, plants grow roots for nourishment. 
Since form is the actualization of the potential, form is the end of matter. Therefore, the 
form is the cause that for the sake of which. The form is the final cause. Aristotle’s world is 
a world of striving from potentiality to actuality. It is a world of purpose. The striving is an 
ontological entity itself.  
Chance and spontaneity don’t present a deviation from the teleological paradigm of 
the world. They can be explained within that paradigm. Chance and spontaneity are cases 
of apparent teleology. Automaton, or spontaneous event, is something that might have 
happened for the sake of something, but as it happens it did not but it was caused by an 
external event. A stone rolls off a cliff and strikes a man. The stone could have been a 
weapon but it rolled spontaneously. The stone rolled of because of its weight and the fact 
that it seeks the center of the earth. Tuche, chance, is another case of apparent teleology, but 
it is restricted by man’s activities. It is limited by the intention of the agent.  
According to Aristotle, nature is an internal principle of change. Nature is the 
form’s transition from potentiality to actuality. This seems, however, to be in stark contrast 
to the Parmenidian notion of permanence of being, which informed the subsequent ideas of 
substance.  
Change is not a process of being arising from non-being. Change is a process of 
actualization of a potentiality.244 This potentiality is not a mere possibility, but it is an 
ontological reality. Change is ‘is the actualizing of potential being as such’. This implies 
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that change is directional. A second implication is that if we don’t comprehend the 
direction of change, we don’t know what the change is because we can only make sense of 
change by its end-state. The third implication is that every change implies a causal agent. 
This cause has to clarify why the change happened in a specific temporal and spatial 
context. This is the principle of sufficient reason. The changer or the cause of change is the 
introducer of form. For natural organism this principle is internally instilled. For artifacts 
the creator introduces the form. The final implication of Aristotle’s notion of change is that 
actualization refers to the cause as well as the subject of cause. This is to avoid the problem 
of infinite regress. Change is a single event of actualization. Teacher’s teaching and 
student’s learning is one event observed from two perspectives. 
Change is the actualization of potentiality. Change is form in action.                
 
8.2 Fundamentals of Process Metaphysics:  
The idea of process metaphysics can be understood in terms of an epistemic and an 
ontological claim. From the epistemic perspective, processes, and their implications, 
provide the best instrument for understanding the human as well as the physical world.   In 
my estimation, and I hope it will be shown, it provides the best conceptual mechanism for 
understanding, individuality, society, culture, and history, as well as the domain of physical 
sciences. The ontological perspective purports that the processes present the most 
fundamental and insidious aspect of reality. At the heart of the process metaphysics is an 
inherent reductionism, which states that all physical entities are reducible to physical 
processes, and all concepts of ‘things’ as necessarily, and fundamentally, explained in 
terms of processes. Process and the concept of process constitute the underlying features of 
the physical world.  Traditional metaphysics’ emphasis on ontology, and an epistemology, 
based on the idea of ‘things’ is erroneous.  
The physical world is made of energy. This energy is in a state of constant flux and 
becoming. According to Whitehead, “the universe is not a museum with its specimen in 
glass cases”.245 ‘Things’ are nothing other than comparative, and impermanent, loci of 
stability within a sea of constant change and impermanence. ‘Things’ are transitory loci of 
stability of an underlying process that is involved in a journey from birth, through 
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maturation, and an ultimate demise and destruction. In a dynamic world of becoming, 
‘things’ necessarily need processes. The change of a substantial thing through time can 
only be facilitated through an internal drive to develop. In fact, substantial things transpire 
from the world’s flux. Hence, in a world of becoming processes have ontological and 
epistemic precedence over substantial things. The fabric of the physical world is one of 
initiation, thriving, and demise of one process and the novel emergence of another process.   
Another crucial necessary factor for this change of paradigm is that processes 
cannot be adequately explained in terms of non-processual notions. This point becomes 
vital, because processes undeniably pervade the physical as well as human world.  Physical 
history of the universe is described in terms of discrete and successive events, which form a 
continuum in time. However, these events are not isolated in time. They are processes that 
signify a beginning of a crucial point in a development, or indicate the end of that process. 
Take for example the case of a natural event like a volcanic eruption.  This event is 
historical. It means that it started by some factors, passed through a course, and finally 
culminated in the eruption. Another event could be the formation of a super nova. This 
event is nothing other than a process that culminated in a specific point in the life of a star. 
The same idea of events as processes also holds for human events. The assassination of 
Arch Duke Ferdinand in Sarajevo is not an isolated event that led to World War I.  It marks 
a crucial point in a process that encompasses all that led to that point and all that followed 
from that point on in that process, otherwise known as WWI.  From the end of that process, 
other processes emerged that signify subsequent history.  Thus, it is apparent that events are 
comparative loci of permanence, and significance, in complex processes.   
Processes, activities, and events provide at least as good a description of the fabric 
of reality as concrete particulars. Language can capture reality, at least equally well, by 
resorting to verbs as well as nouns. The referents of verbs are no less real than those of 
nouns. An electromagnetic field is as real as the magnets affected by it. The question at this 
point is not to uphold the existence of one at the expense of the existence of the other, but 
to assign priority to one over the other. The idea is not to deny the reality of substantial 
things, but to put them in the proper ontological and epistemic station. This is a question of 
priority, fundamentality, and centrality, which puts process over substance. In other words, 
the reality of substance is not denied, but what is adjusted is the priority of substance and 
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its secondary position to processes. The implications of this prioritizing are that change and 
time occupy a basic role in the ontology of the world. Furthermore, contingency, novelty, 
emergence, and creativity are fundamental to the understanding, and more importantly the 
fabric of reality. Moreover, energy, fields, and forces are more elementary than substantial 
things. Therefore, while substance metaphysics emphasizes discrete individuality, process 
metaphysics accentuates interactive relatedness. While substance metaphysics puts 
emphasis on separateness, process metaphysics stresses wholeness. Substance metaphysics 
underlines individualized specificity, while process metaphysics underscores functional 
specificity. Hence, in the physical world change and development takes precedence over 
persistence and fixity. 
 
8.2.1 What does this say about causality?  
This flux, which is the world-process, is a continuous. It does not make 
discontinuous breaks from one arrangement to another. Rather, this flow is smooth. The 
continuity of the flux has the consequence that if we isolate or separate any two parts of the 
flux, there will still be other parts of the flux in between the parts that we segregated. 
Consequently, we can never truly divide the flux wholly, since there will always be some 
undivided parts of the process in the slice that links the parts we attempted to separate and 
isolate. Hence, we can never truly divide the process. This is exactly the condition that the 
concept of substantial causality requires.246 However, a process is a homogenous, and 
indivisible whole. Nietzsche states that a process is “a continuous, homogenous, undivided, 
indivisible, flowing”.247 Consequently, there are no causes and effects in the sense that 
applies to substances, since substances don’t comprise the fundamental level of reality. 
There are just flows of energy and force. When we say that this is the cause and that is the 
effect, we divide the flux into two isolated pieces between which we assume there is 
nothing. However, between cause and effect there are many processes we don’t perceive.248 
The universe is a continuous macro-process comprised of many micro-processes that are in 
constant interaction. Hence, the universe is a plenum, a totality, without any gap. Causality 
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is emergence and change in a process with reference to two, or more, loci of comparative 
relative and transitory stability. We perceive, and conceive, these loci as substantial causes 
and effects. The cause and effect relationship, furthermore, is guided by internal 
developmental program of the process itself or the interaction of many processes, or a 
combination of both.  
 
8.2.2 The Nature of Process and its Interaction with Time. 
A process is a coordinated group of changes in the complexion of reality, an 
organized family of occurrences that are systematically linked to one another causally or 
functionally.249 Processes are composed of series of connected developmental stages, which 
are guided by function or physical causation. These developmental stages are events, and 
substantial things are islands of transitory stability across these developmental stages. The 
concept of process is intimately related to that of time.  Processes necessarily progress over 
time. Hence, processes entail perdurance, continuity, and change over time. This provides 
process metaphysics with a tremendous advantage over substance metaphysics in that it 
averts the problem of persistence through time, which devastates the ontology of substantial 
things. This problem is averted by the very nature of process. Processes are inherently 
lawful. This lawfulness is derived from the fact that the identity of a process is determined 
by its function and developmental program. As a result, the existence of process is not 
limited to now, but reaches into both the Past and the Future. Here, we assume an eternalist, 
as opposed to a Presentist, view of time, and we presuppose a perdurantist view of 
persistence through time as opposed to an endurantist position. 
For Whitehead, one of the most fundamental problems of traditional metaphysics is 
its failure to incorporate time as an essential component of the existence of fundamental 
entities.250 The consequence of this view is that time and space are accidental to 
fundamental entities; and these fundamental entities, substances, are logically independent 
of each other. According to  Whitehead, however, “every item of the universe, including all 
the other actual entities, is a constituent in any one actual entity”.251  Accordingly, 
existence, and existing entities, is defined in terms of relational characters. This requires a 
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rejection of an implicit, or explicit, commitment to the idea of the fundamentality of 
substance as that “which requires nothing but itself in order to exist”.252       
A substantial thing is a temporally bounded and spatially extended invariant. This 
definition implies that substantial things have time dependent existence. They come into 
being, they endure, and they finally pass out of being.  As a result, they persist through 
time.  Moreover, they remain substantially the same throughout their persistence. This 
substantial sameness holds for us as well as the world around us. In fact, this sameness lays 
the foundation for the stability of our concepts and experience of the world.  Endurantism is 
the view that substantial things “persist through time wholly and completely at each of 
several moments”.253 According to this view, the I of today, tomorrow, and yesterday picks 
out the same substantial thing, in this case the same person of me. This sameness is a literal 
identity. Persistence through time is interpreted as the numerical identity of a substantial 
thing at different times.   
Process perdurantism is the theory that the I of yesterday, today, and tomorrow do 
not refer to one substantial thing persisting through time in a numerically identical fashion, 
but they refer to different temporal aspects of the same process. The I of yesterday, today, 
and tomorrow are different stages of the same process, namely me. A process is an 
aggregate of its temporal stages. The different stages of a process are not different things 
persisting through time, but they are different stages of a unified process, which is both 
spatial and temporal. The relationship of the stages to the process is one of parts to the 
whole. This is in sharp contrast to the, substantially motivated, endurantism.  In 
endurantism, the substantial thing is composed of spatially extended parts fully and 
completely at any one time, and this entity persists through time preserving its sameness. 
However, processes are necessarily temporal. This means that time is not a medium 
through which a process travels, but it is of the essence of a process. This is drastically 
different from the endurantist view that substantial things are numerically identical, 
spatially extended invariants that are temporally bound. Accordingly, physical substances 
are three-dimensional, while physical processes are four-dimensional. A person is not just 
an aggregate of his/her spatially extended physical parts, but a spatio-temporal process.  My 
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Past and my Future are as much part of me as my arms and legs are. They are parts, or 
stages, to the whole that is my process. A physical process takes up both time and space.254   
Both endurantism and perdurantism assume different types of theories of time.  
Endurantism assumes the Presentist view of time. According to Presentism, the substantial 
things present exhaust reality now. In other words, the content of the Present tense 
constitutes what is real and existent. Hence, the Present tense is afforded the greatest 
privilege, and the highest priority. The Past and the Future have no reality whatsoever. 
They present things that existed once and have gone out of existence, or substantial things 
that are yet to come to existence respectively. Although, this is a commonsense view, we 
see that its implication for persistence of things through time creates an intractable problem 
of how do concrete particulars persist fully through time and they remain identical with 
themselves. Furthermore, presence is not an easily graspable slice of time in that one can 
never clearly pinpoint the Present moment. It seems that the Present is constantly spilling 
over to the Future, and it never clearly begins. One can never be purely aware of the 
Present tense.255 Moreover, the Present can be grasped only in its relations to the Past and 
the Future. The Present may be portrayed as a continuous flow away from the Past and 
towards the Future. Whitehead calls this flowing structure the “form of process”.256 
Moreover, this structure defines the relational nature of existence.   
Process endurantism charges us to grant the Present, the Past, and the Future tenses 
equal privilege. The contents of the Past, the Present, and the Future are equally real. 
Temporal relations are relative and arbitrary in a sense. Any moment can be taken as the 
reference point and any event earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than that event marks 
the Past, the Present, and the Future respectively. There is no reason to call the contents of 
one frame of reference real and the others unreal. This is an eternalist view of time. 
According to eternalism, expressions such as ‘now’ are indexical. The reference of 
indexical terms is context dependent and determined. Consequently, the utterance of ‘now’ 
does not signify any ontological special status. The role of ‘now’ is to date the 
accompanying statements.257 The statement ‘I have a headache now’ marks the simultaneity 
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of the event of me having a headache and the utterance that proclaims it. No special 
ontologically privileged status can be inferred from indexical terms. As a result, the Past, 
the Present, and the Future should be afforded the same ontological respect.  They are 
equally real. However, is it commonsensical to say the Past, the Present, and the Future are 
equally real? The answer is that commonsense is usually a historically indoctrinated idea. 
What we call commonsense is usually a veiled historical prejudice perpetuated through 
time to the point of common acceptance. The Presentist view of time is commonsensical, 
because it has been indoctrinated over two millennia of explaining every event, happening, 
and experience based on substance metaphysics without seriously challenging that 
ontology. Hence, there comes moments in the history of humanity that requires Copernican 
revolutions that change our perspective toward the world completely and fully. The switch 
from substance metaphysics to process metaphysics marks such an occasion.     
As we have emphasized, traditionally the foremost approach to the study of mind 
has been statical rather than dynamical. Accordingly, the theoretical propositions and 
empirical laws have been expressed as: 
A= f(x1, x2, x3,…, xn)  where A is any theoretical proposition, f is the function 
describing its modality and function, and x is the each component of the theoretical set. 
As we can see from this perspective time is an irrelevant variable in the workings of mind. 
A dynamical approach to the same set of laws would require us to include time as an 
integral part of our description of the laws of cognition. Hence, a dynamical formulation of 
the same theoretical propositions would look like this: 
 A= f(x1, x2, x3,…, xn, t) 
This formulation emphasizes the integral role of time in cognition. Here, we should 
emphasize that simply ordering a sequence of events temporally is insufficient. We are 
required to develop a deeper understanding of what time is. This is of fundamental value to 
the formulation of a dynamical system theory and process ontology. 
 The traditional description of the nature of time-space matrix is inspired by classical 
Newtonian physics. According to this approach, when we talk about time-space, we talk 
about absolute time-space. According to the Newtonian view, time-space provides an 
infinitely extended medium, through which particles move. Here time-space can be 
illustrated two dimensionally: one axis of this grid represents space and the other indicates 
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time. In the case of psychological phenomena, we can supplant space with other more 
relevant variables such as affects, probability to respond to a given stimulus etc. However, 
the dimension of time remains unaltered and it is presented either as an explicit or an 
implicit variable. As an example of explicit representation would be velocity, which is 
defined as covered distance of an object in a particular time span: 
 V=ds/dt 
However, in the formula F=ma where ‘F’ stands for force, ‘m’ is a given mass, and ‘a’ is 
acceleration, time is an implicit variable, which can be expressed as the rate of change of 
the rate of change of the distance covered or simply: a=d (dx/dt)/dt. 
 Leibniz, in contrast to Newton, presented a different notion of time-space. Leibniz 
defined time-space in terms of relations among monads, which are (as seen before) infinite 
particles with no extension in space or time.258 In other words, Leibniz presents a relational 
notion of space-time. To illuminate this point, we must return to Leibniz’s concern of how 
we can distinguish between two otherwise identical objects. This is the problem of identity 
and difference revisited. One way to distinguish between two seemingly identical objects 
would be to identify that property that sets one apart from the other. The likeliest candidate 
would be the relative position of these two objects in space. In other words, if they enjoy 
different spatial properties, we can distinguish between them. However, we could look at 
this simple phenomenon from a different perspective and we could say that the difference 
between these two particles generates space. Thus, space is a relational product. Moreover, 
if we order spatial locations in a certain way, then time emerges. Interval is the movement 
from one point in this temporal sequence to the next; and period is the movement from one 
location to the next and back to the original point. Moreover, two events are simultaneous 
when they can be distinguished spatially but not temporally.  
We can see that the common point of both approaches to time is that time can be expressed 
as an orderly distribution in space. Time emerges as a product of representation of various 
spatial locations, which have been subjugated to an order. Any movement between the 
locations on this set generates time.  
 The above-mentioned exposition of time does not account for our intuition or sense 
of time, as it has been suggested by Kant, James, and Bergson. Our intuition of time is a 
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result of our experience of time. This sense is expressed as the directionality of time. This 
means that the order unfolds preferentially in a certain direction. James calls this the 
‘saddle point’ of the present from which we remember the past and predict the future. In 
fact, the present is nothing other than a perspective toward the past and the future. The 
moment we become conscious of the present it has slipped into the past. 
 Physics accounts for the directionality of time through the second law of 
thermodynamic. Accordingly, in an isolated system entropy increases constantly. We can 
define entropy as increase of disorder. I would suggest that from a process metaphysical 
perspective entropy can be, and should be, defined as increase in probability and 
potentiality and decrease of actuality. Therefore, according to physics, isolated systems 
move toward a state of increased disorder, chaos, probability, and potentiality. This means 
that time represents the evolution from more organized states to less organized states. Or 
time indicates the movement from actuality to potentiality. Hence, the passage of time is a 
statistical phenomenon.  
 Fraser (1982)259 distinguishes between symmetrical succession of time in the 
physical world and the symmetrical passage of time in the biological and psychological 
world. According to this view, time itself evolves along with the spatial universe. The 
spatial universe evolved from Big Bang. Time evolved from an a-temporal stage, where 
photons traveled chaotically at the speed of light. Then came the proto-temporal stage, 
which is characterized by a probabilistic specification of temporal position. Here, a 
‘moment’ has no meaning. We find ourselves in the world of subatomic and perhaps atomic 
particles. The next step in the evolution of time was the emergence of the eo-temporal 
stage. This is the universe of the symmetrical time, which lacks direction. The eotemporal 
stage is followed by the bio-temporal stage. This indicates the emergence of life and living 
organism with evolutionary and developmental past—phylogeny and ontogeny—and the 
predictive future. This is the asymmetrical time. The final stage in the evolution of time is 
the emergence of consciousness and conscious beings. This is the noo-temporal stage. It is 
characterized by the coexistence of the conscious present with the physiological present. At 
this stage, the present becomes a conscious perspective, which remembers the past and 
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imagines the future. We can infer that the directionality of time emerges at biotemporal and 
nootemporal stages. In other words, the directionality of time is the product of life and 
consciousness.260                              
The consecutive temporal stages of a physical process are not the result of blind 
chance, or arbitrariness. The stages of a process are united by causal or functional 
connection under the auspices of a developmental program. As a result, the development of 
a process is lawful. There is a unifying and ordering principle, which guides the 
developmental process. The unity of a process is derived from the unity of a lawful order.  
This lawful order is necessarily delimitative, but not necessarily determinative. The 
unifying principle guarantees the integrity of the process.   
 
8.2.3 Process and Change: 
The next question that arises is that how can the integrity of a process be preserved 
through change? The answer to this question is twofold. First, a process is inherently 
temporal. Unlike substantial things that are spatially extended and persist through the 
medium of time, a process is both spatially and temporally extended.  Secondly, the self-
identity of a process through change is guaranteed by its internal complexity. A process 
does not change as a whole. Change is the property of the parts of a process. Change is the 
relationship between different stages of a process, or it describes the relationship between 
two processes. Any process can be a microprocess to a macroprocess, and it can be a 
macroprocess to other microprocesses. For instance, the universe comprises the greatest 
macroprocess we know. It consists of all the microprocesses that make up the physical 
reality, from the developmental process of the galactic lifespan to the life span of an 
electron in the outer shell of an atom. Change, therefore, is the function of the internal 
complexity of the universe, which is made of numerous microprocesses.   
One important aspect of processes is that they are future oriented and forward-
looking.261 This is due to the creative and purposeful nature of processes. This becomes 
important in our subsequent study of personhood. However, for now, let us suffice to say 
that the developmental character of processes ensures that processes always grasp into the 
                                                
260 Loux, Metaphysics. 
261 Rescher, Process Philosophy. 
 266 
Future to realize existing potentials. Development is a process of self-realization of latent 
potential under the auspices of a lawful, and unified, developmental program, in a specific 
context. For Whitehead, “self-realization is the ultimate fact of facts. An actual entity is 
self-realizing, and whatever is self-realizing is an actuality”.262    
Processes are also historical. The Future orientedness of a process is informed by 
the functional and causal connectivity, which it inherits from its past and its present 
context. The historicity of a process delimitates its range of development, but it is not 
necessarily determinative of what the Future will be like. Freedom and creativity are not 
contradictions to determinism, but they constitute opposite ends of the same spectrum, that 
is the natural world process. The identity of a process is the result of the historical nature of 
processes. What makes a process what it is, is its function, its causal connectedness to the 
Past, the developmental program that reaches into the Future, and the unifying principle 
that ensures the integrity of the process through action and intelligence. This unifying 
principle is, as well, a creative principle. It is responsible for the emergence of new 
microprocesses out of old microprocesses, which guarantees the adaptation of the 
macroprocess to its environment. This emergence of novelty can be accomplished through 
recombination of old feature in a novel manner, or it can be achieved by assigning a new 
functionality to an old feature with different purpose, or it can be the emergence of a 
previously non-existent quality.  This adaptation is a necessary ability in a developmental 
process. In other words, nature requires creativity, agency, and intelligence for different 
processes to different degrees. Here intelligence should be understood as the ability to 
store, process, and utilize information and data. That is something that we see, at a very 
complex level, even at the cellular level. An example would be the signal transduction 
pathways of differentiated cells.    
Although, a process functions based on some regular program, it is also possible for 
this developmental process to be interrupted abruptly by other processes. Hence, processes 
can be cooperative as well destructive toward each other. The cooperative relationship is 
evident in the cases of symbiotic relationship between entities. The symbiotic interaction 
between E. Coli bacteria and human beings is a manifestation of the cooperative 
relationship. Here, two developmental processes cooperate and enhance each other’s 
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chances of self-actualization. The destructive relationship is evident in every instance 
where a predator kills a prey. 
 
8.2.4 Characteristics of Processes: 
There are different qualities to processes. They can be owned or unowned. An 
owned process is initiated by the activity of an agent; for example, I initiated the process of 
writing this chapter. There are also unowned process that are not initiated by any external 
agents, but they are initiated through internal impetus, such as vacillations of an 
electromagnetic field. It is precisely the existence of these unowned processes that proves 
substance metaphysics is incapable of giving a complete picture of the world. The existence 
of these processes is undisputable, and this existence cannot be explained in a non-
processual manner.  
Processes can also be transformative or productive.263 Transformative processes 
facilitate the emergence of new processes, for instance the effect of the gravitational field 
on the journey of a passing photon. Productive processes culminate in products often 
recognized as a substantial thing, for example the manufacturing process of my computer.   
 
8.2.5 Processes and Universals: 
Up to this point, our investigation has centered on the relationship between 
processes and particulars. We claimed that process metaphysics provides a better 
ontological and epistemic framework for understanding the world. We also claimed that 
processes constitute the most fundamental layer of the fabric of reality. Moreover, 
particulars are manifested loci of comparative stability in a process. In other words, 
particulars supervene on processes. This is not to deny the reality of particulars, but to 
assign them a less fundamental, and derivative, role in nature. At this point, we can turn our 
attention to the relationship between processes and the universals. 
Traditionally, there have been three ways to address the problem of universals.264  
Nominalism claims that universals are mental creations, and thus they are products of 
mental operation and they are mind dependent. Realism deems universals to be mind 
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independent. Universals are independently existing aspects of reality, which are perceived 
by mind. Conceptualism maintains that universals are the product of mind-world 
interaction. The common ground between all these views is that universals are seen as 
commonalities shared by different particulars. The point of divergence is that how these 
commonalities are explained. Process metaphysics, however, attacks that very point of 
stipulation, and it asks to explain universals in terms of commonality between processes 
and not particulars. Universals should be explained in terms of common lawful function of 
processes, and not common properties of particulars. Two particulars exhibit the same 
property not by the virtue of some magical quality inherent in them, but rather they show a 
commonality by virtue of sharing a commonality of action in their underlying processes. 
There is no magic of mind or matter involved here. Processes are inherently lawful, and this 
lawfulness renders them repeatedly instantiable. In other words, it is the lawfulness of the 
world’s macroprocess, which make it possible for different microprocesses to repeat the 
same patterns and structures.265   
In substance metaphysics, of any kind, universals are second-order properties.  They 
constitute a second layer of reality. They constitute a commonality that particulars share. 
For example, the property of redness is a universal that is shared by all things considered 
red. In process metaphysics, on the other hand, universals are deemed to be expressed 
adverbial and not adjectival. Redness is not some magical property shared by all red 
particulars. To be red is for a physical process to function in a certain lawful manner that is 
perceived in a lawful mental process as ‘redly’. Different physical processes can lawfully 
duplicate the ‘redly’ pattern, and different minds can duplicate the lawful perceptual 
process of perceiving, or imagining, ‘redly’. How different particulars can share the same 
shade of red is no different from how different hearts can perform the same basic function. 
It is all a matter of lawful function of the underlying processes.   
The question at this point is whether process metaphysics takes a realist or an 
antirealist approach to universal. Universals are real, but this statement needs qualification 
since the very realist/antirealist debate is an unfortunate byproduct of Cartesian dualistic 
thinking. As we mentioned before, Cartesian dualism is well and alive in both explicit and 
implicit manner. Most of philosophical conundrums are the product of this dualistic 
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attitude. It is the task of the next generation of philosophers to dissolve all the dualisms. 
Coming back to our concern about the reality of universals, it is the position of process 
metaphysics that universals are real, but they are two types of universals. First, there are 
phenomenal, or perceptual, universals like colors. The manifestation of these universals 
requires an interaction of a mental process and a non-mental process. Second, there are 
natural kinds. These are manifested through the interaction of non-mental processes. 
Hence, their universality is not mind dependent.  Examples of these types of universals are 
being an acid or a base. An implication of this view is that the final arbiter of reality cannot 
be mind dependence or independence, for mind also is a microprocess in the world 
macroprocess.   
Having discussed the relationship between universals and processes, we can define 
processes in a new but also Hegelian way. To be a process is to be lawful, to have certain 
function, and to have a certain structural and functional makeup. These structural and 
functional types are the manifestation of the laws of natural processes; they are the 
universals. Hence, to be a process is to be a concrete universal.266 Universality is inherent 
in processes, and in fact, to be a process is to be a manifestation of a universal. Since 
universality is a matter of lawful function and structure, universality is never mere 
abstraction. In fact, abstraction presupposes universality. Hence, universals do not belong 
to the realm of fiction or magical facts. They constitute the lawfulness of the world 
processes. 
One of the most important implications of a substance ontology, which is 
committed to the lawfulness of the universe, is that it will be committed to a purely 
deterministic view of the world, where there is no room for creativity and ultimately 
freedom. The case is radically different for process ontology. As we have already 
determined, temporality is inherent to the idea of process. Processes are inherently 
historical in that the Past, the Present, and the Future comprise aspects of a process, and 
they are equally real. Reality is made of both actualities and possibilities. Hence, time 
occupies a fundamental role in the idea of a process. The Present moment is the intersection 
between a determined past and an indeterminate future. The Present moment is the junction 
between actualities of the Past and the possibilities of the Future; and since this Future is 
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always pregnant with new possibilities, the Present moment is the theatre of creativity and 
novelty in the world process. Process metaphysics denies that the Past has the absolute last 
word over the Future. This is a mistake committed by the substance ontology through its 
giving primacy to concrete particulars, and embracing the Presentist view of time. Process 
ontology avoids this misconception by realizing the centrality of the idea of time in 
processes, and embracing an eternalist view of time, which gives equal status of reality to 
the Past, the Present, and the Future. Possibilities make up reality as much as actualities. 
The universe is a lawfully creative process.267 This is manifested in the creative activity of 
nature and human beings. Nature is necessarily creative and lawful.  These two aspects are 
not contradictory. The apparent contradiction is a function of a false metaphysics, 
substance metaphysics. Here, we should refrain from understanding creativity in religious 
terms but in terms of emergence of novel forms not by accident by determinable lawfully 
and explainable. This refers to the determinability of the universe and a rejection of its 
deterministic nature. Creativity and order are two aspects of the world process that insure 
progress and stability of the universe respectively. Creativity brings forth novelty, and it 
causes some level of instability. Order subsumes the novelty and insures the stability of the 
universe. There is no progress in status quo, but progress also requires stability. The 
universe as a process is both creative and orderly, but it is never deterministically stale. The 
progress of the universe is the product of a dialectical interaction of order and creativity. 
This dialectical nature of progress is the hallmark of all evolutionary processes, man-
dependent or man-independent. The fact that processual progress is a result of a dialectical 
process between order and creativity accounts for the fact that scientific inquiry is an 
inductive affair. We can only predict, generalize, and compare, which gives us probable 
and fallible knowledge. This is not an indictment against the human mind, but it is a 
testimony to the creative, and innovative, aspect of the universe. All we can be certain is 
that there will be novelty in the Future, and we can predict what those novelties will 
probably be. However, we can never claim infallible knowledge about the Future. We can 
predict what science, art, literature, culture etc will probably be like in the Future, but we 
can never know with absolute certainty because the Future is not slave to the Past. 
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For Whitehead, creativity constitutes the condition for the possibility of existence as 
such. In fact, creativity acts as a transcendental starting point for the entire process 
metaphysics. Creativity is the activity, through which “whereby the disjunctive singularities 
which constitute the many are conjoined as an actually existing complex unity”.268 Here 
creativity is understood etymologically from the verb creare, meaning to beget, bring forth, 
and produce.269 Creativity is a synthetic and productive principle that is immanent and 
pluralistic. It is the condition for the existence of both ‘one’ and ‘many’. Creativity is not a 
manner of existence, but rather the transcendental condition of being as such. Therefore, 
creativity is not reducible to any instantiation as such, because it is also the condition for 
the possibility of novelty. Creativity redefines our notion of reality by replacing the passive, 
value-devoid, mechanistic view of Newton with an active, evolving, self-constituting, and 
self-realizing process.  
“Creativity is the principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a novel entity diverse from any 
entity in the many, which it unifies. Thus, creativity introduces novelty into the content of 
the many, which are the universe conjunctively. The creative advance is the application of 
this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel situation which it originates”.270 In the 
creative progress of nature, “the many become one, and are increased by one.” 271  
 
Moreover, this progress is always open-ended: “the notion of nature as an organic extensive 
community omits the equally essential point of view that nature is never complete. It is 
always passing beyond itself. This is the creative advance of nature”.272 Creativity is the 
promise of freedom grounded not in magic, but in the inherent creative nature of the world.         
In process metaphysics, the universe is a unified macroprocess, which is comprised 
of subsidiary microprocesses. Accordingly, the fundamental structure of the world consists 
of lawful actions of forces and fields. Law-abiding forces are the impetus for processual 
change. In the case of, so called, physical processes the lawfulness is expressed within the 
context of time, space, causality, and the fundamental laws of physics. However, there are 
other types of processes such as psychological, social, and so forth. The lawfulness of these 
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processes can be represented in terms of physical laws, but this incarnation cannot be a 
license for classification of these processes as reducible to material and nothing more. For 
example, the workings of the mind can be represented as chemical workings of the brain, 
but this representation is not exhaustive of the function of the mind. To understand the 
mental processes, one has also to refer to a higher level of representation and order, in this 
case the principles of psychology. This implies that there are different dimensions to 
reality. No one dimension has an absolute monopoly over what constitutes reality. Reality 
is the totality of all these dimensions. The emergence of these new layers of reality is a 
product of an evolutionary process, which is dialectical in nature. This dialectical 
evolutionary process is fueled by a self-realization ‘instinct’ in all nature.273 This is no 
intelligent design, but a form of entelechy, to use Aristotelian terms. In that, all processes 
act to realize their potentials in the utmost manner possible.  This fact is manifested as self-
formation, self-perpetuation, and self-realization at different levels of nature. At the atomic 
and molecular level, this trend is observed as self-formation of elementary particles into 
atoms and atoms into molecules. At the organic level, this order is observed as self-
perpetuation. This is magnificently apparent in the workings of the DNA molecule, which 
forms the foundation of life, as we know it.  At the mental level, this development is 
manifested as self-realization of the aware individual, which leads to social interaction and 
so forth. Thus, there is a purpose to the world processes and this purpose is self-realization 
at different levels. The point of existence is to form, unite, and develop. At the fringes of 
this orderly development is innovation, novelty, and creativity, and this is where 
development becomes much more than stale self-replication. It becomes progress and 
evolution. Hence, the Present stage of any process is, at once, the nexus between a lawful 
and determined the Past and the creative, indeterminable Future. The world process is not 
the theatre of blind change, but it is a stage for structured, orderly creativity and change. 
This implies that the world process consists of a web of ordered, creatively evolving, and 
interconnected microprocesses. This accounts for the coherence and the intelligibility of the 
world. This unity, and lucidity, is the presupposition of any rational act including scientific 
investigation. The tendency to lawful self-realization and self-propagation explains why all 
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atoms share a common structure and function, or why all humans share behavior within 
certain parameters. 
The coherence of the world is the function of its lawfulness. This lawfulness is the 
product of embodiment of knowledge and intelligence, which is inherent in all processes.274 
The processes are continually evolving. This evolution is progressive and dialectical. The 
subject matter of evolution is not the mere physical entities, but the knowledge these 
entities embody. Take the case of organic evolution. According to Darwinism, natural 
selection prefers certain traits to others in certain environments. However, this preference is 
not guided by physical structures, but the information and knowledge they embody. The 
basic units of Darwinian evolution are not merely sequences of DNA, but the information 
embodied in those sequences. It is that encoded information, or knowledge, that determines 
the outcome of natural selection. This fact can only be understood if one takes a processual 
stance rather than a ‘substantial’ stance. Concrete particulars cannot account for this fact. 
Only a view that embraces concrete universals, as the fundamental constituent of the 
universe, can explain this fact. Teillard de Chardin understands the importance of these 
ideas all too well when he proclaims, “the universe is no longer a state but a process…it is a 
world that is ever being born instead of a world that is”.275    
To say that the evolution of the world processes is progressive is not to deny the 
existence of destructive processes. A lawful, creative evolution makes use of both 
constructive and destructive processes. Just like a sculptor uses both addition and 
subtraction to shape the sculpture, and just like formation of an organism involves cell 
growth and cell death (as in the case of neurogenesis and neural differentiation), so does 
evolution involve constructive and destructive processes. Progress is the lawful creation of 
novelty, and innovation. The practical implication of this claim is that human beings can be 
optimistic about their place in the universe. 
 
8.2.6 Processes and Dynamical Systems: 
What does all this mean for our current concern, namely the question of the relation 
between the mind and the world. The short answer to this concern is a call to change our 
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paradigm from an emphasis on static atemporal computational systems as our model to 
inherently temporal dynamic systems. It is contended that this paradigm shift is necessary 
to produce an accurate theory of human mental life. Up to this point, we have provided the 
outline of the phenomenological-existential critic of RTM and its ontological 
presupposition of substance ontology. We also discussed the crucial position of the idea of 
intentionality in this discussion. However, these points need to be substantiated by a more 
fundamental treatment of the notion of dynamic systems. Here, we have to compare the 
dynamic approach with RTM and the computational model of mind276.  
 The difference becomes more apparent when we provide the definition of what 
cognition is according to each viewpoint. According to the computational model, cognitive 
agents are essentially digital computers. This means as digital computers decision-making 
entails the symbolic processing of data found in the real world, presenting various options, 
assigning different probabilities to each option. These options represent the likelihood of 
occurrence of different events. Decision-making is, therefore, sifting through these 
likelihoods and choosing the most advantageous outcome. 
 In contrast, in dynamic systems relevant aspects of a problem are presented through 
provision of continuous qualities. Consequently, decision-making is an interdependent 
evaluation of these values temporally. The lawfulness of this process can be described in 
terms of vectorial and differential equations. This implies that according to the dynamical 
model, decision-making represents the passing of the system through certain thresholds. 
The emphasis of the dynamic approach on temporality as an inherent feature of these 
systems is crucial. A computationalist model postulates a transformation of states in time as 
well. However, in this case time is a mysterious medium outside of the system, through 
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which the system moves. Time somehow affects the system, but it is not clear how that 
happens. The other crucial point is the concept of causality, to which the computationalist 
would be necessary committed. The transformation of states within a computational system 
is the direct result of causal interaction of the system with its external environment or a 
product of changes of internal environment. Here, we have taken solace in the concepts of 
causality and change, while these concepts are inherently temporal in nature. Causality is 
temporal, since it describes the relationship between two phenomena in time. The cause is 
necessarily precedes the effect. The relationship is mechanistic between these two 
phenomena. However, this mechanism is temporally bound. As for the notion of change, 
we can see clearly, without much discussion, change can be understood in terms of time 
alone. In a dynamic system model, time is an inherent property of systems and causality is 
emergence brought forth by interactions of interrelated temporal dynamic systems. 
 The lawfulness of mentality, and cognition, under the computationalist model 
would make it deterministic in nature. However, in the dynamic model lawfulness should 
be understood as determinability, or discribability. This means that the cognitive processes 
can be explained, and studied, mathematically.  However, that does not mean that they are 
mechanistically and causally determined. There is a room for freedom, which is understood 
as the unpredictability of the system. This unpredictability is not absolute, but it is relative 
to given parameters of environment. This can be expressed as elbowroom. However, this 
allows for creativity to be included and explained in our picture. Computationalism cannot 
solve the question of creativity. It must explain it away, or dissolve it. 
 
Dynamical Computationalist 
Focus: change Focus: state 
State understood geometrically 
(focus on where the state is) 
Internal structure 
(focus on what the state is made up of) 
Timing: when are states passed? Order: which states are passed? 
Systems parallel/change global Systems serial/change local 
Ongoing processes Beginning (input) & ending (output) 
Representations not necessary Representational fundamental 
Structure laid out temporally 
(cognition as simultaneous, mutually 
influencing unfolding of complex temporal 
structures) 
Structure laid out statically 
(cognition as transformation of static 
structures) 
Relevant aspects are represented by means Symbolic representation of different 
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of continuous quantities options & outcomes 
Decision making as interdependent 
evolution of the quantities over time as 
governed by mathematical equations 
Values & likelihood of outcomes is 
represented 
Decisions = passing of certain thresholds Decision making = calculation of most 
promising option 
Table 8.1: Dynamical system vs Computational system  
The difference between the dynamic model and computational model can be 
categorized as such: the focus of the dynamic approach is change. While, the computational 
system focuses on states. The computational model emphasizes the sequentiality and order 
of mental states. The dynamic theory emphasizes their temporality and timing. The 
dynamic model maintains that change should be understood globally and the workings of 
systems and subsystems should be understood parallelly. While, the computational model 
insists on the local nature of change and the serial nature of the interaction of systems and 
subsystems. The computational model calls for the understanding of cognitive events in 
terms of input, processing, and output, which signifies beginning and end of a discrete 
cognitive event. Meanwhile, the dynamic model calls for analysis of not one discrete 
cognitive event, but cognition as continuous and processual. These differences also imply 
that for the computationalist position of representations are fundamental. In contrast, in the 
dynamic model representation should be understood in terms of action, meaning, value, and 
intentionality. This is due to the fact that for computationalism, cognition is causal 
transformation of static structures. However, we maintain that cognition should be 
understood in terms synchronous, mutually influencing and interrelated, temporal 
processes.   
Hence, we can classify the advantages of the dynamic system model as such:277 
1. Time-dependence. 
2. Emergence. 
3. Embodiment. 
Accordingly, dynamic systems are necessarily self-organizing embodied temporal 
processes. In the case of the human mind, this requires that for mind to be that, it needs to 
be embodied in a developing nervous system. Another implication of the embodiment 
requirement is that only representations, which have significance in terms of the activities 
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of the system in its environment. Here, we could be accused of inconsistency by using the 
term representation. However, the emphasis should be on the term significant, since 
representations should be understood in terms intentionality. A systems ability to classify, 
and organize, the features of its environment is dependent on the complexity of its 
attractors. These attractors are utilized to represent the environmental factors. This 
representation, however, is not a mirroring effect it emerges as particular indicators of 
potential interactions of the system. This means that representations emerge in the 
evolution, ontogenetically or phylogenetically, of complex self-organizing systems. 
Consequently, we can understand intentionality in terms of complex relational structures of 
adaptive interactive processes. In other words, intentionality emerges as a result of the 
active participation of a system in its environment. However, the environment introduces 
constraints for the action of the system. Once constrains appear, they lead to emergence of 
priorities, value, concern, and meaning. Consequently, the organism is forced to orient 
itself in a web of referential totalities. Complexity evolves only through enriched 
interaction with other systems in a given environment of finite opportunities to actualize 
potentials. As a result, only representations that have significance in terms of the activities 
of the organism can emerge. 
 At this point it would be advantageous to define what we really mean by dynamic 
systems and what are properties of such systems in general with respect to conscious and 
biological systems. The notion of dynamic systems can be understood as an attempt to 
describe the evolution of a system over time. We can formalize that by saying that a 
dynamical system is a set {T, S, Φ}. This set consists of T, which is an ordered time set, a 
space state S, and an evolution operator, through which an initial state is changed into 
another.278 This operator may be deterministic or stochastic, autonomous or non-
autonomous, defined explicitly or implicitly. Moreover the S may be symbolic or 
numerical; T and S may be discrete, continuous, or a combination of the two. The state 
space is a construct whose coordinates represent the components of the dynamic system. 
More importantly the coordinates of the state space also represent the degrees of the 
freedom of the system’s behavior. This behavior is, however, context dependent. These sets 
of dynamic systems may be best described by differential equations. When we follow the 
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temporal evolution of a dynamical system, we begin from an initial state and proceed 
through states through the action of the evolution operator. This corresponds to the 
implicate order principle of a process. The sequence of states generated by the evolution 
operator is called the solution trajectory and the collection of all possible solution of 
trajectories comprise the flow.  
 A look at the long term behavior of a dynamic system reveals certain properties. 
One interesting behavior of a dynamic system is that it concentrates on a subset of state 
space called a limit set. The important thing about limit sets are that they represent 
invariables or foci of relative points of stability. Hence, once a dynamic system approaches 
a limit set it tends to settle there. The limit set can be an equilibrium point, which is a single 
point that produces a constant action and behavior. Or a limit set can be limit cycle, which 
produces a rhythmic action by a trajectory that collapses in itself over and over again. Limit 
sets can be furthermore stable such as attractors, which act as convergence point for all 
local trajectories or processes. Limit set can also be unstable that can lead to novelty in the 
evolution of this dynamic states. A dynamic system, in general, can have many limit sets 
that have their own attractors and converge over time. That is what we meant by relative 
temporal foci of stability of a process discussed previously. The collection of all these limit 
sets of a dynamic state is called a basin of attraction. This can be illustrated by phase 
portraits.279  
Table 8.2: Advantageous of Dynamical Systems:  
Other Phenomena Real time Embeddedness Emergence 
Dynamics widely 
used in science 
Cognition happens 
in real/continuous 
time 
Cognition is 
embedded in neural 
substrate, body & 
environment 
High level of 
structural complexity 
in natural agents 
without an architect 
Many phenomena 
described 
dynamically 
Many cognitive 
structures are 
essentially temporal 
Necessary to explain 
how cognition to its 
surrounding 
Self-organization 
requires systems 
with simultaneous 
mutually 
constraining 
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interactions 
Dynamics as 
foundation of 
cognition 
Timing: interaction 
with surrounding  
 Cognition as self-
organisation of 
structure 
 
Biological dynamical systems are further characterized by being complex and exist 
far from thermal equilibrium. Being far from thermal equilibrium means that the system 
enters into an energetic regulated relationship with it environment. The energetic 
relationship with the world is asymmetric. The biological system seeks constantly a state of  
homeostasis. This is called the steady state. The complexity can be understood in terms of 
heterogeneity, which is manifested at each level: from the molecular to the cellular, to the 
organic and tissue level,  to the functional organ system such as the cardiovascular and 
nervous system, and finally the systemic level as whole—the embodied agent within a 
specific environment with a history. Another feature of complexity is that the constituents 
of the system interact in non-linear and non-homogenous. So explaining any behavior 
requires drawing information from all levels of complexity and not limiting ourselves 
artificially to one level out fear of complexity or convenience. This is in opposite to 
reductionism and unsubstantiated pluralism. 
 Another feature of these dynamic systems is that they are self-organizing.280 This is 
the product of dynamic systems being open systems and their components having the 
possibility to interact with one another in a non-linear manner. This implies that when 
sufficient energy is introduced into these systems, they give rise to novelty. This does not 
imply that novelty is the sole product of introduction of external input. Emergence of 
novelty is the product of the interaction between internal organizing principle and the 
external requirements. So, dynamic systems—processes—are inherently creative. However, 
these emergent forms are not chaotic but become to subject to evolution operators, or the 
implicate order, of the system. Hence, self-organization emerges as the product of creativity 
and implicate order. Hence, self-organization is the result complexity and openness of the 
system to regulated energy trade. Entropy, therefore, should not be understood as chaos but 
as potential to produce enormous variability, simply potentiality. This is exactly what we 
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saw in our discussion of process ontology. The self-organizing systems select and are 
attracted to one, or many pattern, out of many possible candidates under the influence of an 
order limitation. This is the phenomenon of attractor, which we discussed previously.  
  
Fig. 8.1: Complex systems (www.emeraldinsight.com) 
 
One possible question that emerges from our discussion points to the possibility of 
emergence of intentional consciousness in machines. First, we should realize that whatever 
answer we give is speculative in nature, since it cannot be empirically tested presently. 
Secondly, it is imperative to distinguish between intelligence and intentionality. 
Intelligence is the ability to solve a given problem by analyzing different options, which 
have been assigned probability values, and choosing the most appropriate solution. In other 
words, it is a computational task. Certainly, machines are capable doing that. Consequently, 
machines can be intelligent, even very intelligent. Intentionality, however, emerges from 
the concerned activity of temporal self-organizing systems of a certain type. Here, we 
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should the very insightful distinction between autopoiesis and allopoiesis, as presented by 
Varela.281    
Autopoietic systems are self-organizing systems in the mold that we have discussed 
thus far. Furthermore, they are engaged continuously in an act self-regeneration of the 
components that make up the system as a whole. In other words, they share a history and 
heritage with each other. This heritage can be ontogenetic or phylogenetic. In contrast, 
other processes generate the components of the allopoietic systems. Hence, they lack a 
common heritage. Their lawfulness is not evolved, but it is the product of an externally 
directed developmental program. This implies that this processes lack historicity and hence 
their creativity is limited. 
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Chapter Nine  
Emergence, Consciousness, and Dynamic Logic 
 
Form the preceding discussion; we can infer that consciousness and mind are 
emergent aspects of a complex process such as a human being. We saw that processes are 
essentially lawful and creative. Furthermore, an internal developmental program guides 
them. When a process reaches a certain qualitative and quantitative level of complexity, 
consciousness emerges. Hence consciousness is not an extra dangling feature of universe. It 
is the inflection by the brain and nervous system of that same orderly, creative, and 
intelligence principle, which guides all processes to different degrees of complexity. This 
position is compatible with non-reductive physicalism. However, it is based on process 
ontology rather than substance metaphysics.  
 
9.1 Emergence 
We can summarize our emergentist non-reductive physicalist position as such: 
1) All that exists in the spatio-temporal matrix is physical processes 
posited by modern physics.  
2) When aggregates of physical processes attain a certain degree of 
structural and functional complexity and relatedness authentic 
novel aspects and attributes emerge to signify these systems. 
3) Emergent aspects and qualities are irreducible to, and 
unpredictable from, the basic processual phenomenon from 
which they emerge. 
Here, we have to make some qualifications to clarify our emergentist position. We must 
distinguish between emergent properties and resultant properties that a whole might 
possess. Resultant properties are simply the sum of the parts of a whole, such as height and 
weight. They are additive and subtractive. This makes resultant properties predictable, and 
most importantly reducible. In Kantian terminology, we speak here of synthetic wholes. In 
synthetic wholes, the whole is the sum of its parts—nothing more and nothing less. 
Emergent properties present more than just a simple sum of the individual parts. Here, we 
can speak of analytic Wholes, where the whole is more than the sum of its parts. They are 
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unpredictable and irreducible. An example would be transparency of water, which is an 
unpredictable and irreducible property of combination of two atoms of hydrogen and one 
atom of oxygen. Consciousness presents an emergent quality as well. Hence, it would be 
impossible to predict at what level of complexity what physical structure would yield 
consciousness. Moreover as an emergent quality, consciousness is irreducible to its 
underlying physical process. It constitutes a different level of reality. However, this does 
not undermine the scientific study of consciousness. It simply requires a widening of the 
scientific framework and realm of inquiry.  
With respect to the nature of emergent and resultant properties G. H. Lewes states:  
"Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; their sum, when 
their directions are the same -- their difference, when their directions are contrary. Further, 
every resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are homogeneous and 
commensurable. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion 
to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-
operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components insofar as these 
are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference."282   
According to Jeffrey Goldstein, emergence (Goldstein 1999) can be defined as:  
"the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of 
self-organization in complex systems."283  
According to Goldstein's definition, emergence is comprised of certain properties:  
"The common characteristics are: (1) radical novelty (features not previously observed in 
systems); (2) coherence or correlation (meaning integrated wholes that maintain themselves 
over some period of time); (3) A global or macro "level" (i.e. there is some property of 
"wholeness"); (4) it is the product of a dynamical process (it evolves); and (5) it is 
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"ostensive" - it can be perceived. For good measure, Goldstein throws in supervenience -- 
downward causation."284  
Hence, we could ascribe some fundamental characteristics to emergent 
relationships. It is useful to reiterate them from them quote: 
• Radical novelty (features not previously observed in the system)  
• Coherence or correlation (referring to integrated wholes that maintain themselves over 
some period of time based on some implicate order, self-organization)  
• A global level, which can be understood in terms of "wholeness")  
• Being the product of a dynamical process, which means that it evolves. 
• Being "ostensive": meaning it is determinable  
• Supervenience (downward causation) 
A first formal distinction that we need to make is to distinguish between 
designed/predictable emergence and unpredictable emergence. Designed emergence refers 
to the notion that there are the intended characteristics of a system, which arise from the 
inter-connections designed in it. Unpredicted emergence refers to properties, which may 
transpire unpredictably in a system that can be considered a qualitative novelty.  
Formally, emergence can be differentiated in two distinct notions: that of "weak 
emergence" and "strong emergence". Weak emergence can be understood as the product of 
interaction between the fundamental units of a system. In other words, it is a description of 
the relations between the fundamental units of a system. It is a mode to describe the 
behavior of systems in terms of properties generated by its basic features.  
We could also expand the notion of weak emergence and include the notions of 
supervenience and downward causation. Here, the emergent properties are not necessarily 
reducible to fundamental units, since the novel properties are the product of interactions 
between the basic constituent parts.285 In this case he whole is more than the sum of its 
constituent parts. This notion of emergence is traditionally coined strong emergence. 
Chalmers provides very clear and useful definitions of strong and weak emergence: 
 “We can say that a high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect to a  
low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but 
truths concerning that phenomenon are not deducible even in principle from truths in the 
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low-level domain.1 Strong emergence is the notion of emergence that is most common in 
philosophical discussions of emergence, and is the notion invoked by the British 
emergentists of the 1920s.  
We can say that a high-level phenomenon is weakly emergent with respect to a low-level 
domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths 
concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing the low-level 
domain. Weak emergence is the notion of emergence that is most common in recent 
scientific discussion of emergence.”286  
 
 Hence, we can state that weak emergence is an epistemological project. While, strong 
emergence makes epistemological, ontological, and etiological claims. Strong emergence 
maintains that high-level truths are not conceptually, or metaphysically, necessitated, or 
dictated, by low-level truths. While, weak emergence allows for such possibility. The 
strength of the claims strong emergence proponents understandably produces certain 
amount of skepticism. Bedau states:  
"Although strong emergence is logically possible, it is uncomfortably like magic. How does 
an irreducible but supervenient downward causal power arise, since by definition it cannot 
be due to the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities? Such causal powers would be 
quite unlike anything within our scientific ken. This not only indicates how they will 
discomfort reasonable forms of materialism. Their mysteriousness will only heighten the 
traditional worry that emergence entails illegitimately getting something from nothing."287  
However, this discomfort and suspicion with respect to strong emergence is the product of 
a false ontological assumption and a misplaced need to predict the exact constitution of 
novel properties from the available units. The false ontological assumption is, as we have 
repeatedly stated, the substance metaphysics, which requires a deterministic causal 
relationship. This view cannot be maintained, since it confuses determinism with 
determinability. From a scientific- rational perspective, we are required to produce a 
mathematically account of the states of a system. So, in this sense a system must be 
determinable. It must lend itself to mathematical description. Determinism, of the 
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substantial causal variety, requires moreover the predictability of future states of a system 
based on the past configurations of its constituent parts. This predictability is not obtainable 
in the natural world in a strict sense. We can only point to probabilities of how things might 
be with openness to arising of novel forms not predictable from past conditions. This 
difference is at the core of the divergence between process and substance  metaphysics. 
Coming concurs when he states: "the debate about whether or not the whole can be 
predicted from the properties of the parts misses the point. Wholes produce unique 
combined effects, but many of these effects may be co-determined by the context and the 
interactions between the whole and its environment(s)."288 Koestler similarly states: "it is 
the synergistic effects produced by wholes that are the very cause of the evolution of 
complexity in nature".289 Moreover, he claims that reductionistic and holisitc views should 
not be looked at mutually exclusive but as complementary perspectives to account for 
emergence of novelty. It is to this view that we subscribe as well. Anderson expresses the 
same notion by stating that:  
"The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to 
start from those laws and reconstruct the universe..The constructionist hypothesis breaks 
down when confronted with the twin difficulties of scale and complexity. At each level of 
complexity entirely new properties appear. Psychology is not applied biology, nor is 
biology applied chemistry. We can now see that the whole becomes not merely more, but 
very different from the sum of its parts."290  
Another important fact about the differentiation between cases of weak emergence 
and strong emergence is that cases of strong emergence entail weak emergence, but the 
cases of weak emergence do not, at least, necessarily entail strong emergence. This 
distinction between strong and weak emergence is not just polemical dispute, but it has far-
reaching consequences for our view of the world, physics, and metaphysics. To state that a 
phenomenon is strongly emergent from the physical phenomenon situated in space, time, 
and governed by the laws of physics is to state that it is neither reducible to, nor deducible 
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from the those physical facts. This requires us to expand our notion of ontology and 
metaphysics in that we must make room for this phenomenon in an honest and true way. 
This means that we cannot simply dissolve and dismiss the phenomenon. We must resolve 
it and incorporate it. Such demands are not placed by weak emergence claims. This does 
not mean that weak emergence has no consequence for our understanding of nature. 
However, it does not require us to reform our understanding of laws of nature and 
expanding them or correct them.  
The good news is that we don’t have to choose in a blanket statement between the 
two. We can examine each case and decide whether it falls under one or the other category. 
Intuitively, we can state that there will be many more cases of weak emergence than strong 
emergence. The question whether there are cases of strong emergence is at all. In this I do 
concur with Chalmers that phenomenal consciousness provides the most prominent 
example of a phenomenon strongly emergent from physical, self-organizing, imlpicately 
orderly, creative, and complex processes that are autopoietic in nature. This strong 
emergence relationship applies to qualia and subjectivity, since we can establish that 
intentionality is weakly emergent from physical systems of the above mentioned character. 
The proof that subjectivity is not reducible to or deducible from physical states was 
established in the chapters on reductive materialism and non-reductive materialism. 
Incidentally, we can see that the supervenience is on the right path except that it does 
assumes the wrong ontology, namely substance metaphysics, which leads to it demise for 
the reason that it cannot assume any emergence view based substance theory and is limited 
to a causal notion informed by substance ontology. This means that we can, and indeed 
should, assume a supervenience relationship between the mental and the material. But this 
would be a processual supervenience theory based on strong emergence. This means that 
the consciousness emerges from the nervous system and it is supervenient on the neural 
states, but this relationship is not reducible to neural states and the laws of physics as we 
are accustomed to, but this relationship constitutes a further fundamental aspect of our 
universe: consciousness is a strong emergent property of neural/brain states. This strong 
emergent relationship entails a natural/nomological supervenience and not a logical one. 
This means that not every case of natural complex configuration of neural-like systems will 
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be necessarily conscious. An extra fundamental law governing the relationship, and 
interconnectivity, between these physical states and the conscious states must be satisfied.     
An emergent property, as alluded before, can be understood as the appearance and 
formation of more complex and novel properties as a result of interaction of more 
fundamental or simpler units in an environment. Emergence also presupposes a top-down 
flow of information in form of feedback loops, which inform the causal processes.  In this 
sense, we can understand emergence as a fundamental aspect of a developmental process, 
growth, or evolution. Hence we can, understand emergence in terms of two components: a 
complex causal interaction between different constituent units of a system and a feedback 
process, which reconnects the novel properties and phenomena with the constituent 
elements. This feedback process presupposes a holism. Hence, emergence is a product of a 
causal and holistic interconnectivity.  The emergent process is always creative, lawful, self-
organizing, and determinable. However, the emergent phenomena can be predictable or 
unpredictable in a sense of production of unprecedented and novel forms. This novelty 
signifies a fresh stage of the system's evolution. The new level complexity is not, however, 
reducible to any single basic aspect of the system, since it is the product of the top-bottom 
and bottom-up interconnectivity of holistic causal system. Moreover, the novel forms 
cannot be predicted from the basic configuration precisely due the holistic nature of the 
transfer of information and the processual nature of the system. Hence, the emergent 
novelty is neither reducible to nor deducible from constituent parts.   
With the emergence of each level novelty the complexity of the system increases 
exponentially and combinatorially. We could say that with complexity also the potentiality 
increases. In traditional physics, this has been mistakenly taken for chaos and entropy set in 
opposition to order. Complexity is a vehicle of increased potentiality and creativity, which 
can be actualized. This is still a self-organizing and lawful process. Hence, there can be no 
talk of chaos only potentiality. However, we should be careful not to identify mere addition 
of more features to a system with the kind complexity we mean in this context. Mere 
addition of features can also give rise to noise and abundance of features in a system. Here, 
we mean a kind of functionally relevant addition, which we call complexity. The criterion 
for relevance is a function of a finality of a process or a dynamic system. Finality is nothing 
other than teleological feature of a dynamical system, process. A process is a self-
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organizing, lawful, inherently temporal, and creative dynamic system. In Aristotelean 
terminology, we could say that finality is a function of the entelechy of a self-organizing 
process. Complexity is the product of abundance of relevant features. Hence, it is 
quantitative and qualitative in nature, which is based on organization, diversity, and 
interconnectivity. 
 However, this does not require a centralized organization. In other words, there is 
no need for a homunculus in the system, since process as whole is self-organizing, lawful, 
and creative as whole. Moreover, these features are implicitly present in each constituent 
factor. Hence, the microcosm and macrocosm reflect each other in a web of 
interconnectivity. 
 Moreover, this does not exclude the production and emergence of unintended 
consequences and features. The exclusion of this possibility amounts to smuggling a new 
version of a strict determinism. Steels states: "A component has a  
particular functionality but this is not recognizable as a subfunction of the global 
functionality. Instead a component implements a behaviour whose side effect contributes to 
the global functionality [...] Each behaviour has a side effect and the sum of the side  
effects gives the desired functionality"291. Here Steels emphasizes that global functionality 
of a system with "emergent functionality" is the totality of all "side effects", of all emergent 
novelties and functionalities.  
The incorporation of complexity in the notion of emergence leads a layered notion 
of emergence. Hence, emergence can be understood and differentiated by different levels of 
complexity. Hence, there are: 
1. First-order emergent properties: these are the product of 
spatial manipulations and shape transformations such as 
spatial arrangement of molecules to give rise to steric 
hindrance or surface tension. 
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2. Second-order emergent properties: these are the product 
of spatial and temporal processing such as the changing 
weather conditions. 
3. Third-order emergent properties: these are the product of 
spatial, temporal, and implicate, reproducible, and 
inheritable self-organizing principles such biological 
evolution of biological systems. 
 
9.2 Logic of Being and Becoming: 
One of the main implications of the process ontology is that formal logic is not 
sufficient enough to function as the standard of thought. Formal logic is based on discursive 
and abstract reasoning. It formulates general principles, upon which reasoning is based. 
From certain general assertions, it deduces particular conclusions. The main standard of 
formal logic is to make sure that the Law of Identity, the Law of Contradiction, and the Law 
of Excluded Middle are not violated in the process of reasoning.292 Consequently, the goal 
of formal logic is self-consistency in thought. However, the reasoning based on formal 
logic does not correspond with the facts of the world.  
The three fundamental laws of formal logic, namely, the Law of Identity, the Law of 
Contradiction, and the Law of Excluded Middle are considered as universally true. These 
laws are formal and they represent the most universal nature of things. This is the 
characteristic of all principles of formal logic. These cannot be proved, but they are 
required in all proofs. However, when these principles are rejected, all thought is reduced to 
bewilderment and confusion.  
The principle of identity simply asserts: if any statement or proposition is true, it is 
true. This principle indicates that a thing is identical with itself. The thing maintains its 
essential nature at all times and locations and throughout any change. Things are subject to 
change. This is not disputed. However, the principle articulates the permanent and 
unalterable essence of things. In other words, if a term is used in one sense, it must be used 
in the same sense throughout the same argument.  
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The principle of contradiction claims that no proposition can be both true and false. 
This implies that two contradictory qualities cannot be affirmed of the same thing at the 
same time. Hence, a proposition in which two contradictory qualities are affirmed of the 
same thing at the same time and in the same sense is necessarily false.  
The principle of excluded middle claims that any proposition must be either true or 
false. Accordingly, two contradictory qualities cannot both be false of one and the same 
thing and in the same sense. If one quality is false, then the other must be true. There is no 
possibility of a third option.    
The Law of Identity and the Law of Excluded Middle are tautologies. Hence, they 
are necessarily true. Propositions, which are true under all possible assignments of truth-
value, are tautologies. However, these propositions are empty and they say nothing, for 
they are true under all conditions, regardless what the reality is like. A proposition, which is 
not empty, describes a particular condition; it illustrates a fact about the reality. However, a 
tautology does not depict any situation about the reality; it does not claim any fact or 
situation about the world. If a tautology described a situation about the world, it could be 
wrong about that description, and in that event, it would not be a tautology.  
A tautology represents one extreme of propositions, in which all the truth-value 
assignments are true. The extreme of the propositions is a contradiction. A contradiction is 
necessarily false. A contradiction is a self-contradictory proposition, since it is at all times 
false. Consequently, a contradiction is false under all circumstances and conditions. This 
implies that, just like tautologies, contradictions do not describe any situation about the 
reality, for if they did they could be right, and then the proposition could not be 
contradictions. Hence, according to Wittgenstein, neither a contradiction, nor a tautology is 
a picture of reality. We can know a priori that tautologies are true and contradictions are 
false.293 
Besides tautologies and contradictions, descriptive propositions make up the other 
class of propositions. These propositions, in contrast to tautologies and contradictions, 
describe a particular fact or situation about the world. Hence, the truth-value of descriptive 
propositions cannot be a priori established. Experience determines the truth of descriptive 
propositions; their truth is known a posteriori. However, the truths of formal logic and 
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mathematics are tautologies, or analytic. Unlike descriptive propositions, or synthetic 
propositions, the analytic statements are devoid of factual content; the analytic statements 
make no assertions about the empirical world.  
Consequently, the three fundamental principles of formal logic are necessarily true. 
The conformity to these principles is a necessary requirement for any valid reasoning. 
Consequently, these principles are crucial for achieving formal truth. In any valid 
deduction, the conclusion follows with logical necessity from the premises. Moreover, the 
conclusion yields formal truth. In deductive reasoning, the premises are taken for granted. 
In other words, deductive reasoning is not concerned whether the premises are factually 
true. Deductive reasoning is concerned solely with whether the conclusion necessarily 
follows from the premises. However, if the premises are factually false, the conclusion 
cannot be materially true. Consequently in deductive reasoning, a conclusion can be 
factually false but formally true. This implies that formal logic deals with possible relations 
between propositions, regarding their truth or falsity, regardless of their content. Formal 
logic provides the necessary conditions of valid reasoning and it facilitates the elimination 
of false reasoning. However, deductive reasoning is not sufficient to determine any factual 
truth. The role of formal logic is to investigate the objective relationship between 
propositions, which are the conditions of valid reasoning. Therein lies the limitation of 
formal logic, in that formal logic cannot determine the factual truth of any statement. The 
limitation can be also the source of misuse of formal logic.  
The major misuse of formal logic occurs when its principles are applied a priori and 
unconditionally to propositions about reality. This is a misuse, because there is a major gap 
between formal logic and reality. The laws of formal logic are not the laws of nature or 
reality. Consequently, the a priori application of these laws to the statements, which refer to 
the objects of reality, is not justified. However, this does no imply that the intelligibility 
and order of nature is illusory or false.  
Leibniz understood this well enough. He asserts that differential equations are much 
better representatives of reality, because they can capture the flux of reality. Furthermore, 
he introduced the Principle of Sufficient Reason as the instrument to understand the nature 
of reality. Here, Leibniz makes a distinction between necessary truths and contingent truths. 
The principles of formal logic govern the realm of necessary truths, i.e. mathematics; the 
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Principle of Sufficient Reason governs the realm of contingent truths, assertions about 
nature. In other words, the empirical world is devoid of necessities. Hence, we have to find 
sufficient reasons to understand the world of experience and practicality.  
According to Leibniz, it is one of the basic properties of human intellectual 
consciousness to look for the reason of events and phenomena. Human consciousness is 
such that it functions based on the principle of sufficient reason. This means that our 
faculty of understanding tries to understand every event in terms of some other event. To 
put it logically, anything that can be formulated, can also be questioned. To put it 
psychologically, the status of all propositional attitudes can be queried. In terms of 
epistemology, it is the form of our consciousness and it is the necessary precondition in the 
world that, whatever the content of experience may be, they must have intelligible 
relationship with each other or at minimum, and such relationship can be sought. From 
epistemic point of view, we are always justified to look for reasons. In the physical realm, 
we see this through a causal relationship between events. In the interaction of physical and 
organic events, this reasoning is signified in terms of stimulus and response relationship. In 
the organic realm of conscious being such as us, the grounds for an event can be solicited 
not externally but internally as well. These we call motives of the agent. Reason for an 
event can also be established by a mathematical description of its position in time and 
space. Another way, in which sufficient reasons can be established, is logical entailment. 
The logical entailment can be established either through observation and experience, or it 
can be one of the necessary presuppositions of experience, or it can follow from the truth of 
another proposition, or it can be the one of the laws of formal logic (such as laws of 
identity, contradiction, excluded middle). 
For Hegel, logic is identical with metaphysics. This is so because being and 
knowing coincide. Hegel believes that we can know the essence of reality by moving 
rationally systematically and avoiding all self-contradiction along the path. Thought must 
abide by the inner logic of reality itself. The rational is identical with the actual. 
Consequently, logic and logical connections must be realized in the actual and not in empty 
abstraction. Logic is the process by which we infer from our experiences of the actual, the 
categories that describe the reality, the Absolute. This process of deduction is the essence 
of the dialectic.  
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Fig 9.1: The dialectical process (www.rolfkenneth.no) 
The dialectical process is characterized by a triadic movement.294 This is a 
movement from thesis to antithesis, and lastly to synthesis. Subsequently, the synthesis 
becomes a new thesis. The process continues until it culminates in the Absolute Idea. This 
implies that thought moves and that contradiction, instead of bringing knowledge to a stop, 
acts as a positive impulse in human reasoning. The first basic triad in the dialectical process 
is the triad of Being, Nothing, and Becoming. The mind moves from the more general, 
abstract to the specific, and concrete. The most general concept that can be formed about 
things is that they are, and they exist. It follows that Being is the most general concept the 
mind can formulate. Being must also be logically prior to any specific entity, because 
things represent determination, differentiation, and manifestation of what is originally 
without features. Consequently, reality and logic begin with the indeterminate, with the 
primary featurelessness that precedes all definite quality. This is called Being. Here, Hegel 
rejects the Aristotelian notion that nothing can be deduced from a universal term. For 
instance, there is red and its complement term non-red. There is no way to deduce any other 
color from red. Furthermore, if something is red, then we cannot assert in the same context 
that it is something else, non-red. This is the principle of non-contradiction.  
The concept of Being contains none of the particular qualities of the many things 
that have being. In other words, the notion of Being has no content, because when we give 
it content, it would not be the concept of pure Being but something. However, it is possible 
to deduce another concept from the concept of Being. Since pure Being is mere abstraction, 
it is absolutely negative. This implies that, because the concept of Being is completely 
indeterminate, it passes into the concept of non-Being. Whenever, one tries to think about 
the idea of pure Being without any particular quality, the mind shifts from Being to non-
Being. This entails that in some way Being and non-Being are the connected. 
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Consequently, the concept of non-Being or nothing can be deduced from the Being. Here, 
Hegel agrees with Aristotle that nothing can be deduced from a category that was not 
contained in that category. In other words, to deduce Y from X requires that in some way Y 
already be contained in X. In this case, the concept of pure Being contains the idea of 
nothing. This does not mean that we can say of particular entities that they simultaneously 
are and are not. Hegel’s point is limited to the concept of pure Being and non-Being. 
Hence, the antithesis, Nothing, is contained in the thesis, Being. The antithesis is always 
deducible from the thesis, since the former is always contained in the latter.  
The movement of thought from Being to Nothing produces a third category, 
Becoming. The notion of Becoming arises when thought apprehends that Being contains 
Nothing. In fact, Being and Nothing are the same, since the concept of Nothing leads the 
mind back to Being. Consequently, Becoming is the unity of Being and Nothing. 
Becoming, in other words, is the synthesis of Being and Nothing. An entity can both be and 
not be when it becomes.295 
Hegel uses the same dialectical logic, through which at each step he sets forth a 
thesis, from which the antithesis is deduced; this thesis and antithesis are united in a higher 
synthesis. The culmination of this process is the Absolute Idea, which is a process of self-
development. From an epistemic standpoint, beginning at the lowest grade of knowledge, 
the sensation of properties of particular entities, the Hegel attempts to expand the range of 
knowledge by revealing the interrelationships of all things. For Hegel, single facts are 
irrational; only when they are seen as related to the whole, they become rational. The mind, 
then, moves dialectically, embracing an ever-increasing range of reality, discovering the 
truth of any entity by apprehending its relation to the whole, the Absolute Idea.      
According to Hegel, the goal of logic is truth.296 Traditionally, as we have noticed, 
logical investigation begins with the separation between form and content. Formal logic 
occupies itself with the study of form and not content. As we have seen, because of the 
separation of form from content, formal logic reveals nothing about the actual world. 
Conversely, Hegel begins his investigation of the problem of knowledge by defying the 
traditionally presupposed distinction between the knower and the known. He asserts that 
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there is no objective reality independent of consciousness. Consciousness is objective 
reality and objective reality is consciousness. Hence, the study of thought is the study of 
reality. Consequently, logic can be only occupied with the static, the formal, and the 
abstract; but also the dynamic, and the concrete. The treatment of the dynamic and concrete 
aspect of reality is the function of the dialectical logic. It is important to point out that 
dialectical logic is not to replace formal logic, but to complement it. Dialectical logic 
considers both the form and the content. As we discussed before, dialectical process goes 
through the steps of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The implies that we must look at logic 
as not just rules of manipulation of propositions or even thought itself, but we incorporate 
our ontology into logic. Our logic must transparently reflect our ontological point of view. 
 
9.3 Evolutionary Emergentism, and Consciousness: 
Form the preceding discussion we can infer that consciousness and mind are 
emergent aspects of a complex process such as a human being. We saw that processes are 
essentially lawful and creative. Furthermore, an internal developmental program guides 
them. When a process reaches a certain qualitative and quantitative level of complexity, 
consciousness emerges. Hence consciousness is not an extra dangling feature of universe. It 
is the inflection by the brain and nervous system of that same orderly, creative, and 
intelligence principle, which guides all processes to different degrees of complexity. This 
position is compatible with non-reductive physicalism. However, it is based on process 
ontology rather than substance metaphysics.  In contrast to most other theories we discussed 
so far, we insist that consciousness is an integral part of the world. Nietzsche reiterates this 
point: 
“…Man has evolved slowly, and knowledge is still evolving: his picture of the world 
becomes even more complete. Naturally, it is only a clearer and clearer mirroring. But the 
mirror itself is nothing entirely foreign and apart from the nature of things. On the contrary, 
it too slowly arose as a part of nature of things. We observe an effort to make the mirror 
more and more adequate. The natural process is carried on by science. Thus, the things 
mirror themselves ever more clearly.” 297    
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In human consciousness, a part of the world becomes naturally aware of the whole world. 
So, our eyes become the eyes with which the world looks at itself. Consciousness is the 
self-mirroring and self-reflection of the world. Our consciousness is self-aware. In other 
words, in our self-consciousness the mirror reflects itself. Hence, our consciousness partly 
reflects the world and partly reflects and displays itself.  Consciousness reflects itself, since 
it is part of the world that looks at the whole from inside. The reflection of the world 
through consciousness is achieved by creating a map of the world. Hence, consciousness 
makes a conceptual and symbolic plan. This symbolic and conceptual nature of this 
representation accounts for philosophy, science, and mythology as human attempts to 
understand the world. Moreover, it is an expression of our desire to find our proper place in 
the world. This map amounts to an internal self-representation of the world. It essentially 
forms an internal perspective. Every human mind, hence, forms an internal map, or an 
internal perspective, of the world. This accounts for the intentional and representational 
nature of consciousness. 
 Our theory is based on the theory of evolution. However, for our theory to be 
compatible with evolutionary notions, we most posit the continuity of the evolutionary 
process. This demands that there will be continuity of consciousness, cognition, and 
knowledge throughout different evolutionary stages. If we introduce a gap in the fabric of 
reality, then we must resort to magic and mysterianism to close the gap. Consequently, 
consciousness and natural information processing systems evolve. For Nietzsche, crystals 
exhibit pre-cognitive abilities insofar as they extend their own patterns into the molten flux 
that surrounds them.298 Living cells extend their own pattern into other material as they 
incorporate nutritients. Such extension is cognitive insofar as it equalizes the unequal and 
transforms the other into the same.299 This implies that evolutionary forces drive organisms 
to become more and more complex, and their cognitive abilities increasing in complexity 
along with their bodies.  
 The most basic proper form of cognitive operations originates in plants, which have 
primitive stimulus-response reflexes and primitive memories. However, as consciousness 
evolves, living physical systems become more and more aware of their surroundings. This 
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evolution culminates, as far as we can tell, in human self-consciousness in which a part of 
universe becomes aware of the whole of which it is a part. Our consciousness is that part of 
the whole that mirrors the whole. However, this is an internal representation and 
perspective of the world. Consequently, our knowledge becomes truer and truer as we 
mirror the world more and more clearly and completely, while we reflect on our own 
reflection of the world.       
 According to Sri Aurobindo300, the process of evolution is comprised by a triple 
character: a widening, a heightening, and integration. The process of widening refers to the 
emergence of more complex forms of matter from simpler ones. Heightening refers to the 
ascension from lower quality to higher quality. The evolution of life from matter 
instantiates such ascent. Integration means that when evolution arrives at a higher quality, 
it incorporates the lower stage and alters in accordance with its own principles and laws. 
Consequently, evolution is not just a process of emergence of higher principles from the 
lower ones, but it is also a process of ascension and transformation of the lower stage as 
well. For instance, when life emerges out of matter, it signifies an ascent to a higher grade 
in the evolutionary process and it initiates a transformation in matter as well. The body of 
an animate being presents utterly different qualities from the characteristics of inanimate 
matter. 
This notion of consciousness is based on the logic that what nature produces must 
already be contained in nature in an implicit manner. In other words, causal generation 
manifests what was implicit in the material cause. What evolves in nature must be already 
involved in nature. Consciousness cannot evolve and emerge from an utterly different base. 
There cannot be any relation between two qualities that are utterly different and 
independent from each other. Hence, consciousness is the emergent manifestation of same 
principle of unity, information, and action present in the processes of nature. This view is 
based on the argument that phenomenal effect is not ontologically different from its 
material cause. Consequently, causality presupposes an essential constituent of a causal 
relationship, which is modified but not essentially altered in the process of creation of its 
effect. Hence, an effect inheres in its cause.  
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 The manifestation of the principle of information and knowledge accounts for the 
self-luminosity of consciousness. This view is based on the argument that phenomenal 
effect is not ontologically different from its material cause. Consequently, causality 
presupposes an essential constituent of a causal relationship, which is modified but not 
essentially altered in the process of creation of its effect. Hence, an effect inheres in its 
cause. This is a transcendental argument of the Kantian variety. 
 The same transcendental argument accounts for the identification of consciousness 
with intelligence, knowledge, and information. This argument states that knowledge, 
intelligent experience, and the intelligible orderliness of the world presuppose a 
transcendental information principle. One implication of the identification of consciousness 
with the principle of intelligence and information is that consciousness is identified with the 
principle of action as well, since all action presupposes some level of data and information. 
Volition, or will, is nothing other than applied consciousness. 
We make a distinction between forms of consciousness and contents of 
consciousness. Forms of consciousness describe the different functional roles that 
consciousness assumes. Contents of consciousness refer to sense data, categories of 
discursive cognition, symbolic cognition, emotions, and motivations. We should remember, 
however, that the distinction that we introduce does not constitute an ontological 
separation, but it is a tool of understanding. Hence, forms of consciousness can be 
classified as: 
1) Appercetive or transcendental consciousness.  
2) Self-consciousness 
3) Perceptive or empirical consciousness.  
The content of consciousness is usually classified in terms of the tripartite theory of mind. 
Hence, facultative consciousness is composed of the tripartite mental faculties of: 
1) Cognition 
2) Emotions.  
3)  Motivations 
We should re-emphasize the very important point that there are not different types of 
consciousness, but these are distinct roles of consciousness.   
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9.3.1 Appercetive consciousness:       
 The difference between transcendental consciousness and other types of 
consciousness is that apperceptive consciousness is self-luminous, self-established, 
autonomous, and foundational, while others are subject to constant change and appear in 
relation to particular objects. Consequently, these forms of consciousness are intentional in 
character.  
Self-luminosity is the epistemological aspect of transcendental consciousness. Self-
luminosity is the ability of being immediately experienced without being necessarily an 
object of cognition. This means that apperceptive consciousness is directly experienced, 
while it is not object of knowledge. The self-revelation of pure consciousness is comprised 
in the fact that it illumines or lights everything, including itself. 
Moreover, self-luminosity provides the means for apperceptive consciousness to transcend 
the distinction between the knowing subject and the object known. Transcendental 
consciousness is not a subject or object. It is known purely through itself. This makes 
transcendental consciousness autonomous and indubitable. This highlights a further 
difference between appercetive consciousness and other forms of consciousness. 
Apperceptive consciousness is non-dual in nature, while other forms of consciousness 
thrive in the temporal dualism of past and future and identity dualism of self and the other.  
 Non-dual nature of apperceptive consciousness implies that it is not subject to any 
difference or negation. This means that appercetive consciousness is free from all internal 
and external distinctions. Transcendental consciousness does not have any parts, in an 
ontological sense. Hence, it does not have any internal divisions. External distinctions can 
be either heterogeneous or homogenous. Heterogeneous difference is based on the 
distinction among objects of different classes. Homogenous distinctions are grounded in the 
differentiation among objects of the same class. However, since there is nothing that is 
similar or dissimilar to consciousness, it is devoid of any internal and external distinctions. 
Hence, pure consciousness is non-dual. Our notion of transcendental consciousness 
corresponds very closely to Kant’s idea of transcendental unity of apperception as the 
requirement and pre-condition for all experience. An ontological presupposition of all 
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mental states and experience of their contents without being itself the content experience 
itself.   
 As I sit here and type these words, I have no doubt that the thoughts rushing through 
my mind are mine. I have no doubt that the struggle to find the right words is mine. I have 
no misgiving that I am the proprietor of my experience. Where does this knowledge come 
from? I cannot arrive at this knowledge by inspecting the items of my experience. There is 
nothing in the sense data that would make this knowledge possible for me. In fact, all my 
experiences assume this ownership of my experience. Without this unity of apperception, I 
could not have any experiences at all. The knowledge of ownership of my experiences is 
not a posteriori, since it is presupposed by experience. Hence, it is a priori knowledge. 
 Kant assigned the role of transcendental unity of apperception to transcendental 
consciousness. This unity of consciousness accounts for the ownership of experience. The 
ownership of experience is not subject to dispute. The empirical investigation might reveal 
the content of consciousness, but not its ownership. Apperception refers to all experience of 
which the subject is able to say’ this is mine’. Therefore, apperception is the foundation of 
self-consciousness and perceptive consciousness. Kant described it as the ‘I think’ that can 
be attached to all perceptual experience. It is the awareness that the perceptual experience 
belongs to me. Unity of apperception defines my point of view. There is never a doubt 
about the ownership of my experience. A doubt in the unity of apperception would mean 
that I stop having self-consciousness and empirical experience. For Kant, there are three 
elements involved in the conceptualization of experience. First, there is the structuring of 
intuitions in time and space. Secondly, it is the unification of intuitions under one 
consciousness. Thirdly, it is the ability to organize all the intuitions into concepts of 
categories.  
 The prerequisite to all this is the possibility of apperceptive consciousness. 
Transcendental unity of apperception is a formal unity, which all experience requires. 
Transcendental unity of apperception is the formal unity that makes empirical 
consciousness and self-consciousness (my awareness of my experience) possible. Kant 
states: “it must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations. That 
representation, which can be given prior to all thought is called intuition. All the manifold 
of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the ‘I think’ in the same subject in which 
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this manifold is found”.301 This is what we mean when we say that transcendental 
consciousness is foundational, and autonomous. Apperceptive consciousness is the 
condition of all experience without being its object.  Kant states: 
 It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations;  
For otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and 
that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be 
nothing to me.302   
  
 Kant does not claim that each of my representations must be actually attended by 
the consideration that it is mine. It is not also required that all my representations be 
thought in one grand comprehension encompassing the totality of my experience. What is 
required is that just each of my representations must be such that it is possible for me to 
recognize them as mine in a feat of deliberation. This condition can be met only through an 
unchanging, a priori representation devoid of empirical content; “otherwise I should have 
as many colored and diverse a self as I have representations that I am conscious.”303 
Consequently, transcendental apperception cannot be identified with the cognition of 
anything that can be brought under the concept of substance or res cogitans. 
Transcendental apperception is consciousness of mental states. Hence, it provides the 
ground of our representation of ourselves as spontaneous. Moreover, apperception “is 
something real”.304 Apperception is “something which actually exists”.305 However, we 
have no concept of apperception. According to Kant, it cannot even be brought under the 
category of existence.306 Apperception gives us a sense or feeling of existence without the 
concept thereof: “we cannot even say that this is a concept.”307 
 The other essential characteristic of apperceptive consciousness is temporality. In 
fact, unifying function of consciousness must presuppose its temporality. This point 
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becomes apparent when examine the phenomenological account of temporality of 
consciousness, or time-consciousness, presented by Husserl. 
 The question is simply: How can we perceive temporally extended objects and how 
do we perceive change and succession? One possible answer would be to maintain that 
consciousness takes temporal snap shots of ‘nows’. However, this would not be 
satisfactory, since a series of snap shot of  ‘now’ moments is temporally static and cannot 
account for the dynamic flow of duration of object or succession. Neither, can it account 
the quality of being temporally extended by an object. On the hand, we cannot reject the 
notion of duration and succession, because we simply do experience succession and 
duration. Gallagher states: 
Husserl’s main claim is that a perception of a temporally extended object as well as the 
perception of succession and change, would be impossible if consciousness provided us 
only with a momentary or pure now-slice of the object and if the stream consciousness 
itself was a series of unconnected points of experiencing, like a line of pearls. If our 
perception were restricted to being conscious of that which exists right now, it would be 
impossible to perceive anything with temporal extension and duration. Since we obviously 
do experience succession and duration, we must acknowledge that our consciousness, one 
way or another, can encompass more than that which is given right now – it must be 
conscious of that which has just been, and that which is just about to occur.308  
 
According to Husserl, the temporal structure of consciousness can be described by 
three aspects:  
1. A ‘primal impression’. 
2. A ‘retentional aspect’. 
3. A ‘protentional aspect’   
The ‘primal impression’ deals with strictly now present aspect of the object of 
consciousness. It is that snap shot of that now moment. The ‘retentional aspect’ deals with 
what-has-just-been or the elapsed of conscious material. The ‘protentional aspect’ is 
concerned with what-is-about-to happen of conscious experience. It is an anticipatory 
aspect of consciousness, which is derived from the intentional, the meaning giving, 
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property of conscious act. Hence, in any conscious act the past, the present, and the future 
are united to give meaning to the perceptual experience.   
When I utter a sentence, I have some anticipatory sense of where the sentence is going, or 
at the very least, that the sentence is heading to some kind of ending. This sense of knowing 
where the sentence (the thought) is heading, even if not completely definite, seems essential 
to the experience I have of speaking in a meaningful way. It is the protentional aspect of 
consciousness which provides us with this intentional anticipation of something about to 
happen…the retention does not retain real contents…rather, consciousness retains it as an 
intentional content. It retains the sense of what has just consciously passed. Thus, retention 
must be appreciated as peculiar form of intentionality. Unlike primal impression, the 
retention intends the past. Unlike episodic memory, the retention presents the past; it does 
not merely re-present it. In Short, it provides us with a direct intuitive grasp of the just-past 
and is not a special apprehension of something present.  309 
 
Consequently, the temporality or temporal structure of consciousness consists of  
retention-primal impression-protention. Gallagher puts it beautifully when he says: 
“consciousness is the generation of a field of lived presence”.310 We should also distinguish 
between retention and protention, and recollection and expectation. Protention and retention 
are structural parts of every conscious act. They are involuntary and automatic. They are 
not subject of inspection. Along with primal impression, they are intrinsic aspect of 
consciousness. Recollection and expectation are cognitive voluntary acts, which presuppose 
retention and protention. 
If we compare retention with recollection, retention is an intuition, but intuition of 
something absent, of something which has just been, whereas recollection is is a 
representation of a completed past event… 
Retention and protention are invariant structural features that make possible the temporal 
flow of consciousness as we know and experience it. In other words, they are a priori 
conditions of possibility of there being ‘syntheses of identity’: if I move around a tree, for 
instance, in order to gain a fuller presentation of it, then the different profiles of the tree—
its front, sides, and back—do not appear as disjointed fragments, but are perceived as 
synthetically integrated moments. Temporal synthesis is a precondition for the perceptual 
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synthesis with its entailed semantic integration. Thus, time-consciousness must be regarded 
as a formal condition of possibility for the perception of any object.311      
 
The best way to think about the protention-primary impression-retention structure is 
postulate a self-organizing dynamical system.312 
 
9.3.2 Introspective or self-consciousness:      
 knowledge of the empirical world must meet roughly some conditions. First, 
empirical consciousness must intend its object. Secondly, transcendental consciousness 
must apperceive the sense data and subsume the processed sense data under the categories 
of understanding and reasoning. In other words, apperceptive consciousness unites all 
elements of experience and grants ownership to the experience. In the third position, there 
must be a function that apprehends the experience and apprehends itself doing the 
manifestation simultaneously. This is introspective, or self-consciousness. It is also called 
attention. Consequently, self-consciousness provides the knowledge of the object and the 
knowledge that one knows the object. These two apprehensions occur simultaneously. Self-
consciousness is the mediator between appercetive consciousness and perceptive 
consciousness. It is the immediate perceiver and observer of perception. Moreover, 
retrospective consciousness reveals mental states and their objects, and it observes all the 
changes that perceptive consciousness undergoes. Self-consciousness is the uninvolved 
witness of our experiences in the world. In those moments, when we can relate to our 
experiences in an objective manner, we become a witness to our acts, thoughts, feelings, 
and desires. In these moments, we have an immediate experience of retrospective 
consciousness.  
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9.3.3 Perceptive consciousness:      
 The process of perception is an act that achieves an identity between the subject and 
the object. This process commences with an intentional act of empirical consciousness, in 
which the mind meets the object through various sense organs. In this context, 
intentionality means that the mind comprehends an object as a whole in one continuous 
process. Hence, perception is holistic. Moreover, the underlying intelligibity and the 
implicate order of the object (really the process) is revealed by the intentional act of 
perceptive consciousness. This means that perception is always a meaning-giving act. We 
always perceive something as something. Furthermore, perception manifests the non-dual 
nature of transcendental consciousness underlying both subject and object by unifying the 
knower and the known.  
 At this point, let us examine the claim that consciousness can be intentional and 
self-reflexive or self-manifestive. Intentionality and self-reflexivity, or qualia, comprise 
two irreducible dimensions of consciousness. We propose degrees of intentionality and 
reflexivity. Reflexivity and intentionality are connected to each other in such a way that 
consciousness is self-manifesting insofar as it is intentional, and vice versa.  
 This view implies that my consciousness is only manifested to me and not to any 
other person. It also implies that my past consciousness is not manifested to me now, but it 
can only be inferred. So, consciousness is the foundation of memory. Consequently, a 
consciousness that is not intentional is not manifesting. However, it also implies that not all 
intentional consciousness is explicitly self-manifesting. This allows for the possibility of 
subconscious emotive, conative, and cognitive states. Conversely, there are reflexive states 
where intentionality is barely evident, such as awareness. Awareness is a reflexive state of 
consciousness, which possesses implicit intentionality.    
 All consciousness is reflexive. However, this reflexivity has degrees, which range 
from full lucidity to near indistinguishable awareness. In the cases of indistinguishable 
awareness, one is aware of the presence of something, while not knowing what that thing 
is. A subconscious desire would be an example of this case. Take the example of a patient 
visiting a psychiatrist for a vague sense, which makes the patient quite unhappy. After 
some therapy, the psychiatrist and the patient discover a subconscious belief, which lies at 
the root of the problem. The belief was all along there and causally efficacious. Hence, it 
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exists. However, it was minimally self-manifesting in an explicit way. In fact, neurosis can 
be classified as an impulse of mental states to manifest themselves explicitly in spite of 
suppression. This implies that unconscious or subconscious mental states do not lack 
consciousness, but they admit of a low degree of reflexivity, which can be increased 
through therapy and introspection. On the other end of the spectrum, emotive and conative 
states show low degree intentionality and high degree of reflexivity. These states are 
intentional nevertheless. The intentionality can be brought into a greater light through a 
process of introspection. Hence, self-consciousness illumines the unity of aspects of 
consciousness. In fact, the exercise of retrospective consciousness is the path of all wisdom. 
It is the basis of all meditation, yoga, and the maxim ‘be a witness onto your life’. It 
provides the ability to transcend one’s life and experience in the world; and decide whether 
one’s life has the purpose, which would give, life the meaning one desires. 
States of consciousness constitute a grade or continuum, in which the more a state 
of consciousness is intentional, the more reflexive and self-manifesting it is. In this format, 
cognitive states occupy top of the grade (most reflexive and intentional), subconscious state 
occupy the bottom of the continuum (least reflexive and intentional). The volitional and 
conative states occupy the middle part of the continuum.  
At this point, we should revisit the relationship between the empirical and 
transcendental consciousness in light of the previous discussion. Mohanty expresses the 
relationship clearly:  
“I reject the two-world theory. Consciousness, in its innermost nature, transcendental—the 
same consciousness, which interprets itself, under strictly definable conditions as human, as 
biological and physiological, as bodily, as social, in brief, as empirical and the 
transcendental is usually drawn, which misleadingly suggests as though the transcendental 
subjectivity is not the subject’s experience of herself. The other member of the pair, that is, 
the empirical, also misleadingly suggests that one experiences only oneself as bodily and as 
a member of the natural and social orders. ‘Experience’, as I have said earlier, is 
multilayered. I experience myself as bodily, as an existent Dasein, as a part of nature, as 
subject to external causality, but also a transcendental subjectivity. As transcendental, I am 
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also a cognitive, affective and willing, and acting, speaking and moving around, not a mere 
thinking ego.”313  
 
Up to this point, all our discussion of empirical consciousness has been limited to 
the level of waking consciousness. However, the waking consciousness is only one grade of 
experience. The mind also plunges in or soars to dream consciousness; and it finds rest in 
deep sleep consciousness.  
We can analyze dream state in four different ways. These forms of analogy don’t 
constitute a competitive but a complementary relationship. These present the different 
origins of dream state. According to the presentative theory, dreams are a type of 
perception. Dreams are the product of the mind in reaction to internal physiological 
transformations, from subconscious impressions based on experience rather than from the 
present action of the external sense organs. In this case, dream state resembles waking state 
in that in both instances the mind actively forms the perception and the experience. The two 
states differ, however, in that the contents of the dream state have no objective validity. The 
presentative theory describes dream experience as a direct perception of the mind 
independent of the sense organs. Although, the contents of the dream experience are false, 
dreams are experienced with the liveliness, immediacy, and certainty, which distinguish the 
waking and intentional perception. This means that while the content of dream experience 
is untrue, the dream experience is an empirically real fact. We can draw two important 
conclusions from the presentative theory. The first conclusion is that dream content is as 
coherent and reliable in its own realm as waking experience is to the waking subject. The 
second implication is that dream perceptual experience is as real as the waking perceptual 
experience in terms of phenomenology of both experiences.  
The representative theory states that some dreams are the product of memory. This 
theory states that some dreams are caused by the recollection of some previously perceived 
external objects. 
 The volitional theory states that some dreams act as fulfillment of desires. This 
theory states that desires motivate the production of dreams. The Freudian dream analysis 
provides an adequate foundation for this theory of genesis of dream narrative. According to 
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Freud, dream content is composed of two dimensions. The latent content of a dream is the 
extension of the dream. It is the representation of those unconscious material, to which the 
narrative of the dream refers. The manifest content of the dream presents the intension of 
the dream, or the actual narrative presentation of the dream. Some wishes are obvious and 
non-threatening and can be expressed through the manifest content, as when we go to bed 
hungry and dream of eating our favorite dish. However, some dreams express wishes that 
want to be expressed through their latent content. In this case only proper dream 
interpretation can uncover their true meaning and the underlying desires. Latent contents of 
dreams express in symbolic language the desires of the individual.   
The veridical theory states that dreams can have predictive and prophetic ability as 
well. This is not some magical quality of dreams as it was proposed by the ancients. The 
prophetic value of dreams can be the result of expression of repressed desires, which 
manifest themselves in a non-threatening way.  
 Deep sleep consciousness provides the third level of hierarchy of consciousness. 
Deep sleep is an undifferentiated and non-dual state of consciousness, which lacks mental 
activity. In the Kantian terms, deep sleep consciousness presents the transcendental unity of 
apperception in its concrete reality. Another argument for the consciousness of deep sleep 
is based on the argument, which asserts the ontological inherence of an effect in its cause. 
If deep sleep constitutes a discontinuous state with dream and waking states, then it 
becomes impossible to explain how unconscious body in deep sleep can generate 
consciousness in dreams and waking state. Hence, in order to guarantee the continuity of 
consciousness, deep sleep must be accepted to be an undifferentiated consciousness. Here, 
we argue based on the same principle of inherence of the effect in the cause. Next, we turn 
our attention to some preliminary thoughts about the nature of self. 
 
9.4 More Thoughts on Processes: 
So far we have implied that our understanding of concept of emergence requires 
inherence—meaning that what explicitly emerges must have been always already implicitly 
present. This requires us to determine what kind of stuff makes up the universe. We have 
said that the world is made up of processes? But of what are the processes comprised? We 
have answered this question preliminary by saying that the processes are made of energy, 
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force etc. However, this answer is not completely acceptable, since it does not tells what is 
the relationship of force and energy to mind and consciousness. Our commitment to the 
principle of inherence in relation to causality and emergence requires us to assume that 
what emerges out of energetic processes was already implicitly present there. However, we 
cannot prove that consciousness emerges from energy. Hence, we must posit that what 
makes up the world at its most fundamental level is a kind of Energy-Consciousness, a kind 
of non-dual existence which manifests itself as both energy and consciousness. This does 
not mean that the core of reality is comprised of a duality of both consciousness and 
energy, but what it means is that the core of reality is made of a nondual existence, which 
evolves, unfolds, into energy and consciousness. This is not dualism. Neither is this view 
monism. This is nondualism, which does not deny the existence of one feature of reality in 
terms of another. Neither is we trying to reduce one feature of reality in terms of another. 
We recognize the reality of both energy and consciousness, since they are two aspects of 
the same nondual fundamental being. Hence, it is vitally important to realize that we I do 
not promote a form panpsychism, which ascribes a form of mental consciousness to all 
existing things. According, to this view our form of consciousness is an emergent property 
of the evolutionary process of that nondual existence. On the other hand, we reject the 
notion that consciousness can emerge simply ex nihilo, because the preceding matter 
reached a certain level of complexity. Further intricacy and density cannot account for a 
qualitative jump in the evolutionary process. And the emergence of consciousness is a 
qualitative jump.    
    
9.5 Some concluding thoughts about the self:   
Mainstream philosophy has suffered from a lack of ability to place the self within 
its explanatory framework. This is a direct result of the adoption of substance ontology. 
The direct implication of treating selves as things is that the selves are assigned an essence. 
A person becomes a conglomeration of stable properties through time. This stability 
guarantees the identity through time. The obvious shortcoming of this formulation is the 
inability to account for change through time while preserving a sense of identity. Since 
change is an undeniable fact about the universe, the proponents of substance scramble to 
find a solution to this problem. The major two strategies are either to redefine identity, or to 
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deny identity of the person through time altogether. Neither of these two strategies provides 
a satisfactory solution to the problem. Redefining identity is nothing short of cheating. 
Identity is a clear concept within the framework of subject-predicate logic. One cannot 
commit to this logical system and then commence to redefine its concepts when they 
become inconvenient. The second strategy is equally unsatisfactory, because it goes against 
the phenomenology of self. This phenomenology cannot be easily dismissed as illusion, 
because of its immediate and intimate nature. There is no knowledge more certain and more 
immediate than the one has of one’s existence; and this immediate knowledge gives me a 
sense of continuity of consciousness through time. I know that I have changed, but I also 
know that that change is superimposed on some identity.   
Our immediate intuition of ourselves presents us with a processual view of 
ourselves. We see our selves as agents geared toward teleological actions. We act in a 
purposive manner to meet the challenges of a statement of requirements put forth by the 
world. Our actions are guided by our purposes, and they are informed by our history.  This 
is a salient insight presented by the existentialist view of human existence, to which we will 
turn in the subsequent chapter. At this point, it suffices to say that humans exist 
processually. In fact, the etymology of the concept of existence implies processual being. 
Human beings are processes. The identity of a person is the unity of that process, 
and the identity of a process is a function of lawfulness and temporality. In the case of 
human beings, the lawfulness is translated in terms of unity of experience and 
consciousness. The temporality is understood in terms of the historicity of human 
existence. Human existence at any present moment is a consciously united agency that is 
informed by his/her past and striving toward his/her future. Human existence like any other 
process is at once lawful and creative, and free.  
We are the individuals that we are by the virtue of the macroprocess that unites the 
microprocesses that constitute one’s history. This history is future oriented and the past 
informed. The unity of this macroprocess is a narrative unity of a life made coherent by a 
unity of experience. Dewey makes this point explicit in the following passage: 
“Take the individual Abraham Lincoln at one year, at five years, at ten years, at thirty years 
of age, and imagine everything later wiped out, no matter how minutely his life is recorded 
up to the date set.  It is plain beyond the need of words that we then have not biography but 
only a fragment of it, while the significance of that fragment is undisclosed. For he did not 
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just exist in a time which externally surrounded him, but time was the heart of his existence.  
Temporal seriality is the very essence, then, of the human individual.  It is impossible for a 
biographer in writing; say the story of the first thirty years of the life of Lincoln, not to bear 
in mind his later career. Lincoln as an individual is a history; any particular event cut off 
from that history ceases to be part of his life as an individual. As a Lincoln is a particular 
development in time, so is every other human individual. Individuality is the uniqueness of 
the history, of the career, not some thing given once foe all at the beginning, which then 
proceeds to unroll as a ball of yarn, may be unwound. Lincoln made history. But it is just as 
true that he made himself as an individual in the history he made.” 314 
According to this view, the unity of self is the unity of a megaprocess, which 
includes many microprocesses. These microprocesses are the events of one’s life.  
Accordingly, the best way to define a person is as an agent in the world, and not a spectator 
of the world. This is a perspective that is existentialist in nature. It shows an affinity with 
Heidegger’s view of a person as a temporal being, and Sartre’s view of humans as self-
defining free agents.315     
Human history is processual as well. The life of a society, and a culture, is also 
historical. In that a society is Future oriented, but the ideals that prompt a society to look 
forward are informed, but not determined, by its Past. The life of a society is also a historic 
process; and progress is achieved through a dialectical mechanism. Societies evolve. This 
evolution is dialectical in nature and it is progressive. It is this crucial insight that is 
realized by Hegel, and missed by materialists and relativists. The existentialist view of 
individuals is in accordance with process metaphysics, but the existentialists underestimate 
the social process. This failure is one of oversight and obsession with individualism, and 
not fundamental metaphysical error. The compatibility of these views becomes apparent, 
once we place concrete universals at the core of our view of the world. The 
phenomenologist and the existentialist view of the empirical self is faithful to the process 
ontology. Hence, it must be incorporated in any view with the ambition to describe the 
empirical aspect of our existence.’ 
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One last question that I feel compelled to address is why not assume the Russellian 
‘neutral monism’ view and dispense with all this. I will get into this point shortly and point 
my agreement and disagreement with Russell’s view. 
According to Russell, realism is fundamentally is rooted in dualism. Subsequently, 
there exist minds and a sovereign world of objects, which the minds perceive and conceive. 
We could simplify this by saying that there are minds and there are sense data. However, 
the question remains of what happens to the ‘I’, which meets the sense data. In other words, 
the question of subjectivity and consciousness remains open. Russell states: 
“Sensations are obviously the source of our knowledge of the world, including our own 
body. it might seem natural to regard a sensation as itself a cognition, and until lately I did 
so regard it…This view, however, demands the admission of a conscious subject, or act of 
awareness…I f there is a subject, it can have a relation to the patch of colour, namely, the 
sort of relation which we might call awareness. In that case, the sensation, as a mental 
event, will consist of awareness of the colour, while the colour itself will remain wholly 
physical, and may be called sense-datum, to distinguish it from the sensation. The subject, 
however, appears to be a logical fiction like mathematical points and instants. It is 
introduced, not because observation reveals it, but because it is linguistically convenient 
and apparently demanded by grammar. Nominal entities of this sort may or may not exist. 
But there is no good ground for assuming that they do. The functions that they appear to 
perform can always be performed by classes or series or other logical constructions, 
consisting of less dubious entities. If we are to avoid a perfectly gratuitous assumption, we 
must dispense with the subject as one of the actual ingredients of the world.” 316 
 
Thus, according to Russell, we can close the dualistic rift plaguing realism by eliminating 
subjectivity. Consequently, the dualistic separation of the mental and the non-mental is 
resolved. This is, however, not eliminative materialism, which we met previously. Russell 
proposes that the universe is fundamentally made of a “neutral stuff”. This neutral stuff 
gives rise to both physical objects and minds. In other words, Russell proposes a double 
aspect theory with matter and mind as the emergent product of a neutral stuff. However, the 
mind in this case is devoid of consciousness and subjectivity, since these are useful fictions 
of grammar and the products thereof. I find Russell’s view both extremely useful and 
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extremely troubling. I agree with him in his postulation of a double aspect theory. I believe 
that is the ultimately the solution to the mind/matter problem. However, I find Russell’s 
view very troubling, because he proposes a consciousness-less mind. If consciousness is a 
linguistic illusion and there are only minds, then question is what is the problem. What 
makes this problem so intractable is subjectivity. Moreover, what is mind without 
consciousness? Here, Russell assumes implicitly a form of functionalism, which will be 
subject to the same objections as other forms of functionalism. Furthermore, if one assumes 
functionalism to be the correct theory of mind, then why do we need a double aspect 
theory. This seems to be at best frivolous and at worst contradictory. What makes the 
double aspect approach indispensable is preciously the assumption the there is a subjective 
consciousness along with physical stuff and both are equally real. The last problem with 
Russell’s view is that he simply relegates consciousness to an illusion of grammar. 
However, he never goes into the Kantian form of inquiry of what are the pre-conditions that 
make the self- reflexivity in grammar possible. In other words, what are the transcendental 
states that make self-reflexivity possible. The answer, in short, seems to be that self-
reflexivity is made possible by consciousness, transcendental unity of apperception, and 
self-consciousness that Russell eliminates. The last point is that by proposing a double 
aspect theory is taking over James’ ideas, which he freely admits: 
“You all know the American theory of neutral monism, which derives really from William 
James and is also suggested in the works of Mach, but in a rather less developed form. The 
theory of neutral monism maintains that the distinction between the mental and the physical 
is entirely an affair of arrangement, that the actual material arrangement is exactly the same 
in the case of the mental as it is in the case of physical, but they differ merely in the fact 
that when you take a thing as belonging in the same context with other things, it will be 
belong to psychology, while when you take it in a certain other context with other things, it 
will belong to physics, and the difference is as to what you consider to be its context…It is 
just like rows or columns: in an arrangement of rows and columns, you can an item as 
either a member of a certain row or a member of a certain column; the item is the same in 
the two cases, but its context is different. 
As an example, consider…the appearance that a chair presents. If we take any one of these 
chairs, we can all look at it, and it presents a different appearance to each of us. Taken all 
together, taking all the different appearance that that chair is presenting to all of us at this 
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moment, you get something that belongs to physics. So that if one takes sense data and 
arranges it together all those sense data that appear to different people at a given moment 
and are such as we should ordinarily say are appearance of the same physical object, then 
that class of sense data will give you something that belongs to physics, namely the chair of 
this moment. On the other hand, if instead of taking all the appearances that that chair 
presents to all of us at this moment, I take all the appearances that the different chairs in this 
room present to me at this moment, I get quite another group of particulars. All the different 
appearances that different chairs present to me now will give you something belonging to 
psychology, because that will give you my experience att he present moment. Broadly 
speaking…that should be the definitions of the differences between physics and 
psychology…    
There is no simple entity that you can point to and say: this entity is physical and not 
mental. According to William James and neutral monism that will not be the case with any 
simple entity that you may take. Any such entity will be a member of physical series and a 
member of mental series… 
I ought to proceed to tell you that I have discovered whether neutral monism is true or not, 
because otherwise you may not believe that logic is any use in the matter. But I do not 
profess to know whether it is true or not. I feel more and more inclined to think that it may 
be true.” 317  
So the question seems to be whether consciousness exists under James’ view. 
 James urges us to go back to pure experience and with ‘pure’ he means devoid of 
traditional metaphysical presuppositions. If we do that, then we se that we find that no such 
distinct thing as consciousness exists. As a result, the gap between the mental and material 
will disappear. In this, it seems Russell and James agree.  
“To deny plumply that “consciousness” exists seems absurd on the face of it—for 
undeniably “thoughts” do exist—that I fear some readers will follow me no farther. Let me 
then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to 
insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function. There is, I mean, no aboriginal 
stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material object are made, out of 
which our thoughts of them are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts 
perform, and for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked. That function is 
knowing. “Consciousness” is supposed necessary to explain the fact that things not only are, 
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but get reported as known. Whoever blots out of notion of consciousness from his list of 
first principles must still provide in some way for that function’s being carried on.   
My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or 
material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 
“pure experience”, then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation 
toward one another into which portions of pure experience my enter. The relation itself is a 
part of pure experience… 
As “subjective” we say that the experience represents; as “objective” it is represented. What 
represents and what is represented is here numerically the same; but we must remember that 
no dualism of being represented and representing reside in the experience per se. in its pure 
state, or when isolated, there is no self-splitting of it into consciousness and what the 
consciousness is “of”. Its subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes solely, 
realized only when the experience is “taken”, i.e., talked-of, twice, considering along with 
its two differing contexts respectively, by a new retrospective experience, of which that 
whole past complication now forms the fresh content.”318       
 
It seems like James has retained Kant’s fundamental idea that experience is a creation of a 
stable world from the material sense data. However, he as rejected Kant’s notion of 
synthetic a priori and the transcendental unity of apperception. The rejection of 
transcendental unity of apperception is the reason that he rejects consciousness as 
functionless and fictive. However, transcendental unity of apperception is precisely the 
function of consciousness in its pure form. It can never be a content of experience, but it is 
what makes all experience possible. Therefore, a proof for its existence cannot be empirical 
but only transcendental. For James, experience does not require universal and necessary 
structure.           
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Chapter Ten 
Concluding Remarks 
  
My purpose to embark on this project was to examine the question of nature of 
consciousness analytically and historically. I was interested to find out why most of 
theories of consciousness fail. Is this failure the product of philosophers being simply 
disagreeable with each other? Or is this failure the result of something more substantial and 
fundamental. Consequently, I came to examine the commonality of all these theories. My 
conclusion was that all these theories fail, because they all share a common presupposition. 
They assume the same ontology and they diverge on the emphasis they put on different 
aspects of this ontology. The ontology they all assume is the substance ontology, meaning 
that they assume is made of substances. They use different terminology for the same notion 
of substance. However, they all assume that the world is constituted of concrete particulars 
logically independent of each other, which stand in causal relationship to each other. My 
contention with this view was that it should not be given primacy in our ontological 
paradigm. Moreover, there is no place for an efficacious consciousness in this worldview. 
Either one has to eliminate consciousness, or to reduce it to some other phenomenon and 
label our experience as misguided, or to strip it off any causal efficacy, or assume its 
efficacy but an overdetermination. Hence, I began by examining each theory in turn and in 
depth. My purpose was to leave no stone unturned, and exhaust the logical realm of all 
substance based theories of mind and consciousness. My strategy was to show the falsity of 
the primacy of the substance ontology by showing the failure of the theories of mind and 
consciousness based on this ontology. Then I could motivate a shift in our ontology and 
require us to accept a new approach. This new approach was nothing that I had to invent 
myself. The correct approach was to be found in the history of philosophy itself, in what to 
be considered the fringe and exotic theories that have gone against the mainstream 
philosophical tradition.  
The oldest and most decisive ontological dispute in philosophy was not between 
Plato and Aristotle, but it was between Parmenides and Heraclitus. Parmenides proposed 
substance ontology and Heraclitus maintained process ontology. The subsequent disputes in 
metaphysics are a consequence of this dispute. Parmenidian substance ontology was 
 318 
destined to become the mainstream philosophy and Heraclitus was destined to become the 
cry in the wilderness that processes make up the essence of the world and not substances. 
Plato tried to consolidate these two traditions, but assigned different values to each. He 
assigned process ontology to the world of appearance and substance ontology was given the 
realm of true being. Hence, he introduced an axiological gap and dualism, while he was 
trying to give a unified ontological account. In doing this he undermined his own effort. 
This was recognized by Aristotle, who was really a process ontologist in spite of his 
terminology of substance and causality. For Aristotle, causality was manifold and dynamic 
and it should encompass what we consider a cause plus the function of a phenomenon, and 
its purpose. Substances for him were self-organizing systems guided by an inner program 
called enetelechy. The Aristotelian ontology as we know it was product of a radical 
substantialist reading and commitment by Thomas Aquinas in the middle ages, who needed 
the rigor of Aristotle’s method to put forth a notion of souls in the Christian theology.  
In the modern times, process metaphysics was proposed by some philosophers and 
was assumed in some other philosophies. What hey all have in common is that the 
mainstream philosophy at worst rejected them without really examining them or at best 
they were labeled as eccentric. In this tradition fall Hegel, Schopenhauer, Bergson, 
Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Whitehead, Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, 
the phenomenological and the existentialist traditions, among others. It is in the works of 
them that the right approach was to be found. 
The function of consciousness was already described by Kant. He proposed that 
consciousness plays a synthetic function in that it makes all subjective experience possible. 
It is not to be found in the content of experience, but it makes experience possible. Hence, 
it is transcendental. He was also the first one, who differentiates between mind and 
consciousness. He gives a functionalist account of mind, but he assigns a transcendental 
role consciousness. Whitehead gave us a clear way of thinking about process as opposed to 
substances. Heidegger, Sartre, and other phenomenologist gave us a different way to think 
about embodied minds and consciousness. They showed us how to understand mentality 
and the person contextually and told us that these are fundamental aspects of them. 
Moreover, we learned dealing with temporality, intentionality and qualia is not optional, 
but they are essential in our understanding of consciousness.  
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Modern theories of cognitive science further illuminate the path for us. The 
dynamic systems theory gives us a new perspective on how to think about perception, 
mind, and embodiment. 
Synthesizing all these elements was the purpose and the inspiration of my work in 
order to show the way for a new approach to understand the world, man, mind, and 
consciousness. Accordingly my view can be summarized as such: 
1. The world is primarily made of processes. 
2. These are inherently temporal, lawful, and creative. 
3. Human existence, mind, and consciousness are also best 
understood as a process. 
4. Consciousness is a process as well 
5. Consciousness is essentially temporal, intentional, and self-
luminous (i.e. qualitative). 
6. Consciousness should be functionally distinguished between 
apperceptive and perceptive aspects. 
7. Apperceptive function of consciousness is to act as the 
underlying principle, which makes all experience possible, since 
it unifies sense data temporally and meaningfully. 
8. Perceptive consciousness guides our interaction with the world 
through intentionality in that we confront the world as a 
referential totality of meaningful objects and projects. This is our 
primary mode of interaction with the world.  
9. We are primarily agents in the world, who interact with the world 
as referential totality. We understand the world secondarily 
through causality as spectators. 
     
  
I will conclude this work with a quote from Nietzsche, which captures the 
inspiration behind this work. 
“And do you know what “the world” is to me? Shall I show to you in my mirror? This 
world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force 
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that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself; 
as a whole, of unalterable size, a household without expenses or losses, but likewise 
without increase or income; enclosed by “nothingness” as by a boundary; not something 
blurry or wasted, not something endlessly extended, but set in a definite space as a definite 
force, and not a space that might be “empty” here or there, but rather a force throughout, as 
a play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at 
the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally 
changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a 
flood of its forms; out of the simplest forms striving toward the most complex, out of the 
stillest, most rigid, coldest forms toward the hottest, most turbulent, most self-contradictory, 
and then again returning home to the simple out of this abundance, out of the play of 
contradictions back to the joy of concord, still affirming itself in this uniformity of its 
courses and its years, blessing itself as that which must return eternally, as a becoming that 
knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-
creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of the twofold voluptuous delight, 
my “beyond good and evil,” without goal, unless the joy of circle is itself a goal; without 
will, unless a ring feels good will toward itself…” 319  
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